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Dari ateh gunueng Marapi 
From where did the candle drip? 
Behind the lantern on a cord. 
From where did our ancestors originate? 
From the top of Mount Merapi. 
VERHANDELINGEN 
VAN HET KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT 
VOOR TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 
86 
FRANZ VON BENDA-BECKMANN 
PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTINUITY 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MAINTENANCE 
OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH TIME 
IN MINANGKABAU, WEST SUMATRA 
THE HAGUE - MARTINUS NIJHOFF 1979 
o 100 200 
I I , 
kms 
, 
" ~, r~""\ ... , ~\ 
\ ...... I 
I' ...... - ... , 
N, SUMATRA '--, " 
, 
: 










































".' ~ ... -, 
Map of the research area 
, , 
" , 
o 250 500 750 1000 m 




























B BALAI- COUNCIL HALL 6. MAIN MOSOUE 



















A NOTE ON ORTBOGRAPHY 
ABBREV IATI ONS XVII 
INrRODUCTION 
GlAPTER ONE: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 13 
A. The Analytical Frame of Reference: Social Functions 13 
B. Social Organization: The Restrietion of Society's Members' 
Autonorny 1 8 
C. Law 25 
I. The Terminological Problem 25 
11. The Concept of Law Used in This Study 28 
1. The Specification of the Concept 28 
2. The Manifestations of Law 31 
D. The Social Function of Property and Inheritance 39 
I. Property: Domain, Object, and Relationship 39 
11. Inheritance: Non-Reciprocal Diachronie Transfers 45 
GlAPTER TWO: SOCIG-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN MlNANGKABAU 57 
A. Introduction 57 
B. Group Formation and Inter-Group Relationships 61 
I. The Constituent Groups 61 
1. The Buah Gadang and lts Internal Structure 62 
2. Subdivision and Cleavage of Buah Gadang 64 
11. Other Groups 70 
1. The Jurai 70 
2. The Rumah 70 
3. The Kampuang 71 
4. The Pariuak 71 
111. Group Formation on More Inclusive Levels and the System 
of Inter-Group Relationships 72 
IV. The Territorial Divisions of the Nagari 
1. The Adat Divisions of CKL 
2. The Buek Division 
3. The Sidang System 
4. The Jorong Division 
C. The Allocation of Authority 
I. The Basic Principles of Authority in Mïnangkabau 
11. Authority Vested in Social Positions 
1. Group Leadership 
2. Authority Vested in Females 
3. Authority Vested in the Father 
111. Authority Vested in Offices 
1. The Offices of the Buah Gadang 
2. The Offices of the Hindu System 
















IV. Authority Vested in Groups 92 
V. Conclusions 93 
D. Relationships Between Individuals and Individuals and Groups 94 
I. Introductory Note 94 
lI. The Kin 95 
1. Individualizing Reference 96 
2. References Involving Group Terms 97 
111. Marriage 
1. The Organization of Marriage 
2. Rules Affecting the Choice of Marriage Partners 
3. Divorce 
4. Relationships Established Through Marriage 
E. Residence 
J. Introductory Note 
IJ. Domestic Residence 
lIl. Political Residence 
1. Residence in Adat 
2. Residence in Buek 
3. Residence in Pusako 
















CHAPTER 1HREE: 1HE PLURALISTIC SITIJATION 
A. The Systems 
1. Adat/Adat Law 
1. Adat 
2. Adat and Adat Law 
II. Islamic Law 
II 1. Wri tten Law 
B. The "Existence" of the Legal Systems in Minangkabau 
I. The Colonial and National Legal System 











2. Post-Independence Development 125 
11. The Actual Use Made of the Systems 127 
1. The Legal Systems Used by the Courts 127 
2. The Use Made of the Systems in the Nagari Institutions 
of Decision Making 128 
3. The Use Made of the Systems Outside the Formal 
Institutions of Decision Making 129 
111. The Actualization of the Systems in the Knowledge of the 
~linangkabau 129 
1. The Knowledge of Written Law 130 
2. The Knowledge of Islamic Law 131 
3. The Knowledge of Adat 132 
rnAPTER FOUR: '!HE LEVEL OF MEANING: SYSTEMS OF PROPERIT 
RELATIONSHIPS IN MlNANGKABAU 137 
A. Introductory Note 137 
B. Adat 138 
I. Categories of Property Relationships and Property Objects 
in Minangkabau Adat 139 
1. The Level of Socio-Political Authority Over Property 140 
2. The Category of Pusako 147 
3. The Category of Harato 149 
11. The Adat Pusako: Acquisition, Use, and Diachronie Transfers 
of Property Relationships Based upon Group Membership 150 
1. The Pusakoization of Harato Pancaharian 150 
2. The Relationships to the Harato Pusako 152 
3. The Relationships to the Pusako Kebesaran 164 
111. Transfers of Property Relationships in Minangkabau Adat 167 
1. Introductory Note 167 
2. Jua Bali - Selling and Buying 168 
3. Pagang Gadai - The Adat of Pawning 169 
4. The Privileged Loans of Harato Pusako 176 
s. The Gift of Harato Pancaharian 180 
6. Umanaik, Wasiyat, Hibah-Wasiyat - Testamentary Gifts 181 
7. Utang - Debts 181 
IV. Analysis of the Adat Pusako 185 
1. Corporate Group Structure and Property Relationships 
in the Adat Pusako 186 
2. The Limitation of the Society's ~~mbers' Autonomy 191 
3. The Temporal Dimension in Minangkabau Property 
Relationships 194 
C. Islamic Law 197 
I. MaZ, MiZk - Property and Ownership 197 
11. Property Within the Conjugal Family 197 
111. Property Transactions and the Prohibition of Riba 198 
IV. Hiba- Donation 198 
V. Wa~iyya - Testament 199 
VI. Wa~f - Property of the Dead Hand 199 
VII. Faraidh - Intestate Inheritance 200 
VIII. Debts 202 
D. Written Law 203 
I. The Basic Principles of Dutch Property and Inheritance Law 203 
1. Eigendom - Ownership 203 
2. Mede-Eigendom - Communal Ownership 204 
3. Marital Property Relationships 205 
4. Inheritance 206 
S. Donation and Contractual Inheritance 207 
6. The Restriction of the Individual's Autonomy 208 
11. Written Law in Minangkabau Property Relationships 209 
1. The Decree of 1853 Concerning the Pusako-Eigendomsakte 209 
2. The Agrarian Act of 1870 210 
3. The Ordinance Prohibiting the Alienation of Land 211 
4. The Declaration of State Domain 211 
5. Mortgages 
6. The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 
7. The Marriage Law of 1974 





A. Introduction 215 
B. Stories of Property and Inheritance Affairs 
I. The Situation in a Kaum 
1. The History of the Kaum of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang 
2. The Socio-Political Status of the Groups 
3. The Property Relationships 
4. SlID1JIla ry 
11. Inter-Kaum Relationships and Property 
1. The Kaum-Split 
2. The Punah-Situation 
3. The Inter-Kaum Pawning Case 
111. The Extinct Buah Gadang 
IV. Inter-Strata Relationships 
1. The Descendants of Slaves and Their Mamak 
2. The Descendants of Strangers 
V. The Children - Kamanakan Conflict 
1. The Disputed Legal Status of Harato Pancaharian 
2. The "Impure" Harato Pancahanan 
VI. The Relationships Between the Children 



















ships in Historical Perspective 274 
I. Introductory Note 274 
11. The Means of the Holders 275 
1. The Means 
2. The Exercise of Autonomy 
275 
278 
3. From Status to Contract in Historical Perspective 285 
4. The Adaptation of Interpersonal Relationships to 
Property Strategies 292 
111. The Means of the Would-Be Heirs 300 
1. The Means 300 
2. The Legitimation of the Would-Be Heirs' Claims 301 
3. The Agents of Validation 305 
CHAPTER SIX: THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE II: THE PRODUCT ION OF 
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS IN HISTORlCAL PERSPECTlVE 311 
A. Introductory Note 311 
I. The Product ion of Legal Conceptions 311 
11. Concrete and General Legal Conceptions and the Problem 
of Change 314 
B. The Clash of the Systems of Property Relationships 318 
I. Adat and Western Law 318 
11. Adat and Islamic Law 321 
C. The Development of the Adat System: Legal Consequences 326 
I. The Recognition of Autonomy in Property Affairs in 
Historical Perspective 328 
1. The Individual's Autonomy Over Harato Pancaharian 328 
2. The Autonomy Over Harato Pusako 332 
11. Inheritance 335 
1. The Inheritance of Harato Pancaharian in Historical 
Perspective 335 
2. The Pusakoization of Harato Pancaharian 343 
3. The Inheritance of Relationships to Harato Pusako 350 
D. The Minangkabau Conceptual System of Property Relationships 
in Historical Perspective 351 
I. Introductory Note 351 
11. The Elimination of Diachrony from the Conceptual System 
and the Reification of Property Relationships 352 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 361 
A. The Factors of Change: Concluding Remarks on the Development 
in the Domain of Property Relationships in Minangkabau 361 
B. The Minangkabau Social System and the Maintenance of Property 
Relationships Through Time 373 





Map of the Research Area IV 
~~~ V 
Map of CKL - First SettIements and Territorial Divisions 76 
Map of CKL - The Development of the Nagari Terri tory 144 
Map: Distribution of Harato Pusako per Suku in Candung Kota 
Lawas 145 
Map: The Legal Status of Land 284 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The research of which this study is the first major product was carried 
out by my wife Keebet and myself between 1973 and 1975, when I was still 
a staff member of the Ethnological Seminar of the University of Zürich, 
Switzerland. It was made possible by a generous grant given by the 
Kommission zur Förderung des akademisahen Naahwuahses der Universität 
Züriah and by an additional grant of the Sahweizer NationaZfonds. 
My wife and I spent several months in the Netherlands for literature 
studies, and for three months followed a language course given by drs. 
Mellema of the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam and by Mrs. 
Padmi Strik. Our field research in Indonesia, which lasted from June 
1974 to September 1975, was carried out under the auspices of LIPI, the 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and under the sponsorship of the 
University of West Sumatra in padang. We are indebted to the Rector, 
Dr. Busjra Zahir, and to the Dean of the Legal Faculty, Burma Burhan S.H., 
who supported our research proposals. We had some helpful discussions 
with the staff members of the Legal Faculty. In particular, we wish to 
thank sdr. Narullah Dt. Perpatih nan Tuo S.H., who acted as our counter-
part and conductedhisawn research on inheritance law, the results of 
which unfortunately are still unpublished. The Indonesian government 
institutions on all administrative levels kindly assisted us and took a 
friendly interest in our research. We would like to thank the Camat of 
IV Angkat Candung and the WaZi Ne ge ri of Candung Kota Lawas in particular. 
We owe special gratitude to the chairmen and staff of the PengadiZan Tinggi 
in Padang and of the PengadiZan Ne ge ri in Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar, and 
Payakumbuh who supported our research in a very helpful way. Rasjid 
Manggis Dt. Rajo Panghulu and Sinjar Dt. Mangkuto Sati in Bukit Tinggi 
spent many hours in helping us to understand Mïnangkabau adat. The 
villagers of Candung Kota Lawas accepted us and our curious questions for 
a period of ten months with much understanding and tolerance. In particu-
lar, we would like to thank Itam, who so weIl understood our wish to leam 
XIV PROPER1Y IN SOCIAL CONflNUI1Y 
about Minangkabau village life, and Haji Dt. Bagindo Basa, Dt. Malano 
Basa, Palimo Putih, and Sidi Katik, without whose help our research would 
have been a failure. 
We should also like to mention the fellow anthropologists whom we met 
in the field and with whom we spent many hours discussing Minangkabau 
and the pleasures of field work: Fred Errington, Nigel Phillips, Joanne 
Prindiville, Nancy Tanner, and in particular our friends and "neighbours" 
in nagari Gurun, Kris and Lynn Thomas. Prof. P.E. de Josselin de Jong 
helped us with friendly advice and temporarily very kindly provided us 
with some luxurious field equipment. Dr. Junghans and Dr. Häselbarth, 
the leaders of two German agricultural development projects working in 
West Sumatra, allowed us to make use of some of their material and 
assisted us with maps. 
I gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions and comments made 
by Prof. J. Griffiths, Prof. J.F. Holleman, Prof. L.G. Löffler and Lynn 
Thomas who read earlier drafts of this study. Prof. J.F. Hol leman , Mrs. 
G. Moyer and Lynn Thomas also helped me transform my English into a 
readable language for which I am very grateful. The responsibility for 
any faults and awkward phrases rests, of course, with me. I further 
would like to thank Hans Borkent for drawing the diagrams and most maps, 
and Ank Everts and Marianne Roest for typing the manuscript. 
My wife and I spe nt endless hours discussing law, Minangkabau adat, 
and my study during the last years. I have profited immensely from our 
conversations. Fortunately, there are other ways to express my grati-
tude to her than in these acknowledgements. 
Leiden, December 1978 Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
A l\DTE ON ORTIIOGRAPHY 
In this study I have regularly used Minangkabau and Indonesian words, 
particularly the basic concepts through which the systems of socio-
political organization, property, and inheritance are expressed. I trust 
and hope that the reader will quickly accustom her- or himself to these 
terms and realize that, e.g., words like jurai, kaum, buah gadang, and 
suku convey a much clearer impression of social groups in Minangkabau 
than would the English terms lineage, minimal, minor, major, or maximal 
lineage. 
In the literature, but also in interviews with Minangkabau villagers, 
the Indonesian and Minangkabau terms are of ten used interchangeably, 
e.g. harta pusaka (Ind.) or harato pusako (Min.) ~or inherited property. 
Cornbinations of words from the two languages are also quite frequent, 
like in harta pusakQ. In order to achieve some s tandardi zat ion , I have in 
principle employed the Minangkabau terms; only in direct quotations have 
I given the (usually Indonesian) forms. A glossary of Minangkabau and 
Indonesian terms is appended to the study (pp. 429-436); in the cases 
where Indonesian and Minangkabau words have been used for the same 
term, the Indonesian has been inserted in brackets. 
With re gard to the Indonesian and Minangkabau language in general I 
have followed the new orthographic convent ion which was introduced in 
1972. It is contained in a government publication entitled Edjaan Bahasa 
Indonesia Jang Diserrrpurnakan. The main changes are set out below. 
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Except for same direct quotations, I have transcribed all sources 
using the old orthographic system into the new one. The glottal stop 
in words like mamak has been transliterated with the letter k as has 
became customary in contemporary Minangkabau and Indonesian; older 
futch writers, by contrast, employed the letter q or an apostrophe. 
The number 2 following an Indonesian or Minangkabau word, like in harta2, 
is the conventional abbreviation for the duplication of the word. Du-
plication generally indicates the plural number or undefined quantities. 
In the transcription of Arabic terms I have followed Fyzee (1955). 
However, most Islamic legal terms appear in their Indonesianized form. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, unless 1 have indicated 






























Artike l (section) 
Brother 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch(German Civil Code) 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code) 
Children 
Candung Kota Lawas 
Corops Penasehatan Nikah Thalak Rujuk 
(Advisory Committee of the Registrar of 
Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage) 
Daughter 
Dutch 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Negeri (Elective 
Village Parliament) 
Datuk, Datuek (ti tIe of higher adat 
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Kerapatan Negeri (Nagari Council) 
Kantor Urusan Agama (Office for Religious 
Affairs) 
Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau 
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Landraad (Dutch colonial court) 
Mother 
Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court) 
Minangkabau 
Musyawarah Besar (Full meeting of the LKAANQ 
Paragraph (section) 
PengadiZan Ne ge ri (State Court) 
Peraturan pemerintah (Governrnent Regulation) 
PengadiZan Tinggi (State Appeal Court) 
Pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah ThaZak Rujuk 
(Village Reg is trar of Marriage, Divorce, 
and Remarriage) 
RechtsregZement voor de Buitengewesten 
RegeringsregZement 
Raad van Justitie (Dutch colonial Appeal Court) 
Son 
StaatsbZad (Governrnent Publication) 
Surat Keputusan (Provincial Regulation) 
WaZi Negeri (Village Mayor) 
younger 
Sister 
I NrRODUCTI ON 
Learn the laws of inheritance and teach them to the people; 
for they are one half of useful kno~ledge. 
~,lohanrrned (Fyzee 1955: 329) 
When the prophet created this aphorism he had in mind the TUles of in-
heritance law revealed to him by Allah. We could apply it to social an-
thropology as well since the inheri tance of property and the succession 
to positions of socio-political authority are among the most important 
elements of social organization. They are the vehicles of continuity 
which maintain property and authority through time. In many societies, 
and particularly in those generally studied by anthropologists, inherit-
ance and succession are closely interconnected with kinship and descent 
and provide the economic and political substance for the existence and 
continuity of kinship- or descent-based social groups. They are, as it 
were, the flesh on the bare bones of kinship relations. The importance 
of inheritance has, of course, not escaped the notice of social and 
legal anthropologists, and in recent years several studies have ably 
demonstrated the point (Radcliffe-Brown 1952, Goodenough 1951, Leach 
1961 b, Goody 1962, Lloyd 1962, Gray and Gulliver (eds.) 1964, Derrett 
(ed.) 1965, Gluckman 1972, Moore 1969, Burling 1974). Yet in general, 
property and inheritance have rather been treated as an appendix to 
economic and kinship studies. In particular, "methods of inheritance 
have received little systematic treatment" (Goody 1962: 11), and "there 
are only a few accounts available which give us more than oversimplified 
statements" (Pospisil 1971: 347, cf. Moore 1970: 279 f.). This study 
attempts both: To make a contribution to the systematic study of inherit-
ance and inheritance law, and to give a detailed statement for one so-
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ciety, the Minangkabau. 
The Minangkabau inhabit the west coast of Sumatra. The greatest part 
of the traditional Minangkabau world, the alam Minangkabau, is today 
comprised of the province of West Sumatra of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Within the provincial borders, in the Padang Highlands, lies the nucleus 
of the Minangkabau world, the darek, which was divided into the three 
districts (luhak) Tanah Datar, Agam, and 50 Koto by the legendary rulers 
and law-givers Dt. (Datuk) Perpatih nan Sabatang and Dt. Katumanggungan. 
Surrounding the darek was the rantau, those areas which, according to 
the legendary history transmitted in the tambo-Iegends, were settled and 
colonized by the inhabitants of the darek. The rantau comprised the 
Padang lowlands, the coastal plains of 1Vest Sumatra in general, and 
large parts of the present provinces Riauw and Jambi. Together, darek 
and rantau extended nearly all over central Sumatra (cf. Naim 1974: 33 
ff., 91 ff.). In the 15th or 16th century, a part of the Malayan penin-
suIa, Negri Sembilan, was settled by Minangkabau immigrants and since 
th en there have been constant relationships between Negri Sembilan and 
Minangkabau. Sometime in the 14th century a kingdom was established in 
the Padang Highlands. Little is known about the history of the Minangka-
bau kingdom but there is evidence that it had important external and 
trade relations with the surrounding areas and islands. But when the 
Dutch landed on the west coast in 1600, the coastal plain was under the 
control of Achenese merchant governor~ The reports which reached the 
outside in the second half of the 17th century all indicated that no 
actual power was exercised by the king. The Minangkabau world consisted 
of nagari, village states, which seem to have been quite autonomous. 
Of the nagari in the darek it was said that they were governed by the 
panghulu, the leaders of the nagari matrilineages. The nagari in the 
rantau were said to be governed by a rajo, a king, possibly a represent-
ative of the King of Minangkabau. The Dutch had ousted the Achenese as 
rulers in the main trading centers at the west coast in the second half 
of the 17th century. But it was only in the beginning of the 19th centu-
ry that Dutch colonial rule was established in the Padang Highlands and 
the three districts. Since the Republic of Indonesia has established a 
regular system of administration, the province of West Sumatra is now 
subdivided into 8 districts, Kabupaten, which are headed by a Bupati. 
Three of these districts more or less correspond to the old "three dis-
tricts" Tanah Datar, Agam,and 50 Koto. Each Kabupaten is divided into 
5 to 10 subdistricts, Kecamatan, headed by a Camat. The Kecamatan con-
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sist of 5 to 12 nagari, which total 508 in the province. Besides the 
8 Kabupaten, there are 5 townships or Kotamadya, Padang, Bukit Tinggi, 
Payakumbuh, Padang Panj ang and Sawah Llillto, which have their own admini-
strations and which together comprise 35 nagari. Most of the present 
nagari are also nagari according to adat, the traditional political con-
stitution of Minangkabau. However, during Dutch colonial rule and also 
af ter Independence, some adat-nagari have been split and others lillited 
for administrative purposes. The contemporary population of the province 
numbers 2.792.221, 389.793 of whom live in the towns. Thus approximately 
86% of the population live permánently in the nagari; most of the town-
ships have a rather nagari-like character, too. Minangkabau have a long 
tradition, of "going to the rantau", of a temporary vollilltary migration 
(cf. Naim 1974). Nearlyas many Minangkabau are estimated to live out-
side the province of West Sumatra as within. 
Minangkabau is predominantly an agricultural area. In terms of measures 
of economie productivity, West Sumatra is one of the poorest of Indone-
sia's provinces as there are no highly remlillerative natura I resources 
and but little modern industry. The standard of living, however, is good 
and there is as yet but little poverty. The main subsistenee erop is rice, 
which is cultivated on irrigated fields (sawah) and dry fields (Zadang). 
The quality of the field differs widely, but in some areas two harvests 
per year are possible, and in many are as people can harvest 3 times in 
two years. Coffee, cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves, and chili-peppers are grown 
as cash-crops. Rice is grown as a cash-erop, too. At the coast and in 
the areas surrolillding the lakes, fish are an important means of subsist-
enee and are also sold in the markets. Many nagari have long developed 
specializations in particular economie activities. One is known for its 
gold and silver works, another for its weaving, and yet another for its 
blacksmithing industry (Kahn 1975, 1976; for detailed geographic and 
economie data see Scholz 1977). 
Within Indonesia, Minangkabau is represented in nearly each small 
town by the people who have gone merantau and work as traders, propriet-
ors of restaurants and administrative officials (cf. Naim 1974). A look 
at the street map of Jakarta, the capitalof Indonesia, indicates the 
number of Minangkabau who were prominent in the struggle for independenee 
and who helped to govern Indonesia afterwards. Politicians and intellect-
uals such as Hatta, Natsir, Sutan Syahrir, Abdul Muis and Haji Agus Salim 
are Minangkabau, as also are others whom the street names do not mention 
any more such as Tan Malaka, the leader of the former Communist Party of 
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Indonesia. Besides, the Minangkabau are counted among the most devout Mls-
lims in Indonesia. Any visitor will quickly realize that the puasa, the 
fasting, is kept very strictly in Minangkabau. r1inangkabau has produced 
a large number of prominent Islamic scholars. r4any Islamic schools have 
been established since the beginning of this century which attract pupils 
from all over Indonesia (cf. Taufik Abdullah 1971, 1972). It is estimated, 
that in. Jakarta, about 60% of the khatibs, the preachers who give sermons 
during Friday prayers, are Minangkabau (Naim 1974: 183). 
Of course, the Minangkabau are also known for their "matriarchal" 
adat (socio-cultural and legal system), their adat pusako (adat of ma-
trilineal heritage) or adat kamanakan (adat of the sister's children). 
This latter aspect was of particular interest for the Dutch and other 
foreign administrators and anthropologists. This Islamic society had a 
social system which fulfilled nearly all prerequisites of an ideal ma-
trilineal system: The population was organized in matrilineal descent 
groups. Authority was with the mother's brother. Residence was duolocal 
or uxorilocal. There were no conjugal families. There was the highest 
rate of polygamy in Indonesia. Cross-cousin marriages we re considered 
ideal. There was much to make anthropologists curious. And Minangkabau 
did make anthropologists curious. Among the Dutch scholars of Indonesian 
cultures and adat law, Minangkabau has always taken a prominent place. 
But as most reports on Minangkabau were written in Dutch, most of the 
available literature escaped the notice of the non-Dutch reading anthro-
pological public. Publications in more widely read languages we re rare 
until recently. In German, little has been written (Lublinsky 1927, 
Scholz 1977) since KohIer (1910) acquainted the German public with Wil-
linck's monumental (950 pages) Het Rechtsleven bij de Minangkabausche 
Maleiers (1909) (The Legal Life Among the Minangkabau Malays). French 
publications are equally rare. Collet's book on the peoples of Sumatra 
(1925) only recently has been followed by Cordonnier's report (1974). 
In English, too, there had been only a few publications. Af ter the work 
of Loeb (1934, 1935) and Cooper-Cole (1936, 1945), it was mainly De 
Josselin de Jong's thesis on socio-political organization in Minangkabau 
and Negri Sembilan (1951) and the inclusion of Minangkabau among the so-
cieties discussed in Schneider and Gough's volume Matrilineal Kinship 
(1961) which made Minangkabau known to the general English reading public. 
Only in the 1960' s did there begin what may be called a Minangkabau-
boom. Publications on Minangkabau, written by foreigners and Minangkabau 
social scientists themselves, appeared in an increasing number, and most 
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of them were based upon field research OMaretin 1961, Fischer 1964, Tan-
ner 1969, 1970, 1971, Cordonnier 1974, Kahn 1975, 1976, Dobbin 1975,1977, 
Evers 1975, Thomas 1977, Scholz 1977, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1978; 
Umar Junus 1964, Bachtiar 1967, Taufik Abdullah 1966, 1971, 1972, 
Sa'danoer 1971, Naim 1974). Minangkabau thus certainly is no virgin field 
of study. Yet the words of De Josselin de Jong still hold true, that: 
" ... the social organization of the Minangkabau is known generally but super-
ficially ..• 'Generally', in both meanings of the word: there is a fairly 
adequate. general acquaintance with the Minangkabau among anthropologists 
who are not Indonesia specialists; and the specialists have by now an ade-
quate general picture of the overall structure of this society, but are at 
a 1055 whenever one proceeds from the general to the particular" (1975:20,25). 
The research which my wife and I carried out focussed upon three 
particulars: 
1. The socio-political organization of one nagari. In this study, only 
a general account will be given of the socio-political organization 
of one nagari; we hope to give a more systematic general account 
of Minangkabau socio-political organization in a later publica-
tion. 
2. The processes of dispute-settlement in the nagari institutions and 
in the State Courts, with particular emphasis on the problems resulting 
from the fact that the State Courts are mandated to apply substantive 
adat law but in doing 50 are bound by rul es of procedure and evidence 
which have been modelled af ter Dutch law. These problems will be dealt 
with in a thesis my wife is currently preparing. 
3. The Minangkabau system of property relationships and inheritance, of 
which there has been no systematic study since the writings of Willinck 
(1909) and Guyt (1936). This last topic will be dealt with in this 
study. 
A contribution to the ethnographic knowledge of Minangkabau is, how-
ever, not the sole purpose of my study. It is further meant as a contri-
bution to the anthropological study of property, inheritance, and law. 
Minangkabau is an excellent example with which to illustrate the theore-
tical and practical difficulties of legal anthropology. The legal system 
which pertains to property and inheritance affairs is pluralistic: There 
is adat, the indigenous ~linangkabau system, Islamic law, and written law 
(statutory colonial and national law). Besides, a variety of institutions 
are given an active part in the social processes of dispute-settlement 
and dispute-prevention. There has, moreover, been a considerable change 
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both in the legal systems as weIl as in the practice of handling property 
and inheritance affairs, in particular a process of ever increasing in-
dividual autonorny in property affairs and of concentrating property and 
inheritance within the conjugal family. Such changes are the more striking, 
because they are taking place in a society which still adheres to an 
ideology of matrilineal descent. 
To deal with these problems, a different approach than that usually 
taken by legal anthropologists is necessary. The approach taken in this 
study tries to fulfill Moore' 5 prophecy, that "in the future , law and 
legal ins ti tut i ons are likely to be analyzed simultaneously from long-
term historical perspective, and from the perspective of individual-
centered, short-term, choice-making instrumental action and interaction" 
(1970: 294 f.). In the first chapter I shall outline the assumptions and 
hypotheses underlying this approach. Here I shall only give a brief sum-
mary of the structure of the study indicating the main principles on 
which it is based. 
This study does not just describe systems of property and inheritance. 
The system of property relationships is only one aspect of the total 50-
cial organization (Moore 1970: 253, Nader and Yngvesson 1973: 886). In 
some societies it is 50 weIl integrated into the other aspects of social 
organization that it is nearly impossible to dissect it and treat it in 
isolation. That this is of ten 50 in traditional societies has already 
been stated by Maine, who held that the law of things can hardly be di-
vorced from the law of persons (1905: 230). Yet if one wants to concen-
trate on one aspect, the dissection must be made, particularly in those 
situations where a pluralistic system of cognitive and normative concep-
tions pertains to one field of social relations. However, it is necessary 
to the structure of the study that, before the systems of property and 
inheritance are described, an outline must be given of the social and 
political framework in which they operate and of which they are a part. 
I shall therefore start my study with an overview of the socio-political 
organization in Minangkabau (Chapter 2) and shall then give a brief ac-
count of the development of the pluralistic situation in the admini-
strative and legal field (Chapter 3). 
Property and inheritance in Minangkabau will then be treated under 
three headings. First I shall describe the three systems of property and 
inheritance that exist in Minangkabau (Chapter 4). In the second part 
(Chapter 5) I shall illustrate how the Minangkabau actually handle their 
property and inheritance affairs, and try to assess the degree to which 
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their actions are influenced by the cognitive and normative conceptions 
which the three systems offer. The question of by reference to which system 
the Minangkabau use to legitimate their actions here steps into the back-
ground. The question remains important, but the emphasis here is on the 
actual conceptions used. For even if one system is said to be used, this 
does not yet indicate which concrete conceptions are employed. Conceptions 
of one system may be used in the guise of another, and new conceptions 
may be construed and be declared to be part of a system. Many cases 
described in this part of my study involve conflict, and in many cases 
institutions of conflict resolution take an active part in the process of 
inheritance. Yet my concern is not with trouble cases per se. In terms of 
common anthropological language, the cases discussed are extended ones 
which are defined by reference to an analytical point of reference: in-
heritance. In the second section of Chapter 5 I shall isolate the various 
ways of bringing about inheritance, and attempt to analyze which role 
they play and have played in historical perspective. In the third part 
(Chapter 6) I shall concentrate on the application, change, and creation 
of legal conceptions in historical perspective. A differentiated approach 
is required here, for in Minangkabau there are several "authors" who 
continuously produce and reproduce legal meaning: The courts, the adat 
institutions, the literature, the legal experts within and without the 
nagari, and, last but certainly not least, the "people". I shall restrict 
my description and analysis to the conceptions that refer to what in my 
view are the most crucial aspects of the systems of property and inheri-
tance: the problem of society's members' autonomy over property and the 
representation of time in the conceptual system in which property 
relationships are expressed. 
Af ter the description and analysis of the systems of property and in-
heri tance (Chapters 4,5,6) 1 shall "put" property and inheri tance "back" 
again into the social organization in general. In the concluding analysis 
I shall try to interpret the Minangkabau system of property and inheritance 
and the changes that have occurred therein as part of the overall social 
and political organization (Chapter 7). 
With this organization of my data I hope to come close to a de scrip-
tion and analysis which pays due re gard to the dialectical process of 
social reality, as it has been reformulated recently by Berger and Luck-
mann (1967), and which Gluckman has cast into the formula "that law can 
only be understood through cases, and cases can only be understood through 
law" (1973b: 622). The systems described in Chapter 4 are, of course, 
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nothing but the result of the social processes by which inheritance is 
carried out and by which legal meaning is produced. They must be regarded 
as differentiated bodies of cognitive and normative conceptions, changing 
through time. Yet an understanding of the differentiating processes pre-
supposes the knowledge of the systerns, which are therefore best described 
first in order to make clear what is being differentiated. I do not claim 
that rny ordering of the data is the only adequate representation of the 
dialectical process through time. The only thing I can say is that there 
is probably no "really" adequate form, and that the way I have chosen 
has been chosen conscientiously. 
The kind of data employed in this study raises some problerns which need 
be briefly mentioned. The material upon which my interpretation of Minang-
kabau social organization and its property and inheritance systerns is 
based is very heterogenous. 1'0 a large extent, it is drawn from earlier 
sources in the literature; for the rest it is material which my wife and 
I have collected during our field research in Minangkabau. Our data partly 
refer to the contemporary situation in Minangkabau, and partly to the 
past as it is envisaged by our informants. This raises the question of 
the proper periodization of the information. As Kahn has recently pointed 
out, the Dutch literature has often presurned an "ideal-type" rnatrilineal 
Minangkabau society which is generally taken to be the Minangkabau social 
organization, whereas it in fact only represents the system as it was 
under Dutch rule, reflecting all the influences which Dutch rule had upon 
it (1976: 65, 79 f.). With the general point I agree. Most data were 
collected in the 19th and 20th century af ter the establishment of Dutch 
rule and the turmoil of the Padri-war. And it has to be adrnitted that 
"a consistent picture of pre-Padri social organization has not yet 
emerged" (Kahn 1976: 80).Yet I think that the immense wealth of avail-
able data allows a much more differentiated analysis than is admitted by 
Kahn, and I cannot share his view that the picture of the traditional 
matrilineal Minangkabau system was basically the product of Dutch colonial 
policy. But the fact remains that there are hardly any data on pre-Padri 
Minangkabau, and rny description should therefore, unless 1 indicate 
otherwise, be taken as to refer to Minangkabau since the beginning of the 
19th century. 
The available data will not always permit this study to live up to 
its analytical frame of reference. A duly differentiated account can 
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be given at least partly of the contemporary situation. Also with respect 
to the development of adat in the literature and in the courts, this can 
be done tolerably weIl. However, for the development of adat in the 
nagari and for the actual practice of property and inheritance affairs 
in historical perspective we have to depend on very general and undif-
ferentiated reports. 
A further comment must be made on the representativeness of the data. 
As far as the description of the socio-political organization and the 
systems of property and inheritance and their historical development are 
concerned, the description will hold true more or less for Minangkabau 
as a whoIe; important variations from the general pattern will be 
mentioned. This information is largely derived from the literature, of 
which we made an intensive study in Dutch libraries before we went to 
the field. The data on court practice which we have collected in the 
field, mainly refer to the State Courts (pengadilan Negeri) in the dis-
tricts of Agam, Tanah Datar, and SO Kota. With the friendly help of the 
chairmen and the staff-members of these courts, we could check the 
court registers and study court records and judgements as far as these 
were available. For the period of 1968-1974 we could get a fairly 
differentiated idea about the courts' case-Ioad and the way in which 
suits were handled formally. Additional data were collected through 
structured interviews and casual conversation with the judges and the 
other staff-members. When our knowledge of the languages (Indonesian and 
Minangkabau) had become sufficiently good, we were also able to attend 
court hearings and systematically followed several processes. According 
to our division of labour, this part of the research was carried out by 
my wife, who will report most of her findings in her thesis. 
The particular data on socio-political organization, the system of 
adat, and the practice in property and inheritance affairs - both for 
the historical development and the contemporary situation - were collected 
in the nagari Candung Kota Lawas, where we spent about 10 months of our 
research. Their particular character will always be indicated. 
Candung Kota Lawas (CKL) is located in the Kecamatan IV Angkat Candung 
in the Kabupaten Agam. It lies adjacent to the main road that connects 
Bukit Tinggi with Payakumbuh. The nagari extends from this road to the 
slopes of the vulcano Merapi from where the ancestors of the Minangkabau 
descended according to the legends. CKL has always been one nagari ac-
cording to adat. During the Dutch colonial rule, it had been divided 
into two administrative naga ri , Candung and Kota Lawas, in the 1830'5. 
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In 1915, Candung and Kota Lawas were reunited. CKL is a large nagari. 
It comprises some 20 settIement centres and covers an area of approximate-
ly 2.300 hectares (see map on p. V). According to the Government census 
of 1971, the ponulation numbered 9.636 persons, 4.358 of whom are indi-
cated as "children" (probably meaning:unmarried) and 5.278 as "adults" . 
3.444 persons originally from CKL live in the rantau, 2.291 of whom are 
children, 496 are married pers ons , and 675 are individuals who work as 
dealers and military and administrative officers. The sex-ratio is more 
or less even: Of the children there were 2.166 boys and 2.192 girls. 
Among the adults we find a preponderance of women, 2.970 as compared with 
2.308 men, and this difference is matched with a corresponding preponder-
ance of men among the persons living in the rantau. 
The people of CKL mainly live by agriculture. The naga ri has an area 
of 1.115 hectares of irrigated rice-Iand. The average of 0.116 ha 
per capita is slightly higher than the average for the district Agam 
(0.115) and definitively higher than that of the whole province (0.098). 
If calculated on a per capita basis and disregarding the uneven distri-
bution of land within the nagari, the harvested rice is still sufficient 
to support the subsistence needs of the whole population (using a similar 
calculation as Kahn 1976: 76). In addition to rice, cinnamon and coffee 
as weIl as some tobacco, vegetables, and chili peppers are grown, partly 
for subsistence and partly for the market. The people have few cattIe; 
there were only 284 karbau (water buffaloes) and 230 cows kept in CKL. 
Some people engage in petty trade with cattIe, tobacco, and clothes, 
some families run rice-mills and coffee-shops. Others make embroideries 
for gowns or make baskets, a small home industry. 
We spent ten pleasant months in CKL. Once it had been established 
that we were neither development experts nor missionaries, we were quite 
warmly received by the villagers. That foreigners showed interest in 
their lives and the social organization of their nagari was no surprise 
to most villagers , who are weIl aware that their "unique matriarchal 
adat" gives them a special status among Indonesia's ethnic groups. It 
was within their understanding that our research primarily was aimed to 
further our own academic careers, for success in the modern educational 
system is something which is highly valued in Minangkabau. This enabled 
us to live there with a minimum of hypocrisy. 
We collected our data in various ways. Lengthy interview-sessions with 
adat experts and common villagers provided much information, but of ten 
more valuable information was gained in the daily conversation we had 
Itam Sidi Katik 
Palimo Putih Haji Dl. Bagindo Basa 
Friends and teachers in Candung Kota Lawas 
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with neighbours and acquaintances. We were regularly invited to cere-
monies, mostly weddings, and were also allawed to attend the meetings 
of the Nagari Adat Council (Karapatan Adat Nagari) and of the Nagari 
Council (Kerapatan Negeri) when matters of nagari policy or disputes 
were discussed and decided. A part of the nagari area, comprising 
approximately 35 hectares, was mapped to get a clear impression of the 
distribution and holding of the matrilineages' rice-land (see map on 
p. 145), and genealogies were made of the kinship networks of the per-
sons whose property affairs we got to know best. 
The problems which we encountered during our research varied greatly. 
It was quite easy to obtain data on the ideal adat system, no villager 
finding it difficult to give elaborate lectures on adat topics. But it 
was of ten difficult to collect information on concrete social and pro-
perty relations and matters of nagari polities. The response to our 
curiosity differed greatly here; men, in particular, could become very' 
evasive when such matters were discussed, women usually were much more 
straight forward. The information we received was of ten selective, and 
sometimes we were "fed" particular information. We were content when we 
could detect such cases on the basis of our prior knowIedge. As we 
moved into the nagari from which the relatively greatest number of dis-
putes had reached the State Court, and as we had been able to study the 
relevant court records before we had moved, we of ten knew at least one 
version of the events to which new information could be related. But in 
general, we learnt to live and do research knowing weIl that we could 
not always cross-check the information we were given, not to speak of 
ascertaining its "truth". In the presentation of the materiaIs, par-
ticularly in the stories about property and inheritance affairs told in 
Chapter 5, I identify the souree and kind of information upon which my 
reconstructions are based. 
GIAPTER ONE 
BASIC ASSill1PTIONS AND HYP01HESES 
The method empZoyed I wouZd gZadZy expZain 
While I have it so cZear in my head, 
If I had but the time and you had but the brain, 
But much yet remains to be said. 
L. Carrol, The Hunting of the Snark 
A systematic approach to the study of property and inheritance and the 
law which involves them requires that assumptions and methods be expli-
cated. This I shall do in the first Chapter. I shall outline my approach 
to the categorization of social phenomena for anthropological inquiry 
and explicate my assumptions ab out the nature of human social organiza-
tion. 1 With this done, I shall be able to indicat~ what I understand 
to be "law", "property", and "inheritance". 
A. TIIE ANALYTICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE: SOCIAL FUNCTIONS 
The ultimate aim of anthropology is the scientific understanding of 
human social and cultural behaviour and a systematic understanding of 
the distribution in time and space of its manifestations (in the words 
of Goldschmidt 1966: 2). The theories and methods developed by post-
evolutionary social anthropology have mainly centered upon the analysis 
of the internal structures of single societies, analyzing the functional 
interconnections between their constituent elements. As these elements, 
generally cal led institutions, vary from society to society, the result 
of the study of one society cannot be extrapolated to others. But a 
scientific understanding of human social and cultural behaviour can only, 
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if at all, be achieved through intercultural comparison. This raises the 
question of what should be compared. The dominant approach has been the 
comparison of institutions. As institutions differ from society to so-
ciety, efforts were made to define them in a way as to make the defini-
tions cross-culturally applicable. This raises two questions which have 
not always been kept apart: 
1. How far can such resulting conceptual systems, with their inherent 
problems of ethnocentrism, be appropriate for the comparative study 
of human societies? 
2. Can one in the first place reasonably derive one's conceptual frame 
of reference from institutions per se? 
The discussion of these questions has occupied anthropologists' 
attention to a degree that it has been more or less equated with anthro-
pological theory in general. One of the most notorious discussions to 
plague legal anthropology has focussed on the quest for a cross-cultural-
ly applicable definition of the concept of law; and in this discussion 
the question of whether concepts taken from western legal languages can 
be successfully employed in the description and analysis of non-western 
legal systems has, naturally, been prominent. This discussion found its 
culmination in the so-called Bohannan-Gluckman controversy (see Nader 
1965, 1969, Bohannan 1969, Gluckman 1969, 1973 a). Some stressed that 
the social reality of the societies studied would be distorted if the 
terms of western legal systems were used, a point already made by the 
Dutch adat law scholar Van Vollenhoven in 1909 (1909: 42 ff.). The dis-
cussion found its preliminary end in a compromise on a "comparative ana-
lytical system", a conceptual system to which legal phenomena and theo-
ries of various societies could be related (Nader 1969: 4). Unfortunate-
ly, however, just what this comparative analytical system should look 
like has yet to be determined. 2 
But the basic problem is not 50 much the question of concepts and the 
appropriate analytical language, but what the concepts should mean. As 
Moore has pointed out recently, what the participants in the controversy 
mentioned above were really concerned with was the question: Vfuat do we 
study in order to find out what? (1969: 338, 340, 343). On this level, 
most anthropologists have taken institutions as their point of departure; 
the institutions were then (re-)defined in order to make tlleir cross-
cultural study possible. These attempts have provoked endless terminolo-
gical disputes and resulted in the resignation that all attempts at 
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cross-cultural definitions are vain, and in vain. 3 Both consequences 
are closely interrelated: The resignation is due to the insight that law, 
marriage, or ownership, conceived of as a social phenomenon (institution), 
cannot be satisfactorily defined for cross-cultural comparison; or, con-
versely, it is due to the failure to realize that, as Pospisil has put 
it: 
" ..• law (insert: marriage, ownership, money etc., v.B.B.) as a theore-
ticaI and analytical device is a concept which embraces a category of 
phenomena selected according to the criteria the concept specifies. Al-
though it is composed of a set of individual phenomena, the category 
itself is not a phenomenon - it does not exist in the cuter world" (1971: 
39) • 
The terminological disputes are due to the fact that, although all 
writers agree that the value of a concept depends on its analytical and 
heuristic value, there is no consensus concerning what is of heuristic 
interest. And as concepts are usually applied to institutions, and as 
institutions differ from society to society, terminological and 
definitional disputes are almost unavoidable. 
One of the more constructive results of these disputes has been the 
recogni tion that the terms denoting western ins ti tutions, such as law, 
marriage, ownership etc., are not a monolithic bloc but rather a '~undle 
of rights". The bundle-of-rights metaphor, which goes back to Maine's 
analysis of ownership (1883),4 has been introduced into the discussion 
of marriage by Leach (1961 a: 105, cf. Goodenough 1970). Yet when Leach 
enumerated ten distinct classes of rights with which the "institutions 
corrmonly classed as marriage" are concerned (1961 a: 107), he transcend-
ed the border drawn by the usual definitions of marriage, stating "that 
in no single society can marriage serve to establish all these types of 
rights simultaneously; nor is there any one of these rights which is in-
variably establishedby marriage in every known society" (1961 a: 108). 
In his later essay Rethinking Anthropology, Leach argued that the anthro-
pologists' concern should not be "comparison", understood as the compa-
rison of institutions, but "generalization". The approach necessary for 
generalization was explicated in an analogy with topology: the analogy 
directs thinking to the organizational ideas that are present in any 
society as constituting a mathematical pattern (1961 a: 2). Leach illus-
trated this idea with a reference to the topology of an elastic surface : 
"If I have a piece of rubber sheet and draw a series of lines on it to 
symbolize the functional interconnections of some set of social phenomena 
and I then start stretching the rubber about, I can change the manifest 
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shape of my geometrical figure out of all recognition and yet clearly 
there is a sense in which i t is the same figure aU the time. The con-
stancy of pattern is not manifest as an objective empirical fact but it 
is there as a mathematical generalization" (1961 a: 7). 
By analogy, society should be considered not as an assemblage of 
things (institutions) but an assemblage of variables and their relation-
ships. The same relationships can become manifest in different institu-
tions in different societies. As Leach put it: 
"(We should) cease to be interested in particular relationships (those 
embodied in institutions, v.B.B.) and concern ourselves with the regular-
ities of pattern among neighbouring relationships. In the simplest 
possible case if there be a relationship r which is intimately connected 
with a relationship q then in a topológical study we shall not concern 
ourselves with the particular character of p and q but with their mutual 
characteristics, i.e. with the algebraic ratio p/q. (Generalization 
demands) that a small cluster of interconnected facts must be treated as 
an isolate expressing a particular principle of social mechanism which 
is embodied in the ratio p/q" (1961 a: 7 f., 11 L). 
While this is, in my view, a fruitful way of approaching the elements 
of social organization, it does not yet teIl us by reference to what the 
relationships are to be selected. In other words: On the basis of 
what assumptions are the "interconnected facts that express a particu-
lar principle of social mechanism" conceived of as a "cluster" or an 
"isolate"? 
A general framework into which Leach' s ideas can be and indeed have 
been built, has been provided in Goldschmidt's essay Comparative Func-
tionaZism (1966). Goldschmidt, following Aberle et al. (1950: 100 ff.), 
caUs for the comparison of what he caUs "social functions", "that is 
the actions requisite or desirabIe for the self-maintenance of the social 
system", which are defined by reference to problems with which every 
human society is faced (1966: 33,31). These universal functions are de-
rived from a model of society which is based upon general assumptions 
about the nature of man and human society. The model of society operates 
within a field which is constituted of three basic parts: The psycho-
biological character of man, the ecosystem, and the temporal dimension 
(1966: 33). By his cultural mode of life man is enabled to develop and 
to pass on complex forms of behaviour and to collaborate for mutual 
assistance and protection in large organized entities (1966: 57). These 
characteristics enable us to caU elements of social organization "in-
strumentalities" and the instrumental role leads to the notion of func-
tional requisites (1966: 57). Goldschmidt indicates two general and 
rather broadly defined classes of functions: 
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1. Those relating to human needs like obtaining food, providing shelter 
etc. 
2. The provision of the ins ti tutional machinery to maintain the social 
system as a system (1966: 58). 
The distinction between these two classes of functions is difficult 
if not impossible to draw; this' is, however, not crucial to our problem. 
Primarily, the study of social organization demands the decomposition 
of the second class of social functions into specific ones, which obtain 
their specificity by reference to a particular problem with which each 
human society is confronted. The unit of study is thus no longer defined 
with reference to institutions but rather with reference to social func-
tions which may be fulfilled by different institutions in different so-
cieties. This field of study closely corresponds to what Fortes calls 
"domains" of social organization (1970 a: 95 ff.), which are conceived 
of as socio-spatial sectors of social organization (1970 a: 97). Each 
such sector, as Fortes puts it, "comprises a range of social relations, 
customs, norms, statuses, and other analytically discriminabIe elements 
linked up in nexuses and unified by the stamp of distinctive functional 
features that are common to all" (1970 a: 97). 
However, these sectors, as I visualize them for the purpose of my 
study, are abstract frames of reference. They receive their distinctive 
functional feature by reference to a universal human problem, not through 
reference to the empirical reality of the elements filling them. The 
sectors are analytically discrete; the empirical elements, however, are 
not. The sectors can be thought of as exclusive and complementary, but 
what is within a sector need not be exclusive - is not "either red or 
blue", as Fortes puts it (1970 a: 97). The functional requisites filling 
one sector may weIl fill another as weIl. For the purposes of my study, 
domains have the methodological role of providing analytic frames of 
reference for cross-cultural generalization, not the role of isolating 
empirical phenomena. In a later section of this chapter, I shall try to 
delineate the social functions of property and inheritance on this basis. 
It must, of course, be admitted that in naming social functions or 
domains of social organization, one cannot escape completely from ethno-
centric bias. Such bias is probably inevitable. 5 The advantage of the 
approach, however, is clear: The concepts denoting institutions are de-
reified, and the Leachian resignation, expressed in his 1955-paper on 
the definition of marriage (1961 a: 105), is turned into a positive model. 
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B. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: lliE RESTRICfION OF SOCIETY'S MEMBERS' AlITONCJ.1Y 
Social and legal anthropologists are mainly concerned with the second 
class of functions mentianedabove: The provision of the institutional 
machinery to maintain the social system as a system. The way in which 
society's members solve the organizational problems of maintenance 
through their thoughts and actions is the empirical social organization. 
As Goldschmidt put it, social organization ''nrust be seen as the means 
by which the ego-centered psychobiological needs of the individual are 
both given satisfaction and held in check •.• , for these ego-oriented 
needs can only be attained in a social interaction system" (1966: 59). 
Social organization involves the essential conflict between self-in~st 
and community-interest (1966: 132). Thus conceived, social organization 
is, of course, a relative conception. It mediates bètween the self-
interest of society's members and the interests of the community, 
but the way in which it does 50 differs significantly from society to 
society. Some criteria by means of which we can differentiate the va-
rious forms of social organization will be discussed below. In each so-
ciety, however, whatever its organizational structure, social organiza-
tion always indicates the reZative degree to which the autonomy of 50-
ciety's members is recognized and restricted. The extremes, com-
plete individual autonomy or complete restriction of individual autonomy, 
cannot exist in human society. The degree of recognition/restriction of 
autonomy, of course, varies considerably in the various fields of social 
life. 
The relation of the individual to the social entity of which he is a 
member is also relative in another meaning: \~en we speak of a social 
system or a society, we generally think of an entity which itself is 
autonomous in relation to more inclusive groups, and within which the 
individual members' autonomy is restricted and recognized. But in fact, 
each social formation which we call society is not just structured as 
a composite of individuals but has less inclusive social formations, 
which mostly have group-character. In relation to its individual members, 
these groups in many aspects represent the entity in which the members' 
autonomy is restricted and recognized, whereas in relation to the other 
groups and the more inclusive entity, the group itself is the entity 
whose autonomy is recognized and restricted. Borrowing Moore's words, 
we can better speak of "semi-autonomous" groups (1973: 722). 6 
The conceptualization of the social formations in which the members' 
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autonomy is recognized/restricted in terms of groups is, of course, only 
one if the most frequent and important paradigm of human social organi-
zational forms. There are other formations with less weIl defined bound-
aries and with less continuity, which in anthropological terminology go 
under the names of quasi-groups, action-sets or networks,7 and which 
also mediate between the individual and the more inclusive social entity. 
It is therefore more appropriate to speak of "semi-autonomous sodal 
fields" (Moore 1973: 722). Thus when we speak of societies or groups we 
should always keep in mind that a) in each society the restriction and 
recognition of individual autonomy is mediated through semi-autonomous 
groups or quasi-groups, and that b) the entities of which we speak of 
as societies in most cases are semi-autonomous groups themselves, what-
ever their claim to independence or sovereignty may beo In the contempo-
rary historical period with its extended supra-national forms of 
organizations and networks, all societies in some respect are semi-
autonomous in relation to world society. 
The main instruments by which a society's members solve their organi-
zational problems are institutions. They come into existence when people 
feel recurrently faced with the same or similar problems; then their 
mental and physical activity tend to become habitualized. The standard 
social process by which the problem is to be solyed, its consequences, 
the values connected with it, and the status of the participants become 
set in conceptions which state what things are and why they are what 
they are (cognitive conceptions) and which state how things should, may, 
or must be or have been (normative conceptions). Institutions lay down 
generalized channels of problem-solution in te~ of cognitive and norma-
ti ve conceptions . Wi th Berger and Luckmann we can speak of "reciprocal 
typifications of habitualized action by types of actors" (1967: 72). 
To a great extent, human activity can be made meaningful by its re-
lation to the institutional conceptions. The relation can be either nega-
tive or positive. It is positive if the relevant human activity is con-
ceived of as "falling within" or "being in accordance with" the insti-
tutional conceptions. It is negative, if it is conceived of as "deviat-
ing from", being "not in accordance with" or "in violation of" the in-
stitutional conceptions. 
Non-habitualized behaviour to a great extent is made meaningful 
through typification,'too. The typified but statistically untypical be-
haviour usually is not related to institutional conceptions but is, 
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cognitively, contrasted to the totality of human behaviour and, norma-
ti vely, to the underlying values pertaining to human behaviour in general. 
Thus "killing" in most societies is a typification of behaviour which is 
not usually habitualized and institutionalized. This typified, but 
atypical behaviour is contrasted with and related to the notion of "not 
killing". Typified atypical behaviour constitutes a problem in each 
society, and all societies have developed institutions to deal with it. 
But it is not human activity Qnly, which is made meaningful in terms 
of cognitive and normative conceptions. The human mind tends to bestow 
meaning upon any kind of occurrence; or rather, on anything that it 
perceives as a set of facts or "situation-image" (F.v.Benda-Beckmann 
1976: 362). In most instances, such situation-images will be constituted 
by human behaviour, but they mayalso be formed by occurrences in human 
life, like birth or death, which are not generally subsumed under the 
concepts "behaviour" or "activity". Situation-images may further be con-
stituted by the presumed activity of non-human or supra-human beings 
like gods, demons, witches, animaIs, or nature. In most societies, there 
is a definite tendency to attribute these occurrences, too, to the be-
haviour of humans by means of conceptions of causation and the allo-
cation of responsibility, which may differ significantly from 
society to society (for a recent collection of pertinent examples see 
Gluckman (ed.) 1972). 
All cognitive and normative conceptions by which human experience is 
explained and ordered are products of the human mind. Once made public 
(or "externalized" in the terms of Berger and Luckmann 1967: 78) they 
attain a reality of their own in that they confront their original pro-
ducers and other addressees as a "facticity" external to and other than 
themselves (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 78 f., Berger 1973: 14, who call 
this "objectivation"). Once objectified in this way, they act back upon 
society's members. Each individual is born and socialized in a society 
with an already existing body of cognitive and normative conceptions, 
part of which are "transformed into structures of subjective conscious-
ness through the process of internalization" (Berger 1973: 14). Through 
making their own conceptions public and thereby objectifying them, 50-
ciety's members develop a system of cognitive and normative conceptions 
through time in a dialectical process of externalization, objectifica-
tion and internalization, reproducing it or changing it through their 
own innovative ideas and actions. 
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The conceptions referring to habitualized courses of activity channel 
behaviour into one direction; thàse referring to non-habitualized typi-
fied activities keep human behaviour from going in that direction. In 
the most general manner it can be said that such conceptions imply 
aontrol. The controlling character is inherent in the conceptions as 
such, prior to or independent from any mechanisms of sanction specifi-
cally set up to support them (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 72, Fried 1967: 
9, 13). These mechanisms, the sum of which is generally cal led a system 
of social control,exist in most societies; their controlling efficacy, 
however, is of a secondary or supplementary kind (Berger and Luckmann 
1967: 72). This is weIl supported by the ethnographic accounts of 50-
cieties in which these institutions are developed only to a minima I 
degree and which yet have a de fini te and weIl functioning social organi-
zation (compare Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (eds.) 1940, Middleton and 
Tait (eds.) 1958). These mechanisms themselves constitute a field of 
"reciprocal typifications of habitualized action by types of actors", 
a social function which is the society's institutional answer to the 
universal problem of conflict and dispute. 
This is not to imply, of course, that human thought and action are 
aetually - exclusively or even predominantly - restricted by those pre-
defined conceptions which face the individual member as an "external 
facticity" in the social reality into which he is bom and in which he 
lives. The individual's autonomy is restricted by his psychobiological 
character, by what he has internalized, and in the daily interaction 
with his co-members; in particular, through specific social processes 
in which he is threatened with or directly affected by physical, econo-
mic, or psychological sanctions. Yet what he internalizes is largely 
prestructured by the kind of conceptions which exist in his society. 
In a given situation, the individual will be influenced by all con-
ceptions which he has transformed into structures of subjective thought 
and not only by those which refer directly to the concrete situation and 
the action-alternatives indicated by the conceptions for this concrete 
situation. Besides, the individual may be faced with situations for 
which no conceptions have yet been objectified and where he must con~ 
struct new concept i ons or derive them from the already existing ones. 
And even when concept i ons are provided by the preexisting system, that 
does not preclude the individual from creating his own innovations. The 
body of conceptionsexisting in a society may further be illogical or 
contradictory, in which case the individual is forced to make choices 
between them. 
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To summarize: Social organization and the conceptions through which it 
is expressed always restrict society's members' autonomy to behave and to 
construct cognitive and normative conceptions by themselves. But it is 
always relative. To differentiate the morphology of the various forms 
of the restriction/recognition of society's members' autonomy, four cri-
teria seem useful, which I call here 1) the degree of institutionali-
zation, 2) the referent of institutionalization, 3) the complexity of 
institutionalization, and 4) the mandatoriness of institutional concept-
ions. I shall briefly outline what I mean by these criteria. 
1. The Degree of InstitutionaZization 
The degree of institutionalization indicates the degree to which the 
cognitive and normative conceptions are predefined in a society. Seen 
from the point of view of society's members, it indicates the de-
gree to which they are free - in terms of the predefined conceptions -
to establish their own or new conceptions. 
2. The Referent of InstitutionaZization 
Institutional conceptions lay down predefined patterns for problem solu-
tion in a very general manner. Two different kinds of conceptions can 
be distinguished: Those which refer te the processuaZ f01'l7l of the activi ty-
sequence which is society's answer to the social problem and those, 
which refer to the substantive content through which the problemrsolution 
is to be explained and justified. The former I shall call procedural 
conceptions,8 the latter substantive conceptions. Even if a clear cut 
analytical distinction cannot always be maintained, the distinction 
is of great importance in social reality, where it usually is drawn and 
where the different conceptions affect the autonomy of society's members 
in a very different manner (Geiger 1964: 233 ff.). Society's members 
may be strictly bound by procedural conceptions but relatively free to 
construct their own substantive conceptions in the prescribed process -
a situation known from many traditional societies, where the substantive 
conceptions have a vague and undifferentiated character such as "truth", 
"justice", "reason", or "the unity of the society".9 In other societies, 
like in most contemporary western societies, the body of substantive 
conceptions is llighly systematized. Here the autonomy of society's 
members is restricted to a larger extent by the substantive conceptions, 
whereas the procedural ones have lost in importance. 
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 23 
3. The Complexity of InstitutionaZization 
Complexity means the degree to which the requisites for one soclal 
function consists of a diversity of institutions. In most societies, 
the social reality is not 50 simple that there would be just one insti-
tutionalized solution for one social problem. Generally, we find a much 
more complex arrangement of institutional requisites. These arrangements 
may be of different kinds: 
a. The institutional requisites may be arranged diachronically in the 
way that for the solution of one social problem several successive insti-
tutionalized forms of activity must be followed, each of which only ful-
fills a part of the problem-solution. This kind of arrangement is of ten 
used with respect to the social function of "marriage", e.g. with res-
pect to the ten classes of rights enumerated by Leach (1961 a: 107, 
Goldschmidt 1966: 93 f.). 
b. The arrangement mayalso be synchronie in that alternative insti-
tutions are provided which all fulfill the social function and between 
which the society's members may be allowed to choose. This arrangement is 
also known in marriage, where e.g. the individuals can choose between 
the traditional forms of marriage, marriage by elopement, or marriage 
in court, as is found in many African societies. It is also common in 
inheritance, which can be effected through unilateral dispositions, con-
tractual agreements, or intestate inheritance in many societies. 
TIlis complexi ty may obtain wi thin one body of conceptions which is 
conceived of as a distinct system; but there mayalso be several of such 
systems each of which provide cognitive and normative conceptions and 
institutions for what mayor should be done by society's members. 
These forms of complexi ty are usually called ''horizontal pluralism," 
(Nader and Yngvesson 1973: 904) which one can further differentiate in 
system-internal pluralism and pluralism of systems (cf. Smith 1969, F. 
v.Benda-Beckmann 1970, v.d. Berghe 1973, Hooker 1975). 
The empirical manifestations of pluralism are manifold. Pluralism 
may pertain to the whole field of social activity, to particular social 
functions only, or even to just some aspects of social functions such as 
the standards of validity or permissible behaviour. It may be restricted 
to procedural conceptions, where different procedures may all carry the 
same consequences in terms of substantive conceptions. Finally, there 
may be different degrees of complexity for cognitive and normative con-
ceptions (see Berger and Luckmann 1967: 127). 
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4. The Mandatoriness of InstitutionaZ Conaeptions 
Conceptions, normative conceptions in particular, can further be differ-
entiated according to the degree to which they are rnandatory for 50-
ciety's members. MJore, criticizing the "apparent mandatoriness" 
with which legal rules are of ten indiscriminately characterized by legal 
anthropologists, has argued that one should distinguish at least two 
kinds of rules. She propos es that the distinction between preferential 
and prescriptive rules elaborated by Needham (1962) with respect to 
marriage, should be extended to other rul es (1969: 399 f., on the dis-
tinction cf. Lounsbury 1962). This point has important theoretical im-
plications for the anthropology of law, as the corrnnon "rule - deviation 
- sanction" -cliché, through which law is characterized by most legal 
anthropologists, cannot be successfully appended to rul es which are not 
either prescriptive or proscriptive. However, I think that at least four 
different kinds of conceptions can be distinguished: 
1. Prescriptive Conceptions : Conceptions are prescriptive, if a situation 
image must be evaluated in its terms, and/or if the consequences 
attached to the evaluation of a situation image must follow from it. 
2. Facultative Conceptions: Conceptions are facultative, if in a given 
5 ituat ion , there is more than one set of predefined conceptions and 
where the choice of one among them is prescriptive. 
3. Optional Conceptions: Conceptions are optional or dispositive, if in 
a given situation society's members are free to choose an existing set, 
or between several existing sets, of predefined conceptions or to 
substitute them by their own conceptions. 
4. Options: Options are what I call those predefined conceptions which 
put an individual into the position in which he may exercise his 
autonomy in a way which restricts the autonomy of others. Whereas the 
exercise of the option is free, the consequences attached to the exer-
cise of the option are prescriptive. 
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C. LAW 
I. TI-IE TERMINOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
Law is a particular way of restricting society's members' autonomy. Most 
writers agree that law is a form of social control, that it is essential-
ly normative in character, and that it denotes what I call objectified 
. 10 conceptlOns. 
tional battles 
Beyond these premises, disagreement starts. The defini-
on the field of law are notorious and their results have 
been depressing. Despite the serious efforts of eminent social anthropo-
logists (not to speak of lawyers and legal sociologists) none of the 
definitions offered has found general acceptance in social science. This 
failure can be traced to two main reasons. 1) The semantic implications 
of the word law are 50 manifold and the social phenomena subsumed under 
it 50 complex, that it seems impossible to comprise them all in one 
definition. This insight led several leading theoreticians like Frank 
and Llewellyn to abstain fro~ further attempts to define law. 11 2) Most 
definitions offered 50 far have recourse to normative criteria, legitima-
cy in particular. As these criteria differ from society to society, the 
definitions given proved to be inadequate for a concept aiming at com-
prising the same social phenomena in different societies. 
That these definitions ~ay be barring a road which anthropologists 
need not travel has been convincingly put by Pospisil. They "stem from 
the false assumption th at concepts are objective as are phenomena" (1971: 
39). To quote Pospisil: 
"Lawas a theoretical and analytical device is a concept which embraces 
a category of phenomena (ethnographic facts) selected according to the 
criteria the concept specifies. Although it is composed of a set of in-
dividual phenomena, the category itself is not a phenomenon - it does not 
exist in the outer world. The term 'law' consequently is applied to a 
construct of the human mind for the sake of convenience. The justifica-
tion of a concept does not reside in its existence outside the human 
mind, but in its value as an analytical, heuristic device" (1971: 19). 
Unfortunately, the heuristic value of the concept law has mostly been 
confused with methodology. Since Hoebel (1954) a great deal of the theo-
retical discussion ab out law has been framed in terms of methodology and 
led to the conception of the ''methodological triad" : the study of abstract 
rules (the so-called ideological method), the study of behavioural rul es 
(the so-called descriptive approach), and the study of trouble cases 
(the so-called casuistic approach) (see Hoebel 1954: 29 ff., Pospisil 
1971: 18 ff.). This framework presupposes that "law" wil! be found once 
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the best method to find it has been devised, an assumption which is as 
naive as it is wrong. Methodology, in principle, presupposes a predefined 
object; the object is not to be defined through methodology.12 
As I see it, the anthropologist deliberating ab out which meaning to 
give to the concept of law is faced with three main alternatives, all of 
which have been followed by previous writers, although they have usually 
been stated in different terms: 
1. He can relegate law to a domain of social organization. This approach 
is still dominant in contemporary legal anthropology and it is closely 
connected with the casuistic approach. It becomes evident in "the trend 
to focus on process rather than on the organization and structure of 
institutions" (Nader and Yngvesson 1973: 884); social process for most 
writers being synonymous with the processes of dispute settIement and 
conflict resolution. The approach is best illustrated by the followers 
of the case-methods, no matter whether they focus on the social process 
of conflict resolution as extended case (like Gulliver 1963, 1969, 1973) 
or whether they focus on the exercise of legal authority (like Pospisil 
1958, 1971) or the sanctioning of rules (like Hoebel 1954). 
2. The second alternative is to reserve law to those forms of normative 
conceptions which are particular to a specific form of political organi-
zation. In these, generally evolutionistic,approaches law is defined as 
"an emergent system of social control that develops in. response to the 
need to regulate behaviour attendant upon the expansion of the community 
and the decline in effectiveness of kinship" (Fried 1967: 149). The pro-
posed development from egalitarian societies to the state (Fried 1967), 
or from kinship-based communities to the class-structured polity (Diamond 
1973) is here reflected in the development from "custom" to "law". This 
approach, going back to Maine and Durkheim, is best exemplified in con-
temporary anthropology by Fried (1967) and Diamond (1971, 1973). 
3. The third alternative is to treat law as an "aspect" or a "dimension" 
of social organization which is inherent in all social institutions; 
which pertains to all domains of social life and which is analytically 
divorced from the social processes which produce, apply, or enforce it. 
This approach goes back to the writings of Vinogradoff (1914} ànd 
Malinowski (1926) and has slowly been gaining more adherents like Gluck-
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man (1973 a), Barkun (1968), Moore (1970), and Nader and Yngvesson 
(1973) .13 
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In my view, this last approach offers the relatively greatest analy-
tical and heuristic value for the anthropological study of law, and I 
shall adopt it in my study. I shall speak of law as an aspect or a 
dimension of social organization, which pervades all domains of social 
life. What I have said 50 far about social organization and the insti-
tutions with which it works holds true for law as weIl. Law is a dimension 
of the cognitive and normative conceptions through which society's 
members' autonomy to behave and to cons truct their own cogni ti ve and 
normative conceptions is restricted and recognized. However, such a 
general circumscription of law is, of course, still insufficiently clear 
for a distinction between law and other kinds ofsocial control or con-
ceptions. The concept must be specified through additional criteria, and 
I shall try to specify these criteria in the following section. Such 
specification in my view must concentrate on the character of the cogni-
tive and normative conceptions. The evolutionary-typological approach 
and the domain-casuistic approach have failed to elaborate these speci-
fic characteristics and have stressed the importance of other criteria 
instead, such as the morphology of the political organization, of the 
administrative and governmental domain in particular, and on the social 
processes of sanctioning, which has led to the "rule-deviation-sanction" 
cliché with which legal anthropologists are usually operating. Although 
these criteria undoubtedly are important for a proper understanding of 
the working of law in society, the insistence upon their inclusion into 
the definition of law has led to the many inconsistencies which surround 
these definitions and.which minimize their analytical value. 
In the next section I shall elaborate what I shall understand to be 
"law" in this study. I should like to make it clear in the beginning, 
that my primary concern is with the specific characteristics of concept-
ions and not with the definition of the concept of law. I call these 
cognitive and normative conceptions law, for I think that they most 
appropriately characterize those social phenomena which are usually 
labelled law. But if the reader should be offended by my usage I would 
rather drop the term law and keep to the conceptions indicated as a 
distinct and analytically useful category. In this study, I cannot, of 
course, review the immense literature on the topic of law; all 1 can do 
is to indicate en passant where my concept ion is derived from the ideas 
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of others, where it is fundamentally different, and why I think that 
the concept ion used in this study has a greater analytical value. 
Ir. 1HE CONCEPT OF LAW USED IN THIS S1UDY 
1. The Specification of the Concept 
Law consists in the objectified cognitive and normative conceptions by 
means of which a society recognizes and restricts its members' autonomy 
to act and to construct their own cognitive and normative conceptions. 
With law, situation-images, i.e. facts as construed by the participants 
(see F.v. Benda-Beckmann 1976:362), are evaluated for relevance. Rele-
vance means that definite consequences, in terms of cognitive and norma-
tive conceptions, are attached to and rationalized by reference to this 
evaluation. Empirically, law is manifest in two basic forms: It is 
expressed in a general way (general law), referring to a typified situ-
ation-image and its consequences in general, and it is expressed in 
concrete situations where a concrete situation-image is evaluated for 
its consequences (concrete law). If manifest as genera 1 law, the legal 
conceptions usually are combined in the form of a conditional program 
of the "if - then" character; if manifest as éoncrete law, the legal 
conceptions are usually combined as a rationalization program of the 
"as - therefore" character. Let me briefly explain this condensed 
circumscription of law in more detail: 
To begin with, it is important to note that law comprises both cog-
nitive and normative conceptions. In other words, law is not only con-
cerned with the consequences following from certain situation-images, 
but it also contains conceptions determining the facts from which the 
consequences follow. Normative conceptualizations always imply certain 
cognitive presuppositions (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 127), and legal 
conceptions to a great extent determine the way in which situation-images 
are constituted (see also Barkun 1968, Cancian 1975, Gluckman 1973 a, 
Moore 1969, Von Wright 1974).14 Law may define what a "son", a "thing", 
or a "father" is in relation to specific consequences. The study of 
cognitive concept i ons is of great relevance for the study of law. A com-
parison of the normative rules about killing, for instance, makes little 
sense unless one knows what constitutes the situation-image of "killing" 
in the respective societies (cf. F.v. Benda-Beckmann 1976: 362 f.). The 
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whole body of causal hypotheses and the conceptions relating to evidence 
are usually constructed as cognitive conceptions. 
I do not want to insinuate that legal anthropologists have not con-
sidered this part of law in their descriptions and analyses of ethno-
graphic data; on the contrary, there are some excellent accounts. But 
it is usually not taken into account when anthropologists construct their 
legal theories. The anthropological and sociological theories on law 
which hinge on the "rule-deviation-sanction" principle are clearly inad-
equate to include the cognitive aspect of law within their frameworks 
(cf. Von Wright 1974: 137). 
In law, situation-images are evaluated for relevance. A set of facts 
as construed by the participants is judged for its consequences, i.e. 
whether or not, and what kind of, consequences are to be attached to it. 
If definite cognitive and/or norrnative consequences restricting society's 
members' autonorny are tied to the evaluation, the evaluation may be said 
to be legally consequential; it is non-consequential if no such conse-
quences are attached. Relevance thus covers both forms of evaluation, 
consequential and non-consequential. To which extent the participants 
can employ already existent objectified legal consequences in the process 
of evaluating a situation-irnage for relevance is, of course, a matter 
not of theory but of empirical investigation. It depends on what I call 
the degree of institutionalization (see p. 22). 
The evaluation of situation-images for legal relevance operates with 
three main standards: the standards of permissibility and validity, and 
an indifferent standard. In the first case, situation-images, usually 
constituted by human behaviour, are evaluated in terrns of the permissi-
bility of such behaviour, and the pertinent consequences (generally 
cal led sanctions) are attached to the evaluation or not, depending upon 
its consequentialor non-consequential result. In cases of evaluation 
in terrns of validity, the situation-irnages are usually formed by cogni-
tive and normativ.e conceptions constructed by society's members, such 
as a contract or some other "legal", i.e. legally relevant act ion or 
transaction. Evaluation in terms of validity means that the situation-
image is judged for its validity and for its eventual further conse-
quences as may be attached to it as an exercise of autonomous conduct. 
Both standards can, of course, operate together in the evaluation of 
one situation-irnage. Contractual agreements, for instance, in most 
societies are subject to an evaluation both in terrns of permissibility 
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and validity. What is generally pennissible need not be valid specifically 
and vice versa. 
Validity and permissibility are the dominant standards used in the 
evaluation for relevance. But there is another standard of evaluation 
which cannot be subsumed under validity or pennissibility, as it has no 
bearing upon the va lues and purposes underlying those standards. It can 
best be described as an evaluation in terms of relevance per se. A good 
example is the evaluation of death for consequences with respect to the 
property held by the deceased. Important consequences (inheritance) are 
attached to this occurrence, but by itself death cannot be judged in 
terms of validity or pennissibility. 
The dominant legal theories with their bias for the evaluation of 
human behaviour in terms of pennissibility usually content themselves 
with subsuming the process of evaluation and the attachment of lep,al 
consequences in terms of "sanction". This is often superficial as the 
distinction between validity and permissibility should always explicitly 
be made, but the concept of sanction can weIl cover both forms of evaluat-
ion and consequences (as in Vinogradoff 1914, 1959: 43 f.). But this 
"rule-deviation-sanction" cliché is wholly inadequate if cases of "simpIe" 
relevance are considered. Death has important legal consequences for 
property relationships which cannot be denied by any theorist. But how 
could death, in this respect, be considered a sanction-bearing act? 
It is important that a clear distinction be made between conceptions 
which determine legal relevance and those expressing the consequences of 
such conceived relevance. This is weIl attested by the example of death 
and its consequences. The distinction is particularly important because 
different degrees of mandatoriness (see above p. 24) may operate in these 
two spheres of legal conceptions. Whereas behaviour constituting the 
situation-image may be evaluated in terms of prescriptive conceptions, 
the consequences attached to it may be facultative or optional. Con-
versely, the behaviour constituting the situation-image may be optional, 
whereas the consequences attached to it may be prescriptive. A striking 
example in ethnographic records of the confusion which arises if these 
two spheres are not kept apart is the discussion of prescriptive cross-
cousin marriages. The notion of prescriptive cross-cousin marriage was 
quite unproblematic in those societies in which it was stated that one 
had to marry a cross-cousin, and also in those cases in which one had to 
marry into a category of relatives one sub-specification of which in-
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cluded one's actual cross-cousin. The evaluation of marriage would be 
done in terms of prescriptive conceptions and any violation of the pre-
scription would have its consequences. 15 However, the difficulties arose 
when anthropologists discovered systems in which every man was married 
to a categorically defined person, but where this could be the result of 
two possible marriages. Either the spouse belonged to the category al-
ready before marriage or he/she only became a member of that category 
through the act of marriage. Although the spouses in the latter type of 
marriage have hitherto been unrelated, their and their group members' 
kinship statuses are adapted to the category, and new inter-group mar-
riage relationships are established. This type of marriage was also 
named prescriptive cross-cousin marriage. Quite understandably it has 
been argued that the use of the concept "prescriptive marriage" was 
highly misleading, as the category of persons whom ego should marry was 
not prescribed (L"offler 1964: 218 ff.). It was therefore proposed to 
label such marriages' "taxonomie" in order to indicate the consequences 
such marriages had for future marriage relationships (Löffler 1964: 225). 
Though this characterization is useful, it does not fully reveal the 
distinction we are concerned with here, for the consequences of such 
marriage, the "taxonomie" effects, are prescriptive. 16 
2. The Manifestations of Law 
Law becomes empirically manifest in two forms: As conceptions that 
evaluate a concrete situation-image for its concrete consequences and 
as conceptions which generally evaluate typified situation-images for 
their consequences. The general law is the predefined ins ti tutionalized 
law, the concrete law is the law for "cases". Wi th this statement I more 
or less follow Gluckman's conceptualization of law (1973 a: 227,325), 
although my concrete law covers much more than "legal rulings in pro-
cesses in which cases are tried" (Gluckman 1973 a: 227).17 
General law exists in all societies, but the degree to which it does 
and the forms it takes vary greatly. General law is institutionalized, 
predefined law; the degree to which such law exists in a given society 
must be ascertained with the help of the criteria by means of which the 
society's institutional arrangements can be differentiated (see above 
p. 22 H.). 
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In most contemporary western societies, there exist one or more 
bodies of conceptions, to a large extent laid down in written form, 
which contain very detailed and systematized procedural and substantive 
conceptions which pertain to nearly all fields of social activity. In 
other societies, and in particular in those studied by anthropologists, 
the body of general legal conceptions usually is less sys.tematized and 
less articulated in formulative rules (cf. Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) 
on the near non-existence of detailed genera I substantive conceptions among 
the Cheyenne Indians). But there is hardly any traditional, tribal, or 
primitive society which does not have at least a body of general procedural 
conceptions relating to institutions such as marriage, property, the inter-
nal organization of the society, and the allocation of socio-political 
authority. In comparison with contemporary western legal systems, the 
main difference lies in the degree of the specificity of general concep-
tions. In all societies, legal conceptions must be specified so as to be 
applicable to concrete cases in the processes of law. But whereas in 
western legal systems this task is largely facilitated through a previous 
specification of the genera I conceptions, in non-western legal systems 
general conceptions usually consist more of very vague and unspecific 
conceptions, which makes the task of specifying them in order to fit a 
concrete situation-image more difficult. Conversely, the decision-makers 
in non-western societies usually have a much larger degree of autonorny 
vis-à-vis the general concept i ons than have judges in western legal 
systems. 
In its concrete forms, law exists in all societies. In all societies, 
concrete situation-images must be, and are, evaluated for legal conse-
quences. The characterization of the social processes, of the "cases", 
in which this is done is one of the central topics of legal anthropolo-
gical theory. The conceptions applied, enforced,sanctioned etc. in spe-
cific social processes (trouble-cases, dispute-settlement, conflict-
resolution) for many writers represent the only manifestation of law. 
In my view, these processes, although they are of greatest importance 
for the study of law and although they constitute one of the most im-
portant domains of social organization for the legal anthropologist, 
indicate but one manifestation of law. 
When we speak of "law in act ion" or of social processes which are 
"legal" we must begin with an important distinction between different 
forms of relating law to social process, which is sometimes hidden when 
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the terms "legal process" and "legal ins ti tution" are employed. It is the 
distinction between events having legal consequences, which may take the 
form of a social process, and the social processes in which situation-
images are evaluated for legal consequences. In fact, it is a distinction 
between two aspects of occurrences/social processes, for the activity 
concerned may display both aspects: The processes in which situation-
images are evaluated for legal consequences always have legal conse-
quences, the classical case being the social process of dispute-settlement. 
However, not all legally consequential events are also processes of 
evaluation, the classical cases being those "legally relevant" actions 
of society's members in the exercise of their autonomy. In the following, 
I shall be concerned with the processes of evaluation only. 
Processes of evaluation for legal relevance are an institutionalized 
field of social activity. They are society's answer to problematic situ-
ation-images. The problematic situation-image, through the evaluation in 
terms of legal conceptions, is transformed into an unproblematic one, 
again unproblematic in terms of legal conceptions (F.v.Benda-Beckmann 
1976: 367, Moore 1975, 1977: 159).18 What constitutes a problematic 
situation-image differs, of course, from society to society, and in most 
societies there is a multitude of typified problematic situation-images 
which must be evaluated for legal consequences even if "in reality", 
i.e. by the pers ons concerned, no problem is perceived. The most obvious 
and frequent problematic cases are the social processes cal led dispute-
settIement and conflict-resolution. Here, the factual situation, the 
appropriate standard of evaluation, the consequences to be drawn from 
such evaluation, or all these aspects together may be subject to con-
flicting interpretations by the participants or between some individual 
and an administrative agency in the society. These disputes or conflicts 
are resolved in terms of legal conceptions, which does not, of course, 
mean that the dispute or conflict would necessarily be completely re-
solved in practice - in the same way as institutionalizations do not 
necessarily restrict society's members' autonomy. 
But the problematic situation-image need not be that of a conflict 
or dispute. It mayalso be constituted by "uncertainty", if the parti-
cipants, for instance, do not know what the consequences of a given 
situation-image should be and where the content of the situation-image 
is trouble-, conflict-, or dispute-indifferent (see also Moore 1970:280). 
These kinds of social processes, in which situation-images are retro-
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spectively evaluated for legal consequences - which we may call by the 
short fonnula "reactive law application" - however, are not the only 
forms of social processes in which law is applied to a concrete situa-
tion-image. In most societies there are also institutionalized processes 
in which law is applied "preventively", in which certain types of si tua-
tion-images are evaluated for legal relevance, usually in terms of vali-
dity, before they actually become problematic. The most common instances 
of such preventive law application, both in western and non-western 
societies, are the validation of marriage, the affirmation of one's 
status as heir, and the validation of transactions over particularly 
important property. The evaluatory process establishes the validity of 
the trans act ion in terms of law, implying or explicitly stating that the 
consequences attached to the situation-image of a valid marriage, of a 
divorce, or of a valid transaction will indeed follow. 
Which pers ons or agencies are entrusted with the functions of react-
ive and preventive law application differs with the complexity of 50-
ciety's socio-political organization and its system of roles of socio-
political authority. In non-western societies, the task of preventive 
law application usually is in the hands of the personnel also being 
active in reactive law application, be they contending groups negoti-
ating the evaluation and its consequences, be they family or community 
leaders acting as mediators, arbitrators, or as judges. In contemporary 
western societies, the function of preventive law application is en-
trusted to diverse offices of administration, the registry of marriages, 
to notaries, but also to courts. In Germany, for instance, the affir-
mation of one's status as heir must be obtained from a court, though 
this court is a different institution from the courts engaged in react-
ive law application. 
Concrete law thus becomes manifest in social processes of evaluating 
situation-images for legal consequences. In all the social processes 
discussed above - in the reactive evaluation of conflicting or conflict-
indifferent situation-images as weIl as in the preventive evaluation -
essentially similar concept i ons are employed. There is no basic diffe-
rence between these processes as regards the degree to which the con-
ceptions are explicitly articulated or implicitly acknowledged. There 
is also no basic difference as regards the effectiveness of the diffe-
rent kinds of evaluating situation-images for legal relevance (cf. J.F. 
Holleman 1973).19 I see no reason why the conceptions should not 
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be called by the same tem "law". Anglo-American legal anthropology wi th 
its emphasis on the "trouble-case", on the processes of dispute settle-
ment as the only fonn of law application, has more or less neglected the 
other forms of law application. This restriction of processes of law 
application is unfounded. Only recently, Moore has pointed out that what 
I call conflict-indifferent processes of evaluation and preventive law 
application '~ave seldom, if at all, been treated as a topic related to 
processes of dispute-settlement" and that they "certainly merit this 
treatment" (1970: 280). It should therefore be stressed, that these forms 
of law application have since long been elaborated by the Dutch scholars 
of Indonesian adat law, in particular by Van Vollenhoven (193J: 247 ff.), 
F.D. Holleman (1920), Logemann(1924), and Ter Haar (1930, 1934a, 1937, 
1941). In his analysis of those land transactions in Toeloengagoeng which 
had to be carried out in the presence of witnesses and the village head, 
Holleman had discerned three interrelated functions of these processes: 
1. The guarantee (voorzorg) that no present or future interests are 
violated through the transaction. 
2. The sanction that the transaction is valid in law. 
3. The creation of evidence and legal certainty for the future (1920: 
293ff.). 
The notion of "preventive law care" (preventieve rechtszorg ) was 
first verbalized by Logemann. In his words, the idea of preventive 
law application means the guarantee that what happens (the transaction) 
contains no violation of law (1924: 128) - law being understood as both 
the objective law of society and the subjective legally protected rights. 
Finally it should be stressed that Ter Haar, the most important theore-
tician of adat law, had included the "judicial decisions without dispute" 
as constitutive elements in his definition of law besides the judicial 
decisions taken in processes involving disputes - weIl before the 
"case-method" had been received into legal anthropological theory in 
England and America (Ter Haar 1930, 1934a, 1937, 1941; Van Dijk 1948; 
J.F.Holleman 1973; for a concrete example see Ter Haar 1939: 87).20 
The empirical manifestations of law in the fom of genenliand con-
crete law, are,of course, quite different social phenomena. 21 These 
different kinds of social phenomena are both called law, as they are 
manifestations of one analytically determined kind of cognitive and 
normative conceptions. Against such a kind of definition, criticism has 
36 PROPERTI IN SOCIAL CONTlNUITI 
been levelled, and I shall therefore briefly justify it in relation to 
this criticism. 
With regard to Gluckman's conceptualization of law, which is in this 
respect similar to mine, Pospisil writes: 
"One may criticize this modified casuistic approach and dualistic defi-
nition of law on the basis of logical inconsistency. Since the rules 
that ought to be enforced of ten deviate in a remarkable way from the 
principles that are actually enforced in legal decisions, one can hardly 
call both sets of principles which sometimes differ to the point of con-
tradiction, by the same term, 'law'" (1971: 33). 
Though Gluckman may be criticized for not making the logic underlying 
his concept ion explicit enough (Hooker 1975: 42), the logic is there, 
and I claim that it is the logic which I have tried to outline in this 
chapter. In my view, the logical inconsistency rather is inherent in 
Pospisil's concept ion of law and in all those conceptions which decIare 
law to be exclusively those rules which are sanctioned in troubl~ cases. 
For one, Pospisil himself has taught us that concepts are not social phe-
nomena per se but are designed to categorize different social phenomena 
on the basis of some characteristic properties. That concrete law and 
general law are different social phenomena which may not only diverge 
but cannot coincide (Gluckman 1973 a: 325, Moore 1969: 377) is obvious, 
but that does not mean yet th at they do not have the same characteristic 
properties. That general law and concrete law have the same characteris-
tic properties, the evaluation of situation-images for consequences, I 
hope to have demonstrated in this chapter. That their different charac-
ter as social phenomena be recognized, on the other hand, is crucial for 
the understanding of law. It is here that we find the basic fallacy of 
the theories which focus on cases: The confusion of general and concrete 
law. 
When speaking of "law application", I mean that the legal concep-
tions established for concrete situation-images are derived from and 
legitimated by reference to general conceptions. That it is not the 
"same" law that is applied is obvious. That the concretization of general 
conceptions is not purely the finding of the preexistent law - as was held 
by the traditional western doctrine - but that it usually amounts to 
the specification of new conceptions and of ten to the creation of new 
law, has been long recognized by lawyers in most westanlegal systems. 
In non-western societies, the processes of reactive law application can 
even less be considered an application of predefined general conceptions; 
for such general conceptions may not yet exist. On the contrary, the 
autonomy of society's members - individuals or administrative agencies -
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to construct new conceptions may be explicitly recognized in the socie-
ty's doctrine of decision making. This body of general conceptions re-
ferring to the procedural aspect of decision making, may state that the 
conceptions constructed for concrete cases must be derived from concep-
tions which have been previously applied to similar concrete cases~- i.e. 
that the conceptions applied to concrete cases shall have general charac-
ter. This is the doctrine of Anglo-American law. Law being embodied in 
cases, the conceptions ap~lied in concrete cases should not only evaluate 
one concrete situation-image but aim to evaluate future situation-
images as weIl. By this doctrine, concrete law is transformed into 
general law. 
Many anthropologists have implicitly included this or other trans-
format ion-doctrines in their analytical concept of law. As law, in the 
casuistic approach, is defined by reference to concrete cases of deci-
sion making or sanctioning, no general legal conceptions can be found 
at all unless these concrete conceptions are invested with a general 
character. With Hoebel, legal norms receive their general character 
through concrete processes of quasi-retrospective sanctioning on the 
presupposition, that the norm, as statistically dominant behaviour in 
typified situation-images, has general character already before the 
sancti on (see Hoebel 1954: 14 f.). With Pospisil, the concrete concep-
tions receive their general character through the attribute of the 
"intention of universal application" for the future (1971: 78 H.): If 
taken seriously, this attribute would even "beat" the Anglo-American 
doctrine of precedent, which at least makes a distinction between the 
ratio decidendi, the part of the decision which is to be general law in 
future cases, and the obiter dictum, that part of thedecision which 
need not be followed in later cases. 
That the inclusion of such an attribute into one's analytical con-
cept of law may create general legal conceptions where there are, due 
to a different doctrine for decision making, none, is obvious. This 
unwarranted assumption has already been discussed by Dutch adat law 
scholars weIl before the case-method was received into Anglo-American 
anthropological legal theory. Ter Haar, in his well known "decision-
theory" (bes Zissingenleer ) basically defined law as "judicial decisions 
in cases with and without disputes" (1934a, 1937). In his review of 
Ter Haar's lecture in which the decision-theory was finally developed 
(1937), F.D. Holleman criticised exactly this presupposition in Ter 
Haar's definition of law: 
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''Mr. ter Haar's constructive idea is based upon the asst.nnption that it 
is part of the judge' 5 function that he gi yes the same judgement in cases 
where the relevant facts are the same. His judgement, formally binding 
in the concrete case, implies by necessity that it must be decided inthe 
same way in the future. As such, the judgement can be conceived of as a 
general rule and has importance for the future" (1938: 437). 
Correctly analyzing this asst.nnption as a matter of doctrine, Holleman 
concluded: 
'~ether this doctrine (dogmatiek) holds true for other legal systems 
I shall not judge here. But for the systems of the adat law (of ihe 
Indonesian societies) it seems untenable to me and not without danger" 
(1938: 437) .22 
To include this asst.nnption into one's analytical concept of law distorts 
the social reality of the society one sets out to study. The anthropolo-
gist is better equipped with a concept of law which, though recognizing 
the similar properties of concrete and genera I law, also takes account 
of their fundamental difference as social phenomena. 
I have located law, in all its empirical manifestations, on the level 
of objectified conceptions. These conceptions should not be confused 
with the social processes in which they are produced and manipulated, 
nor with the referents which serve as their legitimation, such as the 
willof the people, the command of the sovereign, traditional behaviour 
patterns, etc. The inclusion of these elements in the concept of law 
inevitably gives rise to confusion and distortion of social reality and 
minimizes the concept's analytical and heuristic value. 
It should, however, be self-evident that the social scientist aiming 
at a description and analysis of law can only do 50 by studying the 
social processes in which law is produced, manipulated, and applied. 
The study of these processes and their operative conceptions forms the 
indivisible microcosmos of legal anthropology. This microcosmos is not 
bound to one specific form of socio-political organization like "the 
state". Like most contemporary legal anthropologists writing in the 
tradition of Ehrlich (1913) and Weber (1921) 1 hold that law operates 
and is operated upon in all the social formations which have semi-autonomous 
character (cf. Van Vollenhoven 1918, Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941, Pospisil 
1971, Moore 1973, Smith 1956, 1969). 
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D. 1HE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTI AND INHERITANCE 
I. PROPERTI: DCMAIN, OBJECT, AND RELATIONSHIP 
In this study I am mainly concerned with one domain of social organi-
zation: the organization of property relationships. In all hurnan so-
cieties there are objects, material or irnrnaterial objectivations, that 
are regarded as having some value. The universal problem with which all 
societies have to cope is to regulate their mernbers' relationships 
to these objects. In all societies, the performance of this function is 
institutionalized to some degree and expressed in legal conceptions. In 
most societies, the institutionalization has reached a high degree, for 
property relationships provide one basic frarnework for economic life, 
they contribute significantly to the cohesion and continuity of social 
groups, and they are an important means through which positions of socio-
political authority are acquired. In each society, there is production, 
and production "requires organizational devices and rul es to direct 
labour, land and other resources to specific uses. Resource allocation 
is never unstructureu because continuity in the product ion of basic goods 
is never unirnportant" (Dalton 1967: 66). Property does not only concern 
basic economic goods, but all goods, i.e. objects that are regarded as 
having value. It does not only concern the allocation and distribution 
of already existing goods but also the manner of allocating newly creat-
ed goods, and the "appropriational movements" which involve changes in 
objects' relations to social roles (Hopkins 1957: 300). In the organi-
zation of property relationships, society's mernbers have to cope with 
and are restrained by the three basic factors which constitute the field 
in which all hurnan societies exist: the psychobiological character of 
man, the ecosystem, and the temporal continuurn. In each society, these 
factors become transformed into socio-cultural ones and therefore are 
culturally variabIe. Nature, hurnan nature, and time are conceptualized, 
and consequences, rnany of them legal in character, are attached to these 
conceptualizations. The content of the conceptualizations and conse-
quences, and the economic use made of these factors, vary considerably 
from society to society, of ten changing natural characteristics beyond 
recognition. Land is irnrnobile, yet its products or the relationships 
to it can be transforrned into a highly mobile cornrnodity. Time is con-
tinuous, yet notions of time may be developed in which the continuous 
flow of time is stopped or declared irrelevant. Persons die, yet proper-
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ty relationships may be held by the dead; or living persons may be 
regarded as incapable of holding property relationships. 
In the most general rnanner, property refers to the whole of instnnnenta-
lities through which the relationships between society's mernbers and 
their valuable goods are regulated. When we speak of property and in-
heritance, property indicates the part of the instnnnentalities that 
regulate the relationships between the living members of society, in-
heritance indicates the maintenance of this regulation through time. 
This conceptual use is, of course, too general and it must be specified, 
and criteria must be offered by which the system of property and inheri-
tance can be described and analysed in a more differentiated manner. 
When we try to refine our conceptual apparatus, we are again confronted 
with the same problerns and questions that we have dealt with in the 
first parts of this chapter. The approach developed there must be pro-
jected onto the domain of property relationships. This means, that we 
shall not be concerned with a definition of the institutions of proper-
ty, ownership, and inheritance which are known to us from our own or 
other societies, but that we rather at tempt to isolate some analytical 
criteria by which we can better describe and analyse the institutions 
which we meet with in the society we study, and which are sufficiently 
abstract of culture-specific institutions in order to allow generaliza-
tions about the instnnnentalities of the function of property relation-
ships in different societies. Again we cannot consider the vast amount 
of anthropological writings on this topic and shall only, in elaborating 
our conceptions, discuss those opinions upon which my conceptions are 
based or from which they radically differ. 
Most a~thors trying to define property or ownership for anthropolo-
gical purposes pay due hommage to Maine's statements, that ownership is 
a bundIe of rights (1883), and that ancient law does not sharply dis-
tinguish between the law of things and the law of persons (1905: 230, 
cf. Goody 1962: 285 ff., Gluckrnan 1972: 94, Bloch 1975: 204). Both 
statements reflect important aspects of property relationships, which 
lead directly to the analytical conceptions with which I shall operate. 
My consequences,however, to some extent are quite different from those 
which have been reached by other anthropologists. 
The reference to ancient law, which does not sharply distinguish be-
tween the law of persons and the law of things, is of ten followed by 
the remark "that prirnitive law rightly represents property relation-
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ships as what they are: namely relationships between persons with res-
pect to things" (Goody 1962: 287, Gluckman 1972: 113, Bloch 1975: 204), 
and "that the notion of property as a relation between a person and a 
thing is a contradiction in terms" (Bloch 1975: 204). These two state-
ments are generally treated as if the lat ter would logically follow from 
the former, an opinion which is due to misconceptions about property law 
both in traditional and western societies: 
1. The distinction between the law of persons and the law of things dis-
cussed by Maine refers to the degree to which the system of property 
relationships is divorced from the law of persons, i.e. the legal con-
ceptions pertaining to the position of the individual, to group forma-
tion and to the allocation of socio-political authority. As Gluckman, 
following Maine, has emphasized, in tribal societies rights to land are 
an incident of political and social status (1973: 78), whereas in wes-
tern societies this incidental character of the property relationships 
has been lost and the legal conceptions which de fine property relation-
ships are conceptually and substanti vely di vorced from the law of pers ons , 
the result of what Maine cal led the movement from status to contract 
(1905: 151). Speaking in terms of domains, we would say that in primitive 
law the instrumentalities, the institutional elements in the domain of 
property relationships, to a large extent are the same ones that obtain 
in the domain of interpersonal relationships. Analytically, however, the 
two domains should be kept apart for the study of all societies, even 
where one institution performs several functions. For only on this basis 
can we determine at all whether, in a later stage of development or in 
a different society, the two fields of law as social phenomena or com-
plexes of institutions, are divorced, i.e. whether distinct institutions 
perform the different functions. 
2. The question of how property relationships are legally defined, how-
ever, is a different one. In many societies, where the law of pers ons 
and the law of things are not divorced, property relationships are 
predominantly expressed as relations between persons and things, or what 
Bohannan cal led the man-thing-unit (1963: 102). As we shall see, Minang-
kabau property law is one of the cases, where property relationships are 
an incident of social and political status, but where the dominant pro-
perty categories are defined by relation to the property holders (see 
Chapter 4). Western lawon the other hand, and contrary to widely held 
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misconceptions2~ defines property relationships only to a very limited 
degree as arelation between pers ons and things: For one, there is the 
whole body of conceptions covering the law of obligations, which con-
sists of relationships between persons with respect to things or immate-
rial goods, and which, although it is sharply distinguished from the law 
of things, certainly falls into the domain of property relationships.24 
And also the rights to things, Iike ownership, are usually defined as 
relationships between pers ons with respect to things. The legal defini-
tion of ownership (Eigentum) in German law, par. 903 BGB, weIl express-
es the right of ownership as the degree to which individual autonomy 
over a thing is restricted and recognized through general law and the 
complementary autonomy of the community's members: 
"The owner of a thing can dispose of it according to his wishes and can 
preclude all others from acting upon it, unless this is contrary to the 
law or the rights of third persons ". 
The misconceptions about western notions of ownership and property 
are probably due to the plural meaning these concepts have in western 
law. The German Eigentum, for instance, is legally defined as a relation-
ship between persons with respect to things. This relationship confers 
upon holder and object of the relationship a distinct legal status, of 
EigentiJmer ("owner") and Eigentum ("owned object"), i.e. the same con-
cept also denotes the object itself. Besides, the relationship itself is 
treated like a thing in law. In Anglo-American law, this plural meaning 
is rather attached to the concept of "property" and not to "ownership", 
which is generally treated as a relationship only. It seems to be the 
latter meaning, the reified notion of the relationship, which seems to 
come up when anthropologists discuss ownership and property. For in the 
reified concept, the relativity of the relationship,its restriction by 
the rights of other persons, is blended out: Eigentum remains Eigentum 
even if the autonomy of the individual (the relationship) is increasing-
ly restricted. 
It is obvious that the anthropologist should not use one term to 
cover all these meanings.25 I shall therefore adopt the following con-
ceptual usage: The relationships between societies' constituents with 
respect to material or immaterial objects that are regarded as having 
value, I shall call property reZationships, no matter whether they are 
reified or not and no matter what their specific degrees of recognitionj 
restriction of autonomy are.The objects, material or immaterial, to 
which such a relationship is attached or to which it pertains, I shall 
call property objects.I shall speak of the ZegaZ status of property 
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objects with the understanding that it is not exclusively defined 
through the relationship which is attached to it. The pers on or persons 
to whom a property relationship is attached I shall call property hol-
ders. 
The social organization of property relationships involves the recog-
nitionjrestriction of society's members' autonomy over property objects 
and it is expressed in general and concrete legal conceptions. In most 
societies, the members' recognized autonomy is conceptualized in 
the form of rights. These rights, no matter what their specific content 
may be, always express a relative degree of recognized autonomy. The 
restriction is, in all societies, manifest in the rights which are re-
cognized for the other members of the community (cf. Hoebel 1954: 58 f.). 
But in all societies which have same farm of government which is vested 
in social roles and statuses, the restriction of all members' auto-
nomy is further expressed through the rights which are vested in these 
positions of socio-political authority which, according to the constitu-
tional legal conceptions, represent the community. These rights usually 
pertain to the most valuable property objects, particularly to the land 
on which the community lives, their territory, and that which provides 
the most important economic resources. Whereas the members' rights 
pertain to the use and the exploitation of the property objects, the 
rights of the socio-political authority usually refer to the outward-
representation of the community in property matters (territorial mat-
ters) and, in relation to the community's members, to the ultimate con-
trol over use and exploitation in its various forms (for a more detailed 
statement about the Yoruba, see Lloyd 1959: 112). 1 shall call these two 
levels on which property relationships are expressed the level of socio-
political authority and the level of use and exploitation. This distinc-
tion is not new, and most anthropologists report its empirical manifes-
tations in the societies they study. It appears in different conceptual 
usages. Some authors speak of sovereignty and ownership (Lloyd 1959: 
112, Vanderlinden 1969). Leach has described and analysed these two 
levels among the Kachin, where the socio-political control over a domain, 
vested in a chief, is cal led madu, and the usufructury rights are ex-
pressed by lu and sha, drink and eat (1954: 141). Leach translates them 
as "ownership in the sense of'having rights over something or some 
person'and ownership in thesense of'having and therefore being able to 
enjoy for the time being'" (1954: 142). Gluckman, following Sheddick 
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(1956), called the two levels "estates of aclministration" and "estates 
of production" (1972: 89 f.). In his analysis of the system of Barotse 
property relationships, Gluckman made an important point, which corres-
ponds to the concept ion of semi-autonomous social fields which I have 
outlined in the first part of this chapter. He demonstrated how among the 
Barotse the level of socio-political authority consists of a series or 
a hierarchy of "estates of aclministration", through which the ultimate 
socio-political authority is mediated to the individual. In whom the 
socio-political authority is vested depends, of course, on the form of 
socio:".political organization. In Barotseland it is vested in offices, 
in other societies it may be vested in lineages or other corporate 
groups. In most contemporary societies, the situation is even more com-
plicated by the fact of pluralistic systems of legal conceptions, which 
are of ten contradictory. This is the case in nearly all societies which 
have been united under a cornmon colonial or national political super-
structure. The pluralistic legal systems may define different positions 
of socio-political authority and give a different content to the rights 
of the incumbents of socio-political authority as weIl as to the rights 
of the cornmunity's members in general. 
The conceptualization of the two levels on which property relation-
ships are expressed, and the recognition of the possibility that they 
may be subject to pluralistic definition, provide useful tools for des-
cription and analysis. They are one aspect of the bundle-of-rights meta-
phor in the sense that the bundle represents the full range of autonomy 
over property in a given community, which in each society must he divided 
into rights, all of which express a relative degree of autonomy. But the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor has another aspect, which provides us with an-
other useful analytic instrument: It is the recognition that each of 
the rights, as conceptualized above, itself can be thought of as a bundle 
of rights. When property relationships are legally defined, there will 
always be,on both levels,one conceptualization of the most complete de-
gree of autonomy recognized for society's members, like in the form of 
ownership in western societies. In relation to the complete range of 
autonomy, this right is one of the "bundle". But, as is usually done in 
legal systems, if it is treated as the most complete kind of rights, it 
provides the basis for the derivation of lesser· rights from it. The 
"full" relationship can be split into component ones, which are, however, 
dependent on and derived from the full relationship. In his analysis of 
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property relationships on Truk, Goodenough proposed a systematic con-
ceptual use to denote this, when he wrote: 
"Two basic forms of ownership must be distinguished. One of these will 
be cal led full ownership, be the owner a person or a corporation. It 
confers upon the owner what will be cal led a full title. The other 
divides a full title asvrnmetrically between two parties, either or both 
of whom may be individuals or corporations. This will be called divided 
ownership. It confers upon the owners two distinct titles, respectively, 
each characterized by different rights and duties. One will be called 
provisional title and the other residual title" (1951: 33 f.). 
I shall partly adopt this usage, and speak of residual and provisional 
property relationships; not of ownership as the latter concept implies 
an ethnocentric specification of a property relationship. However, addi-
tional clarification is necessary: Provisional relationships are by 
definition derived from residual relationships. But the notion of resi-
dual and provisional relationships is relative in 50 far that a pro-
visional relationship is provisional in character only in relation to 
the residual relationship from which it is derived. In other relations, 
for instance in relation to alesser provisional relationship, it may 
have all the characteristics of a residual relationship. To give a common 
enough example: A, holding the (relatively) most complete right over land, 
pffi1nS the land to B. In relation to A, B is the holder of a provisional 
right, and A the holder of the residual right. However, B may give the land 
to C in share-cropping. In relacion to C, B then is the holder of a resi-
dual right. 
Finally, the distinction between residual and provisional property 
relationships may operate on both levels on which property relationships 
are expressed: On the level of socio-political authority and on the 
I I f d I · . 26 eve 0 use an exp oltatlon. 
11. INHERITANCE: NON-RECIPROCAL DIACHRONIC TRANSFERS 
Part of the function of property relationships is the problem of main-
tenance of the system of property relationships through time. This pro-
blem is considerably aggravated by the fact that individuals die, whereas, 
at least in most societies, some or most of the property objects they held 
during their lifetime continue to be used by the remaining members of 
society. 27 When dealing with the instrumentalities by which societies 
cope with this problem, lawyers and anthropologists alike usually 
think in terms of inheri tance. In wes tem law, inheri tance 
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is an institution which is defined in detail by legal conceptions. It 
signifies the transfer of a complex of rights and obligations from one 
person (the deceased) to one or more other persons (the heirs) at the 
time of the deceased' s death. This transfer occurs automatically in and 
through law. The kind of distribution of the deceased's property is al-
50 predefined by general law. Many legal systemsrecognize to varying de-
grees the autonomy of the individual property holder to direct the flow 
of property af ter his death in the form of unilateral declarations or 
contractual agreements. This institution of inheritance is a characteris-
tic of all legal systems which have been influenced by the later Roman 
law. In this specific form it is by no means typical for human societies 
in general. In cornmon anthropological understanding, inheritance there-
fore refers to those social processes which follow the death of a person 
and which are concerned with the property he held during his lifetime, 
and to the cognitive and normative conceptions which refer to these pro-
cesses. As Hoebel has put it, it is useful to conceive of inheritance as 
"the transference of statuses from the dead to the living with respect 
to specific property objects" (1954: 59 f.). When dealing with status-
transfers, we again discover that in most societies, ancient law does 
not sharply distinguish "the law of pers ons from the law of things". 
The deceased's status with respect to property objects may be transferr-
ed, but his or her status as member of a kinship group ot the status of 
socio-political authority may be transferred in the same social process. 
Since Rivers we have been accustomed to distinguish inheritance, as the 
transfer of status with respect to property objects, from succession as 
the transfer of socio-political status, particularly if it is attached 
to an office. Most societies have developed institutions which fall 
under this rather flexible anthropological understanding of inheritance. 
Yet it is cornmonly acknowledged that the problem to which the institu-
tions of inheritance are an answer, need not be solved at the time of 
or af ter the property holder's death but can also be solved at an ear-
lier time. There is a wealth of ethnographic data which show how in some 
societies the transfer of property, or at least of a large amount of 
property, is effected before the death of the property holder(s), the 
classical examples being the Kalinga (Barton 1949) and the Nyakyusa 
(G. Wilson 1951, M. Wilson 1967). These property transfers, in which 
inheritance is anticipated,may be in the discretion of the property 
holder, but they mayalso be prescriptive as e.g. is the case among the 
Nyakyusa at the coming-out-ceremony (G. Wilson 1951: 287 ff., M. Wilson 
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1967: 220). The cases of prescriptive property transfers during the life-
time of the property holders illustrate that the crucial chronological 
point in persons' lives, at which they lose or have to lose the capaci-
ty28 of being property holders is a matter of socio-Iegal definition. 
Death poses a natural problem for the continuity of property relation-
ships, but that does not mean that death must be used as the crucial 
or the only chronological point in legal definition. The duration of a 
person's capacity to be holder of property relationships may be defined 
with reference to an event within their or other persons' lifetimes; on 
the other hand, their capacity to hold property, or some specified kind 
29 of property, mayalso transcend death. The definitions of inheritance 
which focus on the status-transfer with respect to property objects at 
the time of death therefore do not provide a useful concept for cross-
cultural generalization, as other transfers which we would want to in-
clude as "inheritance-like" are thereby excluded. Yet the need for a 
distinction between inheritance and inheritance-like transfers from all 
other forms of property transfers is generally acknowledged as ethno-
graphically justified and analytically necessary. 
Not many anthropologists have addressed themselves to the problem of 
how such a distinction should be made; I shall discuss the one notabie 
exception, Goody in his Death, Property and the Ancestors (1962) pre-
sently. In my opinion, the distinction between "inhe.ritance-like" and 
other transfers should rest upon one characteristic: whether a return 
is given in the transfer which itself is valued as property. Transfers 
in which no return is given in all societies are treated differently 
from those where there is: They are conceived of as being "through time" 
and come closest to what anthropologists call inheritance in its widest 
sense. They are further characterized by the fact that a different 
degree of autonomy pertains to such "diachronic" transfers than to other 
transfers. But however useful this distinction between diachronic and 
other transfers is, it can never mark off a separate field of property 
relationships but must be subordinated to the more general question with 
which we are concerned, the maintenance of the system of property rela-
tionships throught time, time understood as the abstract continuum in 
which all human societies exist. In the following sections I shall ex-
plain this in some detail. 
Related to the abstract continuum, to "stellar time" (Leach 1961 a: 
133), in which all human societies exist, of course all holding of 
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property and all transfers of property occur through time. The continuum 
in which societies exist is one inseparable aspect of the property sys-
tem in general. But time is socially defined in each society. As Leach, 
following Hubert and Mauss (1909) has put it: "The idea of time ... is 
one of the categories which we find necessary because we are social ani-
mals rather than because of anything empirical in our objectiveexperience 
of the world" (1961 a: 125). How time is conceived, however, varies from 
society to society.30 Each society develops notions of time which 
"flows", the concrete manifestations of which may be qui te different. 31 
But each society also develops notions of time where this flow is 
ignored, and notions where the flow is halted, and which are con-
ceived of as "timeless" and "presents" respectively. 
All social relationships are set into time. The various notions of 
time are also inherent in the conceptional system which pertains to pro-
perty relationships and transfers. In each society, there are notions 
of property transfers which are considered to be "through time", in line 
with continuity, which in the following I shall call diachronie trans-
fers. Other transfers are conceived of as being "in or at some time" or 
"within the same time", and these I shall call synchronie. The dia-
chronic dimension of property relationships and transfers is, of course, 
not identical with abstract continuity. It only makes sense in contrast 
to the synchronic dimension, synchrony and diachrony being the two basic 
and complementary modes of relating property transfers to abstract con-
tinuity. When anthropologists speak of inheritance and inheritance-like 
transfers of property, they usually mean such diachronic transfers. 
Underlying this thinking is the implicit or explicit idea that the dis-
tinction between the temporal dimensions is defined by the lifetime of 
the property holder. When people try to differentiate their body of 
property law into a field of property and one of inheritance, they usual-
1y recur to this distinctive point. We have seen that als 0 most anthro-
pological conceptualizations of inheritance rest upon this distinction: 
Inheritances are property transfers which are "through the time marked 
by the lifetime of property holders", property law in genera I is the 
organization of property relationships and transfers '~etween the 
living". Although this is, by all means, the easiest way to make thc 
differentiation, it does not correspond to thc differential treatment 
of property transfers in societies' legal systems. In my introductory 
remarks I have already drawn attent ion to the fact that it is not natural 
lifetime which could usefully mark the distinction, but the legal capa-
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city to be a property holder. But even the legal capacity of a property 
holder, conceived of as the time in which the capacity endures, is not 
a sufficient criterion. Here, toa, diachronic transfers can be "antici-
pated" by actions or transactions which, although eHected befare the 
termination of the legal capacity, are diachronic in character. The 
characteristic of property transfers which justifies our speaking of 
anticipated diachronie transfers in these cases, and which gives them 
a diachronic character, is that na return is given in these transfers 
which is valued as property. Diachronic transfers are non-reciprocal 
transfers, there is na reciprocal property transfer "in time". Non-
reciprocity in property transfers and non-reciprocity in time mutually 
define each other. 32 
The distinction between synchronic and diachronic therefore cannot 
be made with reference to any fixed date in the property holder's legal 
capacity. It rather must rest upon the autonomy of the property holder, 
of which the capacity to be a property holder is only one aspect. The 
distinction between synchrony and diachrony is established with 
reference to the individual, but not with reference to his lifetime or 
his legal capacity to be a property holder but through reference to his 
autonorny irrproperty affairs. The greater the recognition of individuali-
ty and individual freedom is in a society, the more wi11 "the present" 
play a role in the thinking in that society, and the more will continuity 
dirninish in irnportance. The less individuality and individual autonorny 
1S valued, the more will diachronic thinking dominate. But in bath cases 
na final distinction can be drawn between the tempora 1 dirnensions with 
respect to lifetime or legal capacity conceived of in time. In contempo-
rary western legal systems, individual autonomy is highly valued and the 
synchronic property law consequently occupies the prominent place in the 
whole system of property relationships. But when we look at the institu-
tionalized kinds of property transfers, we see that the basic distinctian 
is made between property transfers which involve a return in property 
and those which do not, and that this distinction is manifest in dif-
ferent degrees of recognizedjrestricted autonomy. Even transactions, 
such as donations which are carried out and become effective during a 
property holder's lifetime and thus at first glance seem to be located 
in the synchronic dimension, in the end are judged in diachronic terms 
and can be invalidated retroactively.33 In traditional societies where 
individual autonomy is not that highly valued and where consequently no 
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systematized synchronic property law is conceptualized, the plausability 
of my analysis is even more apparent. As Derrett has said with respect 
to inheritance in Nigeria: 
"Succession (meaning the inheritance of property, v.B.B.) as an event 
happening at death is altogether foreign to Nigerian problems. We must 
be prepared for rules of succession appearing in the guise of restric-
tions upon alienation inter vivos" (1965: 5 f.). 
The implication is clear: The rules of inheritance, representing the 
diachronic dimension of property relationships in western thinking, are 
applicable between the living; i.e. a distinction cannot be made with 
reference to the individual members' lifetime, but only through reference 
to the degree to which their autonomy to dispose of property is recog-
nized. 
The instrumentalities through which diachronic transfers are effected 
are manifold and cannot be defined by their legal cloth. Diachronic 
transfers may become manifest in the automatic transfer of property 
relationships which we call intestate inheritance. They mayalso be 
effected by unilateral actions as testaments and donations, donations 
and testaments bath becoming manifest in contractual farms, toa, in many 
societies. Inheritance is of course the classic case. Such transfers are 
non-reciprocal as the original property holder af ter his death is not in 
the legal position to receive any contraprestation which is valued as 
property. Transfers which occur during the lifetime assume diachronic 
character when they are construed as non-reciprocal in terms of legal 
conceptions. The most common institution of this kind is donation, the 
"outright transfer of property relationships with na expectation of re-
turn in goods or services" (Goody 1962: 309). 
The question of whether donations should be treated as falling within 
the category of inheritance-like transfers at all, and if 50, what kind 
of donations should be 50 treated, has not aften been dealt with syste-
matically by anthropologists. One of the few anthropologists who has 
proposed a systematic analytic treatment of donations in the context of 
inheritance is Goody in his study of property and inheritance among the 
LoDagaa (1962). In his discussion of inheritance, Goody has freed him-
self from the ethnocentric western notion of inheritance. He cautions 
his readers that he uses "the term inheri tance in a wider sense than 
some writers" (1962: 312) and propos es to call this "inheritance in the 
widest sense", "intergenerational transmission", or "devolution". He 
refers to societies in which property, or at least a substantial amount 
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of property, is transferred before the holders' death, and notes: 
"These examples show that even transfers made to the heir within the 
lifetime of the holders must be seen in the total context of inter-
generational transmission. In the last analysis all such transactions 
can be considered as advance payment on the material heritage, and, 
whether they occur post mortem or pre mortem,they all can be thought as 
being made propter mortem'(1962: 279). 
For inheritance in the widest sense we therefore must consider "trans-
fers of property from holder to heir during the holder's lifetime as 
weIl as af ter his death" (1962: 311). Up to this point I can fully share 
Goody's analysis. But Goody makes it clear that not all donations 
among the living are to be included in this extended meaning of inherit-
ance. In principle, two kinds of property transfers are to be disting-
uished: alienations and inheritance. Donations are only treated as in-
heritance in those cases where they occur between the property holder 
and his heir(s), in principle, they are "alienations": "With donation, 
which is admittedly the limiting case, the position is different: from 
the analytical standpoint it comes closest to inheritance, and yet shou1d 
be usually distinguished from it as a form of alienation" (1962: 309). 
This cannot be accepted, and certainly not for the reason that it is 
"usually" done. Goody himself has established the irrelevance of the 
chronological focus on the property holder's death and thus freed him-
self from the ethnocentric western distinction. Yet he proposes to sub-
stitute a criterion, the legal status of the recipients before the trans-
fer, which is no less ethnocentric, in this case LoDagaa-centric: He is 
determined to restrict inheritance to property transfers at death and 
to those property transfers among the living which take place within 
the corporate kinship group (1962: 312). For a concept i on of inheritance 
in its widest sense, which is useful for cross-cultural comparisons and 
generalizations,-and this is Goody's aim, too - this distinction cannot 
be maintained. For if death is not the crucial chronological point upon 
which the distinction rests, and if donations among the living can be 
included in the category of inheritance, why should the distinctions be 
made with respect to the legal status of the beneficiaries of the dona-
tion? Asked differently: If the distinction is made with respect to the 
legal status of the beneficiaries, and if death is not the crucial cri-
terion for the distinction, would not the same distinction have to be 
made with regard to donations which become effective before and af ter 
the property holder's death? This would be the consequence of Goody's 
argument, but this consequence is hardly tenable. For it would mean the 
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exclusion from inheritance of all testamentary dispositions which are 
made for the benefit of persons not belonging to the corporate kinship 
group, or, in other legal systems, to persons not belonging to the legal 
intestate heirs. On this point, Goody's argument is inadequate. He con-
cedes "that in many non-li terate societies wi th established rul es of 
inheritance, oral testaments that take effect at death can serve a 
similar purpose. Indeed, among the Ashanti, wills have been described 
as 'a fom of inchoate gift that takes effect at death' (Mateson 1953: 
224)" (1962: 310). This reference, of course, would strongly indicate 
that such transfers should be included in the wider category of in-
heritance, but Goody is determined to have it otherwise: 
"Analytically, both modes of transactions provide standardized ways of 
alienating property from the corporate group. However, normally the in-
dividual is not free to make such gifts or testaments except with the 
approval of other members of the group, who are cal led upon to act as 
witnesses (Busia 1951: 125). It should be added that even where testa-
. mentary inheritance is the established practice, it does not necessari-
ly follow that a man has free disposition of all his property" (1962: 
310) . 
This is quite true. But it does follow that he is free to dispose of his 
property to some extent by donations and testaments. And corresponding 
to this degree, the legal heirs or members of the corporate group become 
one sort of heirs beside the testamentary heirs. To exclude the testa-
mentary heirs from inheritance would be absurd. In many societies, par-
ticularly in those which have been influenced by the later Roman law, 
the beneficiaries of testamentary dispositions are given exactly the 
same legal status of heir as the intestate heirs. There are even legal 
systems in which the making of a testament is approved by law and 
religion, like in Islamic law, and where the testamentary disposition 
may not be made for the benefit of one of the ZegaZ intestate heirs 
(Juynboll 1903: 256, Fyzee 1955: 310). 
Once we have eliminated death as the distincti ve criterion , there are 
no analytical differences between donations which become effective before 
and af ter death. The opposition we are concerned with is not between 
''heirs'' and "persons to whom property is alienated" but with different 
persons who receive property without contraprestation in time, with 
beneficiaries of diachronic transfers. To what extent these benefic-
iaries can be persons not belonging to the corporate group or the legal-
ly predefined intestate heirs depends on the degree of autonomy which is 
recognized for the property holder. The limitation of inheritance in its 
widest sense to transfers between property holder and predefined heir 
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presupposes a fixed degree of autonomy and includes i t in the concept, 
an approach which obviously is not suitable for the purpose of cross-
cultural generalization. It subjects inheritance to a specific form of 
socially organized groups and, in the case of Goody, makes inheritance 
a function of unilineal descent. However, inheritance is always a func-
tion of social organization in general, which expresses the degree to 
which society's members' autonomy is recognizedjrestricted in all 
domains. As we know weIl from our own society and as is further evidenc-
ed by most studies of change in traditional societies, the rul es regula-
ting the continuity of social groups and those regulating the continuity 
of property are never fully consonant (see Moore 1969). 
Following Goody, we have considered 50 far the donation of residual 
property relationships, or of "outright donations" (Goody), as dia-
chronie transfers only. It is, however, important to note that this 
analysis holds true for provisional property relationships only to a 
limited extent. 
1. 'rhe derivation of the provisional relationship by the holder of the 
residual relationship, e.g. the creation of rights for a pawnee, is no 
diachronic transfer. Provisional relationships are, by definition, pro-
visional in time, too. They are always temporary relationships, what-
ever their actual or intended duration may beo The temporary character 
gives them a synchronic appearance: Temporary relationships are always 
''within time", within the time marked by their temporary duration. In 
this respect, it therefore makes no difference whether the provisional 
relationship has been created in exchange for a return which is valued 
as property or not. Donations of provisional relationship, by the holder 
of the residual relationship to the recipient of the provisional one, 
therefore do not fall into the category of diachronic transfers. 
2. We must, however, recall the most important characteristic of pro-
visional property relationships: They are provisional only in relation 
to the residual relationship from which they are derived. In all other 
respects, they can - depending on the legal system concerned - assume 
all characteristics of a residual property relationship: Lesser relation-
ships can be derived from them, and, in their residual aspect, they can 
also be the object of a diachronic transfer. Thus if A, the holder of 
the residual property relationship a, gratuitiously derives a provïsional 
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property relationship b for B, this always is a temporary and synchronic 
transfer. According to the degree of autonorny inherent in b, B may derive 
another provisional relationship c for C, which again is ternporary and 
synchronic. But the legal system mayalso provide that b can be dia-
chronically transferrred, e.g. be inherited by D. In the relation be-
tween B and D, the relationship then has residual character, even if the 
relationship between A and B, and, af ter B's death, between A and D is 
of a provisional kind. In this way,provisional property relationships, 
like the rights of a pawnee, can be maintained as ternporary relation-
h " h gh "34 s lpS t rou generatlons. 
The distinction between residual and provisional property relation-
ships and their synchronic and diachronic transfers is of particular im-
portance for the study of property systerns where residual property rela-
tionships are usually attached to social groups which do not die in 
legal definition. Anthropologists have too easily assurned that only re-
sidual relationships, generally identified as "ownership", could be in-
herited. Typical for this is the attitude referred to by Allott, Epstein 
and Gluckrnan in relation to African laws of succession and inheritance: 
"But if an estate was, and remains, the property of a kinship group or 
farnily, and the successor to its former holder.adrninisters it for the 
group even while he has beneficial enjoyrnents of it, can there be said 
to be 'inheritance' at all? Can a group be said to 'inherit' what it 
already so-to-speak owns?" (1969: 50). 35 
What, would we ask, happens within the group and between the group 
mernbers? That the residual relationship is attached to a group will be 
quickly ascertained, so our attent ion should be directed at what syn-
chronic and diachronic transfers occur within the group and between 
group members and non-group members. 36 Within the group, there may be 
a differentiated system of provisional property relationships which are 
regularly subject to diachronic transfers. As Moore has pointed out re-
cently, this has "significant theoretical irnplications, since it adds an 
inside perspective to the conventionalpicture of agnatic descent groups in 
which everyone is seenfrom the outside as jurally equivalent to every-
one else" (1969: 390). This theoretical irnplication shall briefly be 
explicated: It shows that the western notion of cornrnon ownership cannot 
be used to characterize the residual right held by the group. For in 
cornrnon ownership, all rnernbers are owners. Their respective relationship 
to the property is expressed in divisible or indivisible shares, in 
terrns of the residual relationship and not in terrns of provisional re-
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lationships. In many non-western societies, in contrast, there is an 
elaborate system of provisional property relationships, through which 
the group's members' rights to use and to exploit the property objects 
are demarcated differentially and which can be inheri ted, whereas the 
group members' participation in the residual relationship cannot be 
expressed in tenns of shares. As we shall see later in this study, the 
Minangkabau system of property relationships is a good example for such 
a system; we shall also see that the projection of the western notion 
of ownership on the Minangkabau system of property relationships through 
Dutch judges and administrators had important practical consequences for 
its further development (see Chapter 4: 190, Chapter 6: 354 ff.). 
The conceptions outlined in this section - the conceptions of resi~ 
and provisional relationships, operating on the level of socio-political 
control over property and on the level of use and exploitation of pro-
perty objects, and of synchronie and diachronie transfers of property 
relationships - in my view are the best analytic devices by which sys-
tems of property relationships can be studied. I also think that what I 
have charaçterized as diachronie transfers comes closest to the kind of 
transfers which are usually subsumed under "inheritance" or "inheritance-
like transfers". In my study of the Minangkabau system of property and 
inheritance I hope to demonstrate the value of this framing of these 
concepts. Yet the analysis also demonstrates one point which has al-
ready been mentioned: When we want to study how societies maintain their 
system of property relationships through time and how they cope with 
the fact that the individual members of the society die, the study of 
inheritance or of diachronie transfers of property relationships alone 
will always be insufficient. We must never forget that all holding and 
all transfers are through abstract time. The distinction between dia-
chronie and synchronie transfers is culturally variable and so is the 
degree of autonomy of the constituents in property affairs. When we 
want to make generalizations ab out inheritance or diachronie transfers, 
the study of the respective institutions is not sufficient. We must 
always study the whole system of property relationships and must start 
with the question, how society sets its property relationships into time 
and why it does it in the way it does. 
Balai adat (village council hall) in Singkarak 
Village mosque in Candung Kota Lawas 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIO-POLITlCAL ORGANIZATION IN MlNANGKABAU 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Little is known about the early history of the political organization 
of the Minangkabau wor ld. Data which would allowan historical re con-
struction are scarce (see Kielstra 1887a, De Josselin de Jong 1951, 
Dobbin 1975), and the main sourcffifor knowledge and conjecture are em-
bodied in the tambo, the historical Minangkabau legends which are trans-
mitted in oral and written form. In this study I shall restrict myself 
to the description of the socio-political organization of the Minangka-
bau village states, the nagari, and of nagari Candung Kota Lawas (CKL) 
in particular. The analysis of the materials on Minangkabau political 
organization before the beg inning of the 19th century would go far 
beyond the scope of this study (for a recent at tempt see Dobbin 1975). 
I shall give my interpretation in a different publication, which will 
also deal with the question of how CKL fits into the general picture. In 
this introduction I shall therefore only give a very summary account of 
what is known about the political history of the Minangkabau world. 1 
The Minangkabau tambo relate the creation of the world, the arrival 
of the ancestors under the king Maharajo Dirajo, the youngest son of 
Iskandar Zulkarnain (Alexander the Great), the settIement in the first 
nagari Pariangan Padang Panjang, the expansion of the population and the 
activities of the two half-brothers Dt. Perpatih nan Sabatang and Dt. 
Katumanggungan, who devised the political organization and the adat. 
The settled area was divided into the "three districts" (Luhak nan tigo) 
Tanah Datar, Agam, and 50 Koto, and the "two lareh" (lareh nan duo) 
Koto-Piliang and Bodi-Caniago. The population lived in nagari, village 
states, which consisted of one or more settIement centers (koto). Within 
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the nagari, the population was organized in matrilineages; the matrili-
neages were each affilitated with a suku. The suku were and still are 
named matriclan-like groups. They may onoehave functioned Minangkabau-
wide as true matriclans, but in historie times they have had a group 
character only within nagari. The nagari were governed by panghulu, the 
matrilineage leaders resident in the nagari. In the 14th century a king-
dom was established in Tanah Datar by the prince Adityawarman (an his-
torie figure) who probably extended into West Sumatra one of the great 
empires which had flourished at the east coast of Sumatra in the second 
half of the first and the beg inning of the second millenium. The king-
ship was later vested in three offices, Rajo Alam, the King of the 
World and the actual rul er of the kingdom, Rajo Adat, the King of Custom, 
and Rajo Ibadat, the King of Religion. The kings resided in the nagari 
Pagarruyung in luhak Tanah Datar. Succession to their office was patri-
lineal, a contrast with the matrilineal organization of the suku. Little 
is known about the position of the kings. They seem to have wielded 
little power. In the original three dis tri cts the nagari were sovereign 
states, whereas in the rantau, the area surrounding the luhak nan tigo, 
there was a rajo (a king's representative) in each nagari (Francis 1839). 
Howsoever the political organization may have been in the 14th, 15th, 
and 16th centuries, the Minangkabau kings did.not exercise substantial 
power in the first reports given by western foreigners. The first Euro-
pean to reach Minangkabau from the east coast, the portuguese Dias, who 
visited the royal courts in Buo, probably a dependancy of the Rajo Adat 
(De Josselin de Jong 1951: 101) in 1684, noted the very limited powers 
of the king (see De Haan 1897, Schnittger 1939). And the messengers from 
the Dutch at the west coast who established contact with the "emperor" 
(Keizer) of Minangkabau in 1665, reported that the king himself was not 
in the position to exercise any authority, but that they had to nego-
tiate with the heads of the two "tribes" (geslachten) Koto-Piliang and 
Bodi-Caniago (Kroeskamp 1931: 46). These two tribes, the lareh Koto-
Piliang and Bodi-Caniago had been established by the legendary law-
givers Dt. Katumanggungan and Dt. Perpatih nan Sabatang weIl before the 
Kingdom was established in Pagarruyung. The character of the two lareh 
is rather unclear. De Josselin de Jong (1951) regards them as moeities, 
out of which the allegedly original, four suku, Koto, Piliang, Bodi, 
and Caniago developed. Most authors, however, regard the two lareh as 
political parties (see De Rooij 1890,Leyds 1926). Koto-Piliang, founded 
by Dt. Katumanggungan, was the "royal party" which supported the King-
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ship, and established a rather autocratie form of nagari government, 
which was exercised by the Datuek nan ampek suku, the heads of the four 
suku, to which the matrilineages of the nagari were affiliated. Bodi-
Caniago, founded by Dt. Perpatih nan Sabatang, was the "democratie 
party", opposing the Kingship and proclaiming complete nagari-autonomy 
and the equality of all lineage heads in nagari government. There were 
additional differences in the penal law, Koto-Piliang stressing the 
talion-principle whereas Bodi-Caniago relied on the principle of com-
pensation in homicide cases. The Four Ministers of the Minangkabau Em-
pire, the Basa nan Ampek Balai (The Great Men of the Four Council Halls), 
all resided in nagari belonging to the Koto-Piliang Federation; this 
supports the hypothesis that the establishment of the Kingship was 
essentially an effort of the Koto-Piliang party. Each nagari had to 
adopt either the adat Koto-Piliang or Bodi-Caniago, but several nagari 
have claimed to belong to neither, a further indication of the "politi-
cal party"-character of the two Zareh. Historically the "parties" seem 
to have lost their original function, but Bodi-Caniago and Koto-Piliang 
have persisted as distinct adat systems into the present. The differences 
between the two systems have largely disappeared, a process which was 
enhanced by the imposition of a new political superstructure by the 
Dutch in the 19th century and the abolition of penal justice according 
to adat in 1875. 
The Islamic religion was imported to Minangkabau most probably in 
the second half of the 16th century, but it seems that it was only gra-
dually accepted. As late as 1761 the inhabitants of the west coast were 
described by a Dutchman "not as MUslims but mostly pagan, or rather with-
out religion" (Dobbin 1975: 85, with further references). But as we have 
seen, among the Royal offices there was one of a "King of Religion", 
and among the Basa nan Ampek Balai there also was a minister of religious 
affairs, the Tuan Kali who resided in Padang Gantiang. Religious func-
tionaries were also created within the suku administration in the nagari: 
the Imam, Chatib, or MaZim Adat. The degree to which the Islamie reli-
gion was accepted by the Minagkabau in the first period of Islamization 
is largely unknown. At the end of the 18th century, at least, they were 
not devout believers. Variations in intensity of belief in Islam greatly 
contributed to the civil war which broke out in Minangkabau in the be-
ginning of the 19th century, the so-called Padri-war. The Padri were an 
orthodox religious movement founded by three hajis who had returned from 
their pilgrimage to Mecca in 1803. During their stay in Arabia, they had 
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come under the influence of the very strict religious tenets of the 
Wahabite sect. Af ter their return to Min~bau they began preachinf, 
the abolition of gambling, opium smoking, cock fighting, and palm wine 
drinking, pleasures in which the Minangkabau seem to have indulged to a 
great extent at this time. Their campaign was also directed against the 
political organization of the nagari; they sought to replace the govern-
ment based upon the heads of the matrilineages by a theocratic form of 
government through Tuangku (Lords), who were to wield both religious and 
secular power. Against those nagari which did not want to submit to 
their teachings, the Padri waged a holy war. At the beg inning of the war, 
the members of the royal families were rnurdered, and soon the whole 
country was engaged in a civil/religious war. As will be described later 
(Chapter 3), it was the Padri-war which served as a pretext for the Dutch 
occupation of Minangkabau. 
The Padri-war and the subsequent imposition of Dutch colonial rule on 
the Minangkabau nagari had a great impact on the socio-political organi-
zation. In the following description I shall indicate the most important 
changes which occurred as a consequence, but my main aim is to present 
the basic principles of the adat socio-political organization of the 
nagari. The development of the pluralistic situation in the legal and 
administrative field will be dealt with in the next chapter. I shall 
order the Minangkabau conceptions which refer to the order of their 
nagari under four headings. At first I shall describe the principles 
which divide the nagari-population into groups and which regulate inter-
group relationships. Vnder the second heading I shall treat the alloca-
tion of authority to individuals and groups. The third is concerned 
with the individual's relationships to other individuals and to groups. 
Vnder the heading of residence I shall finally deal with the conceptions 
which localize the inhabitants' rights and duties and their activities. 
The principle which pervades all four sets of organizational rules is 
the conception of matrilineal descent (keturunan garis ibu) , which the 
Minangkabau define as "blood relationships" (batali darah) . The funda-
mental socio-political units are structured according to this principle. 
Matrilineal descent provides an important criterion for determining the 
eligibility of pers ons for positions of social and political authority; 
the same des cent principle also provides a criterion for determining 
the range of pers ons and groups over which positions of authority ex-
tend. The principle also rnarks off the functionally most important sub-
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set of the individuals' kin, and i.t further functions as a guideline for 
the continuation of positions of atlthority and property relationships 
through time. But although the conception of matrilineal des cent is the 
dominant principle used in social and political organization, it is by 
no means the only one. In the field of inter-individual relationships, 
relationships established through marriage are of considerable importance, 
and the relationships between children and their father and their 
father's lineage are functionally loaded to an important degree. So far 
as positions of authority are concerned, selection and communal agree-
ment modify the principle of succession according to matrilineal descent. 
Finally, thc population is dividcd into groups not only through the ma-
trilineal principle, but there are also group divisions which are based 
upon political arrangement and on a territorial division of the naga~i. 
'111cse addi tional principles should be stressed, as the principle of 
matriJineal des cent has generally been over-emphasized by prcvious 
authors. Further principles divide the population into categories of 
different social and political rank. 2 Stratification is based upon type 
of residence in a naga~i. In principle, each naga~i recognizes three 
categories of inhabitants: the descendants of the original settlers 
(u~ang usali, "original people"), the descendants of strangers which 
were acccpted in the naga~i at some later time (u~ang datang, strangers, 
newcomers, arrivals), and the descendants of former slaves (locieh or 
kemanakan dibau)a lutuik, sisters' children below the knee) (see De 
Josselin de Jong 1975: 11, Umar Junus 1964: 292,308). 
B. GROUP FORMATION AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONSHIPS 
I. THE CONSTITUENT GROUPS 
By constituent groups I mean those groups which are presumed to exist in 
perpetuity and which function as the structural units of the naga~i-con­
stitution. According to the adat of CKL, the basic socio-political units 
are the groups called buah gadang. They correspond to the groups which 
in the literature on Minangkabau are usually cal led buah pa~uik, pa~ik, 
familie, or kaum (for an overview of the varying terminology see De 
Josselin de Jong 1951: 49 ff.). 
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1. The Buah Gadang and Its Internal StruatuT'e 
The buah gadang is defined as "one" in several respects: The members of 
the buah gadang are said to ''have in conunon" or are "of one" panghulu-
title (sasako) , heritage (sapusako) , property (saharato), and grave-
yard (sapandam sapakubUT'an); they are people who are "offended and 
ashamed together" (sahina scunalu). The buah gadang can be a matrilineal 
descent group ~), comprising only persons who trace common matrili-
neal descent from one apical ancestress. It mayalso be stratified or 
consist of MDGs of the same rank which do not together make up a MDG. 
As it is a rule of adat that strangers and the descendants of former 
slaves can acquire nagaPi-citizenship only by incorporation into a 
buah gadang, the social strata are usually indicated through a reference 
to their status as buah gadang members. For this reference the concepts 
of matrilineal des cent are used: All group members are referred to as 
kcunanakan ("sister's children"). According to adat, there are four kinds 
of kcunanakan. To these four kinds of kcunanakan correspond four different 
mechanisms of incorporation and the three social categories which have 
already been mentioned: 
1. The first kind of group members is made up by the persons who are 
directly related by matrilineal descent to the buah gadang's apical 
ancestress, and who have become members by birth to one of the group' s 
female members. These are the "sisters' children related by blood" 
(kcunanakan batali daT'ah) or "sisters' children below the chin" (kcunana-
kan dibawa dagu). A buah gadang may consist of such blood relatives only, 
but mayalso containkamanakanof the following three categories. 
2. The second kind of group members are those who have been adopted .by 
the first kind and the adopted members'descendants. These are the "sis-
ters' children below the breast" (kcunanakan dibawa dado). Adoption is 
rare in Minangkabau and mainly occurs for demographic reasons : The buah 
gadang is threatened with extinction (punah, putuih) or there are no 
male group members who can effectively lead the buah gadang and manage 
its affairs. In principle, pers ons should be adopted with whom matrili-
neal descent relationships are recognized, but exceptions are permitted. 
Usually, the adopted members are also batali darah, blood relatives in 
the matriline, who were, before their adoption, members of a different 
buah gadang resident in the nagaPi. 3 In addition to nagari residents 
members of a buah gadang's balahan can be adopted. The balahan are 
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groups formed by the descendants of pers ons who, in the past, had been 
members of the buah gadang but who, at some time in the buah gadang's 
history, have split off to move into a different nagari (a case in which 
such an adoption is envisaged will be described in Chapter 5). The adop-
tion requires a formal ceremony and the consent of the nagari-government. 
The new members must be acknowledged as kcunanakan (mangaku kcunanakan) 
and be officially and publicly received as new group members (di on-
jokkan). Af ter the adoption, the new group mernber(s) enjoy the same 
rights and privileges as the blood relatives (see Willinck 1909: 357). 
3. The third kind of group members consists of strangers and their des-
cendants, who have associated (malakok) with a buah gadang. Any stranger 
wishing to settie in the nagari must be incorporated into a buah gadang. 
Minangkabau adat says of them: "tabang manwrrpuehkan dahan - hanggo man-
ccunkan rantiang" - "(a bird) leaves the tree branch when flying away -
it catches a twig when sitting down" (Kroesen 1874: 22). They must find 
a mcunak, a ''mother' s brother", and they should seek acceptance in a buah 
gadang which belongs to the same suku to which they, in their original 
nagari, belonged. These are the "sisters' children below the stomach" 
(kcunanakan dibC/);)a pusek) or the ones related by "good relationships" 
(bataU budhi). 
4. The fourth group consists of the descendants of former slaves. 
These are the "sisters' children below the knee" (kcunanakan dibC/);)a 
lutuik) or the ones "related by gold" (bataU cuneh). 
Slavery seerns to have played only a minimal role in Minangkabau be-
fore the Padri-war. The Minangkabau are reported to have made occasional 
raids on their non-Islamic neighbours and on the islands off the west 
coast (Verkerk Pistorius 1868: 435 ff.). Only in the Padri-war, could 
Minangkabau thernselves be made slaves. For the padri treated all those 
who did not want to submit to their rule as kafirs, unbelievers, and 
unbelievers could be made slaves. The budak or locieh, as the slaves 
were called, were treated as self-acquired property (harato pancaharian) 
and af ter their master's death became budak pusako, inherited slaves 
which were treated like inherited property (harato pusako) (see Kielstra 
1892: 640 H.). In general, slaves seem to have been treated rather wel! 
and were set free af ter having rendered good services to their master. 4 
When slaves were set free, they had, as strangers in the nagari, to look 
for a mcunak and to be accepted in a buah gadang, and they in general 
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chose their former master as mamak. When slavery was officially forbid-
den in the Colony in 1860, the colonial government freed all slaves, 
and also freed the kamanakan dibawa Zutuik from their of ten slave-like 
obligations towards their former masters by buying them off (Kielstra 
1892: 641, 643, Verkerk Pistorius 1868: 435 ff., AB 11: 82). In the 
district of "Old Agam", where CKL is situated, slavery played no role: 
Only 504 kamanakan dibawa Zutuik were bought off at the time (Kielstra 
1892: 643). But in some other nagari, such as Silungkang and Padang 
Sibusuk, nearly one third of the population consists of the descendants 
of former slaves. 5 
The different kinds of kamanakan are all group members. They are all 
subject to the socio-political authority of their panghuZu who repre-
sents all his group members in the nagari. Besides, all group members 
share the same rules of exogamy. Thus strangers of suku X who had asso-
ciated with a buah gadang of suku Y were henceforth not allowed to marry 
members of suku Y. But in some respects the status of the various kinds 
of group members is clearly differentiated: The kamanakan of the third 
and fourth kind have no equal vote in buah gadang matters. They are 
ineligible for their buah gadang's panghuZuship, an exception being some-
times made for the descendants of strangers. They also have no equal 
rights to the buah gadang's property. As will be described in detail 
later, only the blood relatives and the adopted members have a right to 
an equal distribution (pambahagian) - the other kamanakan are only 
"given" some property (pambarian; a story involving the property rela-
tionships between kamanakan dibawah Zutuik and their former masters will 
be described in Chapter 5). 
2. Subdivisian and CZeavage of the Buah Gadang 
The buah gadang differ in genealogical depth. Some trace their existence 
to times before the foundation of the nagari. Although not all ancestors 
are remembered (the deepest genealogy, ranji, which we saw comprised 11 
generations), one "knows" that the buah gadang and the first incumbent 
of i ts panghuZu ti tle were among the founding families. Other buah gadang 
have come into existencè at a later stage. Some may have branched off 
from an already existing one, others may have been constituted by the 
descendants of strangers or former slaves according to the rules which 
will be described later. In CKL, buah gadang are also subdivided into 
formal subgroups, the kaum. Whereas subdivision as such seems to be a 
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regular feature of Mïnangkabau adat, the form in which it is presently 
done may have been seriously influenced by Dutch administrative policy. 
This question win be discussed after the processes of subdivision and 
cleavage have been described. 
a. Subdivision: The Kaum 
In CKL, the subdivisions of a buah gadcmg are called kaum. A5 the use 
of the.word kaum in the Mïnangkabau literature and in contemporary 
Minangkabau varies considerably, same general remarks must be made first: 
The word kaum is Arabic and means group. It has probably been used in 
Minangkabau since the Islamization, but it is not known to which of the 
socially defined groups the term was applied, and whether there was a 
uniform usage throughout Mïnangkabau. In 1908, the Dutch colonial admini-
stration employed the term kaum to denote the groups which we re to be 
responsible for the payments of the newly introduced tax (Van Vollenhoven 
1918: 249, Joustra 1923: 92). For this purpose the groups were chosen 
which were presumed to hold property in common. The head of this group 
was styled mcunak kepala waris (Min.: mamak kapalo warih), the "mamak 
who is the head of the heirs" (on the term warih see below pp. 99 and 196). 
This use of the term has persisted into post-Independence Indonesia, and 
it is universally applied in the State Courts. Disputes over group-pro-
perty are, by definition, over kaum property, and the kaum must be re-
presented by its mamak kepala waris (see also Tanner 1971: 265 H.). It 
is, however, very doubtful whether the uniform usage in the courts 
corresponds to a uniformi ty on the nagari level. 6 
In CKL, the kaum are potential subunits of the buah gadang: The in-
ternal formal organization of buah gadang is expres'sed in terms of kaum. 
A buah gadcmg can consist of one kaum only, but also of several kaum. 
There are 100 odd buah gadang in CKL and nearly 400 kaum. The average 
thus is 3 to 4 kaum per buah gadang, but there are many buah gadang with 
just one kaum, and at the other extreme is one buah gadang which consists 
of 13 kaum. 
The buah gadcmg is one group (kaum, in the most inclusive reference 
of the term) with "one" property and "one" panghuluship and -title. Sub-
division of the buah gadang into two or more kaum involves a formal di-
vision of the common property, but not of the panghuluship. Of two kaum 
in the same buah gadang it is said that "harato dah dibagi", the pro-
perty has already been divided. Both kaum have their kaum-leaders, the 
mcunak kepala waris, as they are nowadays cal led (the terms mcunak kaum or 
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tungganai are also still used, see below), who exercise authority in 
kaum-internal property affairs. According to court-practice, they also 
represent their kaum in all disputes over kaum-property. In inter-kaum 
disputes, however, or in intra-kaum disputes which cannot be solved at 
the kaum level, the panghulu retains the highest authority also in pro-
perty affairs. No transfer of any buah gadang property, share-cropping 
agreements excepted, may occur without him taking cognizance. 
Common holding and division of property are, however, expressed on 
two levels of socio-political organization: According to adat, in the 
senseof pOlitical-administrative relations, the buah gadang consisting 
of more than one kaum is still "one"; all buah gadang members are still 
urang saharata, people with one common property. The property division 
in the buah gadang between its kaum is to be valid only internally. As 
one of the stories told in Chapter 5 will demonstrate, this principle is 
still recognized in the nagari and has practical consequences in proper-
ty-politics. On the other hand, the autonomy of the kaum in property 
affairs is clearly acknowledged in the State Courts, where the mamak 
kepala waris, and not the panghuZu, represent their kaum in inter-group 
disputes. This somewhat arnbiguous kaum-buah gadang relationship may be 
due to the fact that in the courts' perspective, kaum are the groups 
which have one property; "one property groups" can be either kaum or 
buah gadang groups in CKL. 
Subdivision of buah gadang consisting of one kaum into two kaum will 
mostly be the result of a longer process. The division generally occurs 
for demographic reasons, when the group members have become numerous 
enough that they lose the feeling of "really" being one group. Minangka-
bau adat says: "panjang dikarek - bun tak dikapiang" - "what has become 
too large, must be shortened, what tends to become unclear, must be 
clarified" (Kooreman 1902: 917, Willinck 1909: 353). The division itself, 
however, must be formalized. When the division is to occur, the rule of 
"kok lima kali turun" - "when there are descendants five times", must be 
adhered to (Willinck 1909: 352, De Josselin de Jong 1951: 85). This rule 
indicates the generation level at which the apical ancestresses of the 
newly formed kaum are established: The apical ancestresses whose descen-
dants form the new kaum are those women who, at the moment the group 
split is made, have had five generations of descendants. They thus are 
determined on the ~~~level of the youngest living generation; the 
counting proceeds from the youngest living generation upwards, not from 
the apical ancestress of the former undivided group downwards, through 
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. 7 the generatlOns. 
The above deseription only refers to divisions of buah gadang or kaum 
which eonsist of blood relatives. Kamanakan of the third and fourth kind 
can also be given kaum-status, and in this ease the kok limo kali turun-
rule does not play a role as there is no question of a eommon apieal 
ancestress. The formal reeognition of kaum-status requires the deeision 
of the buah gadang elders. 
The above prineiples do not only pertain to the subdivision of buah 
gadang which are one kaum,but to subdivision of kaum in general. Due to 
the varying demographie pressures, kaum will generally develop asymmetri-
cally. There may be kaum where the eommon apieal aneestress is still re-
membered by the living kaum members. In others, however, where due to 
failing demographie pressure there was no need for kaum splits, the 
common apical aneestress may be several generations removed, and the 
actual genealogieal relationships between the kaum members may be not 
clear to them any more. 
As long as the buah gadang as a whole is not split, the newly formed 
kaum still have the same sako, panghulu-title. This is of ten kept by the 
genealogically older kaum. But of ten (and apparently in Bodi-Caniago 
adat in partieular) the two kaum agree to rotate the title and the 
panghuluship between them. This agreement is called "gadang balega 
(bagiZieh)" - "the greatness rotates" (see also Willinck 1909: 801 f., 
De Josselin de Jong 1951: 87, who speaks of the adat sansako). This 
agreement of ten leads to diffieulties and serious eonfliets between the 
kaum. For one, this is due to asymmetrie kaum development. If a buah 
gadang subdivides into two kaum, the two kaum should alternatively use 
the title. But if one of the kaum is subdivided again later, and there 
are three kaum, the title should still be rotated between the two origi-
nal kaum, whereas the two "subkaum" should now start rotating their turn. 
The title thus should be rotated in a sequenee like ABACABAC. But af ter 
some time, B and C will usually claim the same right as A. In addition, 
the kaum which has held the panghuluship more of ten is loth to give it 
to the other kaum af ter the panghulu's death and rather tries to install 
one of its members as new panghulu again. Such eonfliets of ten lead to 
definite splits of buah gadang. 
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b. Cleavage of Buah Gadang 
By cleavage 1 mean the establishment of two (or more) buah gadang out of 
one. The TUles for cleavage are the same as have been described for sub-
division, but there is one important additional TUle: As it is one re-
quirement for a group's buah gadang status that their members have "one 
sako" , the establisrunent of a new buah gadang means the establishment of 
a new panghuZu title. Conversely, the installation of a new panghuZu 
means the formation of a new buah gadang. As the members of the new buah 
gadang must have been members of a buah gadang before, the establishment 
of a new buah gadang always means that an existing buah gadang is divided. 
The process of cleavage is generally preceded by the subdivision of the 
buah gadang into kaum. 
There are four principle modes of establishing a new panghuZuship.8 
The concepts used to denote these four modes are not uniformly used 
throughout Minangkabau,9 but the processes indicated by the sometimes 
varying terms denote the same mechanisms: They deal wi th the cleavage of 
buah gadang consisting of blood relatives (1 and 2), of the descendants 
of strangers (3), and of the descendants of former slaves (4): 
1. Gadang manyimpang (The Greatness branches oH) 
In the case of gadang manyimpang, a new buah gadang is formed by one 
group of the blood relatives af ter an agreement over the cleavage has 
been reached. The typical situation is, that the kamanakan bataZi darah 
have increased. The buah gadang has already been subdivided into two 
kaum and one kaum may already have moved to cultivate land in a diffe-
rant part of the nagari. So one decides "that the time has come" and 
that independence should be given to that kaum. The new group is given 
its own panghuZuship and title, which in many nagari generally is (or 
even has to be) derived from the panghuZu title of the old buah gadang. 
Thus if the buah gadang of Dt. Sinaro establishes a new buah gadang, the 
new panghuZu title may be Dt. Sinaro Panjang. To speak of "old" and 
"new" buah gadang only makes sense if it is related to the group which 
keeps the original title, and this of ten is the genealogically older 
group (descending from the older sister of the sisters who are apical 
ancestresses). Another and mostly corresponding reference is to the 
residence of the groups. The old group usually stays at the original 
settlement area, the "new" group moves away. But the two buah gadang may 
also agree upon "title-rotation": Each buah gadang wears the original 
and the new title in rotation. This was quite common in CKL. 
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2. Baju sehelai dibagi duo (One shirt is divided into two) 
In this case, the buah gadang of the blood. relatives is divided into two 
groups of equal rank, which both keep the original panghulu title. Thus 
one buah gadang Dt. Sinaro becomes two buah gadang with the panghulu-
title Dt. Sinaro. According to "old" adat, this was forbidden, but it 
seems to occur 50 of ten that most Minangkabau consider it an unpleasant 
but hardly avoidabIe practice. Such a cleavage only occurs in case of 
trouble: mostly when there are two or more kaum which cannot agree 
which kaum is to keep the panghuluship or when the title-rotation does 
not function. If the dispute cannot be solved by the other panghulu or 
not even by the highest panghulu in the Karapatan Adat Nagari, the 
Nagari Council, this kind of division may be the last resort. 
3. Mangguntiang siba baju (A piece of the shirt is cut off) 
In this case, a new buah gadang is formed by the descendants of former 
strangers, who had at some time associated with the buah gadang. If 
their descendants have increased, and when they have demonstrated their 
worth, it may be decided to give them independent buah gadang-status. 
They will be given their own panghulu title, which should in general be 
derived from the title of their former panghulu. The new panghulu thus 
may get a title like Dt. Sinaro nan Panjang. 
4. Mambuek kato nan baru, mambuek panghulu baru (To make a new panghulu) 
In this case a new panghuluship is created for the descendants of former 
slaves which have been given independent buah gadang status. The title 
is new insofar as it may not contain part of the sako of their former 
masters; a new ti tIe has to be invented. 
The same processes hold, of course, true for future cleavages of the 
newly formed buah gadang. If at a later stage the buah gadang which has 
been formed by the descendants of former strangers is split, this 
will follow the rules laid out in 1. and 2., the rul es concerning 
cleavage of groups of blood relatives. 
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I I. O1HER GROUPS 
The buah gadang and kaum have been described as the constituent socio-
political units. This constituent character is rooted in adat and the 
nagari-constitution. In addition, there are other references to groups, 
which partly overlap with buah gadang and kaum: jurai, rumah, kampuang, 
and pariuak. In CKL, these terms have the following connotations: 
1. The JUY'ai 
The term jUY'ai can be used to denote any MDG which traces common matri-
lineal descent to one common apical ancestress, irrespective of its 
genealogical depth and formal structure. JUY'ai thus can be used to refer 
to a mother with her children, to a kaum or a buah gadang, and it can 
also denote a group of several buah gadang which share common matrilineal 
descent. In general, however, the term jurai is employed to indicate 
lineages within the formal groups, the kaum or buah gadang; i.e. the 
apical ancestresses of the jUY'ai can be taken from each genealogical 
level below the one on which the kaum- or buah gadang ancestress is 10-
cated. JUY'ai means both the actually living members of a jurai as weIl 
as the group in perpetuity. It has a purely genealogical connotation: A 
jUY'ai is always formed of blood relatives (bataZi darah) , whatever their 
social status may beo 
2. The Rumah 
The term rumah, house, refers to the rumah gadang, the Minangkabau long-
house, which is the center of kaum activities and ceremonies and in 
which the female group members sleep together with their husbands and 
children. Rumah, or the people who are sa-rumah, "of one house", can be 
used to indicate the kin group sharing the same rumah gadang. The eldest 
matrikinsman, the head of the house, is styled mamak rumah or tungganai. 
But rumah can also be used in reference to all persons whose an-
cestresses, howsoever far removed, once shared the same rumah gadang. It 
thus can indicate all members of a buah gadang, even if they now live 
in several houses. In suku Caniago, e.g., there was a subdivision cal led 
Caniago 5 Rumah, the Caniago of the 5 Houses. In this case, the 5 houses 
indicated the five original buah gadang of that subdivision. In CKL, as 
probably in most nagari in Minangkabau and as in many other societies, 
"house" has both a genealogical and residential/territorial meaning. In 
former times, the genealogical and residential rules were probably 
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matched insofar as a residential unit was also a genealogical unit re-
cognized as a formal group. In a given historical situation, the people 
who were sarumah constituted thekawn or even the buah gadang. When the 
group members increased, at first new rooms would be added to the rumah 
gadang, or a smaller house would be built adjacent to it. In this case, 
the group mernbers in the small house would still be "of one house" wi th 
the others. If the group continued to increase, people would start think-
ing of building a new rumah gadang. This is an important matter, to be 
decided by the whole group and the panghuZu. If the new rumah gadang was 
built, the group members going to live there would have their own mamak 
rumah or tungganai, and the residential split would probably be accom-
panied by a forma 1 subdivision of the group. 
As far as I can judge, the genealogical principle, however, was the 
decisive one. It certainly has proved to be the persistent ane in CKL, 
where the residential referent has lost most of its irnportance. For 
rumah gadang are no longer regularly reconstructed eit is too expensive 
and people appreciate some more privacy) and the rumah gadang which are 
still used usually do not house a formal group any more. The rnajority 
of people live in smaller houses, which have space enough for a jupai of 
three generations. Whether these houses can be called pwnah in its adat 
meaning is questionable. In CKL, the eldest male matrilineal relative of 
a group living in a small house is sometimes designated mamak rumah, 
but in general mamak rumah or tungganai is used to denote the kawn-heads, 
also when the kawn members lived in several small houses. 
3. The Kampuang 
The concept kampuang is also used with both genealogical and territorial 
reference in Minangkabau. In the literature, it is used to refer to 
groups such as buah gadang in CKL as weIl as to larger groups cornposed 
of several buah gadang of the same suku. This seerns to be the general 
case for nagapi with Koto-Piliang adat in the district 50 Koto. 
Kampuang is also used to indicate the settlernent area in which a genea-
logical kampuang lives. In CKL, the word is only used in a residentialj 
t . . I . 10 errltorla meanlng. 
4. The PaPiuak 
The word papiuak li terally means "ri ce-pot" . It is used to denote the 
people who share one rice-pot - the group of matrilineal relatives who 
eat together. 
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II 1. GROUP FORMATION ON MJRE INCLUSIVE LEVELS AND 1HE SYSTEM OF INTER-
GROUP RELATIONSHIPS 
The buah gadang are the basic socio-political units in the nagari. Their 
mutual relationships, hierarchical order, and the formation of more in-
clusive groups of buah gadang are regulated in the nagari's constitution. 
The constitution is partly subject to Minangkabau-wide adat which con-
tains principles according to which a nagari must be constituted; in 
part it consists of constitutional arrangements which have been made by 
the nagari's political leaders. 
One of the most important principles of nagari organization is that 
each Minangkabau individual, and consequently each group, must be long 
to a suku, and that there must at least be four suku in a territory be-
fore the territory may be declared a nagari. The description and analysis 
of the Minangkabau suku organization is complicated by the fact, that 
the term suku is applied to groupings of different character - in the 
literature as weIl as in the various nagari: Suku refers to the named 
groups which are generally considered to have been Minangkabau-wide 
matriclans, and which are said to have developed out of the "original" 
four suku Koto, Piliang, Bodi, and Caniago. At present, there are more 
than one hundred of such suku in Minangkabau, but they have group cha-
racter only on the nagari level. Secondly, suku álso refers to admini-
strative associations of buah gadang which may not be related to each 
other by actual or assumed common matrilineal descent and which may even 
belong to different clan-suku. A detailed discussion of the Minangkabau 
suku system and of the interpretations given to it in the literature 
would go far beyond the scope of this study.11 Here, I shall only des-
cribe the situation as it was in nagari CKL. 
In CKL, there are two kindsof most inclusive groups, the suku and the 
hindu. The suku, also called suku pusako, are formed according to the 
principle of common matrilineal heritage, and are known by the matri-
clan names. The hindu (from induek, mother, genetrix) or hindu adat, 
which formerly had been cal led suku adat, are formed according to the 
principle of adat in the sense of political arrangements not (or not ex-
clusively) based upon common matrilineal descent. The hindu adat are 
named af ter its dominant suku pusako group or af ter the number of its 
12 component suku pusako groups. 
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In CKL, there are 9 suku pusako: Sikumbang, Guci, Koto, Jambak, 
Caniago, Selayan, Melayu, Pili, and Tanjung. There is unfortunately no 
exact information on the number of the suku members, but the relative 
strength can be indicated by the number of kaum and the multiplication 


































Genealogical relationships are not acknowledged between all the buah 
gadang of one suku pusako. Those which are related to each other by 
common matrilineal des cent and which have developed through the proces-
ses of cleavage from one original buah gadang are characterized as being 
"saparuik" - "of one womb". (Note: In the literature the term saparuik 
is generally used as a formal group term for the groups cal led buah 
gadang in CKL.) But with other buah gadang of the same suku no such re-
lationships are recognized. Some buah gadang had, at the time of the 
first immigration, come from very different parts of Minangkabau. With 
these buah gadang, only a very vague and putative common descent is 
recognized on the basis of common suku-membership, and the notion that 
all members of one suku ultimately had descended from one original group. 
With other buah gadang, even those relationships are not recognized as 
they had been formed by the descendants of strangers (who before their 
incorporation may have belonged to another suku) or the descendants of 
slaves. This, at least, is the conception held by the adat experts in 
CKL. The different kinds of relationships are clearly distinguished by 
them, and one still ''knows'' the actual kind of relationships. The charter 
of relationships is orally transmitted, and it is also written down in 
74 PROPER1Y IN SOCIAL CONTlNUI1Y 
the tamba of the nagari. We were shown excerpts, containing the lists 
of panghulu (buah gadang) and their grouping according to saparuik re-
lationships. In the tamba excerpts, adat experts had also written down 
the places of origin of the buah gadang which had moved to CKL from else-
where. 
The buah gadang of the 9 suku pusaka are grouped together differently 
in the 12 hindu adat. The composition of the hindu is as follows: 14 
1. Hindu Sikumbang Tangah (the Sikumbang in the middle ). This hindu 
comprises at least two unrelated (in the sense of saparuik) groups 
of Sikumbang buah gadang. 
2. Hindu Sikumbang Koto Ambalau (the Sikumbang in Koto Ambalau). This 
hindu comprises at least two unrelated Sikumbang groups and the four 
buah gadang of suku Pili. 
3. Hindu Sikumbang Koto Kubang (the Sikumbang in Koto Kubang). This 
hindu consists of at least two unrelated Sikumbang groups and the 
three buah gadang of suku Tanjung which originally settled in the 
northern part of CKL. 
4. Hindu 111 Saniniek (the three of one grandmother, ancestress). This 
hindu comprises buah gadang of suku Koto, Guci, and Melayu. 
S. Hindu Jamb·ak Ujuang Balai (the Jambak at the end of the council hall). 
This hindu consists of two unrelated Jambak groups. 
6. Hindu Jambak Batu Baji (the Jambak at Batu Baji). This hindu is com-
posed of two unrelated Jambak groups and one group of Sikumbang buah 
gadang. 
7. Hindu Caniago 5 Rurnah (the Caniago of the five houses). This hindu 
comprises 8 buah gadang of suku Caniago which form at least two sapa-
ruik groups. 
8. Hindu Caniago-Selayan. This hindu consists of two unrelated Selayan 
groups and three buah gadang of suku Caniago. 
9. Hindu Koto Jantan (the male Koto). This hindu comprises several (at 
least three) unrelated groups of suku Koto. 
10. Hindu Koto Batino (the fernale Koto). This hindu is also composed of 
several unrelated Koto groups and in addition comprises those buah 
gadang of suku Tanjung which originally settled in the southern part 
of CKL. 
11 • Hindu Guci Tangah (the Guci in the middle ), and 
12. Hindu Guci Ateh (the Guci high up (the mountain)), which are both 
composed of at least two unrelated groups of Guci buah gadang. 
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The hindu adat are formally subdivided into sabuah paruik. The sabuah 
paruik comprise buah gadang of one suku pusaka within the hindu adat. 
Depending on the number of buah gadang within one hindu there are one or 
two sabuah paruik, 4 buah gadang being the average of a sabuah paruik. 
The sabuah paruik are grouped together as far as possible according to 
genealogical closeness, but even they contain buah gadang which are not 
considered to be related to each other. As will be remembered, the re-
lated ones are called saparuik. Experts in CKL laid great emphasis on 
the difference: Buah gadang which are sabuah paruik were "disabuahkan", 
were made into one buah paruik. (Note again: In the literature the term 
sabuah paruik is of ten used for what is called buah gadang in CKL). 
This rather complex arrangement will briefly be outlined in its his-
torical development (as could be reconstructed according to the informa-
tion given by CKL experts): At the time when the territory of the later 
nagari CKL was still forest, 7 panghulu with their buah gadang moved 
into the area. They took possession of as much land as they wanted and 
started to cultivate it. These were 3 panghulu of suku Sikumbang, and 
one each of suku Selayan, suku Guci, suku Koto,and suku Jarnbak. In the 
course of time, the original buah gadang split and other immigrants moved 
into the area. The first settlers allowed them to settIe nearby and to 
occupy and cultivate land. At that time, the newcomer groups retained 
their suku pusaka membership but had to subrnit to the socio-political 
authority of the panghulu of the oldest lineages. The 7 panghulu, the 
leaders of the first buah gadang to occupy the area, were styled panghulu 
7 suku and their following suku adat. 
The population increased and new immigrants·settled in the area adja-
cent to the original settIement area. In the course of time, the inhabi-
tants of the various small residential clusters established three kata. 
Kata are settIement centers which have already some formal structure but 
not yet the status of a nagari. They could be established in an area 
over which no nagari yet claimed sovereignty but also within a nagari 
area. In the latter case, the founders of a new kata could be given na-
gari status, too, by the government of the original nagari which forth-
with had the position of a ''mother-nagari'' towards the new one. In CKL, 
however, no nagari had claimed sovereignty over the area. 
The centers of the three kata were located at some distance from the 
original settIement area (see map p. 76), and their foundation must have 
occasioned a shift in the traditional power-system from the old to the 
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new and more heavily populated settIement clusters. Apparently, not all 
newcomers wanted to subject themselves to the authority of the panghuZu 
7 suku. So when the inhabitants of the three koto decided to establish 
one nagari in the area, the former 7 suku systemwas changed into the 
12 hindu constitution. In each of the three koto were 4 hindu adat. 
The 12 hindu system is said to be the "cupak usaZi" of CKL -
the "original measure/standard" which cannot be altered. 15 All new 
groups had to be incorporated into their framework. The sabuah paruik 
division, on the contrary, was flexible. A comparison of the sabuah 
paruik groupings in the tambo excerpts with the groupings given for the 
contemporary system shows that there had been several rearrangements of 
the buah gadang. 
When the nagari was founded, there were 60 panghuZu recognized as 
buah gadang leaders, and each hindu adat consisted of 5 buah gadang. 
These 60 formed the Karapatan Adat Nagari, the nagari adat council. For 
administrative and governmental affairs, the hindu-functionaries con-
stituted the highest executive. Each hindu has one panghuZu bahindu - a 
panghuZu for hindu affairs, one juaro adat ("adat champion"), who has the 
function of an executi ve official, and an aook mudo ("young child"), who 
functions as assistant to the juaro adat. 16 The juaro adat form a sepa-
rate council under the chairmanship of the tambang adat (the "mine of 
adat"), who generally is a panghuZu. The original 7 suku (adat) are still 
acknowledged, and the 12 panghuZu hindu are normally referred to as "the 
pang hu Zu of the 7 suku", although they mmmer 12. The panghu Zu of the 
7 hindu which have grown out of the 7 suku adat are regarded as having 
a "somewhat" superior status, and in formal ceremonies their former posi-
tion is indicated by special seating-arrangements. The juaro adat are 
likewise distinguished and one speaks of the juaro of the 7 suku and the 
juaro of the 5 hindu. 
Both suku/hindu adat and suku pusako have different spheres of compe-
tence and a different, though overlapping, hierarchy of socio-political 
authori ty. CKL- adat says: "Pusako sakato niniek mamak - adat sakato 00-
gari" - ''Pusako is a matter of the lineage elders - adat is a matter of 
the nagari". Pusako matters are subjects dealing with heritage, property 
and panghuZu titles. Disputes about such problems should be settled in 
the suku-pusako hierarchy. Pusako also regulates the question of exogamy. 
In principle it is the suku pusako which are the exogamous units (see 
below D 111 2). Inter-buah gadang inheritance is also regulated according 
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to pusako: If one buah gadang is extinct (punah) its property must be 
inherited within the suku pusako. 
The hindu system is concerned wi th adat, which is used here in the 
sense of ~ari administration and government, from which pusako (intra-
lineage-, suku pusako-)affairs are exempt. Though the hindu are also 
spoken of in terms of matrilineal descent, hindu relations are irrele-
vant for matters such as property and marriage. Hindu, induek, means 
'inother". The hindu II I Saniniek, the "three wi th a connnon grandmother", 
for instance, contains buah gadang from suku Guci, Kata, and Melayu. In 
adat, they are "one" - but they may intermarry, and if the Guci in III 
Saniniek should become extinct, their property would be inherited by 
Guci buah gadang of another hindu, not by the buah gadang of Kata or 
Melayu in their hindu. 
When the nagaY'i was founded, there were 60 buah gadang and panghulu. 
Since then the number of buah gadang has increased, and in CKL 100 pang-
hulu are recognized as legitimate buah gadang leaders and members of the 
Karapatan Adat Nagari. The imposition of a new political superstructure 
by the Dutch has, however, seriously affected the adat constitution (see 
also Chapter 3). The Dutch had not recognized all panghulu as being of 
equal rank, and only a limited number had been given "panghulu-offices" 
in terms of the new administrative system. At the end of the last century, 
the Dutch had further forbidden the establishment of new panghulu titles, 
and the 100 panghuluships most probably are the number at which the buah 
gadang and panghulu system was "frazen in" by the Dutch. They do not 
seem to have realized that with the prohibition to create new panghulu-
ships they also disturbed the adat mechanisms of group formation. A num-
ber of 'wild" panghuluships have been established, and the panghuluships 
have risen to a number between 113 and 139. It is not easy to determine 
which panghuluships are the 'wild" ones; even among the acknowledged 
adat experts of CKL there is some dis agreement about that. In 1975, there 
were only 20 panghulu who had officially been instalIed, among them two 
of the panghulu 7 suku. Their authority has decreased, but the adat con-
stitution and the adat functionaries still play a considerable role in 
nagari poli tics. The Karapatan Adat Nagari still holds meetings, and sa 
do the juaY'o adat under the leadership of the tambang adat, who also 
ftmctions as the chairman of the Karapatan Adat Nagari • In terms of wes-
tern conceptions of effectiveness, they cannot govern the nagari, but 
they are still influential enough to sabotage the national nagari admini-
stration, which, to a great extent, is also recruited from their numbers. 
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IV. THE TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS OF THE NAGARI 
The terri torial structure of CKL is as complex as the adat and pusaka 
structure. There are several and partly overlapping territorial divi-
sions of the nagari (see map. p. 76), which divide the inhabitants into 
adat-, neighbourhood-, religious- and administrative local communities 
(see also below E 11 on Residence). 
1. The Adat Divisians af CKL 
Traditionally, CKL is divided into three kata. Besides being a territo-
rial division of the nagari, the kata division is also a division of 
adat. The members of the four hindu localized in a kata formed semi-
autonomous groups in adat. Adat matters and disputes usually came to the 
attention of "the nagari", i.e. the combined three kata, only af ter they 
had been discussed and decided within the kata. In former times, the 
people of one kata also shared collective liability in unsolved 
homicide cases. 
In the course of time, the kata division has been overshadowed by an-
other adat division of the nagari territory. When the Dutch used the 
Minangkabau nagari as units of local government in the 1830'5, some 
nagari were divided, others united for administrative purposes. CKL was 
divided into two nagari, Candung and Koto Lawas. There were 5 hindu in 
Candung and 7 in Koto Lawas. Besides the division into kata, one spoke 
increasingly, but not exclusively, of an adat of Candung and an adat of 
Koto Lawas. When Candung and Koto Lawas were reunited in 1915, this dis-
tinction was retained. 
2. The Buek Divisian 
Another important division of the nagari is the one into buek. The buek 
may best be described as neighbourhoods which have been constituted by 
agreement of the members of the various suku residing in the same resi-
dential cluster of the nagari. The buek are subdivided into umpuek (Ind.: 
keZampak, group, cluster), which are the smallest territorial units con-
sisting of members of more than one buah gadang of one or of different 
suku. The buek have their own rules and regulations, buek perbuatan, con-
cerning community and neighbourhood matters. Probably since the Padri-
war, each buek has developed its own regulations about the surau (prayer 
house) and mosque. 
Besides the two basic principles of group and authority structure in 
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CKL which have already been mentioned (adat sakata nagari - pusaka saka-
ta niniek mamak) there is a third one concerning the buek: "Buek sakata 
baliYI{Jka" - "neighbourhood matters are decided by the neighbours". The 
buek council is formed by the oldest men of the kaum resident in a buek. 
Besides, each umpuek has a panghulu buek, a panghulu for buek affairs, 
who usually is no panghulu according to adat, i.e. no incumbent of a 
buah gadang's saka. The panghulu buek are umpuek representatives, who 
are responsible to the buek for the maintenance of umpuek affairs. 
The buek structure probably precedes the foundation of the nagari and 
can be regarded as the oldest form of cross-buah gadang (suku) political 
and social organization. 17 Af ter the nagari had been founded, the old 
buek structure was retained, but with the increase of the population 
some of the old buek have been subdivided and new buek have been formed 
in formerly unsettled parts of the nagari. The buek borders partly cut 
across all other territorial divisions of the nagari. As buek are not 
concerned with adat (which is a nagari matter) the adat-territorial divi-
sion into the three kata and later into Candung and Koto Lawas was less 
relevant than the actual territorial neighbourhood. In some parts of the 
nagari, settIement clusters which belong to two kata are much cIos er 
to each other than the other settIement clusters in their respective 
kata, and buek were formed across the kata-divisions or vice versa. 
3. The Sidang System 
The terri tory of CKL is further di vided into four sidang. The sidang are 
religirus councils, which are attached to the four main mosques. Their 
function is decision making in religious matters, mainly in disputes 
about marriages. 
The contemporary sidang system in CKL most probably is the remainder 
of the attempt to establish a theocratie governmental system, which in 
the Padri era had beenundertaken in most nagari which had come under 
the political domination of the Padri forces (cf. AB 39: 212 ff.). In 
CKL, it was based upon the buek system. Several buek were united to form 
one sidang which, with the mosque as its center, was to be governed by 
the mosque officials and representatives of the buek. The highest buek 
representatives were cal led Tuangku or Angku in CKL; according to the 
number of buek united in one sidang their full title was Tuangku nan 3 
or Tuangku nan 4. In CKL, the sidang system has been "adatisized", inte-
grated into the adat political structure in the course of time. A sharp 
distinction was made between the "four sidang according to adat" and the 
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religious village council which has been created within the local govern-
ment system (see Chapter 3: 125 f.). 
4. The Jorong Division 
Finally, the nagari is divided into village districts, jorong, as part 
of the local government system. The jorong borders to some extent run 
parallel with old buek borders. Each jorong has a village district head-
man, wali jorong, as administrative head, who is subject to the village 
mayor, the wali negeri. In his daily affairs, the wali jorong is assis-
ted by a jorong deliberation-committee. 
C. THE ALLOCATION OF AUTI-IORITY 
I. THE BASIC NOTIONS OF AUTI-IORITY IN MINANGKABAU ADAT 
The basic notions of authority in Minangkabau adat are weIl expressed 
in one of the most frequently quoted adat sayings (see e.g. R.M. Dt. 
Rajo Panghulu 1971: 80): 
"Kamanakan barajo ka mamak 
mamak barajo ka panghulu 
panghulu barajo ka mupakat 
mapakat barajo kapado alua 
alua barajo kapado mungkin dan patuik 
patuik dan mungkin barajo kapado bana 
bana itulah nan manjadi rajo." 
"The kamanakan are subject to the mamak 
the mamak is subject to the panghulu 
the panghulu is subject to the mupakat 
the mupakat is subject to the power of reasoning 
the power of reasoning is subject to what is appropriate and possible 
what is appropriate and possible is subject to truth 
i t is truth which is the highest authori ty (which becomes king) ." 
Final authority thus is vested in abstract values, but what is appro-
priate,possible, and true, must be found through the exercise of human 
reasoning. As far as authority is vested in man, the adat saying weIl 
expresses the two basic notions of authority which pervade all Minang-
kabau adat: 
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1. There is the idea that authority is vested in individuals (mamak, 
panghulu) who occupy social positions which are defined by sex, age, 
and offices. This authority is hierarchical. It gives the individual 
occupying such a position authority over other persons. The hierarchy 
of social positions corresponds to the political structure of the nagari, 
starting on the most exclusive group (jurai) level up to the most in-
clusive group, the nagari. 
2. There is the idea that authority is, somewhat diffusely, vested in 
groups of persons. This finds its expression in the principle that all 
decisions affecting groups must be taken in a process of common delibe-
ration, musyC/);)arah, and lead to a unanimous decision, sakato ("one word") 
or mupakat. This principle applies to all group levels, and it comple-
ments and restricts the first principle according to which authority is 
vested in individual persons. 
The groups, in which authority is vested according to adat, are the 
groups we already have discussed: structured by matrilineal des cent or 
at least modelled on this principle. Authority is allocated to indivi-
duals as members of such groups. In the fOllowing, I shall describe the 
manifestations of the adat principles. The territorial and pOlitico-
religious group structures have already been discussed and the offices 
of these structures have been mentioned. As they are of less relevance 
for property affairs, they need not be described in detail here. 
Ir. AU1HORITI VESTED IN SOCIAL POSITIONS 
1. Group Leadership 
The clearest manifestation of authority vested in social positions which 
are filled by individuals is the rule that each group has, or must have, 
a leader. This rule finds its expression in the not ion of "mamakship". 
Each group from the smallest jurai to the hindu adat must have a mamak. 
Mamakship in this sense denotes group leadership. It involves authority 
over the group members and the representation of the group or the indi-
vidual group members in inter-group relationships. This pertains to all 
kinds of social relations: political, where the group is represented in 
the nagari; economic , where all property transactions between members of 
different groups (or between groups) need the presence and the consent 
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of the group leader; social, like cases of marriage, where the group 
leader must give his consent and represent his group and his marrying 
kamanakan in the ceremony. 
As regards intra-group affairs, the mamak (on whichever group level) 
is responsible for the maintenance of order in his group. He is the 
person whom one must notify when one wants to leave the nagari and to 
whom one must report when one returns. 
With respect to outsiders, the mamak is responsible for any acts 
which his group members may have done in violation of adat. He must take 
care that the fault is atoned by the appropriate measures. If not, it 
is he who will be sanctioned, too, not his group member only. Thus if 
a group member has violated adat by not adhering to the marriage rules, 
it will be his or her mamak who will be banned from nagari political and 
social activities, unless atonement for the fault has been made. In CKL, 
we observed several such cases where a mamak was held liable for an 
offence of his kamanakan. The mamak is also responsible for the execu-
tion of any decisions taken at more inclusive group levels. 
Mamakship in general is vested in the male sex (but see Kom 1941 on 
the "female mamak") and is defined by age: The mamak is the oldest matri-
lineal kinsman of the group, of a jurai of ~y size. No official process 
is required to make him mamak. If the present mamak dies, or when he is 
unable to fulfill his funct ion , the kinsman next in age will automati-
cally assume the function of mamak. These principles are modified for 
those mamakships which are vested in offices, which exist from the level 
of buah gadang upwards. The system of offices will be described later. 
2. AuthoY'ity Vested in FemaZes 
The mamakship is not the only individualized social position in which 
authority is vested. The mamak's authority covers the representation of 
the group completely, but in matters internal to the group authority is 
also vested in the position of the eldest woman of the group (jurai un-
til the size of buah gadang). She is the "Zimpa:peh rumah gadang", the 
"strong pillar of the family house", and the "amban puruek - kunci nan 
tagueh" - "the strong lock of the chest" in which the harato pusako, the 
group's inherited property, is kept (see Willinck 1909: 392, 403, 601; 
Kom 1941: 319; R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 50; I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 
1973: 50 ff.). She wields the highest authority within the house. But 
her authority is not restricted to purely domestic matters. For the 
oldest woman is the one "nan pagang harato", who controls and keeps the 
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property, who has the dominant voice in the distribution of the group's 
property and any surplus the group's property may have yielded (for more 
details see Chapter 4). That these references to the woman's position 
are not just idealizations of the female'sjmother's role but a concrete 
reference to her function in social organization is amply borne out by 
the knowledge we have of Minangkabau social life during the last one and 
half centuries (compare Willinck 1909, Kom 1941, Tanner 1971), and it 
will also be apparent in the stories of property affairs (Chapter 5). 
In group internal affairs, she is even characterized as the highest 
authority: Willinck states "that in the Minangkabau family circle, the 
oldest common ancestress, if still alive, actually stood above the mamak. 
She remained in each case where family affairs had to be decided in the 
sabuah paruik or jurai, the highest authority (1909: 391 f., cf. Kom 
1941:320). 
Yet in general, women cannot assume the function of group leader and 
outward representative. If males are absent, this function is generally 
assumed by the leader of the group which is most closely related accor-
ding to matrilineal descent. Occasionally exceptions are made, but this 
seems to be restricted to group leadership in property affairs. 18 
According to our findings, the principle that women cannot act as group 
leaders is adhered to. In one case in CKL, where the problem arose 
whether a woman could represent her kaum in a property transaction, the 
adat functionaries decided that she could not and that the mamak kepaZa 
waris of the most closely related kaum should do 50. The principle is 
also, with same exceptions, applied in the State Courts. 19 
3. Authori ty Vested in the Father 
According to adat, only little authority is vested in the role of the 
father. The mamak is the center of authority; it is he who should disci-
pline his kamanakan if necessary. The mamak represents his kamanakan in 
social and political matters, and the childrens' pusako affairs are also 
subject to the authority of the mamak and the childrens' matrikin in 
general. Minangkabau men as fathers are supposed "to carry their chil-
dren" , as mamak they are supposed to "lead their kamanakan". However, 
in their role of in-married husbands (urang sumando) , men participate in 
the decision making processes which affect their childrens' property 
affairs and in the ceremonies which accompany their rites de passage. 
Besides, fathers can exercise some economie control over their wives and 
children by transferring their self-acquired property or some of their 
SOCIO-POLITlCAL ORGANIZATION IN MlNANGKABAU 85 
own jurai's pusako-property to the conjugal household. But in principle 
the father's authority is limited to minor domestic matters (see also 
below the sections on marriage and residence). 
The adat conceptualization of the father's role, however, is modified 
through the Islamic notions about the father's position. In religious 
matters, fathers usually represent their children. In particular, fathers 
act as marriage guardians "according to religion" (waZi syarak) besides 
the mamak, the marriage guardian "according to adat" (waZi adat). The 
extent to which fathers can exercise authority over their children has 
also changed considerably during the last 150 years, mainly as a conse-
quence of the decrease of the mamak's authority and an increasing econo-
mie orientation of men towards their conjugal household (this development 
will be analyzed more fully later in Chapters 5 and 6). Men live more 
permanently in the houses of their wives, they contribute more to the 
economic budget of their wife and children, and they usually pay the 
school fees which in former times were paid by the mamak. But the fact 
th at they do 50, and that they are consequently less in the house of 
their kamanakan (which means that their childrens' mamak also will stay 
most of the time with his children) does not mean that the authority 
over the children has been shifted from mamak to father. It rather has 
eoncentrated on the childrens' mother. According to our experiences, 
both with villagers and edueated townspeople most serious decisions and 
disciplinary measures were taken by the wife/mother, the husband/father 
taking care not to interfere with the education of ''her'' children (cf. 
Tanner 1971; Thomas 1977). 
lIl. AlJTIlORITY VESTED IN OFFICES 
The leadership positions of the buah gadang and of all more inclusive 
groups formed by buah gadang, are vested in offices. Offices are social 
positions that in principle exist independently of their incumbents. If 
the office is vacant, the function is either fulfilled by an office 
holder of another group acting as representative, or by the group's 
mamak as non-office holding "normal " group leader. Only wi thin the buah 
gadang are there same offices which are attached to concrete individuals. 
The offices are titled, and the office titles (gaZa bapangkat) and par-
ticularly the title of the panghuZu (the sako) belong to the inherited 
property (pusako) of the buah gadang's blood relatives(see below Chap-
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ter 4: 164 ff.). 
1. The Offiaes of the Buah Gadang 
a. The PanghuZu 
The leadership of the buah gadang is vested in the panghuZu. The panghu-
Zuship is the sako of the group, which descends through the generations. 
But the panghuZu is also the group's leader in the nagari. Thus if a 
panghuZu is to be instalIed, two sets of rules have to be adhered t~. 
One set refers to the choosing of the panghuZu-candidate by the persons 
to whom the panghuZuship belongs. The other refers to the rules by which 
the nagari political community accepts a new panghuZu as one of its 
leaders. 20 According to the principle of pusako, the appointment of the 
panghuZu is the concern of the group which holds the sako as inherited 
property (pusako). No panghuZu can be instalIed without the unanimous 
"round" decision of the group,without a kebuZatan kaum buah gadang. As 
a general guideI ine, the title is to descend from mamak to kamanakan, 
from MB to ZS. But this is, at least in the adat Bodi-Caniago, not a 
prescriptive succession rule in terms of genealogical positions. 21 It 
rather indicates that succession must be between matrilineal relatives 
and that it should be from a senior to a junior generation. But in prin-
ciple, the candidate must be ahosen, and have all the attributes that 
Minangkabau adat demands of a panghuZu. 22 The principle of MB-ZS succes-
sion is further mediated through the institution of gadang baZega 
according to which the panghuZuship is rotated between the jurai or kaum 
of the buah gadang (see above). Sa the successor may weIl be a brother 
or grandnephew or even a very distant matrilineal relative of the former 
panghuZu. If the buah gadang members cannot agree upon a candidate and 
the musy(J1;)arah does not lead to mupakat, the sako is di Zipek, ''put aside", 
for the time being. In the case where there is no suitable candidate at 
all (no male buah gadang members, or only too aId or too young ones etc.) 
the sako is tatarueh, "deposited". If the sako is diZipek or tatarueh, 
the buah gadang has a ''normal'' mamak as group leader (or a panungkek, see 
pp. 82,88). He will act as mamak in all intra-group affairs and will in 
principle alsa represent the group in the nagari. Only on the occasions 
where a panghuZu must act in nagari affairs, will the graup be represent-
ed by one of the panghuZu who is "saparuik". 
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According to the principle of adat, the installation of a panghulu 
is a matter of the nagari, and the other panghulu must accept the new 
candidate as their equal. Non-acceptance is expressed by not attending 
the ceremony at which the highest nagari officials, the panghulu of the 
12 hindu, the juaro adat and the anak mudo, finally invest the new pang-
hulu with his title. 
The selection and installation of a panghulu is a long and expensive 
process. Several meetings must be held, in which the approval for the 
candidate must be formally secured from different groups of persons, 
starting with kin groups ~oving up through the more inclusive political 
groups and finally culminating in a meeting in which only the panghulu 
of the 12 hindu, the juaro adat, and anak mudo participate and in which 
the new panghulu is officially instalIed '~y the nagari". At all these 
meetings, ceremonial meals are held, and for the final ceremonies a buf-
falo must be slaughtered, a certain amount of rice must be given, and 
the adat-money must be handed to the adat-officials. 23 
The panghulu can be instalIed in three different ways, which are dis-
tinguished according to the distance in time from the end of the pre-
vious panghulu's office-holding. The descriptions given in the litera-
ture are rather uniform, but there is some variation in the terminology:4 
The following categories are used in CKL and also in the nagari 111 Balai 
and Padang Tarab, where we were able to attend altogether 4 panghulu in-
stallations: 
1. Hiduik Bakarilahan 
In this case, the succession occurs during the lifetime of the old pang-
hulu. This happens very rarely. Informants in CKL could not remember a 
single case, but there was a rumour that one panghulu, while still alive, 
wanted to give his title and office to a kamanakan. 
2. Mati Batungkek Budi 
In this case the successor is determined shortly af ter the panghulu's 
death and publicly declared panghulu in a formal meeting of the highest 
adat-functionaries. This meeting should take place on the day of the 
death or immediately afterwards. The actual installation ceremony is 
then held af ter the funeral ceremonies, but must not exceed three weeks 
from the day of death. Until the installation ceremony has been held, 
the new title holder cannot act as panghulu, although the transfer of 
the panghulu title is and remains valid, and the new panghulu-~o-be is 
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addressed with his new title. In CKL, there are several of such '~alf­
panghuZu" who have not yet held the installation ceremony, and who can-
not "go to adat" as panghuZu. During our stay, one panghuZu died, and 
on the same day a buah gadang member was selected and declared new pang-
huZu in the manner described above. Due to nagari polities, however, the 
installation ceremony was not held in due time, although it had been 
scheduled during the meeting in which the candidate was declared pang-
huZu. Unfortunately, the resulting problems had not yet been solved 
before we left the nagari. 
3. Mambangkik Batang Tarandam 
This is the ceremony by which a panghuZu is installed if his predecessor 
has been dead for a longer period than for which mati batungkek budi is 
allowed. This is the most elaborate and most expensive way to install a 
panghuZu. 
b. The Panungkek (Tungkek) 
In CKL (as weIl as in other Bodi-Caniago nagari) a panghuZu can have 
one or more panungkek, "aides" . The panungkek also carry the ti tIe Datuek, 
and their title is generally derived from the title of their panghuZu. 
So if the panghuZu is Dt. Sinaro, the panungkek's title may be Dt. Sinaro 
nan Tungga. The function of the panungkek is to help the panghuZu in the 
administration of the buah gadang. If the buah gadang consists of several 
kaum, a panungkekship may be created and the administration of one or 
more kaum may be entrusted to the panungkek. 
The office of panungkek is closely connected with that of his pang-
huZu. The panungkek is instalIed together with his panghuZu, and con-
tinues to function as long as a new panghulu is not instalIed. If a new 
panghulu is instalIed, he may confirm the old panungkek, but the panungkek 
mayalso be relieved of his office and a ncw one appointed. If the pang-
hulu dies, the panungkek assumes most of the panghulu functions in buah 
gadang internal matters. In adat, in the nagari, he can represent his 
panghulu only to a limited degree. It is not unusual that panungkek try 
to establish themselves as successors when the panghulu has died. This 
is called "bulan manjadi matahari" - "the moon becomes the sun". Parti-
cularly in cases of gadang balega, where panghuluship and panungkekship 
are rotated, this of ten leads to buah gadang cleavage in the form of 
baju sehelai dibagi duo (see above p. 69). In contemporary CKL, there 
are several groups the status of which - kaum or buah gadang - and the 
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status of their leader - panungkek or panghuZu - are unclear. 
c. The Angku 
In CKL, each panghuZu who is not the eldest lineage member, has an ad-
visor, an angku. Angku is used here to denote the adat-office. Besides, 
it is a title of Islamic functionaries, it can be conferred upon elderly 
persons as an honorary title, and is also used as a polite form of address. 
The angku according to adat is the eldest and wisest man of the buah 
gadang, who is to give advice in all matters, particularly in adat 
matters, to the young and perhaps inexperienced panghuZu. He is instal-
Ied together with the panghuZu, and his title is the same as the pang-
huZu's, with the difference that, instead of the Datuek title prefix, the 
angku has the "Angku" prefix. The angku of Dt. Sinaro thus is Angku Si-
naro. In CKL, the groups under a panungkek usually also have their angku. 
2. The Offices in the Hindu System 
The offices in the hindu system are quite complex. The information which 
was given in CKL by informants and which could be found in the excerpts 
of the village-tambo was partly ambiguous or contradictory. It seems 
that some offices were created af ter the Dutch had established their ad-
ministrative system as it has been also reported for some 
offices in district 50 Koto (see De Rooij 1890; Leyds 1926). 
a. The PanghuZu Bahindu 
Each group in the hindu system has a panghuZu as leader who is responsi-
bIe forthe management of hindu (adat) affairs, but who for the rest 
functions as primus inter pares with the other panghuZu. 
On the buah gadang level, the panghuZu are the panghuZu of the buah 
gadang. On the sabuah paruik level, there is a panghuZu babuah paruik. 
This is one of the buah gadang panghuZu, who has the additional function 
of running the sabuah paruik's adat matters. The hindu also has a pang-
huZu bahindu, who is responsibIe for all hindu-internal adat matters. 
The authority of the panghuZu bahindu thus can extend over panghuZu of 
different suku pusako. Such panghuZu bahindu exist in each hindu. But 
besides, there are also panghuZu basuku, as leaders of the suku pusako 
within hindu groups. 
The actual practice is as follows: The panghuZu 7 suku are "panghuZu 
suku". In their hindu, they function as hindu-Ieaders, in the other 
hindu it is the panghuZu bahindu. The panghuZu 7 suku are the oldest 
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panghuZu in their hindu, the heads of the buah gadang which in former 
times had founded the suku adat/hindu adat. In their hindu, the panghuZu 
bahinduship is usually given to the oldest buah gadang of the younger 
sabuah paruik. In some hindu (of the other 5) the panghuZu bahinduship 
is rotated between two buah gadang, the oldest buah gadang of the hindu. 
Thus in the hindu 111 Saniniek, the panghuZu bahinduship is rotated be-
tween a buah gadang of suku Guci and of suku Melayu, and similar arrange-
ments exist in other hindu where no "oldest" buah gadang isrecognized. 
When a meeting of the 12 panghuZu of the 12 hindu took place, the 
panghuZu 7 suku went to represent their hindu; in the other hindu the 
panghuZu bahindu were the representatives. 
The panghuZu bahindu offices are connected to the particular panghuZu 
titles. If a new panghuZu is instalIed, his status within the hindu is 
determined and restated. If the panghuZuship is vacant, another panghuZu 
of the buah paruik will fill the vacancy of panghuZu bahindu, not as 
office holder in his own right, but as representative. His acting as 
panghuZu bahindu for his col league does not make him a representative 
of the non-installed panghuZu in buah gadang matters, too. 
b. The Juaro Adat 
The juaro adat are the "executives" of the hindu, who have to manage 
hindu affairs under their panghuZu. Juaro carry titles, but there are 
two or three titles for each juaro, one of which has to be assumed by 
the newly instalIed juaro. The installation of the juaro is similar to, 
though less elaborate than, the panghuZu installation. The office of 
juaro is the property of the buah gadang of the panghuZu bahindu. This 
also applies to those hindu which have a panghuZu 7 suku as leader. 
When the panghuZu bahinduship is rotated, the juaro is rotated as weIl, 
the juaro being then held by the non panghuZu holding group. 
c. The Anak Mudo 
The anak mudo act as assistants to the juaro and panghuZu, and are used 
as messengers and go-betweens in adat affairs. In addition, the anak 
mudo have to be weIl versed in the pidato, the ceremonial recitals of 
history and adat which fill a large part of the adat ceremonies. In adat 
ceremonies, such as panghuZu installations, they serve the panghuZu and 
juaro. The anak mudo also carry titles, but no special installation 
ceremony was held for them. They could be instalIed whenever a ~ore im-
portant ceremony was held in the nagari. In principle, the anak mudo 
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were chosen for their capabilities, and their office was not the definite 
property of a buah gadang. In the two Sikumbang hindu in which other 
suku were incorporated, the other suku (Tanjung and Pili) also had one 
anak mudo so that the actual mnnber of anak mudo was 14. 
3. The HierarchicaZ Structure of SociaZ positions of Authority 
The adat saying already quoted "kamanakan barajo ka mamak - mamak barajo 
ka panghuZu" - " the kamanakan are subject to the mamak, the mamak is 
subject to the panghuZu", expresses the hierarchical order of the leader-
ship positions within the buah gadang. Leadership positions derive their 
status from the status their group has in adat, and a definite hierarchy 
exists, from the smallest group, the jurai with its mamak, to the largest, 
the hindu adat with the panghuZu bahindu. This hierarchy is relevant for 
two fields of social activity: 
1. It must be followed in the processes of decision making in conflicting 
issues. The conflict should be solved at the lowest level. If it cannot 
be solved, it must be brought to the next higher level until it reaches 
the highest forum, the Karapatan Adat Nagari. For adat- and pusako mat-
ters, different though overlapping hierarchies exist. 
In pusako matters, the way to be followed is from mamak to panghuZu; 
from the panghuZu to all the panghuZu of the sabuah paruik who are of 
the same suku in the same hindu; then to all panghuZu of the same suku 
in the same hindu; then, such matters go to all panghuZu of the same 
suku in the nagari. 
In adat matters, conflicts go from the mamak to the panghuZu, but 
then the juaro adat should take over, exercising his function for the 
panghuZu bahindu. If the problem cannot be solved by the (Juaro) hindu, 
it must be brought to the 5 hindu(in Candung) or the 7 hindu (in Kota 
Lawas). The final forum for both hierarchies is the Karapatan Adat. 
2. Decisions made on a higher level (i.e. in matters concerning the 
implementation of nagari polities or suku-wide problems such as a change 
in the exogamy rules) have to deseend according to this hierarchy. 
Minangkabau adat expresses these two principles with the adat saying: 
"Bajanjang naiek - batanggo turun" - "One has to go up the stairs - one 
has to go down the ladder". No step may be left out. If people approach 
a higher forum immediately, this is ''wrong'' according to adat; the 
parties will be reprimanded and the issue not entertained. 
This is, of course, the ideal order which has been heavily influenced 
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by the other available means for conflict resolution provided by the 
buek/sidang system and the local government and judicial systems. But 
the principle of bajanjang naiek-batangga turun is still used in nagari 
politics and processes of conflict resolution, and has been extended to 
include the State Courts, which sometimes refuse to hear a case unless 
the adat-hierarchy in the nagari has first attempted to deal with it. 25 
IV,AlITHORITI VESTED IN GROUPS 
The second basic principle of authority makes the exercise of authority 
a matter of all group members. Here the ideas of togetherness, unanimity, 
and equality of the group members are stressed. This finds its expression 
in the principle of the ''musY(J1;)arah until mupakat": "Decisions concerning 
group interests must be taken by the group members and lead to a decision 
in which all concur". Minangkabau adat says: "Bulek aie dek pambu lueh -
bulek kata dek mupakat": "(as) the water gets round in the bamboo-pipe -
the words (decisions) get round through the mupakat". This principle is 
highly valued in Minangkabau, and the Minangkabau use it to define the 
character of their society in the terms of the mupakat-democracy, which 
they consider superior to other forms of allocation of social authority~ 
The principle minimizes the power exercised by individuals by virtue of 
their social positions of authority, for the most important issues in 
Minangkabau social and political life (property, panghulu installation, 
marriage etc.) are matters which affect the group and are decided by 
musy(J1;)arah. 
The general principle works at all group levels. However, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between those groups which are, in this respect, re-
garded as a group of individuals, and those groups which are regarded as 
being composed of sub-groups. In the former, all group members of 
"reasonable" age and of both sexes take part in the decision-making 
process. In the latter, only the leaders of the sub-groups, thus males 
only, participate as their groups' representatives in the decision-
making process on a higher group level. In former times, the border case 
probably was the buah gadang, in contemporary CKL it is the kaum: On the 
supra-kaum level, the representatives of the groups decide, within the 
kaum all kaum members participate. 
The musy(J1;)arah until mupakat principle is, of course, an ideal, and 
a brief comment may be made on the actual practice. Actual decision 
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making is generally prepared in smaller groups or by individuals who 
make their own policy and recruit support for it. The decision has of ten 
been taken already when the formal meeting, in which the mupakat is to 
be secured, starts. The ideal equality of the participants is modified 
to a great extent by the personal authority, economic status, and, in 
the political field in particular, by power sources outside the adat 
system. There is a rnultitude of evidence, both in the early literature 
on Minangkabau as weIl as in our own field-experience, that these sources 
" I d f "bI 27 are manlpu ate as ar as pOSSl e. 
In kaum-internal affairs the same holds true, but here another factor 
heavily influences decision making: the strong position of women, the 
older women in particular, who "swing" most decisions or prevent effec-
tive decisions from being made. It must be a very strong mamak who wants 
to control his female lineage members effectively - within the kaum. 
Externally, the mamak skilfully operate power sources which are usually 
not available to women. The principle that the kaum must be represented 
by the mamak kepaZa waris in property matters in the State Courts has 
led to frequent abuse of the mamak position. 28 This has led to a shift 
in kaum-internal authority relations and to the not uncornmon occurrence 
of mamak cheating their female kaum members on the basis of their arti-
ficially strengthened mamak-position. Yet the force of the musyawarah/ 
mupakat principle should not be underestimated. It is true, that "round" 
decisions are less frequently taken, but the actual force of the princi-
ple resides in its negative aspect: If no mupakat is reached and no 
unanirnous decision taken, nothing will hapen, and undecided problems 
and conflicts dominate the social and political life of the nagari. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The two basic conceptions of authority are clearly objectified in adat. 
In practice, and particularly in kaum-life, they are hardly distinguish-
able and seem to flow into each other. It is striking how closely the 
two Minangkabau principles correspond to the two analytical principles of 
governmental activity, which Smith has elaborated in his famous essay 
"On Segrnentary Lineage Systems" (1956). The allocation of authority to 
the group leaders and the kamanakan barajo kamamak principle correspond 
to the principle of "administration" (1956: 49), and the allocati(;m of 
authority to the groups and its exercise through musyawarah~processes to 
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the principle of "political activi ty" (1956: 48 f.). Whereas one may 
question whether "administrative" and "politicaI" are the best labels 
for these different kinds of processes, the distinction itself is ex-
tremely valuable and fully supported by the Minangkabau data. As Smith 
has noted, the principles, though analytically distinct, frequently 
occur together (1956: 48) and th~s certainly is the case in Minangkabau, 
most obviouslyin kaum-social life and decision making. Yet what goes on 
in these processes could not be better described than in Smith's words: 
'~ereas the form of political systerns is segmentary, and only displays 
hierarchical patterns to the extent that the political structures are 
directly involved in administration, the form of an administrative sys-
tem only displays segrnentary patterns to the extent that the administra-
tion itself constitutes a political system" (1956: 49). 
The words "administrative" and "politicaI" have only to be substi-
tuted by the two Minangkabau principles of authority: Kaum administra-
tion is in the handsof the mamak and is hierarchical as far as it in-
volves the execution of musyawarah decisions taken at higher group 
levels as weIl as everyday organization of kaum life. But insofar as 
decision making is concerned that touches the interests of the whole 
group, the kaum constitutes a political system (in Smith's words) in 
which authority is segrnentary, the individual kaum members being the 
segments. On higher group levels, characterized by their hierarchical 
order expressed in the saying " bajanjang naiek - batanggo turun", this 
'~ierarchic devolution of authority and functions is transformed into 
a segmentary contraposition of components" (Smith 1956: 49) when policy 
decisions (musyawarah-decisions) are taken by the representatives of the 
component subgroups. 
D. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS AND BETWEEN INDIVIOOALS AND GROUPS 
I. INfROOOcrORY NOTE 
Each Minangkabau has a complex set of relationships to the other members 
of his nagari and to the groups which exist therein. These relation-
ships are expressed in a similarly complex system of references and, 
to a rnuch lesser degree, by the system of terms by which the Minangka-
bau address each other. Some of the relationships and their social 
functions have already been described in the previous part of this 
dhapter: The relationships arising out of cornmon group membership. As 
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groups play an important role in social and political life, reference to 
common group membership is of ten made when inter-individual relationships 
are characterized. This is done by the expression that one is/is not of 
"one" (sa-)group with the other person/group referred to, the kind of 
group being specified. Most of the groups have already been described: 
It can be a territorial group (sa-buek, sa-kata, sa-nagari) , a descent 
group (sa-jurai, sa-kaum, sa-buah gadang, sa-paruik, sa-suku) , or a 
group formed according to adat (sa-buah paruik, sa-hindu). Another quite 
frequent mode of reference is the indication of the common sharing of a 
social function or relationship, which is specified in the reference. 
Thus ego will denote his relationship to another individual or to a 
group by naming the social function which they share or which pertains 
between them. E.g. ego will state that his relationship to X is of one 
property (sa-harata) , one heritage (sa-pusaka) , of the same adat (sa-
adat), or that one pays debts together and receives outs tanding debts 
together (utang sama dibaie - piutang sama ditarima). These functions 
are generally attached to groups, but the reference is made without 
explicitly naming the group. Within the complex set of relationships 
with his nagari co-citizens, a person's kinship and, to alesser ex-
tent, his marriage relationships take a central place. These shall be 
described in some more detail. 
Il. 1HE KIN 
The Minangkabau are of the opinion that both father and mother have a 
part in procreation, and that social relationships come into existence 
by the fact that a child is bom to his married parents. By extension, 
ego is related to all persons to whom his/her parents are related by a 
series of filiative links. This aspect of bilateral filiation in Minang-
kabau kinship has aften been overlooked or not sufficiently emphasized 
by previous authors on Minangkabau. 29 The adat saying "ayam gadang indak 
bataZua" - "the cock lays no eggs", is of ten quoted in support for 
statements that "there are no kinship relations between the father and 
his children" or that "the children belong to the mother's side only". 
However, this saying merely refers to the principle of incorporation 
into groups on the basis of matrilineality; it contains no statement 
about the establishment of relationships through procreation in general: 
Fathers do not bear children in patrilineal societies either. 
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Ego can denote most of his kin by two modes of reference: By indivi-
dualizing reference wh ere ego refers to a kinsrnan/wornan as an individual, 
and by the use of social group terrns by which ego either refers to his 
relatives as a group, or to individuals as mernbers of such a group, or 
where ego, as a mernber of his own group, denotes individual relatives 
(for a more systematic account cf. Thomas 1977). 
1. Individualizing Reference 
The recogni tion of "abstract" bilateral kinship is reflected in the 
terrns by which ego denotes his kin as individuals. With two exceptions, 
the terminological system for cognates is of the generation (Malayan) 
type: The same term is used for relatives on the same (known or assurned) 
generation level, and the kind of the relationship is specified by 
qualifiers indicating sex, relative age, or closeness. 
On ego's generation level, all kin are labelled dansanak - "sibling". 
Separate terrns can be used to indicate younger (adiek) and older (kakak) 
siblings. Older siblings can be distingUished according to sex, uni 
(elder sister) and uda (elder brother). 
On the +2 level, all grandparents and their dansanak are called 
niniek or (in)yiek. 
On the -2 generation level, ego's and his danqanaks' grandchildren 
are called (anak) cucu. 
On the +1 and -1 levels, there is an exception to the genera I prin-
ciple: All matrilineally related males on the +1 level are called mamak. 
In eKL, mamak is usually employed to denote the +1 generation males 
within one's suku pusako. Only in the case of Caniago and Selayan this 
use of mamak was extended to both suku, which we re said to have been 
"one" in former times. The inverse term for matrilineally related per-
sons of both sexes, on the -1 level, is kamanakan. The father and his 
matrilineal collaterals are cal led bapak, the inverse term is anak, 
children. All kinswomen on the +1 level are uniformly cal led 
biyaik or amak (in CKL), and of ten the Indonesian ibu is also used. The 
inverse term for the children is anak. 
As has been mentioned before, the terrns mamak and kamanakan are also 
used to denote group leader and group fOllowers, irrespective of their 
genealogical position. 
These terrns are qualified by additional terrns which indicate: 
* the sex of the pers on referred t~: laki2, male, and parampuan or 
padusi, female. 
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* nearness: Nearness can be expressed explicitly as genealoBical nearness 
through the reference to the comrnon ancestor/ancestress which ego 
shares with the pers on referred t~. Thus one speaks of being dans a-
nak saibu or dansanak saniniek - siblings of one mother or siblings 
of one grandmother. Through this usage, also half-siblingship is ex-
pressed: dansanak saibu (saja) - siblings with a comrnon mother (only) 
and dansanak sabapak, siblings with a comrnon father (only). Nearness 
can also be indicated in a more general way through the terms of 
dakek (near) and jaueh (distant, far) , but it is clear from the usage 
of these terms, that nearness is here also conceived of in terms of 
the genealogical levels of the respective apical ancestresses (cf. 
Thomas 1977). 
* ego's direct ascendant or descendant: This is generally expressed by 
leaving away qualifiers. 
* the relative age of one's direct ascendants' siblings: tuo (older, 
oldest) tangah (in the middle) and (k)etek (younger). Thus amak tuo 
means MeZ, bapak ketek means FyB. 
2. References Involving Group Terms 
In addition, groups of kin can be denoted by the use of social group 
terms. Reference to individuals as members of some group can also be 
made by saying that he/she is a member of that group. As most social 
functions in Mînangkabau are attached to groups, this part of the 
referential system most clearly shows the basic principles of social 
organization. In contrast to abstract bilateral thinking, here emphasis 
is put on matrilineal descent. The kin groups referred to are all struc-
tured according to matrilineal descent. Relationships to them are based 
either on matrifiliation or patrifiliation. By matrifiliation, ego be-
comes a member of his mother's group. By patrifiliation, ego does not 
become a group member, but important relationships are established be-
tween him/her and the matrilineal group to which his father belongs. 
a. Relationships Involving Patrifiliation 
Any ego's father's matrilineal group is cal led bako. In CKL it was applied 
to the kaum and buah gadang of the father. The term designates the group 
as a whoIe. Each member of the bako, with the exception of the father 
himself, can be referred to as being bako, without any further differen-
tiation according to the sex or age (relative or genealogical). Reci-
procally, all the group members (the bako) refer to the real children 
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of their male group members (thus excluding ego as a group member) as 
anak pisang, no matter in which genealogical position the respective 
male kaum member stands to the speaking ego. 
In some nagari, there are still special terms which denote the bako 
of the father and the anak pisang of the anak pisang (Thomas 1977). In 
CKL, only the father's bako was recognized as such and labelled induek 
bako,the ''mother bako". This was done in reference to panghulu installa-
tions, where the father's bako still has a specific function. In general, 
however, the terms bako and induek bako were employed coterminously in 
CKL. A category of "anak pisang of the anak pisang" was not conceptua-
lized in CKL. The anak pisang in CKL were all children of one's male 
group members in the same kaum/buah gadang. However, the expression anak 
ujuang ameh was used in reference to children of the male members of 
other kaum in one's buah gadang; the same expression was also used to 
refer to the children of males of other buah gadang in one's sabuah 
paruik. The anak ujuang ameh also had a function inpanghulu installa-
tions, but no inverse term was used for the group to which the panghulu 
belonged. The panghulu in this case was not bako. The relationship be-
tween the bako and its anak pisang is loaded with important social 
functions (see Korn 1941; Fischer 1964) which will be described in de-
tail for property matters in the following chapters. 
b. Relationships Involving Matrifiliation 
By matrifiliation, ego becomes a member of his mother's group and of 
all groups of which his mother's group is a sub-group. Ego can denote 
all his group members by indicating common group membership and speci-
fication of the group. 
Besides the group terms already given in the previous parts of this 
Chapter, the category warih must be mentioned. Warih, in Indonesian: 
waris, is derived fram the Arabic warith, which means heir. It is used 
with this meaning in Indonesianas weIl as in Minangkabau. In concrete 
cases of inheritance, warih is used to denote the heirs, also called 
ahli warih. In contemporary usage, all heirs - be they the children or 
the kamanakan - are called waris/warih. But besides, warih is also used 
to indicate all of ego's living group members, whether or not ego would 
actually inherit something from them or they from ego. It is in this 
sense that the group head is the mamak kepala waris, the mamak who is 
the head of the warih ._30 
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In addition, the warih eategory ean also be used to express relation-
ships between groups. Ego as a member of his own group refers to other 
groups as his group's warih. These group-warih are qualified by terms 









sejari) - one finger 
setempap)- the breadth of one hand 
sehasta) - from finger to elbow 
sedepa) - from fingertip to fingertip (fathom) 
Distanee ean mean genealogieal distanee , measured in eommon matrilineal 
des cent , or distanee in adat, or both. In the literature, the warih-
categories are described in both eontexts, sometimes by the same author 
(I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1973: 57 for genealogieal meaning, and 1974 :44 
for adat-meaning). This is probably due to the faet that the term is 
used in the context of the Minangkabau concept ion of inheritanee, and 
of inter-group inheritanee in partieular, whieh ean also be based upon 
adat (i.e. non-genealogieal) relationships. In CKL, the eategory was 
usually employed in the genealogieal meaning to indieate matrilineally 
related kin groups. 
The Minangkabau referential system is eomplieated in that the same 
labels may be used to denote both kin, aeeording to the Minangkabau 
conceptions of filiation and descent, and non-kin. During the deserip-
tion of the internal strueture of the buah gadang lalready mentioned 
that the voeabulary of matrilineal des cent is also employed to denote 
persons with whom there is definitely no filiative or descent relation-
ship. Likewise, some of the terms denoting kin are also used to address 
kin and non-kin, and the same holds true for referenees based upon eom-
mon funetions. I shall not attempt here to analyse which meaning, in 
the case of multiple meanings, is to be eonsidered the "primary" and 
whieh the "extended" one. In my view, all terms should be regarded as 
soeial eategories which are defined by different speeifies, genealogieal 
and others. But I should like to drawattention to Thomas' recent study 
in whieh data bearing on the so-ealled Leaeh - Lounsbury (soeial eate-
gories vs. extensionist) eontroversy are discussed. His eonelusion,that 
the modified vers ion of the extensionist approach whieh he proposes is 
the most fruitful way to explain Minangkabau kinship eategories,seems 
very plausible to me. 31 
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I I I. MARRIAGE 
As in most societies, marriage in Minangkabau is not an affair of just the 
two spouses but involves their kin as weIl. Through marriage, relation-
ships are established between the spouses and the spouses' kin. For a 
better understanding of these relationships, a brief account must be 
given of the rules according to which marriages are organized and which 
affect the choice of marriage partners (for a recent description of 
Minangkabau marriage adat and ceremonies see Sjafnir et al. 1973). 
1. The Organization of Marriage 
According to adat, marriages must be arranged by the spouses' kin. This 
rule particularly pertains to first marriages. In former times, boys 
were reported to be married off at about the age of 15 and girls at the 
time of their first menstruation(Loeb 1935: 114). In contemporary CKL, 
the average age at which people marry has risen considerably. Of the 
186 marriages contracted in the years 1973 and 1974, only 15% of the 
boys had married at an age below 19, 58.6% had married when they were 
between 20 and 25 years old. 74.2% of the female marriage partners were 
between 17 and 33 years old, and only one marriage had been with a 16 
year old girl. 32 The ma in organizers of a marriage are the girl's kaum 
members. The kaum of the girl must take the initiative. Once a girl has 
reached a marriageab1eage, her mamak must organize a meeting of the 
kaum in which the problem of the marriage is discussed. The girl 's 
father and some other members of the bako are invited. At this meeting, 
the potential candidates (there should always be more than one) are 
discussed. Once a preliminary choice has been made, the respective 
elders of the boy are approached. Marriage involves elaborate ceremo-
nies which are held in the (jurai's) houses of the groom and the bride, 
and the groom is officially "fetched" from his (mother's)house to his 
new house, the house of his wife (for more vivid accounts see Verkerk 
Pistorius 1871; V.d. Toorn 1881; Van Eerde 1901; for a recent descrip-
tion of such a meeting see Tanner 1971: 289). In contemporary CKL, 
marriage involves no major economic transactions. Each group pays its 
respective costs, which may be substantial as the ceremonies and the 
meals given during the ceremonies involve a large number of guests. But 
there is no major gift giving or gift exchange. From earlier accounts 
of Minangkabau marriage, and also from contemporary accounts from other 
na,[iari i t seems, however, that this is not the dominant practice and 
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rule in Minangkabau. It seems to be (have been) customary in Minangka-
bau that the bride's ~aum makes substantial gifts to the groom and his 
jurai (see Loeb 1935: 115; Naim 1974: 428; Thomas 1977: 66). 
Islamic law has had an important impact on marriage in Minangkabau. 
It has been taken as the basis for the official administrative regula-
tions concerning marriage. The marriage is officially validated (in 
terms of Islamic and statutory law) by the Tuan Kali, the mosque offi-
cial, and it must be registered at the office ofthe village Registrar 
of Marriage and Divorce, and Remarriage (P3NTR, Pembantu pegawai Penca-
tat Nikah, Thalak, dan Rujuk). Marriages are officially valid even though 
adat rul es have been violated. However, if the marriage has not been 
contracted in accordance with adat, if e.g. the adat ceremonies have not 
been held, the marriage will not be recognized in the nagari, and the 
spouses and their mamak will be punished by bamüng them from certain 
activities as long as they have not atoned for their fault by inviting 
the niniek mamak, the community's adat elders, to a ceremonial meal in 
which they admit their fault and ask for forgiveness. In practice, 
marriages thus are subject to a dual set of rules. In general, both sets 
of rules are adhered to by combining the necessary actions in the 
marriage ceremonies. 
In 1974, a new uniform marriage law was enacted for Indonesia, which 
had not yet come into force when we left Minangkabau. Some details of 
this law will be discussed later in the study (Chapter 4: 213). 
In CKL, as weIl as in other parts of Minangkabau, the number of 
marriages initiated by the young people themselves, has been increasing. 
This is normally tolerated 50 long as the young lovers "keep to the 
rules". This means, that they have to report their choice to their mamak, 
and then the indicated boy will be "chosen" as future husband in the 
kaum meeting in which the candidate is discussed and the usual formal 
contacts will be determined by the girl' s kaum. Failure to "keep to the 
rules" will mean that the girl's kaum will not consent to the marriage 
and not stage the ceremonies,which has the consequences described above. 
In the nagari, young people are usually not in the position to evade the 
social pressure following such an affront to their elders. 
2. Rules Affecting the Choice of Marriage Partners 
Minangkabau adat poses several restrictions upon the choice of potential 
marriage partners and considers some uni ons as particularly appropriate. 
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a. Nagal'i Endogamy 
Until the middle of this century, the nagal'i were endogamous units. Ex-
ceptions were made for those nagari which had developed out of one com-
mon mother-nagari. The rule was prescriptive, violations were punished 
with temporary or even permanent33 expulsion from the nagari. Due to 
growing inter-nagari relationships and the increasing mobility of the 
nagari inhabitants, dissatisfaction with the endogamy rule grew, and it 
was officially abolished by decisions of the Karapatan Adat Nagari in 
most nagal'i in the 1950'5. 34 Breaches of the rule were known in CKL, 
and one informant, now aged 72, claimed tha t he had been the first 
pers on to marry out. He was punished by exclusion from adat activities 
until he had atoned for his fault. 
In contemporary CKL, most persons still find their partners in the 
nagari. Of the 186 marriages contracted in 1973 and 1974, 9 men (4.8%) 
and 12 women (6.4%) had married out. In two cases, both spouses did not 
originate from CKL. 
b. Suku Exogamy 
As a general principle, it is the suku pusako which is the exogamous 
unit in CKL. The acknowledged exceptions to this rule are said to be 
based upon agreements made by the respective lineage elders in times 
which were not remembered anymore.These exceptions pertain to suku 
Sikumbang, where marriage is allowed between'some (but not all) sub-
groups which are formed by sabuah paruik, or groups of sabuah paruik, 
in thesuku-within-hindu of Sikumbang. This was explained by the fact 
that these groups had, when settling in the nagari, no genealogical 
relationships whatsoever. The other main exception was, that persons of 
the suku Caniago and Selayan could not intermarry. It was explained, 
that Caniago and Salayan "perhaps" had been "one" in former times. 
In CKL, suku pusako exogamy, with the exceptions mentioned, still is 
the legal and statistical rule: Of the 186 marriages contracted in the 
years 1973 and 1974, only 10 (5.4%) were between members of the same 
suku, and 6 of these marriages were between members of suku Sikumbang 
where intermarriage is partly permitted. 35 Violations of the exogamy 
rule are still regularly sanctioned in CKL: the parties must invite the 
adat elders to a communal meal and they must admit their fault and ask 
for forgiveness. The character of this sanction, however, seems to 
change slowly from "punishment" to "fee". 
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These data from CKL should not, however+ be taken as being repre-
sentative for Minangkabau in general. Other reports suggest that in 
other Minangkabau nagari the formerly common suku exogamy rule has 
lost most of its force and that much smaller social groups have become 
h . 36 t e exogamous unltS. 
c. Second and Further Marriages 
Polygyny is allowed. According to Islamic law, men may be married simul-
taneously to as many as four wives. Whether polygyny was allowed in Mi-
nangkabau before the coming of Islam is not known. 
There are several adat rul es which restrict the taking of a second 
(and third etc.) wife: During the lifetime of the first wife, no woman 
from the first wife's group may be married, "group" meaning the suku-
within-hindu groups in CKL (for nagari Gurun compare Thomas 1977: 98 f.). 
A man should further not be married to two (or more) women from the same 
residential area (umpuek). According to the rationalization of the 
villagers, the wives' houses, their bathing place, and also their pro-
perty should not be close to each other. For they would become ashamed, 
malu, if they saw their husbands working with or going to the house of 
the other wife. 
d. Social Rank 
Marriage partners should in principle be of the same social status. In 
determining a person's social status, not only his status as kamanakan 
(i.e. his or her status within the buah gadang, and of his buah gadang 
in relation to other buah gadang, with respect to the original settler, 
ex-stranger, ex-slave differentiation) is considered but also the status 
of his father and his bako. It is, however, open to the deliberations of 
the girl 's kaum to choose a partner of different rank. Hypogamy for 
females was said tohave been forbidden in former times, male hypogamy 
tolerated (compare Thomas 1977: 102). In the course of history, these 
rules have undergone change; in particular they have been influenced by 
the new status attributes provided by the administrative, economic, and 
religious status hierarchies. 
e. Parallel Cousins 
Parallel cousin marriages are forbidden. For matrilateral cousins this 
al ready follows from the principle of suku exogamy. Patrilateral parallel 
cousins are considered to be "too closely" related; the explanations 
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given for this rule differ widely (compare Besseling 1904; Fischer 1964: 
105; Thamas 1977: 93 f.). 
f. Preferred Unions 
There are same kinds of marriages which are considered ideal in Minang-
kabau. The most ideal form of marriage is with one's cross cousin. The 
two forms of cross cousin marriage (CCM) are expressed by distinct ex-
pressions wl1ich take the point of view of the male spous.e. Matrilateral 
CCM is expressed as "puZang ka anak mamak", to return to the child of 
the mamak, meaning a marriage of a male with his MBD. Patrilateral CCM 
is expressed by "puZang ka bako", to return to the bako, indicating 
marriage with the FZD. Villagers in CKL explain the ideal character of 
the CCMs by reference to their value in property strategies and by the 
fact that they reinforce affinal relationships which have been establish-
ed one generation before. 
Among anthropologists, the form and social function of CCM in Minang-
kabau are topics of discussion. De Josseling de Jong (1951) developed 
the hypothesis that in early Minangkabau social structure, the matri-
lateral CCM was the only ideal marriage, and that the Minangkabau social 
system was based upon a system of asymmetrie marriage alliances.The patri-
lateral CCM by this interpretation is a recent development. This view 
has been accepted, though with less caution than it had been originally 
proposed, by some writers (see Umar Junus 1964; Maretin 1961; Kahn 1976). 
Other authors have received this hypothesis with same reservation (Leach 
1952; Kloos 1963; Fischer 1964); and Thomas (1977) has systematically 
refuted it on the basis of his recent field research. My reading of the 
literature and our own field research has led me to essentially the same 
conclusions wnich Thomas has drawn. The issue, however, is too camplex 
to be dealt with adequately in this study. I shall discuss the property 
argument which bears on it later in this study (Chapter 5: 295 ff.). 
For the rest I content myself with stating that in all reports on 
Minangkabau both forms of CCM are given as ideal marriage, and that 
there is rather a bias in favour of the patrilateral CCM. 37 In my inter-
pretation, which will be justified more fully elsewhere, CCM was an 
option given to the girl's kaum: It had the right to ask a cross cousin 
in marriage.; and such a uni on was considered ideal; but the exercise of 
this option by the girls's kaum was in no way prescriptive. And I 
further tend to support the view that the patrilateral CCM was the 
"more ideal" match in former Minangkabau (see below Chapter 5: 297 H.). 
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The marriage of a sister and brather of one kaum with a brather and 
sister of another kaum, "batimbang baluak", freely: "balanced opposition, 
balanced exchange" is also considered ideal as it is said to produce 
"strong connections" between households (see Thomas 1977: 97). 
The remarriage of a widower with a sister of his deceased wife, and 
the remarriage of a widow with a brather of her deceased husband are 
also considered ideal. Bath marriages are called "ganti lapiek" or 
"batuka lapiek","to replace" or "ta change the sleeping mats". 
3. DivoT'ce 
Divorce is regulated according to Islamic law. Men can divoree their 
wives by uttering the Islamic phrase of thalak. Wamen must obtain a de-
claration of divorce from the Religious Court. In Minangkabau, wamen 
can obtain a divorce rather easily due to the thalak taklik, the "sus-
pended" thalak, an agreement in which the husband declares his thalak 
as having fallen under certain conditions. In Minangkabau, as in most 
Indonesian societies, the thalak taklik is a regular part of the marri-
age contract, which is already printed in the marriage baak, buku nikah, 
which the spouses are given when registering their marriage. The husband 
declares in written farm: If I leave my wife for an uninterrupted period 
of langer than 6 months, or if I do not support my wife for a period 
langer than 3 months, or if I treat my wife "indiffèrently" for a period 
longer than 6 months, then my wife is free to file her request for 
divorce at the Religious Court. Under the condition that she pays the 
divorce-fee (uang 'wadl) , my thalak falls automatically. 
Divorce is easy and frequent in Minangkabau, and bath men and wamen 
. kl 38 remarry qUIC y. 
4. Relationships Established ThT'ough Marriage 
Through marriage, relationships come into existence between the spouses 
and the spouses' households. Formalized and socially defined relation-
ships are further established between each spouse and his or her spouse's 
kaum/buah gadang. 
Affinal relationships are partly expressed through individualizing 
reference. Husband and wife speak of each other as laki, male, and 
padusi or bini, female. In contemporary Minangkabau, the Indonesian 
(-Indian) terms suami, husband, and isteri, wife, are als 0 frequently 
used. On the O-generation level, the in-laws of both sexes are designated 
as ipa. Children refer to their parents-in-law as mintuo, and parents.to 
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their children-in-Iaw as menantu. Co-spouse kin types are labelled pam-
bayan. Pambayan is used between wives of a man or the wives of a male 
sibling, and between the husbands of female siblings (cf. De Josselin 
de Jong 1951: 45 ff.; Umar Junus 1964; Thomas 1977). 
Besides, there are terms by which ego as a group member designates 
all husbands and wives which are married to members of his group. The 
term urang sumando is given to husbands of the women of one's own group. 
The term is used by male and female speakers, except that women do not 
ordinarily refer to their husbands as urang sumando. The group in this 
respect is the kaum or buah gadang. The term urang sumandO is used to 
denote the single in-married husband as weIl as the sum of all husbands. 
It is not used to designate the urang sumando's kaum. In fact, there is 
no special term by which the urang sumando's jurai, kaum, or buah gadang 
could be referred t~. The only way to do 50 is to speak of "the kaum of 
X (of our urang sumando)", or, if the couple has children, of the "bako 
of our children/kamanakan". 39 
The term pasumandan is used to denote the wives of one's male lineage 
members. In CKL, little use was made of this term. In how far pasumandan 
is and was also used to designate the wife's kaum or buah gadang in other 
parts of Minangkabau, is not clear from the literature. 40 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the people do not have a "conceptuali-
zation of the groups linked by marriage as a triad: ego's group, its 
bride givers, and bride receivers" (De Josselin de Jong 1975: 19); and 
it is improbable that they ever had. Marriage does not establish 
socially defined relationships between the constituent social groups, 
but only temporary inter-household relationships and relationships be-
tween the individual spouse and his or her spouse's socio-political unit 
(kaum or buah gadang). 
E. RESIDENCE 
I. INTRODUCTORY NarE 
Under the heading of residence I include the complex of legal concep-
tions which localize a person's or group's activities in terms of pre-
defined alternatives, duties, and rights (see K. and F. von Benda-Beck-
mann 1978).41 In Minangkabau adat, no distinct residence-rlile category 
exists, but the rul es drawn together here are part of the various fields 
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of relations which have already been discussed. 
The residence rules in Minangkabau, the post-marital residence for 
men in particular, have suffered various and divergent interpretations. 
The Minangkabau have been cited as one of the few societies where 
nuclear family arrangements are absent due to residence rules: The hus-
band stays a member of his localized matrilineage and only visits his 
wife at.night. The residence rules have therefore been labelled natoIo-
cal or duolocal (see De Josselin de Jong 1951: 11; Gough 1961: 548; Fox 
1967: 101 f.). Other authors have discerned a change in Minangkabau 
residence: due to the impact of economic conditions, the residence rules 
were said to have become uxorilocal (De Josselin de Jong 1951: 117; 
Umar Junus 1971: 223; Sjafnir at al. 1973: 18 H.) or even patrilocal 
or neolocal (Maretin 1961: 158). The idea of original duolocality, which 
mainly has been stated by reinterpreters of ethnographic records and 
not always by the reporters themselves, has been rejected by Kom (1941) 
and Fischer (1964), who claim that also in traditional Minangkabau 
social organization post-marital residence for men was uxorilocal 
(similarly Tanner 1971: 18, 39 f.). Thomas has recently reviewed the 
literature on residence in Minangkabau and shares Korn's, Fischer's and 
Tanner's conclusions (1977: 50 ff., 59). His field data, collected in 
1974, unequivocally indicate post-marital uxorimatrilocal residence for 
men (1977: 50 ff.). 
These discussions of Minangkabau residence are usually concerned only 
with post-marital eating and sleeping arrangements. However, if the 
category of residence, as I understand it, is to have any value for the 
analysis of Minangkabau social organization, we must differentiate 
further. Residence rules inter alia determine where people may exercise 
their rights as community members and where and by whom they may be 
asked to make contributions, in the form of money or labour, in the 
communal interest; they lay down with whom one shares collective res-
ponsibility in certain cases, with whom one shares a prayer house and 
mosque, and to wham one must bring one's disputes. At least three 
different aspects of residence must be distinguished: 
1. "Domestic" residence: the localization of domestic activities like 
eating, sleeping, the education of young children. 
2. "PoliticaI" residence: the localization of a person's political 
rights and duties as a community member. 
3. "Economic" residence: the localization of a person's labour and 
other economic activities. 
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Only these three aspects together allow a satisfactory analysis of 
Minangkabau residence. In what follows, I shall be mainly concerned with 
domestic and political residence, as economic residence is to a large 
extent dependent on this system of property relationships, which shall 
be described in detail later. Just a short comment may be made here in 
order to give the reader a general impression. As far as agricultural 
work is concerned, it is the norrnative and statistical rule that persons 
work the land which they have the right to use and exploit; in addition, 
they willoften work on others' land in the context of neighbourhood-or 
kinship-based working arrangements. Women hold most of the rights to 
rice-Iand, and men therefore work as rice cultivators mainly on land 
which belongs (in the sense mentioned above) to women. In former times, 
men spent most of their labour on the fields of their female members of 
their jurai or kaum, nowadays men prefer to work on the fields of their 
wives. Areas used for cash crops and perennials are mainly held by men, 
who do most of the necessary work and are only occasionally helped by 
women. 
11. DOMESTIC RESIDENCE 
Domestic residence changes during the life-cycle of individuals, and is 
different for men and women. 
For children, the domestic residence is their mother's house. During 
the day-time, they play, help their mother and aunts, and, when old 
enough, accompany their parents or their mamak to the fields. At night, 
they sleep with their parents in the parents' sleeping-room (bilik) in 
their mother's house, be it a family long house (rumah gadang) or a 
smaller house. When the boys reach puberty, they may not sleep in their 
mothers'/sisters' house any more. They move to a surau, the bachelors' 
dormitory which is also used as prayer house and for religious and adat 
education. The surau can be held by a buah gadang or kaum rut mayalso 
be common property of a buek. Children are also frequent and welcome 
guests in the house of their father's mother, "in the house of the 
b k " 42 a 0 • 
Af ter marriage, the husband sleeps in the house of his wife. Polygy-
nists are supposed to make some arrangement by which they share their 
time fairly between their wives, and most polygynists we knew had de-
veloped a fixed schedule. In principle, the young ceuple lives in the 
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house of the wife's mother. If this is a family house, the couple will 
be given one sleeping-room (biZik). In former times, new rooms were 
added to the family house when the house became too crowded, i.e. when 
there were more married females than there were rooms. If no rooms could 
be added, another house, either a new family house or a smaller annex, 
would be built adjacent to the old rumah gadang. If the housing area 
did not permit the construction of a new house, or if a jurai wished to 
move to another part of the nagari, new houses could be built there, if 
the wife's jurai possessed inherited property (harato pusako) there. In 
contemporary CKL, rumah gadang are still in use, but are generally used 
by a jurai comprising one grandmother, mothers and children only. Most 
people live in smaller houses, which are constructed according to the 
same plan as the rumah gadang, but which can accomodate fewer persons. 
The report of the WaZi Ne ge ri of CKL made in 1971 lists 330 rumah gadang, 
626 houses (gedung, houses with a verandah intended as permanent resi-
dence) and 419 "primitive houses" (rumah bungkus nasi, which do not have 
a verandah and are aften rebuilt or torn down aft er a short while). 
In the last resort, domestic residence is thus determined by reference 
to property. The residence of the married couple may not always be in 
the wife's mother's house, but it will always be on the wife's (kaum's) 
property. The house, no matter who financed its cons truct ion , is on the 
wife's pusako land, and it is a part of the wife's pusako (as als 0 in 
Gurun, see Thomas 1977). As residence is determined by reference to the 
property on which the house stands, "nealocal" residence is nearly im-
possible in the nagari. For all land is already someone's property, and 
the houses are built on the wife's property. Exceptions to this rule 
are extremely rare. In the part (jorong) of CKL in which we lived and 
which comprised about a hundred houses and more than 1000 inhabitants, 
no husband did not live in his wife's house! One wife lived with her 
husband in a different part of the nagari, but villagers stressed that 
this was only a temporary measure until the wife's house had been re-
constructed. During our stay, this was done, and the husband moved in 
afterwards, indeed. Cases in which husbands try to live with their wife 
and children on their own jurai's property occasionally occur, and in-
evi tably lead to trouble. Usual Jy the wife and children have to leave 
af ter their husband'sjfather's death. In CKL, there had been one case 
of neolocali ty. The foJJndej of the famous Islamic school of Candung had 
managed to exchange some of his buah gadang's property against a house-
site which belonged to a different suku, on which he then built a house 
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for himself and his wives. His sons, however, though they belonged to 
the most prominent religious functionaries of the nagari, all lived in 
the houses of their wives. 
An adult man does not sleep in the houses of his mother. Exceptions 
are made if the man is old or when it is too troublesome for him to 
return ''home'' or to the surau af ter a long night of discussion or cere-
mony. However, men may neither sleep in nor even enterthe sleeping 
quarters in the mother's or sister's house. If they spend the night, a 
mat.will be placed near the staircase in the open front room, or they 
may be allowed to sleep in the kitchen. Divorced men, unless they re-
marry quickly, have to move to a surau. Old men are sometimes allowed 
to sleep in their jurai's family house permanently, and it is customary 
that dying lineage members are cared for there during their last illness 
(cf. Kom 1941). 
This account of domestic residence in contemporary CKL, and of post-
marital domestic residence of men in particular, does not differ signi-
ficantly from the descriptions given in earlier writings on Minangkabau. 
In my view, there is little reason to speak of a "visiting marriage", 
and I would consider post-marital domestic residence of men uxorilocal. 
Taking into account, that most daytime activities are outdoors, men will 
during the daytime be where they have property to work, and for the rest 
of the time they are free to choose their locality: the coffee-house, 
the surau, the house of their bako, their mother's and their wife's 
house. Under these circumstances, emphasis must be put on the activities 
af ter dark, and af ter dark men lived and live in the houses of their 
wives, unless they visit their mother's house to discuss or instruct 
their kamanakan in family matters, or to participate in ceremonies. But 
they are also present in the houses of their wives, when family matters 
are discussed there. As urang sumando they participate in the decision 
making processes which affect their wives'childrens' property and in the 
ceremonies accompanying their rites de passage (see Kom 1941). 
111. POLITlCAL RESIDENCE 
Little attention has been given to political residence in Minangkabau, 
yet a knowledge of political residence rules is indispensabIe for a 
proper assessment of residence in general. The place of political resi-
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dence is where a person's buah gadang is resident. This holds true for 
persons of both sexes during all stages of their life cycle. In terms 
of short formulas, political residence is matrilocal. In CKL, there was 
no exception to this rule. The rule refers to all three basic principles 
of socio-political organization: adat, buek, and pusako. However, the 
rules are more complex than the 'matrilocality" label suggests, and must 
be described in detail. 
1. Residence in Adat 
A person's source of political rights and duties in adat is his buah 
gadang membership, and it is localized where his buah gadang is loca-
lized. But buah gadang localization is not a matter of actual staying 
or living on buah gadang property, it is determined by the original poli-
tical constitution of the nagari. The latter contains the localization 
of the 12 hindu adat, according to which 4 hindu are localized in each 
koto. In the process of expansion of the nagari population, several com-
plete buah gadang have moved to different koto in different parts of the 
nagari, and new buah gadang may have split off in these new localities. 
Yet in adat, their political residence remains their old koto, or the 
koto to which their mother-buah gadang belonged through hindu affilia-
tion, even if they have been living and been resident in buek terms 
(see below) in the new locality for generations. 
Political residence in terms of adat Candung and adat Kota Lawas func-
tions in the same way. For instanee, buah gadang from suku Sikumbang, 
which have been resident in Kota Lawas territory for generations, still 
have to adhere to the adat Candung. Political residence in adat is thus 
localized where the buah gadang/hindu adat was localized in the original 
nagari constitution, and may be quite different from the place where a 
person's buah gadang is now located, and where its members spend most of 
their time. 
2. Residence in Buek 
Residence in buek is similar to residence in adat, in that one's resi-
dence is where one's buah gadang is resident. However, in contrast to 
adat residence, official changes can be made in bue.k residence. Moving 
into a new buek requires a formal ceremony by which the new buek members 
are accepted by the urang sabuek (we attended one such ceremony in CKL). 
Individuals cannot move, only jurai, and these must, of course, have 
some property on which to live in the new buek. Men thus acquire buek 
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membership only in their role of mother's brotherjmother's son - as a mem-
ber of a jurai but not as husband or father. Husbands who have married 
into another buek, and who spend most of their domestic time at their 
wife's place, have therefore no political rights there in community and 
neighbourhood affairs. 43 
3. Residence in Pusako 
The place of pusako residence is where the buah gadang and its property 
are actually located. Rights in pusako matters are exercised in the (one 
of the) rumah gadang on the buah gadang's harato pusako-Iand. 
4. Residence in Jorong 
Residence in jorong is generally based upon the adat rules concerning 
domestic and political residence. Thus when the nagari government con-
ducted a census, the men were registered as ''household heads" at their 
wife's place, uxorilocally. However, in political matters concerning the 
national local government system (election of the Wali Negeri and of the 
members of the elective village parliament etc.) residence was based 
upon the principles outlined above for residence in adat. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If all aspects of residence are considered together, we may conclude 
that residence for married Minangkabau men is duolocal: domestic post-
marital residence was and still is uxorilocal, political residence was 
and is matrilocal. I should like to emphasize, however, that this state-
ment about duolocality does not express the same views as those held by 
previous writers who overemphasized domestic residence and took little, 
if any, account of political residence. The changes mentioned by obser-
vers generally refer to the economic residence of men, which has seen a 
shift in the daytime activities of men, who tend to live and work with 
their wives and children. As they live and work mainly on the property 
of their wives, such residence can hardly be called neolocal or patri-
local; on the contrary,the increasing trend to form stronger nuclear 
families has strengthened uxorilocal post-marital domestic residence 
(cf. Tanner 1971: 39 f.). 
CHAPTER TI-lREE 
THE PLURALISTIC SITUATION 
Three bodies of objectified meaning exist in Minangkabau which contain 
conceptions pertaining to property relationships and their diachronie 
transfers, and which are conceived as distinct systems. These are adat/ 
adat law, Islamie law, and wri tten law. This "existence" can be tied to 
three basic points of reference: 
1. The national legal system of the Republic of Indonesia - formerlyof 
the colonial system - which recognizes the three bodies as distinct 
systems of law and which contains rules about the applicability of 
the sys tems • 
2. The actual use which is made of these systems in the social processes 
which deal with property relationships and diachronie transfers. 
3. The "general knowIedge" which the Minangkabau have of these systems . 
Before these three points of reference are dealt with, a short des-
cription of the systems shall be given. 
A. THE SYSTEMS 
I. ADAT/ADAT LAW 
1. Adat 
Adat is the symbolic universe by which the peoples of the Indonesian 
archipelago have constructed their wor ld. To employ the words of an In-
donesian adat-Iaw scholar: '~dat is the whole body of teaching and their 
observanee which governs the way of life of the Indonesian people and 
which has emerged from the people's conception of man and world" (Koes-
noe 1971: 3). Adat refers to all domains of social life, and it also 
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covers the realm of the sacred and supernatural. Although the sacred 
world has been superseded in most Indonesian societies by one of the 
established religions - Buddhism, Hinduisrn,Islam, Christianity - in most 
societies adat still contains eIernents of the sacred, magical, and mysti~ 
cal sphere (Koesnoe 1971: 7, 15; Surjono Wignjodipuro 1973: 24). In 
those societies which have not yet, or but recently, been converted to 
one of the official religions, adat still covers both the supernatural 
and secular social reality. 
The etyrnology of the word "adat" is evident to most scholars : Adat 
comes from the Arabic and has been incorporated into most languages 
spoken in the archipelago (Koesnoe 1971: 3; Van Dijk 1971: 5 f.; Van 
Vollenhoven 1918: 7). In Arabic, adat means "custom"; in Indonesia, how-
ever, adat does not rnean custom but has the meaning indicated above 
(for "custom" usually kebiasaan, Dutch: gewoonte, is used). There is, 
however, another etymological interpretation which should not go unno-
ticed, as it is rnuch more in accordance with the meaning the word 
has in the Indonesian languages. According to R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu, 
the leading contemporary Minangkabau adat expert, the word adat which 
is used in Indonesia, is a Sanskrit word, and its existence in Indonesia 
thus antedates the coming of Islam and of the Arabic language. The word 
is cornposed of 'h" meaning ''not'' and "dato" meaning the ''rnaterial'' 
(sifat kebendaan, 1971: 8S and personal communication). Adat or adato 
thus would mean "the irnrnaterial". In Dt. Rajo Panghulu's opinion, adat 
in its Sanskrit meaning was the belief system of the Indonesian peoples 
pertaining to the secular and the sacred, which only later was restric-
ted to the secular as a consequence of the intrusion of the established 
religions (1971: 86 f.).l 
Adat in Minangkabau is ernbodied in an innurnerable nurnber of proverbs 
and sayings which have poetic and rhythrnic character. 2 There are several 
different kinds of "sayings", and adat-experts still distinguish the 
mamang and pitua adat (proverbs), the kato adat (the adat rules) and the 
papatah petitih adat (the adat maxirns).3 Most sayings contain a reference 
to the workings of Nature from which the relevant rule fOT hurnan be-
haviour is derived according to the basic maxim: "Alam takambang manjadi 
guru" - "The growing nature is the teacher" (see LH. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 
1973: SJ. To give one example (see Nasroen 1957: 52) the adat saying 
concerning the process of decision rnaking runs: 
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"Bulek aie dek pambuluah 
Bulek kato dek mupakat 
Aie batitisan batuang 
Bana batitisan urang." 
"The water gets rOlmd in the bamboo-pipe 
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The words (decision) get round through the mupakat (the unanirnous decision) 
The water is led through the bamboo 
Truth is revealed (bridged) by man." 
Within adat, some complexes of rules are distinguished fram the rest 
of adat sayings and traditions: The two standards, cupak nan duo, the 
four laws, undang nan ampek, and the four kinds of adat rul es , kato nan 
ampek. The actual classification given by Minangkabau experts varies a 
little, but it mostly comes down to the following (taken from Dt. Sidi 
Bandaro 1965: 12, sirnilar I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1973: 114 ff.; R.M. Dt. 
Rajo Panghulu 1971: 100 ff.).4 
1. Cupak usali - the original standard.(Cupak is a measure of bamboo, 
but also used to denote standards of behaviour.) 
2. Cupak buatan - the standard which has been made (in cases where the 
original cupak has been changed by decision of the Karapatan Nagari). 
3. Undang2 Nagari- the laws about the constitution of a nagari (e.g. 
that a nagari must have four suku etc.). 
4. Undang2 dalam nagari - the laws about the nagari-internal life. 
5. Undang2 luhak - the laws about the Minangkabau empire and the division 
of Minangkabau into the three luhak. 
6. Undang2 nan 20 - the law of 20, which consist of the law of 8, a crude 
criminal code, and the law of 12, a code of evidence. 
7. Kato pusako - the rules which are heritage. 
8. Kato mupakat - the rules which have been made by mupakat in the 
Nagari Council. 
9. Kato dahulu - the "olden" rules. 
10. Kato k(em)udian - the rules yet to be made. 
Adat as a whole is generally divided into four kinds of adat (Nas-
roen 1957: 45; I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1973: 109; R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 
1971: 87): 
1. adat nan sabana adat - the adat which is truly adat. 
2. adat nan taadat - the adat which has developed into adat. 
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3. adat nan diadatko:n the adat which has been made into adat. 
4. adat istiadat - the general (ceremonial) adat. 
Although different contents are attributed to these four categories, the 
same four or five core-rneanings reappear, which distinguish adat accor-
ding to its sources: 
1. the adat which .consists of the laws of nature (adat nan sabo:na adat). 
2. the adat which is the old, pure adat, gi ven by Dt. Katurnanggungan and 
Dt. Perpatih nan Sabatang. This is either adat nan taadat or adat nan 
diadatkan for the various authors. Under this kind of adat, the 
cupak nan duo, the undang nan ampek and the kato nan ampek usually 
are subsurned. 
3. the adat which has been made by a decision of the Nagari Adat Council, 
gene rally labelled adat nan diadatkan. 
4. the general custorns, mostly adat nan taadat or adat istiadat. 
Several authors have incorporated another distinction of adat into 
this quadrupartition: the distinction between adat jahiliah, the adat 
which is contrary to Islam, and the adat islamiah, the adat which is in 
accordance with Islam (cf. Taufik Abdullah 1966: 15): The adat nan sa-
bana adat is conceived of by several authors as the Law of God, whereas 
the adat istiadat is conceived of as the adat contrary to Islam. 5 
Adat is further specified by reference to a particular field of 50-
cial relations. Thus one spe aks of the adat kawin, the adat of marriage, 
or the adat pusako, the adat of heritage. It is also used to indicate a 
standard of evaluation, both in terms of permissibility and of validity: 
menurut adat - in accordance to adat, salah menurut adat - wrong accor-
ding to adat; and: syah menurut adat - valid according to adat, tidak 
syah or batal menurut adat - not valid, void according to adat. As has 
already been mentioned, adat can also be used in a more restricted way, 
signifying a particular field of social relations in contradistinction 
to others, e.g. pusako or buek. 
2. Adat and Adat Law 
Adat restricts the constituents' autonorny in various ways and to dif-
ferent degrees. Some adat sayings and rules are quite explicit in their 
prescriptive character and leave little room for interpretation and 
discretion by the decision makers. However, most sayings are vaguely 
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phrased, of ten in an allusive way and have to be interpreted in an actual 
context: they leave room for the exercise of the constituents' autonomy 
in the interpretation of the rather general notions embedded in the adat 
sayings. This kind of autonomy is firmly embodied in the adat doctrine 
of decision making through the process of common deliberation, the 
musyawarah, which has already been described in the discussion of the 
Minangkabau notions of authority. The adat rules restricting the auto-
nomy in these processes are more what we would call procedural in charac-
ter. The decision must be found in a proper process, and certain proce-
dural criteria must be adhered to. If this is done the decision makers 
are not restricted by substantive criteria. Adat is amenable to change 
(see below Chapter 6: 314 ff.), and the principle of a common decision 
upholding the harmony between the contending parties and the social re-
lations in the nagari in general is higher valued than the idea of an 
application of rules to a set of facts. 6 
According to the concept ion of law which I have outlined in the first 
chapter, there is much general and concrete law in Minangkabau adat. It 
should be noted, however, that my concept ion does not fully correspond 
wi th the concept of "adat law", Dutch: adatrecht, Ind.: hukum adat. The 
concept adatrecht had first been created by Snouck Hurgronje, who de-
noted with it "those adats which have legal consequences" (1893: 357). 
The concept was subsequently taken up by Van Vollenhoven, and through 
his usage the concept received its publicity. In Van Vollenhoven's 
definition, adatrecht meant "the sum of the behavioural rules in force 
for the natives and foreign orientals, which have sanctions (therefore: 
law) and which are not codified (therefore: adat) (1918: 14).7 The dis-
cussion about what adatrecht is, or rather, what it should mean, has 
since then been carried on through the subsequent generations of Dutch 
and Indonesian adat law scholars. The most prominent conception became 
the so-called decision-theory (besZissingenZeer) of Ter Haar (1930, 
1934 a, 1937, 1941) which has already been discussed in the first chap-
ter. In the meantime, Indonesianscholars have developed their own con-
ceptions which are usually variations of Van Vollenhoven's and Ter Haar's 
definitions . 8 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the not ion of adat law, hukum adat, is 
known, but its use and its interpretations differ. Most persons who have 
received a formal legal education, such as judges, lecturers at the uni-
versities, and higher administrative officials, use the concept, 'and by 
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their use they contrast adat law from adat. The judges, in particular, 
have insisted on a distinction between adat and adat law, and empha-
sized that they applied adat law. In their opinion, expertness in adat 
law is firmly connected with a formal legal training, and the Minang-
kabau adat experts, panghulu who have written books on Minangkabau adat, 
are experts 'in adat only. Their not ion of what constitutes that differ-
ence, however, was very vague. It mostly referred to Van Vollenhoven's 
or Ter Haar's definitions of adatrecht: Law was what was applied in 
their courts. However, in the rationalizations and legitimations of the 
courts' judgements, we could detect no difference between adat and adat 
law. Both terms were used indiscriminately, and the problem of the even-
tual distinction was never explicitly dealt with. 9 Minangkabau villagers 
generally do not speak of adat law, but of adat. The term adat law, 
hukum adat, is known, but is, quite correctly, considered a Dutch in-
vention. 10 If the term hukum adat is used, no distinction is made from 
adat. But in general, no matter which field of social relations they 
discuss (thus also in the processes of conflict resolution)only adat is 
employed. The word hukum is used, but not in the sense of "law", but 
rather in the sense of "judgement, verdict". Hukum is mainly used in its 
verba 1 form menghukum, mahukum, to judge, to convict. If adat is speci-
fied or differentiated at all in the nagari, people refer to the classi-
fications which I have mentioned. The quadrupartition of adat, though it 
forms part of the standard repertoire out of which first information is 
offered to the foreigner, is hardly ever used in the processes of deci-
sion making. It is rather the cupak, undang2, and kato which are refer-
red to. But most people are quite aware of the somewhat obsolete charac-
ter of these subdivisions in adat, as particularly the fields of penal 
sanctions and of constitutional law have been superseded by colonial 
government regulations and national law. What I would consider law in 
adat (but also what others consider to be adat law) is not conceptually 
distinguished from.adat in general by Minangkabau villagers. 
Ir. ISLAMIC LAW 
Islamic law, shari'at,Ind. and Min.: sarak, syarak, or syarat, is inti-
mately connected with the Islamic religion. It is religious law and 
regarded as "canon law" by most scholars of Islamic law (see Fyzee 1955: 
15). Syarak literally means "the road to the watering place, the path 
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to be followed". It consists of the totali ty of Allah' s connnandments, 
each of which is called Qukm (Ind.: hukum). Basically, syarak is a doc-
trine of duties which extends to all fields of human behaviour, the 
sacred and the profane worlds (Fyzee 1955: 15). The religious injunc-
tions of the syarak are classified into five different standards of 
evaluation (see Juynboll 1903: 5 f.; Fyzee 1955: 15): 
1. those actions which are strictly forbidden (~äm) 
2. those from which one is advised to abstain (makrUh) 
3. those where syarak is indifferent (ja'iz) 
4. those which are advised and looked upon positively (mandüb) 
5. those which are strictly enjoined or prescribed (fard) 
In terms of the conception of law which I have outlined in the first 
chapter, only the injunctions of nos. 1 and 5 could be regarded as 
general law, as only they explicitly limit the individuals' autonomy 
in a definite manner. 11 But besides or rather within the syarak, there 
is the body of the fiqh. The fiqh is defined as "the knowledge of one's 
rights and obligations derived from the four sources of law" (Fyzee 
1955: 17). Fiqh means "intelligence" , but under its name the whole 
Islamic science of jurisprudence has become known. It is generally re-
garded as the "proper law" or "law in a more narrow sense" by students 
of Islamic law, and it contains what I call standards of permissibility 
and validity and the pertinent legal consequences. The "four sources" 
or "roots" ('Um UI~i1l) of law are the Koran, the traditions and prac-
tices of the prophet (hadtth and sunna) , the principle of analogical 
deduction (qiyas) , and'the consensus of the learned (ijma,).12 
Islamic law is the product of a long development process. Islamic 
scholars divide this process into four main periods, in the third of 
which, counted from the year 40 until the third century af ter the 
hidjrah (622 A.C.), the four important schools of Sunnite jurisprudence 
were formed. 13 In the Indonesian archipelago, most Mohammedans follow 
the school of Imäm Shäfi'ï (150/767 - 204/820). The Shafi'ites mainly 
recur to the works of Imam Shäfi'l and to the two standard works in 
which the fiqh has been elaborated: the Tu~fah of Ibn ~adjar (died 959/ 
1551) and the Nihayah by ar-Ramlî (died 973/1565) (Juynboll 1903: 38). 
Another important source of Islamic law have become the collections of 
fatwa. Fatwa are explanations of the law in a concrete case, which have 
been given by a recognized legal expert (Juynboll 1903: 40). 
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lIl. WRITIEN LAW 
Written law (hukwn tertuZis) is the sum of the futch law which has been 
received as law in the Colony of the Dutch East Indies, of the laws pro-
mulgated for the Colony in Holland, and of the laws made by the colonial 
and later Indonesian legislative institutions. 
Dutch law, like most western legal systems, is a mixture of the late 
Roman law and the Germanic tribal laws .14 Most law was codified in the 
beg inning of the 19th century. The futch codes were closely modelled on 
the French codes which were enacted lIDder the reign of N3jXlleon I. In Dutch 
legal theory, law is in principle codified, and is applied to concrete 
sets of facts by the subsumption of the facts lIDder the law. Dutch court 
decisions do not play the important role they play in Common Law coun-
tries, and there is no doctrine that the law is embodied in cases. But 
court decisions as weIl as the books written by learned jurists serve as 
important sources upon which judges draw in the rationalization and legi-
timation of their judgements. This system was also introduced into the 
Colony. Legislation-techniques in the Colony also followed the futch 
system, aiming at a complete solution of the problems to be covered in 
the form of codification of detailed rules, and leaving the judges little 
room for the exercise of discretion in the application of the law. 
Early in this century, Colonial law (Indisch Recht) gained in impor-
tance when a separate study of it was established at the University of 
Leiden. In the 1920'5 a University for Law was established in the Colo-
ny's capital, Batavia (now Jakarta). 
B. 1HE "EXISTENCE" OF 1HE LEGAL SYSTFMS IN MINANGKABAU 
I. 1HE COLONIAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
The officialIegal system of the Republic of Indonesia, and formerly the 
legal system of the Colony of the Dutch East Indies,contains rules about 
the applicability of the different subsystems and establishes, or re-
cognizes, the administrative institutions which have to apply these sub-
systems to concrete cases. Most Indonesian societies had already known 
some sort of legal pluralism af ter the acceptance of the Islamic reli-
gion, but with the futch colonialization, the legal pluralism gained in 
importance. The inhabitants we re partly subjected to a new set of 
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legal rules, and they were also subjected to an administration of 
justice which was carried out by the new rulers, who were not content 
to have their own law applied to themselves but also usurped the appli-
cation of the inhabitants' law. Legal pluralism thus did not just affect 
domains of social life such as marriage, inheritance, or property. The 
constitutional systems, and particularly the field of the exercise of 
socio-political authority were affected to a much greater extent. In 
the following section, I shall briefly sketch the development of this 
dual legal pluralism in Minangkabau. 
1. Pre-Independence DeveZopment 
The Dutch had first come to the west coast of Sumatra in 1600. Then in 
the first half of the 17th century they had managed to establish some 
trading posts at major coastal sites. Between 1647 and 1660 they ousted 
the Achenese merchant governors who had brought the coastal area under 
their control, probably as a consequence of the weakening of the Minang-
kabau empire. In the coastal area, in particular in the largest place, 
Padang, the Dutch introduced some kind of administration, but until the 
English interregnum (1795-1819), no European had ever set foot into the 
three Zuhak from the west coast. Raffles, who governed the west coast 
during the English interregnum for the English East India Company, was 
the first European to make the journey into Tanah Datar in 1818, where 
he established a small military post at Simawang. When the west coast 
had been returned to the Dutch in 1819, they were approached by some 
adat-leaders from Tanah Datar for help against the Padri, and this 
served as pretext for the introduction of colonial rule in the Padang 
Highlands. In 1821, the Dutch pesident of Padang made a treaty with 
these adat-leaders in which "the regions of Pagarruyung, Saruaso, and 
Sungei Tarab" (all situated in Tanah Datar) as well as "the other 
regions of the Minangkabau empire" were handed over to the Government 
of the Dutch East Indies (Westenenk 1918b: 678; Kielstra 1887b: 27 with 
the full text of the treaty, cf. Dobbin 1977). It is in this treaty that 
the first regulation concerning the applicability of the laws was made. 
In fact, legal pluralism was not yet to be introduced. Art. 5 of the 
treaty said: 
"The time-honoured customs and traditions of the land and the relation-
ships between the Native Heads and their subordinates shall be complete-
ly safeguarded. In no case shall they be violated, insofar as they are 
not contrary to the regulations stipulated above" (Kielstra 1887b: 28. 
The regulations referred to concerned the military presence of the 
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Dutch in the Highlands and the obligation of the Minangkabau to provide 
the futch with coolies) • 
The war against the Padri, which was only ended in 1837, prevented 
the Dutch from a fast establishment of a proper administration. But for 
the areas under futch control, a preliminary administrative system was 
erected in 1823. 15 Following the pat tem also used on Java, the Minang-
kabau region was divided into 2 hoofdafdelingen and 4 regentschappen. 
The regents~happen were subdivided into districts. These districts were 
cal led laras and were based upon actual,or what were erroneously assumed 
to be,nagari-federations. They were placed under the control of a Minang-
kabau administrative official, the Tuangku Laras (Lareh). The nagari 
were placed under a village-mayor, Kepala Nagari. These officials were 
paid by the Dutch administration. In the first phase they were appointed 
by the Dutch administrative officials, later elected by the population. 
In 1864 election became obligatory (Westenenk 1918b: 830, 832). In 1825, 
the firs~ court (landraad) in the Padang Highlands was established at 
Fort van der Capellen (Batu Sangkar) (Westenenk 1918b: 680 ff.). In 
1833, it was decreed (by Missieve 9.1.1833) that courts (landraden) 
were to be constituted in all major centers of Minangkabau, and "that 
the law should be applied in accordance with the existing customs in 
each district". 
The jurisdiction of these first colonial courts was restricted. All 
disputes between natives were in principle to be decided by the nagari-
government. Only appeal to the futch courts was allowed (Westenenk 1918b: 
686). This state of things was solemnly confirmed by the Govemor of the 
West Coast in the so-called plakaat panjang, "the long declaration" , of 
25 .10 • 1833: 
"The Government shall refrain from all interference into the domestic 
affairs of the natives, and all problems conceming debts, torts, 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance must be decided by the adat-functiona-
ries according to adat". (Kroes en 1873: 95 ff. with the full text of the 
plakaat panjang; Kielstra 1889: 332; Westenenk 1918b: 688). 
The promises of the plakaat panjang were quickly forgotten. In 1837 
the futch had taken Bonjol, the last stronghold of the Padri-forces. 
The court structure was renewed, but without any significant changes. 
But already in 1825, the futch had begun levying a market tax (Kielstra 
1887b: 125), and in 1847 the cultuur-stelsel, the system of forced cul-
tivation of cash crops, in Minangkabau mainly coffee, was introduced 
(cLKahn 1976: 81), the latter made compulsory in 1862. The villagers 
were forced to plant a number of coffee trees and sell the products to 
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the storehouses run by the Duteh. The Tuangku Lareh, village mayors, 
and the panghulu officially recognized by the Dutch (the panghulu rodi) 
were responsible for the implementation of this policy. 
In 1875, the West Coast received a new judicial structure which 
brought some fundamental changes (see der Kinderen 1875). The Reglement 
op het Reahtswezen van Sumatra's Westkust (coming into force on 1.11. 
1875) completely abolished the jurisdiction of the village government, 
and the penal law was made subject to a (Duteh) Penal Code. The West 
Coast now had the typical dual court structure with different chains of 
courts for Europeans and Natives. 16 Only the lowest court for the 
natives, the distriktsgereaht or Rapat Tuangku Laras, was staffed with 
natives. It was presided over by the Tuangku Laras, with some of the 
nagari panghulu as assessors. These courts were to apply adat law but had 
to follow Dutch procedural law. Appeal lay in the Inlandsahe Reahtbank 
(later to be styled landraad) which was presided over by a Dutch admini-
strative official with at least two Tuangku Laras as his assessors. 17 
The application of adat through adat officials, which had been 
abolished in 1875, flourished also without official recognition. The 
Karapatan Adat continued to exercise their jurisdiction according to 
adat. The official courts condoned this. Guyt, himself a judge in the 
Landraden, states that the governmental courts highly valued the deci-
sions of the panghulu (1934: 133). In the 1930'5, it had even become 
regular court practice that intra-lineage (kaum) disputes were not 
accepted by the courts unless the parties had obtained a decision of the 
Karapatan Adat Nagari beforehand (Guyt 1934: 134 and the judgements 
published in T 133: 264, T 135: 299, T 138: 471). 
In 1935, some kind of 'yillage justice" was officially resuscitated 
by the colonial government. 18 An ordinanee amending the Reahtsreglement 
voor de Buitengewesten, R.B.G., was enacted, in which it was stated 
that: "Legal actions, of which the judges of smaller communities should 
take cognizance according to adat law, are subj eet to such cognizance" .19 
The newly recognized adat ins ti tut i ons were given the status of a media-
ting body (hakim perdamaian). The natives were not prevented from bring-
ing their suits before the Dutch courts. However, the distriktsgereahten 
had to inform themselves as to whether the "village judge" had already 
given a ruling in the case, and if 50, were obliged to take cognizance 
of this ruling. They were also entitled to remit the case to the village 
judge and could regard the suit as lapsed (vervallen) if the plaintiff 
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refused to do 50. 
Islamic institutions of dispute-settlement were not recognized as 
judicial institutions in West Sumatra. 20 However, in those nagari where 
such institutions had been established during the Padri-war and, as in 
CKL, had been more or less integratedcinto the adat system, they con-
tinued to exercise jurisdiction, particularly in marriage affairs, also 
without official recognition (see AB 39: 212 ff.). 
The law which was to be applied in this dual court system had been 
systematized for the whole colony in 1848. The basic principle was th at 
different law was to be applied to the different population groups. 
These groups were mainly based upon racial origin. At first, two groups 
were recognized, Europeans and Natives, but the RegeringsregZement (R.R.) 
of 1854, the constitution of the colony, recognized three population 
groups: Europeans and persons treated like Europeans (mainly Christians), 
Natives, and Foreign Orientals. 21 These provisions remained unchanged 
until 1920, when the R.R. was amended, and then to 1925, when the 
Indische StaatsregeZing (l.S.), the new constitution, was enacted. Art. 
163 l.S. defined who belonged to which population group, and art. 131 
regulated which law was to be applied to which population group.22 
According to art. 131 (6) l.S., all private law in force for the native 
population on 1.1.1920 continued to be in force. This meant, that accor-
ding to art. 75 R.R. the law which was applicable to the natives con-
sisted of their unwritten adat law and those European regulations which 
had been made applicable to the native group by decree of the Governor 
General. The application of adat law was restricted by the rule that 
it was not to be applied when it offended the (western) principles of 
equity and justice (see Gautama and Hornick 1972: 10, Hooker 1975: 278). 
Before 1920, only very little Dutch law had been made applicable to the 
native group.23 The members of the native category had also some oppor-
tunities to become subject to European law, but these were infrequently 
used by the Indonesians. The fields of property and inheritance law were 
excluded from these possibilities in any case. 24 
The adat law of property and inheritance thus was in principle un-
touched by these provisions. However, several laws and regulations had 
been enacted which had some impact on property relationships and land 
law in particular: The DomeinverkZaring for Sumatra (S. 1874: 94 f.) 
by which all 'waste land" was declared to be the domain (domein) of the 
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State, and the "Prohibition on Land Alienation"(Verbod van vervreemding 
van erfelijk individueel gebruiksrecht of 1875) which prohibited sales 
of ''native land" to non-natives (Gautama and Hornick 1972: 75 ff., 83). 
These laws will be discussed later in Chapter 4. 
2. Post-lndependence Development 
Since the independence of the Colony of the Dutch East Indies in 1945/ 
49, the pluralistic situation has not basically changed. The regulations 
of arts. 163 and 131 l.S. are generally held to continue to be in force;5 
and they are still applied in contemporary Minangkabau State Courts. 26 
Some laws have been enacted by the Indonesian legislature which have im-
portant consequences for the fields of property relationships: The Basic 
Agrarian Law of 1960 and the Marriage Law of 1974. They will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
The dual court was abolished during the Japanese interregnum, and 
af ter Independence this unitary court system was retained. The ordinary 
jurisdiction was conferred upon the pengadilan Negeri (PN) as courts of 
first instance, the Pengadilan Tinggi (PT) as courts of appeal, and the 
Mahkamah Agung (MA), the Supreme Court, as court of revision. 27 
The village justice in its officially recognized form survived the 
Japanese interregnum and the Dutch military actions. In post-Independence 
Indonesia, it is generally held that the regulations introduced in 1935 
are still valid and that the village institutions are still permitted to 
act as hakim perdamaian. In West Sumatra, the structure of the admini-
strative bodies which function in village justice has been changed by 
several regulations. 28 The first systematic reorganization of the local 
government system in West Sumatra was introduced in 1968 by a decree 
of the Governor. The nagari government was to consist of a village 
mayor, Wali Negeri (WN), a nagari council, Kerapatan Negeri (KN), and 
a village parliament, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Negeri (DPRN) , the member-
ship to which was elective (SK 015/GSB/1968). The KN was to assist the 
WN and to function as court of mediation in adat and religious matters. 
The regulations on the KN were implemented by a decree of 1970 (SK 149/ 
GSB/1970): The KN consists of three sections, an Adat Section, a Reli-
gious Section, and a General Section. For each section, a jury (Dewan 
Juri) is to be established. The juries shall take decisions 'which are 
to mediate between the parties and which should be accepted by both 
parties" (keputusan perdamaian yang disepakati oleh pihak2 yang berper-
kam). The members of the Adat Section shall be the members of the 
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Karapatan Adat Nagari (KAN), the members of the Religioos Section the 
members of the Cooncil of Religious Experts (Majelis Ulama Negeri) or 
those persons who are recognized as religious experts (Alim Ulama).29 
In most nagari, the Karapatan Adat Nagari, the adat cooncils accor-
ding to ada~ constitutional law, exist side by side with the officially 
established nagari-institutions. The KAN are not officially recognized 
by Indonesian national or provincial law, but their existence is known 
and indirectly acknowledged by the provision that the members of the 
KN shoold be recruited from the KAN. 30 
During our stay in Minangkabau, a new local government regulation was 
introduced (SK 155 and 156/GSB/1974), which abolished the DPRN and 
restructured the KN, withoot, however, basically changing its juris-
dictional powers. Ther~stablishment of a religioos section of the KN 
has already been mentioned. 
Post-Independence sawa growing recognition of Islamic institutions. 
Besides, Religioos Courts were set up in several parts of Sumatra af ter 
Independence, mainly by and in cooperation with the Ministry of Reli-
gioos Affairs. 31 The Ministry has a department (perwakilan) in each 
province, and Religioos Administrative Offices (Kantor Urusan Agama, 
KUA) were set up on Kecamatan level. The KUA in many parts of Indonesia 
assumed jurisdictional powers, until in 1957 Religioos Coorts were 
officially established ootside Java and Madura (see Lev 1972a: 76): The 
Government Instruction (PP 45 of 1957) established Religioos Coorts, 
pengadilan Agama or Mahkamah Syriah, in the places where PN already 
existed. The Religious Courts' jurisdisction is only vaguely circum-
scribed. It comprises disputes between married persons of the Islamic 
religion as weIl as matters of marriage, divorce, remarriage, and dis-
putes conceming inheritance and gifts, but only "if these subjects are, 
according to the living law (hukum hidup) to be decided according to 
Islamic law. If other than Islamic law is in force in these matters, the 
Religioos Courts may not assume jurisdiction" (art. 2 and 4). The de-
cisions of the Religioos Courts can only be executed af ter they have 
been reviewed and confirmed by a State Coort (art. 3-5). 
The administrative structure of the Religious Department reaches down 
to the nagari level. There is an Officer for the Registration of Marriage, 
Divorce_, and Remarriage (pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah, Thalak, Rujuk, 
P3NTR) in each nagari , who is chosen by the village mayor and whose 
appointment must be confirmed by the KUA. Since 1969, the P3NTR has an 
advisory commi ttee, the Corops Penasehatan Nikah, Thalak, Rujuk, (.CPNTR) , 
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the members of which are appointed by the village mayor. 
11. THE ACTUAL USE MADE OF THE SYSTEMS 
The second form of actualization of the three systems in Minangkabau 
is the actual use made of the systems in property and inheritance 
affairs. The substantive rules of the systems will be described in the 
next chapter, and the actualization of the systems in the social pro-
cesses which are concerned with property and inheritance affairs will 
be treated in Chapters5 and 6. But in order to convey an impression of 
the systems' respective importance, first a general overview will be 
given here. 
1. The Legal Systems Used by the Courts 
a. The State Courts 
The State Courts either apply adat law or written law but not Islamic 
law. That Islamic law is not applied is to be emphasized, as the 
foreigner is of ten told the contrary in introductory interviews. Most 
people whom we interviewed still vividly remembered the two conferences 
which had been held in 1952 and 1968 on the subjects of land and in-
heritance law. In the resolutions issued by the conferences' partici-
pants it had been stated that Islamic law should be applied to the in-
heritance of self-acquired property (see Prins 1953, Naim (ed.) 1968). 
The Judges' Organization had participated in the 1968-conference and 
had agreed with these resolutions. In some of our first interviews with 
judges and administrative officials we were offered the statement that 
Islamic law was indeed applied in the State Courts. But our check of the 
court records of the PN in Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar, and Payakumbuh 
for the period of 1968 - 1974 revealed, that Islamic law was not applied 
in one single case. Once we had become better acquainted with the judges, 
they, too, emphatically denied that Islamic law was, or should be, 
applied in their courts in property or inheritance matters. 
Most courts explicitly legitimate their judgements by reference to 
adat or adat law. Written law only enters the judgements in rare in-
stances. The only substantial exception is formed by the bulk of cases 
in which banks try to recover loans from their debtors. In the period 
under review, this kind of case constituted about 14% of all contested 
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civil cases (71 of 507). In practically all other cases, adat (law) was 
applied as the system of substantive law. In disputes about property 
and commercial transactions in the towns, the courts sometimes recur to 
single principles of Dutch law like the principle of bona fide acquisi-
tion. But the law in these cases also is, for the rest, adat law (for a 
more detailed overview of the case load see Chapter 5: 307). 
It must be remembered, however, that the law of procedure and evidence 
is a modified version of Dutch procedural law. This is of considerable 
influence on the concretization of adat law in the state courts. 32 
b. The Religious Courts 
In principle, the Religious Courts apply Islamic Law. The actual exercise 
of their jurisdiction in Minangkabau is reduced to marriage problems. 
The greatest percentage of their case load (78%, N=1.237) is formed by 
applications demanding the declaration of validity of a previously un-
registered marriage (pengesahan nikah). Propertyor inheritance questions 
are hardly ever brought before the religious courts. In the 6 years of 
1969-1974, for which we examined the case load of the PengadiZan Agama 
in Bukjt Tinggi, only 8 cases concerning property (or 0.64% of the total 
case load) came before the court. Of these 8 cases, only two were 
actually decided: One uncontested case of inheritance and one property 
dispute between a married coupIe. The other six cases were withdrawn, 
and in two cases the court did not assume jurisdiction on the grounds 
that the matter in dispute was subject to adat law and should therefore 
be heard by a State Court. 33 One of these cases will be reported in 
Chapter 5: 267 ff.). 
2. The Use Made of the Systems in the Nagari-Institutions of Decision 
Making 
It is difficult to give an answer for Minangkabau as a whole to the 
question of the degree to which the three systems are used to legitimate 
decisions in property and inheritance matters by the nagari's institu-
tions. Although 1 think it probable that the situation in most nagari 
will be similar to the one in CKL, I shall restrict my statements to 
nagari CKL. 
Property matters are in principle dealt with only by the adat lnsti-
tutions and the adat section of the Kerapatan Negeri. These institutions 
use adat to legitimate their decisions. The P3NfR did not handle property 
problems, and neither did the religious section of the KN; in fact, the 
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latter had not decided any case at all and its existence was very much 
on paper only. Marriage affairs are dealt with by the P3NTR, the KUA, 
and the Pengadiûzn Agama, but disputes over the division of marital pro-
perty are handled by the adat institutions. In some cases in CKL, dis-
putes concerning property were also dealt with by the sidang-councils 
(see Chapter 2: 80). The sidang, however, were regarded as adat insti-
tutions in definite contrast to the P3NTR or the religious section of 
the KN. 
3. The Use Made of the Systems Outside the FormaZ Institutions of De-
ais ion Making 
Here again, it is difficult to give a precise and statistically supported 
statement. As a general rule, adat is used by the population to rationa-
lize and légitimate all kinds of property relationships. One exception, 
which will be discussed in detail later in this study, is, that the in-
heritance of a father's self-acquired property by his children is some-
times rationalized as being in accordance with Islamic law. Religious 
experts are also occasionally approached for advice with respect to the 
division of self-acquired property of a deceased in accordance with 
Islamic law. In CKL, such cases seem to have been extremely rare, and 
no concrete instance was reported to us. 
lIl. THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SYSTfMS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MlNANGK.ABAIJ 
The third point of reference for the "existence" of the three systems 
lies in the knowledge of the Minangkabau that these systems exist; a 
knowledge held by more or less all adult Minangkabau, independently of 
the degree to which these systems are applied in social processes that 
deal with property affairs, and independently of the degree to which the 
Minangkabau have internalized the formal characteristics and the sub-
stantive content of the systems. The situation may be compared with 
that of the common German, who knows that in his society religion, law, 
ethics, and morals exist as different and distinct systems which contain 
standards for his behaviour, but who can neither define the distinction 
between the systems nor claims to have adequate knowledge of their con-
tents. For he knows that in his society this knowledge is the realm of 
lawyers and theologians, of experts who have undergone a special training. 
Yet he knows "something" of the systems' substantive rules and has his 
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own ideas about them. The situation of "the Minangkabau" is quite simi-
lar, and it shall briefly be described in what follows. 
1. The KnowZedge of Written Law 
Minangkabau do not know much written law. This law has been made in 
Holland or in the national or provincial capital, it is laid down in 
statutes, and has been elaborated by learned men. Written law is taught 
only at the Legal Faculties of the Universities, in West Sumatra at 
Universitas Andalas in Padang. !he courses include lectures on Dutch 
civil law, the students thus becoming acquainted with the principles of 
Dutch property and inheritance law. Some more written law is taught at 
the APDN, the Camat Training School, but there no courses in western 
property or inheritance law are given. The judges in the State Courts 
- the State Courts are, with a few exceptions, all staffed with Minang-
kabau judges - for the greatest part are University graduates (according 
to the law, judges must be law graduates) or have at least followed the 
training in the School for Judges and Public Prosecutors, where the 
basic principles of western law are also taught. 
But these sources of knowledge are not open and accessible to the 
common villager, and they interest him little. The written law which 
reaches the villagers consists mainly of government re~llations relating 
to administrative matters. Thus there is no actual knowledge of the 
western written law of property and inheritance, although the most 
relevant provisions of the Basic Agrarian Law and the new Marriage Law 
are known to many. But most villagers hold some vague notions of what 
western law is, like: That Dutch family law does not recognize matrili-
neal descent; that it is patriarchal; that the children follow the 
father; and that they inherit from their father, whereas the mamak 
does not play a role in western law. It is also known that according 
to western law a person is quite free to dispose of his property as he 
wants to, and that his relatives cannot interfere in his property re-
lationships. 
Information about written law reaches the villagers mainly through 
the ch~înels provided by the State administration. National or provincial 
regulations flow from the provincial administration to the Bupati's 
office, from the Bupati's office to the Camat's office. The WaZi Negeri 
receive information and instruction from the Camat. A separate channel 
is provided by the Department of Information which keeps information 
officers down at the Kecamatan level. If new regulations are to be ex-
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plained or propagated, the information officer calls a meeting of the 
WN of his Keaamatan. 
Another important channel of information is the organization of the 
"Kar>apatan Adat League of the Minangkabau World" (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat 
Alem Minangkabau, LKAAM). The LKAAM is a government sponsored organiza-
tion of adat-functionaries which functions on Keaamatan, Kabupaten, and 
Provincial levels. It serves as a forum in which government plans and 
policy are explained to the adat-elders by the representatives of the 
GoveTI1I)lent, wi th the aim of securing the adat-elders' cooperation for 
the implementation of these plans. 34 
The information thus flows through the various channels to the 
village government, either to the Wali Negeri or to the Head of the 
Kar>apatan Adat. In meetings it is then transmitted to the Niniek Mamak, 
the lineage elders, whose task it is to pass it on to their kamanakan. 
2. The Knowledge of Islamia LCM 
The principles of Islamic law are known to a much greater extent. "ReaI" 
knowledge of the law, the fiqh, and of its interpretation and applica-
tion, however, is firmly ascribed to the status of alim ulama, of the 
religious expert. 
Principles of Islamic law, as part of the religion, are taught at all 
levels of the educational system. In the nagaPi, children of the age of 
8 to 10 years follow a yearly course of religious instruction which is 
held in the mosque or surau. They are taught rudiments of the Arabic 
language and are instructed in the Koran. At the end of this year, the 
Khatam-al-Koran ceremony is held: The children are led in a procession 
through the village, accompanied by relatives and neighbours. On the 
return to the mosque, each child recites one verse of the Koran. This 
ceremony is followed by a feast, which usually takes two days, during 
which friends, relatives and neighbours come to congratulate the parents 
and matri-relatives of the children and to eat with their hosts. There 
is some religious instruction in government schools, and systematic 
teaching takes place in the Islamic schools at primary and secondary 
school level. 35 Religious instruction - for all villagers - is regu-
larly carried out at night in the rnosques and surau. The Islamic func-
tionaries recognized as alim ulama who act as teachers there, of ten are 
persons who have learned religion from a recognized teacher, and have 
had no formal education in religious matters. 
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Even if the exact knowledge of Islamic law and its interpretation is 
a matter for the experts, the general principles of Islamic law are weIl 
known to all Minangkabau. Islamic law plays its most important role in 
the field of marriage and divorce, and the basic rul es are regularly 
restated in the relevant procedures. In inheritance matters it is weIl 
known that the Islamic rules of inheritance differ radically from the 
adat rules. Everyone knows that according to Islam "the children in-
herit from their father", and that male heirs get a bigger share than 
female heirs. Most people know that the actual distributory rules of 
Islamic law as laid down in the Koran are much more complicated, but 
these details are considered a matter for the experts (which is under-
standable in view of the complexity of these rules). 
3. The KnowZedge of Adat 
a. The Knowledge of Adat in the Nagari 
Most of adat is known to the population, but there are also several 
fields of adat which are considered the special knowledge of experts. 
Adat is learnt during the process of socialization. Children listen 
to their elders, observe their behaviour, learn the language and the 
many adat sayings in which adat rules and maxims are embodied. The 
basic principles of adat are taught at a very early age. Children are 
systematically educated in feelings of shame, of propriety, and of 
lineage solidarity. Much of adat is learnt by observation and imitation, 
but there is also (or used to be at least) some formal instruction. 
When boys move to sleep in the surau, they are taught by older men, if 
possible by their mamak. Children are allowed to attend most ceremonies 
and formal occasions, at which adat is restated in ceremonial language 
by the adat-functionaries. In some nagari (such as Padang Parab, where 
we attended two panghuZu installations) children are even allowed to 
attend the most formal meetings of the panghuZu installation. Adat is 
also contained in most of the stories and epics told to the children, 
and there are some stories, like Raneak DiZabueh (see Dt. Panduko Alam 
1954, Johns 1958) which contain more or less the whole of the principles 
of adat morality and law. 
Rethorical skill is highly valued in ~1inangkabau. Knowledge of adat not 
only means the ability to remember adat rules and proverbs once learnt, 
but great emphasis is laid upon the capacity to reproduce adat in the 
proper verbal behaviour. Each proper Minangkabau must be able to 
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berunding, to talk in a highly flowery and polite phraseology, which is 
Eull of allusions. For it is one basic principle of adat (under which 
the curious anthropologist willoften suffer) that one may not speak 
straightforwardly: "Indak bulieh taruih tarang" - "you may not express 
yourself directly and clearly", was a phrase which we repeatedly heard 
during our stay as a characterization of the proper way to speak in 
adat. To berunding is generally learnt by observation and imitation. 
For other forms of verbal behaviour, however, special knowledge is re-
quired. The pasambahan is a form of formalized speaking which is em-
ployed at all ceremonies. It also consists of allusive and flowery 
phraseolqgy which involves a constant restatement of adat proverbs and 
rules, in which the intentions of the speaker have to be expressed. The 
pidato are adat recitals, which are held during the major ceremonies, 
for which there are different kinds of pidato. Those pidato held during 
panghuZu installations mainly consist of a recital (spoken or sung) of 
the tambo of the Alam Minangkabau, the Minangkabau adat and its histori-
cal (tambo) development. The pidato are performed by younger adat func-
tionaries, in CKL by the anak mudo. The pasamabahan and the pidato must 
be learnt from someone who is "pandai" , an expert, and this invol yes a 
formal teacher - pupil relationship. Nowadays, there are several 
"standard-versions" of the most frequently used pasambahan and pidato 
which have been published by Minangkabau adat-experts. 
A more intensive knowledge of adat is expected from the adat func-
tionaries and lineage elders. The adat functionaries, the panghuZu and 
juaro hindu in particular, must "know" the adat. They must know how to 
use adat in the processes of decision making. They must be skilIed in 
the verbal behaviour which is employed in these processes. They further 
IIllst know the undang2, the kato, and the cupak of the Minangkabau adat 
and the nagari's own adat. This knowledge has to be learnt from a 
teacher, who should be a mamak or the panghuZu or some other pers on of 
one's suku who has a reputation for his adat- knowIedge. Young panghuZu 
who have not yet had the opportunity to learn enough continue their 
adat-education af ter their installation. 36 
This intensive knowledge of adat is one of the prescribed status 
attributes of the adat functionary. But villagers are quite aware of the 
fact, that not all panghuZu are equally knowledgeable, and that in con-
temporary Minangkabau "panghuZu are not what they used to be". Parti-
cular skill and knowledge as weIl as obvious inabilities are freely dis-
cussed and commented upon. Intensive knowledge of adat is not only 
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recognized in adat functionaries. It can also be achieved by persons who 
do not hold any office. Their abilities will always become evident as they 
are-displayed at the nUl!lerous public occasions and ceremonies. Persons 
who acquire the reputation of great knowledge and who are neither adat 
not Islamic functionaries, are cal led Caradiek Pandai (Ind.: Cerdik 
Pandai) , the "intellectuals" , who may play an important role in nagari 
1 " " 1 1" f 37 po lt1ca 1 e. 
An important part of expert adat knowledge is the adat of one's naga-
ri; in particular its history, its constitution, the political and genea-
logical relationships between the buah gadang and the status of their 
panghuZu. Such knowledge is of great relevance in the frequent disputes 
over kaum or buah gadang property, especially when one kaum or buah 
gadang has become extinct and the question of its inheritance has to be 
settled. This kind of knowledge is highly valued and kept secret. It 
means prestige and power and has also some economic consequences. For 
if such knowledge is required to solve a dispute, the expert will be 
approached with customary (or modem) gifts. 
For the common villagers and the experts themselves, the differentia-
tion of adat knowledge is accepted as a matter of facto In discussions 
about the adat of CKL and its development, we were frequently referred 
to those ''who know", even when we had reason to assume that the person 
asked would perfectly know himself. The experts, too, held th at "know-
ledge must be in different levels" (iZmu mesti bertingkat2). There are 
some fields of knowledge which are ascribed to the panghuZu or juaro 
status: Only a panghuZu "can" know about the development of his suku 
(buak gadang etc.) and the development of the original lineage property 
belonging to the buah gadang of his suku. Others "cannot" know this. 
This knowledge is transmitted to selected pers ons only, generally to 
the prospective successor, and only when the expert feels his end 
" 38 cOill1ng. 
On a lower level, the buah gadang or kaum genealogy, and the location 
of the property are also transmitted from mamak (group head) to his 
kamanakan (his prospective successor). This knowledge is part of the 
group's heritage, which may only be transmitted within the group. Mi-
nangkabau adat says: "warih dijawek" - "it has been received as heritage". 
Reference to this kind of acquisition of knowledge is a valid basis for 
"d "ad 39 eVl ence ln at. 
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In contemporary Minangkabau, the value attributed to adat knowledge 
has decreased, and so has the number of persons who are adat experts. 
The younger genera ti ons are attracted by the new knowledge offered by 
the schools which opens the way for new and attractive careers outside 
the nagari. The panghuZu have lost much of their traditional authority, 
and their position is less respected and desired than before Independence, 
when the adat functionaries were used as the main tooI of Dutch colonial 
policy. In the nagari, there are only a few younger people who really 
want to learn adat, and the panghuZu in CKL had only a very few pupils. 
The youthsin the towns seem to display no interest in adat at all. 
The adat elders and the adat pressure groups are greatly concerned 
with this situation. At present, adat is not taught at schools, and 
people realize that in the field of the formal educational system, adat 
has lost all ground to religious and modern knowIedge. At the LKAAM-
meeting in 1974, a special committee on adat-development had been formed, 
which made some proposals for the improvement of the situation. According 
to these, adat is to be introduced in the curriculum of primary schools. 
In addition, the LKAAM intends to organize courses and lectures in adat 
in the towns and nagari. Lectures which had been organized by Bunda 
Kanduang, the Women's Adat League, were held already shortly af ter the 
LKAAM-meeting of 1974. Finally, plans have been made to found a People's 
University (universitas masyarakat) in which lectures in adat shall be 
given. This university will be open to everyone interested in Minangka-
bau culture (see K.v.Benda-Beckmann 1975: 73). 
Besides the predominant oral tradition of adat, it must be noted that 
since the beginning of this century a substantial number of books and 
brochures has been published by Minangkabau, generally by panghuZu. The 
start was made by Ot. Sangguno Oirajo (1919, 1920, 1924, for an early 
review see Ter Haar 1934b) and the publicity campaign for Minangkabau 
adat was furthered by Ot. Sutan Maharajo who edited several joumals in 
which adat was explained and discussed. Both writers reacted against the 
publishing activity of the Islamic pressure groups (see Taufik Abdullah 
1971,1972). Most of this expert literature consists of an exposition of 
the tamba and Minangkabau adat, stressing its compatibility with Islam 
and the state ideology of the Republic, of ten in the form of a serious 
attempt at reinterpretation of adat in the terms of religion and ideo-
logy, of ten as a lip-service only. The ideas contained in these books 
and the systematization of adat and history are to a growing extent 
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disseminated to the nagari, and we have met or heard of several panghu-
Zu who returned to these books when they thernselves were interviewed 
as experts. 40 
b. Knowledge of Adat in the Courts 
As has been mentioned, the judges consider thernselves experts in law, 
not in adat. In the curriculum of the Legal Faculties, courses on 
adat law are taught, but these courses are on "adat law in generai" and 
are mainly based upon the writings of Dutch (Van Vollenhoven, Ter Haar) 
or Indonesian scholars (Supomo). There are no courses on Minangkabau 
adat law in particular. Most judges, however, are Minangkabau and have 
undergone some socialization in adat, and some of the elder judges are 
thernselves panghuZu. 
However, the crucial questions which decide about 80% of the court 
cases, are not problerns of substantive adat (adat law) rules (in the 
sense of legal consequences) but rather problerns of evidence and nagari-
specific adat: The constitution of the nagari, the genealogical relation-
ships between buah gadang, the genealogical position of the parties, etc. 
These facts generally are not known to the judges, and in practically 
each case expert-evidence given by panghuZu of the nagari is required. 
As the research of K.v.Benda-Beckrnann has shown, much confusion arises 
from the fact that the standard terrninology for property holding groups 
used in the courts - the kaum under the mamak kepaZa waris - is insuf-
ficient to understand the actual relationships in a dispute, and fre-
quently does not correspond to the terrninology used by the parties. 41 
With the exception of several judges who are generally acknowledged 
to be knowledgeable, the villagers do not consider judges to be experts 
in adat. Court judgements are freely criticized as not being in accor-
dance with adat. However, it is generally only the outcome of the dis-
pute, the concrete decision, which is evaluated by the villagers against 
their own understanding of adat. The legal reasoning of the judges and 
their elaboration of adat law usually do not come to the notice of the 
villagers. 
rnAPTER FOOR 
1lffi LEVEL OF MEANING: SYSTEMS OF PROPERTI RELATIONSHIPS IN MlNANGKABAU 
A. INfROOOcrORY NarE 
In the last two chapters an exposition has been given for the detailed 
study of the systems of property relationships through the description 
of the basic principles of the socio-political organization and of the 
administrative and legal pluralism in which they operate and of which 
they are part. I have until now spoken of Adat, Islamic Law and Written 
Law as ''bedies'' or "systems" of conceptions • I should like to emphasize 
that this was a description of ethnographic facts, for in the official 
legal system of Indonesia, in the social processes which deal with pro-
perty and inheritance, and in the knowledge of the Minangkabau these 
three bodies of conceptions are treated as distinct systems. In this 
chapter, I shall describe the substantive content of these systems. 
Most space will be devoted to the system of adat, for it is the system 
which is generally applicable in property and inheritance matters. Yet 
a brief account must also be given of the other two systems. This is 
because the treatment of the three bedies of conceptions as distinct 
systems does not, of course, mean that ideas and principles of one 
system cannot be used as part of another. Neither does it indicate to 
what extent system-external legal or non-Iegal factors have influenced 
those conceptions which are regarded as part of the adat system. These 
problems will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6, but in order to analyse 
the possible influences of such system-external ideas, they must be 
known first. In this context two remarks must be made which directly 
affect the following description of the systems: 
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1. Since the Islamization of Minangkabau, many words of the Arabic 
language which are part of the legal tenninology of Islamic law have 
been incorporated into adat; in fact, a great part of adat has been ex-
pressed in these words since then. Though, as far as we can teIl, they 
in general signify adat-institutions and not, as we do know, the ones 
of Islamic law, the restatement of adat in Islamic legal concepts must 
have had a heavy influence on the pre-Islamic adat (see Taufik Abdullah 
1966: 9 f.). Unfortunately, there are no data on adat from pre-Islamic 
times, and one is left to do one's best in intelligent speculation. I 
shall deal with this problem in the sixth Chapter when I try to analyse 
the change in the conceptual system of property relationships in Minang-
kabau in general. Yet whatever the influence of Islamic legal tenninolo-
gy may have been on pre-Islamic adat, adat and Islamic law have hence-
forth always been distinguished in Minangkabau, and Islamic law has con-
tinuously been taught and transmitted as a distinct legal system. In 
this chapter, I shall describe this system as far as it is directly 
related to the study of property relationships in Minangkabau. 
2. An important part of adat is emhodied in conceptions which refer to 
the processes of decision making. The outcome of these processes depends 
much more on social interaction processes than on the substantive cri-
teria in terms of which the decision must be legitimated. But in the 
Dutch colonial courts and in the present Indonesian State Courts, whose 
judgements constitute an important source of data, the law of procedure 
and evidence is a modified version of Dutch procedural law. Through this, 
an important part of adat is surpressed in the courts. This affects the 
judgements of the courts the more, as most judgements depend on questions 
of evidence, whereas the substantive rules are generally undisputed. The 
analysis of these effects, important as they are, would go far beyond 
the scope of my study. They fonn an important part of the study which 
K. v. Benda-Beckmann has made on the work of the contemporary State 
Courts in Minangkabau. The adat produced by the courts and the adat 
produced by the other agents of externalization should therefore, on this 
ground alone, be differentiated, irrespective of the question as to how_far 
the substantive rules, which are externalized within and without the 
courts, are congruent or not. The new procedural system has not only in-
fluenced the law produced by the courts, however. It has also had 
an impact on the procedures used in the adat institutions, as a compari-
son of the old adat processes with the current processual practices 
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clearly reveals (On this problem see Ter Haar 1929, 1950 I: 416 ff.). 
It constitutes one of the many factors which have influenced adat in 
its development, which shall be briefly discussed in the sixth Chapter. 
B. ADAT 
I. CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS AND PROPERTY OBJECI'S IN MlNANG-
KABAIJ ADAT 
In Minangkabau adat, as in many other traditional social systems, pro-
perty relationships are one aspect of social and political relationships 
which are not clearly conceptually distinguished from the latter. The 
principles of social and political organization which have been des-
cribed in Chapter 2, also govern the system of property relationships 
to a large extent. This holds true both for the level of socio-political 
authority over property as weIl as for the level of use and exploitation. 
However, it is characteristic of the basic Minangkabau categories of 
property objects, that they de fine the legal status of property objects 
in relation to the person(s) holding them. The categories of property 
objects are construed as "man-thing units" (Bohannan 1963: 102); they 
do not express the rights and duties, the specific relationships attached 
to the property objects. 1 
On the level of socio-political authority over land, the main con-
cepts are tanah ulayat ("trust"-land) and pusako (heritage). When the 
formerly autonomous buah gadang united to form a supra-buah gadang com-
munity, the nagari, they had to cede some of their autonomy to the newly 
established community and its governmental agents. With respect to the 
land which they had taken possession of before the foundation of the 
nagari, however, hardlyany autonomy was ceded. This land already become 
their pusako, their heritage, which was transmitted through the genera-
tions of group members according to the rules which will be described 
in detail in this chapter. The nagari had no competence in pusako 
matters. As hasbeen mentioned earlier "pusako matters are decided by 
the lineage elders" (pusako sakato niniek mamak). But the control over 
the area claimed as nagari territory which was not yet the pusako of 
one of the buah gadang was assumed by the groups together. This area 
was called u layat or tanah ulayat, "trust-land", and the authority over 
this area was vested either in the nagari's governmental agents or it 
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was distributed among the buah gadang/panghuZu who had founded the naga-
rio Depending on who exercised the authority, the land was styled tanah 
uZayat nagari or tanah uZayat panghuZu. 
The relationships on the level of use and exploitation center around 
the concepts of harato, rnaterial property objects, and the various cate-
gories of harato known in adat: The harato pusako,inherited property, 
the harato panaaharian, self-acquired property held by individuals , and 
the harato suarang, the self-acquired ccmnon property of spouses. Before 
the relationships legitirnating the use and the exploitation of property 
objects are described, the basic categories of uZayat, pusako, and 
harato and their subcategories will be outlined in the following 
section. 
1. The LeveZ of Soaio-PoZitiaaZ Authority over Property (Teroritory) 
Since regular inforrnation on Minangkabau adat has become available, the 
concepts uZayat or hak uZayat have been used to denote the highest form 
of property relationships exercised by and vested in the community or 
its governmental agents. Both uZayat and hak are Arabic words. Hak means 
right, power, competence; uZayat means guardianship, trusteeship (Weste-
nenk 1918a: 15). In recent usage in Minangkabau and Indonesia in general, 
the term uZayat or wiZayat has assumed a spatial meaning: "area, region, 
district". There is little information on the pre-Islamic and pre-colo-
nial system of property relationships and its conceptiml expression. 
Westenenk (1918a: 19) and Kroesen (1874: 7), however, report an adat 
saying which refers to socio-political control over land and which does 
not yet employ Arabic words. 
Nan barimbo rajo, rajo 
nan bautan kareh, panghuZu 
nan bauran Zambuik, kamanakan 
Literally, this would mean: 
The King's jungle belongs to the King 
The hard forest belongs to the panghuZu 
The soft forest belongs to the kamanakan 
Kroesen, Westenenk, Willinck (1909: 651) and indeed most authors on 
Minangkabau adat were convinced that the reference to rajo, '''king'', was 
not to the King of Minangkabau, as according to most sources the king 
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of Minangkabau did not exercise any socio-political control over land. 
They translated '1'ajo as "king in the nagaPi" , as referring to the 
highest governmental institutions of the nagaPi (Kroesen 1874: 7; 
Westenenk 1918a: 19).2 In his translation, the saying has the following 
meaning: 
The jungle is under the nagaPi government 
The hard wood, the cultivable but yet uncultivated area, is under the 
panghulu 
The soft wood, the area under cultivation, is under the kamanakan 
(1918a: 20). 
This interpretation is plausibIe. Yet the translation of '1'ajo meaning 
nagaPi government could not be extended to the tanah '1'ajo - the "king I 5 
land". The tanah '1'ajo was a strip of land between adjacent nagaPi which 
had the status of no-man's land. Nobody was allowed to cultivate it, 
and it was believed that any encroachment would evoke magical sanctions. 
The tanah '1'ajo was also used as a battlefield for inter - nagaPi wars, 
where the pa'1'ang batu, the stone war, or the parang bedil, the rifle 
war, were fought (see AB 27: 327; Willinck1909: 119). It has been re-
ported that in fOI1l\er times such wars had to be stopped when a royal 
emissary of the King planted his yellow banner on this land. Rajo, 
meaning'~ing in the nagaPi" would certainly be a wrong translation here, 
as nobody from the two adjacent nagaPi could lay any claim on this land. 
Yet it would be premature to conclude from the few available data, that 
the King of Minangkabau exercised political control over this land or 
that this land may have even been worked for the King in times of greater 
centralization and expansion of the Minangkabau empire (Kahn 1976: 89 f.). 
Still, there certainly is a reference to the King of Minangkabau, on the 
exact nature of which one can only specula te. As the kingship in Minang-
kab au was identified with the sacred and magical, the tanah '1'ajo may 
have been attributed to the King in this sense, which may have led to 
the custom of having his emissaries bringing peace to the land by appeal 
to his mystical powers. This interpretation would not cover Westenenk's 
translation of 'l'imbo l'ajo as "jungle under the nagaPi government". But 
it is possible that, contrary to Kroesen, Willinck and Westenenk, 
rimbo l'ajo also referred to the King of Minangkabau as the sacred inter-
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mediary between the hwnan and superhuman worlds. Both tanah rajo and 
Y'imbo rajo then would not have made part of the old adat classification 
of property relationships, as the "king-thing (Y'imbo, tanah) units" did 
not imply a possessory or controlling relationship. In contemporary 
Minangkabau, the tanah rajo, where it is easily accessible and is good 
rice land, is cultivated, and has since long been transformed into 
pusako, the inherited property of a buah gadang or kaum. 
Since the Dutch colonization, socio-political control over communal 
property was expressed as ulayat or hak ulayat. The Dutch writers trans-
lated hak ulayat as beschikkingsrecht, the communal right of avail. 3 
There is some dis agreement between the Dutch authors as to which part 
of the nagari the hak ulayat extended and in whom it was vested. Some 
held that the hak ulayat was exercised over the whole nagaY'i territory 
(Van Vollenhoven 1918: 263; Westenenk 1918a: 16); in other reports it is 
said that it pertained only to the uncultivated areas and the forest 
within the nagari territory (Résumé 1872: 15; Kroesen 1874: 7,9, AB 11: 
77, AB 11: 115 ff., 122, 124). These apparent contradictions can, how-
ever, be resolved: It had been early realized by the Dutch that in most 
Indonesian societies there existed property relationships expressing 
socio-political control which were held by communities. These relation-
ships had been labelled by several terms, for example ulayat, which were 
of ten taken from the regional languages. The term beschikkingsrecht, 
which already had been employed by previous authors (Kroesen 1874; De 
Rooij AB 10: 113) became the standard term through its use by Van Vollen-
hoven (1919,cf. Ter Haar and Logemann 1927: 5).4 This beschikkingsrecht 
extended over the whole nagari territory, but in different manifestations. 
So far as nagaY'i terri tory was "dipusakoi", made into the pusako of one 
of the resident buah gadang, the socio-political control was vested in 
this group alone: on th is point there are no contradictory reports. Only 
the beschikkingsrecht over the uncultivated areas was denoted by ulayat 
nagaY'i or ulayat panghulu in Minangkabau, quite in correspondence with 
the Minangkabau way of categorizing property objects and property rela-
tionships, which does not conceptually focus on rights but on the status 
of objecrs. The beschikkingsrecht over the ulayat (or, in Dutch usage: 
the hak ulayat over the ulayat land) seems to have been vested in the 
panghulu in most nagari, either as the representatives of the nagaY'i or 
as the representatives of their lineages (see Westenenk 1918a: 22; Van 
Vollenhoven 1918: 263; Kroesen 1874: 7, 9; Résumé 1872: 11; Willinck 
1909: 119).5 
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The relationships of individuals to property of pusako status will be 
described in detail in the later parts of this chapter. The land which 
was uZayatcouldbe used by all inhabitants of the nagari, or, if the 
uZayat was distributed between the suku or buah gadang, by the members 
of these groups only. According to most authors, such use was free, at 
least if no permanent use was intended (Dt. Sangguno Dirajo 1924: 73; 
Willinck 1909: 675 ff.). Kroesen reports, that the panghuZu were not 
asked for '~ermission" if non-permanent use was intended, but that they 
had to be asked if permanent use of the land was planned (1874: 10-12). 
In later times, fees, uang adat, were demanded, but this custom probably 
only developed when the panghuZu had been incorporated into the Dutch 
system of local administration. Such fees were demanded for the mining 
of land (bunga tanah) , when forest products were collected or used 
systematically (bunga kayu) , or when Zadang (dry fields or gardens) 
were made (Willinck 1909: 675 ff.; Westenenk 1918a: 27 f.; Kroesen 1874: 
10 ff.; Résumé 1872: 20 f.; AB 41: 381 f.). The fees consisted in part 
of gold and generally in a ceremonial meal in which the permission was 
asked and the authority of the uZayat holder formally acknowledged. If 
permanent agricultural use of uZayat land was intended, the property 
became subject to the set of property relationships which regulate use 
and exploitation in general. Newly cultivated land (tarukoan) was the 
self-acquired property (harato pancaharian) of the cul·:ivator. If af ter 
his death his heirs did not want to continue to use the land, the land 
simply reverted to the uZayat holder as part of the uZayat. If the heirs 
continued to use the land, it became their harato pusako. 
This genera I outline, drawn from the literature, is more or less in 
accordance with what we were told in nagari CKL: The panghuZu who first 
moved into the territory of the present nagari CKL, the panghuZu 7 suku, 
took possession of as much land as they wanted. They constructed rice 
fields, built houses, and made grave-yards for their buah gadang members. 
The land which was permanently used was their harato pusako, their inhe-
rited property. When the population increased and when new groups moved 
to the territory, still uncultivated land was given to the newcomers by 
the original settlers. At this time, the original settler groups and 
their panghuZu were the absolute lords over the land. The panghuZu 7 
suku were the highest authorities in land matters over all those who 
had received land from them. When, at a given time, the groups resident 
in the nagari founded the nagari, the areaunder cultivation and the 
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areas reserved for future cultivation were declared the official nagari 
terri tory, the lantak nagari (see map on p. 144). The nagari and the 
lantak nagari ''belonged'' to the 60 founding panghulu, politically and 
economically. The distribution of the buah gadangs' harato pusako was 
marked by signs and stones, and this distribution pattem, the corian 
barih (Ind.: coreng baris, "the streak of lines") symbolized the proper-
ty constitution of CKL. Still today, the adat experts of CKL teach their 
pupils !he titles of the 60 oldest panghulu by asking them to find out 
who (which buah gadang) has the largest portions of harato pusako within 
the lantak nagari. 
The area adjacent to the lantak nagari was also claimed as nagari 
territory. In CKL it was cal led tanah ulayat panghulu. According to the 
unanimous opinion of all CKL-experts, it was the tanah ulayat of the 60 
panghulu. At least in the areas which were suitable for rice-cultivation, 
the tanah ulayat was (at which time?) distributed among the 60. This is 
still easily observabie in the northern part of CKL, where the tanah 
ulayat was divided into parallel strips of land running downhill (turi-
han) and where each panghulu was assigned one of those strips (see map 
on p. 145). The tanah ulayat was mainly used to gi ve land to expanding group 
members and to provide newcomers, who had associated with one's group, 
with harato pusako. In contemporary CKL, the area which was tanah ulayat 
is dipusakoi, i.e., is the harato pusako of various buah gadang, but the 
former border between the lantak nagari and the tanah ulayat is weIl 
remembered; the expression tanah ulayat is today only used in a terri-
torial (spatial) reference. Only in the southern part of CKL, on the 
higher slopes of Mount Merapi, is there some tanah ulayat which is not 
yet harato pusako. 
The present terri tory of CKL comprise.s more than the lantak nagari and 
the former tanah ulayat. Surrounding the tanah ulayat was tanah param-
pasan, open land over which one had fought in former times, and which 
one had incorporated into one's nagari (see map on p. 144). In these 
areas, one had built kubu (walls, fortifications ) and settled ''brave men" 
in the kubu area to demonstrate the territorial claims of one's nagari. 
The kubu area settlers were mostly strangers or the descendants of 
former slaves. When the attempts to take possession of these areas had 
succeeded,the tanah uZayat was extended to the newly won land, and i t was 
generally given to the settlers as their harato pusako. 
ArlOther area making part of CKL, the area of 100 Janj ang ("the 
hundred steps") (see map on p. 144) was tanah jajahan, "colonial" land. 
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This area was won in war (during the Padri-war?) from the neighbouring 
nagari - 50 people in CKL claimed. When this land was occupied, the 
number of the panghulu recognized as members of the Karapatan had in-
creased to 100. Each panghulu ~as given some land in the area, which 
he then distributed to the buah gadang members who wanted to settIe in 
this area. In present CKL, nearly all former tanah perampasan and tanah 
j aj ahan is harato pusako of the buah gadang, wi th the exception of same 
tanah jajahan on the slopes of Mount Merapi which is not cultivated. 
Like the uncultivated tanah ulayat, most of this area has been declared 
State Land and is under the administration of the Forestry Department. 
I have not been able to find out precisely who exercises con trol over 
it according to adat. Permanent use can only be taken up with the 
permission of the Wali Negeri. 
2. The Category of Pusako 
Pusako (Ind.: pusaka) is a word derived from Sanskrit. 6 In Sanskrit 
the supposed cognate means "those things that serve to sustain life", 
and in the Indonesian languages it means "inherited things, heritage" 
(Loeb 1935: 108). In Minangkabau adat, the term pusako embodies the 
ideology of matrilineal des cent and heritage. The most famous and most 
frequently heard adat-saying goes: 
Dari niniek turun kamamak 
Dari mamak kakamanakan 7 
Patah tumbuah, hilang baganti 
Pusako alam baitu juo 
From the great-uncle (MME) it is handed dCMI1 (it descends ) to the mcle (MB) 
From the uncle to his nephews and nieces (ZCh) 
Where it breaks oH, it grows again,mereitislost,itissubstitutedagairl 
It is just the same as with the pusako of nature 
Pusako is divided into two basic categories by most Minangkabau adat 
experts: 
1. pusako which is immaterial, the pusako kebesaran 
2. pusako which is material property, the pusako harato. 
The pusako kebesaran consists of immaterial entities which are the 
heritage of a group. Experts list under pusako kebesaran the suku, the 
adat-istiadat, the papatah patitih, and the titles. The category is 
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of ten equated with the most important part of the pusako kebesaran, the 
sako, the title of the group's adat-office holders, and some authors 
therefore distinguish between the sako and the pusako harato. 8 The 
pusako harato are material property: hutan-tanah, sawah-Zadang, pandam-
pakuburan: the forest and the land, the wet and the dry rice fields, 
the place for the living and the place for the dead (Dt. Sidi Bandaro 
1965: 76). The pusako harato is, however, not limited to the heritage 
of immovable property: also included are movables like the ceremonial 
costumes of the panghuZu, the valuable bridal costume, cattIe; also 
money or gold can be harato pusako. 
Harato pusako as inherited property is generally subdivided into 
four classes: 
1. harato pusako tambiZang ruyuang or harato pusako turun temurun 
2. harato pusako tambiZang ameh 
3. harato pusako tambiZang basi 
4. harato pusako tambiZang kai'tan or harato hibah 
The classification distinguishes the pusako property according to the 
way they were tambiZang, "dug up" with a spade,i.e. the way they have 
been acquired: 
1. The harato pusako tambiZang ruyuang, the property which has been "dug 
up from the tree sturnps", is the property which the ancestors have 
created by their cultivation of the jungle. It is the actual pusako 
property which is turun temurun, which "descends and descends" 
through the generations of buah gadang members. 
2. The harato pusako tambi Zang ameh is the property which has been 
acquired through the use of gold (later money). In this class also 
feIl the budak pusako, the slaves who have become pusako property 
(Kielstra 1892: 641; AB 11: 74 ff.; Willinck 1909: 139). 
3. The harato pusako tambiZang basi is the property which has been 
acquired with (the) iron (hoe). This is land which has been newly 
cultivated, the tarukoan. 
4. The harato pusako tambiZang kai'tan or harato hibah is property which 
has been acquired by the way of hibah, gift (on hibah see Chapter 4: 
p. 178 H.). 
Of ten only two of these categories are used to express distinctions 
in the harato pusako. Thus tambiZang ameh and tambiZang basi are used 
to contrast the basic different modes of acquisition: by gold or by 
SYSTFMS OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS 149 
agricultural work. Both tambilang ameh and tambilang basi are used to 
distinguish harato pusako which have been acquired recently from the 
harato pusako turun temurun, the property acquired by the ancestors. 
This classification of harato pusako was given by adat experts in 
CKL, and it is the one most frequently mentioned in the writings of 
Minangkabau adat experts (see e.g. R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 135; 
Dt.Majoindo 1956: 89).9 In contemporary Minangkabau, the classification 
of harato pusako most frequently used is the one between the 
''high'' and "low" pusako property (harato pusako tinggi and harato pusako 
rendah). ''High'' and "Iow" indicate the relative distance in time from 
the time at which the property was made into pusako: High pusako proper-
ty acquired by the ancestors at a time which is not remernbered anyrnore, 
low pusako property is that which only recently has become pusako; one 
still remernbers the persons who acquired it. This distinction has been 
employed in the Dutch colonial courts, a practice which has been con-
tinued by the judges in the Indonesian State Courts. It is also used 
by Minangkabau villagers and adat experts (see Dt. Sidi Bandaro 1965: 
77) .10 
3. The Category of Harato 
Harato (Ind.: harta) in Minangkabau adat means 'IDaterial property 
objects".ll The use of the term implies that the objects are conceived 
of as standing in a relationship of being possessed by a person or group of 
persons. The relationship is not, however, specified. Harato more or 
less corresponds to the meaning of the English concept "property" and 
to the way I use the concept 'IDa terial property object" in this s tudy . 
The main distinction of harato is between the harato which are 
pusako and the harato which are pancaharian. The harato pusako have 
already been discussed above. Harato pancaharian (from: cari, mancari -
to look for, to search) are property objects which one has acquired 
during one's lifetirne by one's own efforts. Most harato pancaharian are 
movable property objects (most land is harato pusako) , but land which 
has been bought or which has been newly cultivated (tarukoan) is also 
harato pancaharian. 
Besides the "pancaharian proper" there are also property objects 
which are "impure" pancaharian in the usage of Guyt (1936: 78). "Impure" 
property has been self-acquired, but the basis of its acquisition has 
been harato pusako, "harato pancaharian pokok asalnya didapatinya dari 
pada harta pusaka" (Dt. Sanggoeno Dirajo 1924: 101). A young kaum member, 
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for example, has been given some more starting capital for his trade, 
which was taken from the sale of the ri ce harvested on the harato pusako. 
Or a kaum member was given money from the pusako in order to go to 
school and university which enabled him to become a rich and successful 
man. Although the later profits of the trader and the salary of the 
graduate undoubtedly are pancaharian, their initial source, the asal 
usulnya, was his group's harato pusako. 
The Minangkabau themselves do not separately label these two "kinds" 
of harato pancaharian, though they do recognize the distinction. Their 
point of view is that, as far as harato pancaharian are concerned, one 
must always look into the background and source of it and determine 
whether it has some connection with the pusako or not. This factor in-
fluences the legal consequences which are attached to the harato panca-
harian, which will be described later (see Chapter 5: 267 ff.). 
The harato category is also employed to de fine the legal status of 
marital property. The property acquired by husband and wife during the 
marriage is their harato suarang or harato pasuarangan (Ind.: perseo-
rangan, individual), their common harato pancaharian which can only be 
divided at the dissolution of the marriage. The property which the hus-
band brings into the marriage is his harato pambaoan, the '~rought pro-
perty", labelling the post-marital domestic residence of the Minangkabau 
husband. The corresponding category for the wife is the harato dapatan, 
the "received property". 12 Both pambaoan and dapatan can comprise harato 
pancaharian and harato pusako. As Minangkabau used to marry at an early 
age at which they normally had not yet acquired much property by their 
own efforts, the dapatan and pambaoan usually signified the pusako -
portions allocatedto the spouses by their kaum. 
11. THE ADAT PUSAKO: ACQUISITION, USE, AND DIACHRONIC TRANSFERS OF 
PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS BASED UPON GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
1. The Pusakoization of Harato Pancaharian 
The dominant idea of the Minangkabau system of property relationships 
is that all property is pusako which descends and descends through the 
generations of the members of groups which are structured according to 
matrilineal descent. All property has been handed down through the 
generations, and all property will be handed down through the genera-
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tions, from the great-uncle (MME) to the uncle (MB) and from the uncle 
to his sisters' children. The pusako must be guarded, and it is the 
moral obligation of all kaum members to add to the kaum's pusako. The 
latter is the task of the men in particular. The "good" mamak must go 
out in order to mancari, acquire property. His earnings, the harato 
pancaharian, are destined to become harato pusako for his sisters and 
kamanakan. In adat, the harato pancaharian were, as Willinck put it, 
harato pusako in chrysalis state ("in larvenstadium " 1909: 584). The 
pancaharian status of property objects is temporary, it is tied to the 
lifetime of the pancaharian holder. Af ter his or her death, the property 
objects assume the status of pusako. This pusako can be specified by the 
means by which i t has been acquired (haY'ato pusak..o tambilang ameh or tam-
bilang basi) or by reference to the person who acquired it (haY'ato mamak, 
the property which had been acquired by the mamak). In the contemporary 
usage in the nagaY'i and in the State Courts the haY'ato pancaharian which 
have been inherited are usually cal led haY'ato pusako Y'endah. 13 
The inheri tance TUles for pancaharian inheri tance are the same as 
those that apply to inheritable property relationships to pusako objects 
in general (see below p. 157 ff.): Inheritance occurs within the panca-
harian holder's jurai. For a female pancaharian holder, this is the 
jUY'ai of which she is the apical ancestress. For a male pancahaY'ian 
holder, it is the jurai of which his mother is the apical ancestress. 
Within the jUY'ai, inheritance occurs first in the older generation: for 
a woman her childrens', for a man his siblings' generation. For prede-
ceased female heirs, the principle of representation allots their part 
to their descendants. 14 If the whole jurai is extinct (punah) , the 
property is inherited by the jUY'ai with common apical ancestresses on 
the next higher generation level, by the woman' s mother or the man' s 
mother 's mother. 
The same principles pertain to the common pancaharian property of the 
married coupIe. According to the adat saying " suarang diagieh" - "the 
suarang is divided", the harato suarang are divided at the time of the 
dissolution of the marriage. If the couple is divorced, the property-
half of each spouse is "normal" pancaharian again. In the case of death 
of one spouse, the suarang-half is normal pancaharian for the surviving 
spouse and the half of the deceased spouse falls to his or her heirs as 
haY'ato pusako Y'endah. 15 In many areas of Minangkabau, and specifically 
in CKL, the houses which had been built on the wife's group's pusako 
land partly or wholly with the husband's money, are not considered to 
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form part of the harato suarang. They are regarded as belonging to the 
wife's group's pusako, under the socio-political control of the wife's 
mamak. If the rnarriage is dissolved, the houses (the money invested in 
their construction) "remain" wi th the wife and no compensation is given 
to the divorced husband or the deceased husband's heirs (compare also 
Van Hasselt 1882: 227 f.). 
Polygynists form suarang complexes with each wife. As they stay in 
the houses of their wives, their harato pancaharian willoften also be 
separated spatially. In cases where the suarang complexes cannot be 
clearly distinguished, e.g. with capitalor property outside the nagari, 
one must try to sort out the wife with whom the husband had acquired the 
various parts of the property. 
In the course of time, there has been a change in the inheritance 
rules concerning a man's harato pancaharian. Since the 1960's it has 
been official adat (law) , that a man's harato pancaharian is inherited 
by his children. It becomes their harato pusako rendah and is turun 
temurun in their jurai, i.e. is henceforth inherited according to the 
rnatrilineal rules. If a man leaves no children, the rules of the adat 
pusako are followed. 
A similar change has occurred in the adat concerning the individual's 
autonomy to dispose of his harato pancaharian during his or her lifetime. 
Whereas in former times, such dispositions were only valid with the 
consent of the person's kaum members, in contemporary Minangkabau the 
individual can freely dispose of his or her harato pancaharian. The 
development of the adat concerning the inheritance of and the autonomy 
over one's harato pancaharian will be described and analyzed in detail 
in Olapter 6. 
2. The ReZationships to the Harato Pusako 
a. The Dual Olaracter of the Pusako - Group Relationship 
The harato pusako is by definition the common property of a rnatrilineal 
group, a jurai. The jurai which holds common harato pusako may be a 
jurai of any size up to that of the buah gadang. The status of members 
of a jurai which holds common property is the basis upon which they, 
whether as individuals or as subgroups of that group, are entitled to 
the use and the exploitation of the harato pusako. Two basic kinds of 
relationships legitimate use and exploitation: the distribution of 
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property on the basis of inheritable rights and the allocation of 
temporary rights. Before these are described, however, it must be ex-
plained that the relationship between the group and "its" harato pusako 
has a dual character in Minangkabau adat. 
The harato pusako are generally attributed to the panghuZu of the 
buah gadang, the members of which are spoken of as "the people of one 
pusako property": One refers to the "pusako of Dt. X". But from this 
usage one may not conclude that the panghuZu "owns"his group's pusako, 
or that he "owns it for" his group. This is evident in cases where such 
reference is made to a buah gadang's harato pusako, the last panghuZu 
of which has died some time ago. This attribution of the property to the 
title is not to the incumbent of the office, but to the title as symbol 
of the group. The group holds both ti tIe and property in common. 
All harato pusako which is held by the buah gadang's or kaum's mem-
bers is considered the "harato pusako of buah gadang X" or "of Dt. X". 
Such reference, however, can mean two things: 
1. It may refer to the fact that all group members hold the harato 
pusako in common in "adat", in the restricted meaning of that term 
signifying socio-political control over property and common repre-
sentation in inter-group relationships in particular. Such reference 
is always possible. 
2. It mayalso mean that the property is turun temurun for all group 
members, i.e., that it is common heritage for all group members 
alike. The group members' claims to a portion of the harato pusako 
can only be based upon the latter facto 
In principle, all harato pusako held by the buah gadang's members 
may be turun temurun for all group members. But usually, this is only 
the case with respect to a part of the property which is held in common 
in adat. There may be jurai with apical ancestresses on generation 
levels below the one of the buah gadang or kaum ancestress, which hold 
their separate pusako. Such separate pusako will come into existence 
through the inheritance of the harato pancaharian of a jurai member 
(see above) or through the reception of property by way of gift (see 
below p. 176 ff.). Such property is turun temurun only for the jurai, 
and only the jurai's members are entitled to receive a part of it in 
the processes of distribution and allocation. But also in this case, 
their harato pusako is under the control of their panghuZu and is 
part of "the pusako of Dt. X". If, for instance, pusako property is 
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given by the bako to the children of one of their male lineage members, 
the transfer will occur in a public ceremony in which the panghuZu of 
the bako will ceremonially transfer the socio-political control over 
that property to the panghuZu of the anak pisang (see Duursma 1934: 
160 ff., own interviews in CKL). Yet the property will be turun temurun 
only in the children's jurai, and only they are entitled to the use 
and exploitation of it. 
This distinction is of utmost importance for the understanding of 
pusako-relationships. The distinction has not always been recognized by 
Dutch writers on Minangkabau adat 16 and is usually not considered in 
the Dutch and Indonesian Courts. The introduction of the cliché of the 
"kaum which holds common harato pusako" and the neglect of the dif-
ferentiated adat classification of harato pusako led to the concept ion 
that no such difference exists and that "the harato pusako tinggi of 
kaum X" are held in common also with respect to use and exploitation 
(see p. 190 ff. and Chapter 6: 353 ff.) . 
b. Distribution 
It is difficult to describe the principles of distribution of the hara-
to pusako turun temurun of a group, for any given situation in the 
group's history which we try to conceive of as in the present (syn-
chronic) flows out into time and assumes diachronic character. The 
property relationships on any ego's generation level depend on and are 
structured by the ones on the + 1 and + 2 generation levels; the former 
in turn predetermine the property relationships on the - 1 and - 2 
levels. Thus in order to understand a given situation, we must know the 
principles which have structured it - the principles of diachronic 
transfers of property relationships. Yet conversely, in order to under-
stand the latter, we must start in a given synchronic situation. In 
order to describe the principles of diachronic transfers, I shall start 
with a fictive point in the group's history, of a kaum which has common 
and yet undistributed harato pusako. 
The kaum's common pusako may not be divided (dibagi) unless the kaum 
is split. But the property of which the harato pusako consists can be 
distributed. However, not all property objects will be distributed. The 
movable property objects, the ceremonial dresses of the panghuZu and 
the bridal costumes, the ornaments and the family's gold will be kept 
in the house of the senior women, who will guard this pusako for the 
kaum. What is distributed is agricultural land and land for new housing 
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sites. If the kaum has more agricultural land than would be required by 
its mernbers, the surplus land may be left undistributed. In general it 
will not be worked in this case, but it may e.g. be pawned if the kaum 
requires money (see below p. 169 ff.). Also,some fields may be reserved 
for the panghulu or other adat functionaries,if the kaum has a living 
adat functionary. The sCMah pagadangan gala (cf. Kahn 1976: 71) or 
sCMah ninik mamak, the sCMah of the lineage elders, as it was called in 
CKL, would be worked for the adat functionary by his kamanakan in 
order to permit him to exercise his duties as group head free of econo-
mic troubles. 
The distributive mechanism is the bagi baumtuek, "the distribution 
for use" (bag i can mean both divide and distribute). Through the process 
of distribution, the recipients get the ganggam bauntuek, the "handful 
for use". The distribution must be the result of a kaum meeting in which 
a musyCMarah is held, and which must lead to a unanimous decision on how 
the property is to be distributed. The mamak has to see to it that such 
a meeting takes place and that a consensual decision is taken. He must 
prepare the mupakat in discussions with the individual households of 
his kaum. This is quite a difficult burden, as his aunts, sisters, and 
nieces may have quite different ideas ab out how the pusako should be 
distributed. The ganggam bauntuek is given to the kaum mernbers who need 
it most. In principle these are the women who have dependants: mothers 
or grandrnothers. The eldest living women on the same generation level 
(in our fictive example) have a right to get ganggam bauntuek from some 
part of the harato pusako, but there are no specific rules of distributior 
Distribution is subject to the general principle th at the ganggam bauntuek 
be distributed according to the needs of the various households. A woman 
married to a rich man, who has much of his own pusako fields at his dis-
position, should claim and get less than her po or sister. Likewise, a 
women who already has nine children will be given more than her sister 
who has only one child. 
The ganggam bauntuek gives its recipients the exclusive right to use 
and to exploit the property and to consume its products. It is, in prin-
ciple, given in continuity to the woman and her jurai, but that does 
not preclude a redistribution at some later stage in the kaum history. 
If the circurnstances have changed, if the demographic development in 
the jurai has led to an obviously unfair distribution, the ganggam baun-
tuek distribution should be revised. But this is only possible in a new 
kaum meeting, in which again a unanimous decision on the redistribution 
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has to be taken. These kaum meetings are a heavy burden for the mamak, 
for it is not always easy to bring his kaum members to a consensus about 
the distribution and redistribution of the harato pusako. In the deli-
berations much will dep end on the personal authority and influence of 
the main actors. 
If the mamak cannot convince his kamanakan of the necessity of a 
redistribution, the authority of the panghuZu may be invoked, and the 
quarrel may be discussed on all levels of dispute-settlement in the 
nagari. The panghuZu will press for a redistribution if he feels that 
the situation is intolerably unjust, and generally the disputing jurai 
will yield to the pressure exercised by the adat functionaries. Such 
forced rearrangements of the ganggam bauntuek distribution may seriously 
influence the inter-jurai relationships. Particularly when the original 
distribution has taken place some generations ago, the quarrel about 
the redistribution may give rise to the feelings that actually one does 
not want to be "one" any more: ''Why should one be bothered by a distri-
bution which allegedly took place 60 years ago? Is it really true that 
our grandmother was a sister of Angku X who now demands a redistribution 
under the pretext that he has more kamanakan than Sutan Y, our mamak ? 
As a good mamak, he should be able to take care of his kamanakan - we 
at least can do 50". 
If no settIement can be reached in friendship, such quarrels of ten 
lead to permanent group splits. 17 The harato pusako are divided, dibagi, 
and two new kaum are formed: The former common harato pusako ceases to 
be common; the property which the former jurai held as ganggam bauntuek 
will now form the common property which is harato pusako turun temurun 
in the newly formed kaum. This property then is again distributed as 
ganggam bauntuek among the jurai of the new kaum: Here we have arrived 
at the beginning of our fictive kaum history.18 
The ganggam bauntuek is distributed to the women and their jurai in 
continuity. At the moment of the distribution, it is vested in the indi-
vidual women. If the original ganggam bauntuek holder dies, the gang-
gam bauntuek is inherited by her heirs, who together hold the ganggam 
bauntuek in common. The ganggam bauntuek as such is not divided; in 
adat, it cannot be divided. But the various property objects to which 
the ganggam bauntuek pertains, are factually distributed between the 
heirs in a process of musyawarah. On the basis of the rule that all 
heirs are likewise ganggam bauntuek holders, the factual distribution 
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is subject to principles of law and morality. Sex-specific property ob-
jects will usually be given to the persons of the respective sex. The 
house(s) are left to the female heirs, for the males have to stay in 
their wives' house anyway. Male heirs are "expected" to leave most 
agricultural property to the use of their sisters and kamanakan, as is 
"proper" for a good mamak. But males definitely have a right to the 
ganggam bauntuek property as weIl as their female co-heirs, and it is 
quite customary that they leave the exploitation of their part of the 
harato pusako to their sisters or kamanakan on the basis of share-
cropping, the most frequent form of which is the "mampaduokan-manya -
duoi" - "to make it into two parts". Others may work it together with 
their wives and children for their own use; yet others will try to get 
their sisters' and kemanakan' consent to give their part to their child-
ren for the lifetime of the children in a formal gift-ceremony. Which 
concrete course is taken, depends on the outcome of the musyawarah and 
the "condisi dan situasi", the concrete circumstances in which it takes 
place. 
Usually, most of the agricultural property is distributed among the 
female ganggam bauntuek heirs. If the fields are more or less of the 
same value, each female heir may be given a certain nuJ11ber of fields to 
work. If the fields have different agricultural values or if they are 
spatially unevenly located, one will usually agree upon a system of 
rotational use, according to which each heir works the good and the bad 
fields alternatively for a period of time (bagilieh, balega).19 The 
period gene rally used is the "sawah-year"~ the tahun kesawahan, which 
allows the possessor to have one rice harvest and use the land there-
af ter for other crops like chili-peppers or vegetables until the next 
rice-planting season starts. 
The inheritance rules are the same as those which have already been 
briefly outlined for the inheritance of harato pancaharian: Primarily, 
inheritance is in the ganggam bauntuek holder's jurai and by the oldest 
generation: If a female ganggam bauntuek holder dies, the ganggam baun-
tuek will be inherited by her children, male and female. For predeceased 
female children, their descendants will inherit according to the prin-
ciple of representation. The heirs within the jurai are the "close 
heirs", the warih nan dakek (see Willinck 1909: 776). If the ganggam 
bauntuek holder has no descendants her jurai is extinct, punah or putus. 
In this case, the property is inherited by the "distant heirs", the 
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warih nan jaueh (Willinck 1909: 779). The closest distant heirs ate 
those kaum members who are the descendants of the common apical an-
cestresson the next higher generation level, i.e. of the ganggam baun-
tuek holder's mother. If this jurai should be extinct, too, the propert 
will be inherited by the jura i formed by the descendants of the ganggam 
bauntuek holder's mother's mother etc. The same principle also applies 
if the whole kaum or buah gadang should be extinct. Inter-group inherit 
ance is based upon genealogical closeness measured in common apical an-
cestresses in the matriline. As has already been mentioned the genealo-
gical distance is expressed through the warih-categories of sajari, 
satampo, saeto, and sadapo (see p. 99). 
These principles of ganggam bauntuek distribution and of inter-jurai 
inheritance function within and between the groups of blood relatives, 
kamanakan batali darah. In the case of a stratified kaum or buah gadang 
the harato pusako will therefore not be distributed between all kaum 
members. Only the kamanakan batali darah have a right to share in the 
distribution (pambahagian). The other kamanakan, who form part of the 
kaum/buah gadang in adat, are only entitled to a gift of property, a 
pambarian: The blood relatives will decide how much of the buah gadang'~ 
property is to be given to the kamanakan dibawa pusek or dibawa lutuik. 
The property given remains subject to the ultimate authority of the 
kamanakan batali darah, and the recipients of the pambarian are of ten 
not allowed to pawn the property. Within their group, however, this 
property is treated like harato pusako turun temurun and thUs is sub-
ject to the same rules of distribution and inheritance described above. 
If the blood relatives in the kaum are extinct, their harato pusako may 
be transmitted to the kamanakan who are the descendants of strangers or 
slaves. This is, however, no automatic process in adat but requires 
the consent of the distant heirs of the same matrilineal des cent in the 
other related kaum. 
The "punah-situation", where a kaum is extinct, however, is generally 
resolved before the kaum is completely extinct, i.e. during the lifetime 
and at the initiative of the last kaum members who foresee that there 
will be no more descendants in the female line. They can try to adopt 
one or more new kamanakan with the aim that they continue the group and 
its harato pusako. The principles concerning adoption have already been 
outlined in Chapter 2; a property history concerning an adoption will 
be presented in the following chapter (p. 253 ff.). The last kaum mem-
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bers are usually also granted a larger degree of autonomy to dispose of 
their harato pusako by pawning, sale, or - if the last kaum member is a 
man - by gift to their children. According to "old" adat, such trans-
actions always required the consent of the distant heirs in the genea-
logically related groups. In contemporary Minangkabau, the last group 
members are more or less free to dispose of their group's harato pusako 
if there are no more pers ons who are saharato, i.e., if the whole buah 
gadang is extinct. If only a kaum is extinct, the consent of the other 
kaum in the buah gadang is still necessary. In the following chapter two 
property histories will be presented in which this difference is quite 
explicitly stated (p. 239 ff. and 253 ff.). 
c. Allocation 
The ganggam bauntuek is not the only relationship which legitimates the 
use and the exploitation of the harato pusako. Besides, there are also 
temporary allocations of property objects to group members. In fact, the 
actual distribution of the property objects which are held by the gang-
gam bauntuek holder(s) is of ten already prestructured by temporary allo-
cations which have occured at a time when the ganggam bauntuek holder(s) 
had not yet inherited the ganggam bauntuek. 
Allocations usually occur when group members marry. The harato pusako 
allotted may be property which is still held in common by the whole 
kaum and which is not yet distributed as ganggam bauntuek; it mayalso 
be property which already has been distributed in this way. To under-
stand the principles of allocation, we must again take into account the 
development of the group: The ganggam bauntuek is given to adult women 
at the fictive point in our kaum history. The woman has received several 
sawah fields, a piece of land to build a new house, and some garden land. 
She will work the land, helped by her children and by her husband. A 
great deal of the agricultural work is carried out with the help of the 
other jurai members, and in the main stages of the agricultural work, 
such as planting, harvesting and threshing, the kaum members and also the 
bako and the buek-neighbours will help on the basis of the principles of 
tolong menolong, the ideal of mutual help. In former times, the decisions 
about the timing of planting and harvesting of rice were taken by higher 
authorities, the kaum council, the neighbourhood council or even by the 
nagari government, but in contemporary CKL the decisions are taken with-
in the ganggam bauntuek holding group. The children will help their 
mother and father , both on the fields of their mother and on the fields 
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of their bako. 
A change occurs, when the ganggam bauntuek holder's children grow 
older. A daughter marries, and her husband moves in to live with her in 
the biZik in the rumah gadang. If the family does not live in a rumah 
gadang any more, the girl will be given a plot of land to build a house 
for herself, her husband, and her children. There will be no great 
change in the activities of the young coupIe. The young wife will con-
tinue to work on her mother's fields, and her husband will also help 
her, and continue to help his mother and sisters on their fields. But 
at marriage or af ter some time, when the young couple get children, 
the wife is given a part of the harato pusako, to which her mother holds 
the ganggam bauntuek, or which is still unused common harato pusako of 
the kaum. This property is for the couple's exclusive use and consump-
tion in their pariuk, their "ricepot". The married daughter's younger 
sisters, who are still unmarried will continue to help their mother, 
and they will now also help their older sister. When the next sister 
marries, she in turn is given some of the harato pusako for her use. The 
property gi ven in this way is the dapatan, the "property (she has) re-
ceived". The harato (pusako) dapatan, however, remain subject to the 
authority of the ganggam bauntuek holder, and the normal Minangkabau 
grandmother does not easily lose control. Major problems concerning the 
jurai's property will, of course, be discussed with all adult group 
members, and within the group, the mamak jurai will have an important 
word to say. But note that the jurai in question here is the group of 
which the ganggam bauntuek-holder is the apical ancestress. The mamak 
of the ganggam bauntuek holding jurai will be the original ganggam 
bauntuek holder's son or grandson. The eldest woman in this group is 
generally on a higher generation level than the mamak, she is his mother, 
and this explains to a large extent the dominant position of the senior 
women in Minangkabau social organization (see Chapter 2: 83 f.). In this 
way we have also to understand Wi11 inck 's statement (1909: 391 f.) "that 
in the Minangkabau family circle the oldest common ancestress, if still 
alive, stood actually above the mamak. She was in each case, where fami-
ly matters in the sabuah paruik or jurai had to be decided, the highest 
authority". For the ganggam bauntuek holder's ''mamak'', her mother's 
brother or her brother, do not, in this fictive situation of the kaum's 
history, belong to her ganggam bauntuek holding group. Theyexercise 
authority only in those affairs which have to be decided by the whole 
kaum, matters which concern the relationships between the ganggam baun-
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tuek holding group with other such groups or with individuals or groups 
that do not belong to the kaum at all. 
When the male children of the ganggam bauntuek holder marry, they 
mayalso be given some of their kaum's or ganggam bauntuek holding 
group's harato pusako for the exclusive use and exploitation of their 
conjugal family. This property is cal led (harato pusako) pambaoan, the 
"brought property". The decision of whether the young bridegroom is to 
be given harato pambaoan must be taken in a meeting of the kaum council, 
for it involves inter-kaum relations, the marriage and a temporary 
factual alienation of the property. The following considerations will 
play a role: '~ow much property can his own kaum spare? Will the young 
couple have enough property for themselves? How rich is the bride's 
family? How much should one give in order to demonstrate to the bride's 
kaum that they made an excellent choice in their urang sumando? How 
much can one dare to give as pambaoan, as there is always the danger 
that the man's wife and children will try to 'sneak away' with this 
property". The relationships between one' s own and the girl' s kaum and 
relatives will also play a role. If the young man, for instance, had 
puZang ka anak mamakJ .married his MBD, the mamak would be inclined to 
favour the giving of pusako pambaoan (onmarriage as strategy in pro-
perty politics, see Chapter 5: 295 ff.). 
The allocationsof dapatan and pambaoan are temporary. If the girl/ 
woman to whom harato dapatan has been given is divorced, she will keep 
the property for herself and her children. llJhen she dies, the property 
will revert to the ganggam bauntuek holder and can be allotted anew. 
According to the adat rule for the division of marital property, the 
"dapatan tingga" - "the dapatan remain" with the kaum/jurai of the wife. 
According to the same rule the "harato pambaoan kembaZi"-"it returns" 
to the group which had given it; to the kaum, if the pambaoan had been 
taken from the yet undistributed harato; to the jurai, if the property 
has been taken of the stock on which the jurai already held the ganggam 
bauntuek. When the property "returns" it becomes "regular" harato pusako 
again and will be redistributed. The kaum/jurai of the deceased husband 
may, however, decide to leave this property to his children, in order to 
show their good intentions to their anak pisang. Such a decision will be 
facilitated, if the children. e.g. one of the man's sons, has puZang ka 
bako, has married a kamanakan of his father. In this case, there is no 
danger of the property getting "lost". Such a decision requires a 
musYOJ.JJarah of the whole kaum and a formal transfer of the property to 
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the anak pisang in the fonns known to adat (see below p. 176 ff.). 
When the original ganggam bauntuek holder dies, her heirs thus gene-
rally al ready hold dapatan and pambaoan relationships to the property 
for which they now inherit the ganggam bauntuek. They may have worked 
this property for twenty years, and it will not always be easy to come 
to a re arrangement of the property distribution af ter such a long time. 
Such a re arrangement willoften be demanded, for the older sisters 
(oldest daughters of the ganggam bauntuek holder) and their descendants 
will generally have more property at their disposal than the younger 
ones: They may have been given dapatan already before their youngest 
sister was bom, and her mother could not know yet the number of jurai 
members for which the harato pusako must suffice. In general, the 
daughters are given as much property as they need, and the oldest 
daughters, as the first ones who need property, will usually be given 
a lot, on the basis that they, in the later stages of the jurai's de-
velopment, will cede some of that property to their younger sisters in 
case they should need it. Such rearrangements require the mupakat of 
all the ganggam bauntuek holders, thus also the consent of the one who 
holds too much in comparison with her sisters. As the oldest sister 
af ter the mother's death, will be the oldest and senior woman of the 
group and as such be the one nan pagang harato, ''who keeps the property", 
it will generally be very difficult to enforce a new property arrange-
ment against her wishes. Though adat treats siblings as equals in pro-
perty affairs, the practice willoften lead to the result that the 
oldest sisters, and later, the oldest jurai in the kaum, and the oldest 
kaum within the buah gadang, control most of the harato pusako. Combined 
with the factor of (uneven) demographic development, this may lead to a 
quite uneven distribution of the harato pusako even within the ganggam 
bauntuek holding group. This unequal distribution will later be "frozen 
in" when the ganggam bauntuek holding group develops into a kaum and 
when,later still, this kaum splits again. 
d. The Pusako Relationship in Tenns of Rights 
The individual kaum members' legitimations to the use and the exploita-
tion of the harato pusako which are their common pusako turun temurun 
are expressed in tenns of ganggam bauntuek, dapatan, and pambaoan. The 
relationship of the kaum as such to its pusako is not defined with a 
special concept. The relationship is one of ''having'' the property as 
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turun temurun in one's group. The relationship is only specified in a 
dual way by stating that "mcunak bahak - kcunanakan bcuniZiek". This might 
be preliminarily translated as "the mcunak has the right of control -
the kcunanakan have the possession". This specification is further 
illustrated by the adat saying: 
hak bcuniliek - haràto bapunyo 
hak nan bancorrpu - harato nan bamiZiek 
hak nan tagantuang - miliek nan takabiah 
arati miliek: nan disauaki 
This saying is difficult to translate. Westenenk gave the following 
translation (1918a: 15): 
hak bcuniliek 
harato bapunyo 
the common right of disposal is transformed 
into possession 
one has limited ownership of individual 
property objects 
hak nan bancorrpu hak are the rights held in common 
harato nan bamiliek the harato are possessed individually 
hak tagantuang the hak is ''hanging'' (not specifically 
assigned) 
miliek takabiah the milik is personal possession 
arati miliek: nan disauaki milik means: what is derived (from the hak). 
A similar translation (into Indonesian) is given by a leading Mînang-
kabau expert, I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu (1973: 197): 
hak adalah berscuna 
harta adalah milik 
hak adalah bergantung 
milik adalah bermasing 
the hak (right) one has together 
the harta are possessions 
the hak is hanging 
the milik one (each) has for oneself 
These sayings are especially difficult to trans late because two 
translations are involved: One translation is of the adat conceptual 
system into the legal concepts of Islamic law, and the other is of 
these into one's own language. However little role this saying plays 
in the courts' judgements and in normal conceptual usage in the nagari, 
it is interesting in 50 far as it attempts to express the group's re-
lationship to the harato pusako in terms of rights. I shall not try to 
give another translation of the saying (which was probably created by 
Islamic adat experts in the last century) but only state two points 
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which I think can be inferred from i t : 
1. One point is that the pusako relationship has two aspects: the one 
of socio-poli tical control , the hak, which is "hanging", abstract, not 
reified. This hak is of the whole group, but is vested in the mamak, the 
group head. The other aspect is the material property, the miZik, which 
is possessed and distributed among the kamanakan, the individual kaum 
members. Hak and miZik indicate two different aspects, the communal and 
the individualized, or the man-thing relation. The mamak is bahak over 
all of his kamanakan' ha~ato which they hold in the state of miZik. The 
mamak, as group member, will generally also have some miZik, some pro-
perty objects for his own use. But th at does not make him "bahak miZik" 
on these property objects. In Minangkabau adat, hak and miZik cannot be 
combined in one person or group. The concept hak miZik, which in con-
temporary Indonesia is used as an equivalent for the Dutch eigendom 
(ownership) was unknown in adat. 
2. The other point is that these abstract characterisations of hak and 
miZik do not indicate a legitimation for the use and exploitation of 
the property object. The hak does not entitle the mamak to use and 
exploit the property over which he has the hak. The miZik is the des-
cription of a possessory relationship, but not its legitimation. This 
adat-meaning of hak and miZik is important to note, as in the more 
recent conceptual usage in Minangkabau, the concept hak miZik is in-
creasingly used to express property relationships in adat. This develop-
ment will be analysed in Chapter 6. 
3. The ReZationships to the Pusako Kebes~an 
a. The Ti tIes 
The most important (and only) part of immaterial pusako to which Minang-
kabau, and the men only, have an individualized relationship are the 
titles, gaZa. Each grown-up Minangkabau man used to wear a title in 
former times. Minangkabau adat says: "ketek banamo - gadang bagaZa" -
'when one is small, one has a name, when one is grown up, one wears a 
gaZa". There are some regional variations as to how far the gaZa-wearing 
is still practiced. Mansveld reported already a hundred years ago, that 
the custom was most strictly adhered to in the district of Agam, where-
as, e.g. in 50 Koto, only the adat functionaries still used and were 
cal led by their titles. This situation does not seem to have changed 
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since then: In Agam, and also specifically in CKL, each adult man wears 
a title, with the exception of Islamic functionaries and those persons 
who hold a post in the state administration. The gala are mostly of 
Hindu origin, meaning King (Rajo) , King of Kings (Maharajo Dirajo) , 
Crown (Mangkuto, Mahkota) , Military Commander (Palimo, Pang lima) , Sultan 
(Sutan) , the Great One (Bas a) etc. In CKL, as in most nagari in Agam, 
most titles wom by the individuals consist of two components like Rajo 
Basa, Palimo Putih, Sutan Nagari etc. 
Most of the titles wom in Minangkabau are pusako. 20 The most im-
portant titles, the office-titles of the adat functionaries with the 
additional title Datuek, the gala sako, are the pusako of the buah 
gadang. The ti tIes which are not attached to adat offices, partly are 
the property of the suku (pusako), partly the common property of all 
suku. 21 These titles are usually cal led gala pusako. 
The ti tIes are conferred upon the men af ter they have married. With 
marriage, the Minangkabau man is "gadang", great, grown-up. The ti tle-
giving occurs in the course of a ceremony, such as a panghulu installa-
tion or a marriage ceremony. At some stage of the ceremony, one of the 
elders functioning as "host" reads out the new titles to the public: 
that X will wear from now on the ti tIe Rajo Sutan, that Y will now 
wear the title Payuang Arneh etc. In the course of his lifetime, a Minang-
kabau man may wea~ several titles. He will get a title in any case at 
the time of his marriage. If at a later time he should assume an adat 
office, he will receive a new title, or he may be given an honorific 
gala when he is older. 22 
b. The Giving of the Gala Pusako 
When the title of the young man is read out (dihimbau) to the public in 
the ceremony it had already been determined which title he should re-
ceive. The principles of the title-selection can best be compared with 
the allocation of material property, with the essential difference that 
titles can be duplicated whereas material property cannot. Titles can 
be duplicated in that two or more living group members can wear the same 
title which consists of two components (e.g. Sutan Marajo) or through 
the multiple use of the single components.For example, one group member 
may have the title Rajo Imbang, another Sutan Rajo Imbang, and yet an-
other Rajo Sutan. The mamak of the young man has the task of finding the 
title. That means that he must organize a kaum meeting in which the 
question is discussed and a unanimous decision is reached. The kaum can 
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take one of the title-stock of their suku, and they can also use one of 
the common ti tles. In CKL i t' has become a custom, that the yOlmg man 
receives one title-component from his kaum, and the other from his 
father's kaum. If the man's father wants to confer a title (component) 
upon his son, there has to be a musyawarah in his kaum (the son's bako) 
in which it is decided which of their gala-stock will be given to the 
anak pisang. In the last resort, the complete title thus has to be 
chosen by the mamak of the man's kaum and by the mamak of his bako (not 
necessarily by the father hirnself) .23 
If persons are asked from whom they have got their titles, they will 
usually state that they gat it (dapek) from their mamak and, as in CKL, 
from their father, or that the title has been given (dikasih) by them. 
Such statements have been interpreted in the sense of "title-inheritance" 
from mamak to kamanakan, or from father to son. It is therefore quite 
important that the rnechanisrns of title-giving are weIl understood. In 
the statements "I got rny ti tle from rny mam:J.k " or "from rny bapak", mamak 
and bapak indicate the collectivities represented by the mamak and the 
father. It does not mean, that the mamak or the father selected the 
title by thernselves. Nor does it mean, that the nephew/son, 'who gat 
his ti tle from his mamak/bapak", wears the same ti tle or one of the 
title components which his mamak or father wears. This may happen, but 
is rather unusual, and of course a father has several children, and a 
mamak several kamanakan (and the kamanakan several mamak) who norrnally 
are not gi ven exactly the same ti tles . 24 As far as the ga la-gi ving "from 
father to son" in CKL is concerned, it rust further be mentioned, that 
the gala component is given by the bako to its anak pisang. Once the 
anak pisang has died, his gala "reverts" to the bako again. It may not 
be used by the kaum of the man, as it is the pusako of his bako. 
c. The Giving of the Gala Sako 
The principles for the giving of the sako, the office title, are some-
what different. The office is the pusako turun temurun of the buah 
gadang (blood relatives) and it cannot be duplicated. The title is 
attached to the office, and will automatically be given to the new 
panghulu in the course of the panghulu installation. 
The basic principles of the succession to the panghulu office have 
already been described (Chapter 2: 86 ff.). Like all pusako, the sako 
is "turun temurun from the MME to the MB, and from the MB to the ZS". 
But this does not necessarily mean that the successor to the panghulu 
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will always be his sister's son. At least in the nagari following the 
adat Bodi-Caniago, the buah gadang members are quite free to select the 
successor, and the inheritance-principle is further mediated through 
the institution of the gadang baZega. Economic considerations will also 
play a role. As it is quite expensive to install a panghuZu, it may be 
more economical for the buah gadang to have a grandnephew instalIed than 
a brother or nephew, thus lengthening the time between installations. 25 
Office ti tIes in principle may not be given to other persons than 
buah gadang members. Only under special circumstances may a panghuZu 
gaZa be given to a son: If the buah gadang of the father (the panghuZu) 
is extinct or if there are no suitable male successors for the panghuZu, 
his buah gadang can agree in a musyawarah that their anak pisang should 
be allowed to wear his father's title. This has happened once in CKL. 
When Dt. Mangiang had died his son was allowed to wear his title. Though 
the ti tle was the sako of his father '5 buah gadang, the son did not (of 
course) assume the office of panghuZu in his father's buah gadang, and, 
once he had died, the gaZa Dt. Mangiang could not be wom by any of the 
26 sons's buah gadang members. 
I I I. TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS IN MlNANGKABAU ADAT 
1. IntrodWJtory Note 
It is the basic principle of the adat pusako, that pusako property is 
turun temurun, th at it continually descends in the group of persons for 
whom it is common heritage. To achieve this goal, the property must be 
kept in the group. The living generation may use and exploit the pusako 
property, but must guard its basic resources for the future generations 
just as the ancestors have guarded it for the present generation. An 
adat saying states: "Aienyo buZieh diminWTI - buahnyo buZieh dimakan -
batangnyo tatap tingga" - "lts water may be drunk, its fruit may be 
eaten, but its stem remains and remains". TransfeI;.s which would alienate 
the harato pusako from the group in which it is turun temurun are 
severely restricted by adat and permanent alienations are prohibited in 
principle. But the ideology of the adat pusako does not only affect the 
harato pusako. It is the moral duty of each Minangkabau, the men in 
particular, to add to their group's pusako. Whatever they eam as 
pancaharian is destined to become harato pusako. Pancaharian transfers 
which threaten to alienate this harato pusako in spe from the holder's 
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group against the wishes of the group were not allowed in adat. 
The pusako ideology is reflected in the legal adat TUles that pertain 
to temporary and permanent property transfers. These TUles conceptualize 
the various forms of transfer~ state the conditions under which they 
are valid and wh at the consequences of such transfers are. More general-
ly, the ideology is firmly embedded in adat morality. As such, it con-
stitutes an important factor influencing the holders' decisions of 
whether or not a transfer, though valid in law, should be carried out 
at all. 
In the following part of this chapter, I shall describe the adat con-
cerning the possible transactions. In the course of history, there has 
been a considerable change, both in the adat conceptions pertaining to 
transfers and in the way the Minangkabau made use of these transfers. 
The most important changes will briefly be mentioned here; in the follow-
ing two chapters the use made of the property transfers and the develop-
ment of the adat conceptions will be described and analyzed in detail. 
2. Jua Bali - Selling and Buying 
The concept jua bali (Ind.: jual beli) corresponds closely to the western 
concept of sale. Jua is the transfer aspect, bali the buying aspect. Jua 
bali is the exchange of property against money or gold. Once the exchange 
has occurred, no party can reclaim its original property. As the adat 
saying states: "Jua salamaik" - "selling is safe". Jua bali is conceived 
of as a synchronic property exchange (which, however, can be used to 
effect diachronic property transfers, see Chapter 5: 267 ff.). 
In adat, no basic legal distinction is made between immovable and 
movable property objects. 27 "Land is sold in the same way as a writing 
desk" (PN Bukit Tinggi in case 16 of 1972). This is a trait of all adat 
systems in Indonesia, which has even been kept under the influence of 
Dutch law (which makes that distinction), and which has also been in-
corporated into the Basic Agrarian Law (Gautama and Harsono 1972: 47 f.). 
With respect to the holders' autonomy to sell property objects, an 
important distinction was made according to the status of the objects in 
terms of harato pancaharian and harato pusako. 
Harato pusako in principle cannot be validly alienated at all. Minang-
kabau adat says: "Jua indak dimakan bali - sando indak dimakan gadai" -
"if to be sold, it may not be eaten up by the buying, if to be pawned, 
it may not be eaten up by the pawning". Only two exceptions seem to have 
been made from this TUle: 
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1. Pusako land could be sold to nagari co-citizens if it was to be used 
for house sites, and if all buah gadang members and their panghuZu 
agreed to the transfer. It is not known whether this is a recent de-
velopment. Duursma reports that it could be done "since the olden 
times" if the land was not rice-Iand (1934: 163). In CKL, some house 
sites had been sold during the last 100 years, and their sale was 
regarded as being quite in accordance with adat. 28 
2. When the urang saharato sapusako are extinct, the last living members 
29 of the buah gadang are usually allowed to sell the harato pusako 
to nagari co-citizens. Such sales required the consent of the warih 
nan sajari, the relatives of one blood in the genealogically related 
buah gadang. In contemporary Minangkabau, the buah gadang members are 
usually free to dispose of their harato pusako without this consent. 
However, if only a kaum is extinct, the consent of the other kaum 
within the buah gadang must still be obtained (see the story of the 
"Extinct Buah Gadang", (Chapter 5: 253 ff.). 
Agricultural products produced on harato pusako, the "bungo pusako", 
"the fruit of the pusako", are treated as harato pusako, with the ex-
ception that they could be sold. The goods or money received in return 
have the status of harato pusako. 
Harato pancaharian in principle could be sold. Trading activities ne-
cessitated some circulation of goods, and most objects created by econo-
mic production (weaving, gold- and silver works, blacksmithing etc.) 
were harato pancaharian. The property received in return had the status 
of harato pancaharian. Diachronic transfers, however, which would 
alienate the holder's pancaharian property and harato pusako in spe of 
his kamanakan we re subject to severe restrictions (see below p. 180). 
3. Pagang Gadai - The Adat of pawning 
a. The Pagang Gadai Transaction 
The pagang gadai trans act ion has been translated as "pawning" or "pledging" 
by English authors and as "verpanding" by Dutch authors. 30 It involves a 
temporary transfer of the right to use and exploit land in exchange for a 
sum of money or gold. 31 Pagang indicates the taking, gadai the giving 
of the land. I shall speak of the "pawner" and the "pawnee", meaning the 
panggadai (giver of the land) and the pamagang (giver of the money). 
Most land having the status of pusako, pawnings usually involve pusako 
property. Pawnings of harato pusako were subject to two sets of restrictions: 
They may only occur in specific situations and additionally need the 
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consent of all (adult) kaum (group) members. 
1. Pawning is allowed in four "classic" situations which are mentioned 
in any publication on Minangkabau adat and which are immediately quoted 
in each interview about pusako. Harato pusako may be pawned if the kaum 
as a whole needs money for: 
- gadis gadang aZun baZaki - the grown-up girl is still without hus-
- ~mah gadang katirisan 
band, i.e., money is required for the 
wedding ceremonies, 
the family house needs repair, or a new 
family house is to be built, 
- mambangkik batang tarendam - the panghuZu must be instalIed, 
- maik tabujua di tangah rumah - the corpse lies in the middle of the 
house, i.e., money is required for the 
burial ceremonies. 
Besides these four cases, some others have been mentioned in the 
literature, such as to provide the costs for the pilgrimage (naiek haji) 
of a kaum member or the payment of common debts (utang di tangah medan) 
(Résumé 1872: 19; Joustra 1923: 118; Guyt 1936: 59).32 
In our interviews in CKL, people usually mentioned the classical 
four cases. Most interviewees emphatically denied, that harato pusako 
could be pawned in order to provide the costs of the pilgrimage. But as 
the pawning register of CKL reveals, such transactions were, however, 
not uncommon 100 years ago. In lengthier discussions of the problem 
most people expressed a rather liberal opinion (which seems to be shared 
in contemporary Minangkabau in generaI), namely that harato pusako may 
be pawned in any case where money for common needs is required. In CKL 
pusako was frequently pawned in order to secure the necessary money 
for court-suits over harato pusako (cf. Chapter 5: 228 ff.). 
2. The pawning of harato pusako is done by the mamak, af ter he has 
secured the sakato or mupakat of his kaum members. In all pawning trans-
actions, the mamak (of the panggadai party, the pawner) represents his 
group in inter-group relationships, and.he also does so in the cases of 
property relationships between groups. As he is responsibIe for the 
organization of the ceremonies for which the money is required, it is 
he who has to secure the money in the case that the kaum has not enough 
funds to finance the ceremonies. The initiative for the pawning will 
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therefore of ten be taken by him. To make the pawning valid, he must, 
however, have the consent of his ahZi warih, his group members, in prin-
ciple of all adult members of his kaum. 33 The initiative mayalso come 
from an individualor from a ganggam bauntuek holding jurai. The gang-
gam bauntuek rights,however, do not entitle its holders to pawn the 
harato pusako. The consent of the kaum's other jurai and its mamak is 
required, and the mamak must act as the actual pawner's representative. 
Slightly different is the case, where a jurai holds separate harato 
pusako turun temurun. Here the jurai is entitled to pawn the harato in 
their own right without the consent of the other jurai, but the mamak 
of the kaum must act as representative in the pawning ceremony (see also 
Sarolea 1920: 120 ff.). 
The transaction is usually initiated by those who need the money. 
They will approach someone who might be willing to lend the money and 
take the harato in exchange until the money can be repaid. According to 
adat, the persons approached should be persons closely related, possibly 
in one's buah gadang or one's suku. If the pers on or group approached 
is willing, and if the pawners have secured the unanimous decision of 
their ahZi warih, a ceremony must be held in which the transaction is 
publicly carried out. This ceremony must be held in the house of the 
pawnee (the pamagang), for the money (uang gadaian) must be "fetched" 
(dijemput). If the pawnee is a woman, the ceremony will be held in her 
(mother's) house. For men, however, the "house of the pamagang" can mean 
either of two houses: the house of his children, i.e. the house of his 
wife, or the house of his kamanakan, i.e. the house of his mother. 
llJhere the money is fetched depends upon for whom the pawnee intends 
"the money" and the right to use and exploit the pawned property. If 
the money is fetched in the house of the kamanakan, it means that the 
transaction has been made for the immediate or future benefit of the 
kamanakan. If it has occurred in the house of the children, it means 
that the pawned property is intended for the children. 34 The ceremony 
consists of a communal meal, in which the transaction is publicly con-
firmed. In addition to the parties, their mamak and the ahZi warih, the 
panghuZu of the parties, and in some nagari, also other adat,functiona-
ries, have to participate as weIl as the holders of the plots adjacent 
to the one being pawned (cf. Guyt 1936: 93 ff.). This participation of 
the adat functionaries is a classical case of "preventive law applica-
tion" (preventieve rechtszorg ) as described by the Dutch scholars of 
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adat law (Holleman 1920, Logemann 1924, Van Vollenhoven 1931). Through 
the presence of the adat functionaries the transaction is validated in 
adat (Ter Haar 1948: 106). 
In 1915, the Dutch introduced a regulation (S. 1915: 98 jo 687, art. 
14, 15), which permitted the making and the registration of apagang 
gadai contract before the Dutch administrative officials (Guyt 1936: 44). 
But in some districts, the administrative officials had already informal-
ly introduced the rule that the trans ac ti ons should be confirmed in the 
presence of the Tuangku Laras, the parties, their panghuZu, and one of 
the ahZi warih, possibly a young female kaum member. In CKL, this was 
already practiced in 1873, as the pawning register of Candung shows. 35 
The practice of making a gadai-deed, a surat gadai, has in most nagari 
persisted, and nowadays a copy of the surat gadai is of ten given to the 
archive of the WaZi Nagari. Not all transactions are reported as many 
villagers do not wish to inform the WaZi Nagari and give greater publi-
city to the transaction than is needed. But as can be inferred from 
interviews and regular court practice, the written document is used 
as evidence only, not as an element determining the validity of the 
transaction. 
The period for which the property is pawned can be stipulated by the 
parties. If no such date is set, the property may be redeemed af ter a 
minimal period of two years (duo tahun katigo). Af ter this time, the 
pawnee (pamagang) has to accept the redemption money (uang tabusan) if 
it is offered to him. 
b. Tebusan - The Termination of the Pagang Gadai Relationship 
The pagang gadai relationship is terminated by the redemption of the 
property, which is ditabuih or ditahuri by the pawner (panggadai). If 
the property is not redeemed af ter a short time the relationship should 
be disabuik-sabuik, ''mentioned again and again" (cf. LH. Dt. Rajo Pang-
hulu 1974: 54): The fact that the property is pawned and is not pusako 
of the pawnee, should be declared each year to the pawnee and the four 
witnesses, the holders of the adjacent plots. This was not done in CKL, 
however. 
No matter how long the pawnee keeps and works the property, the right 
to redeem it can never be abrogated and is not subject to limitation. 
Minangkabau adat says: "SeZama peredaran matahari, buZan dan bin tang -
saZama awan putih - saZama gagak hitam - saZama aie hiZir" - "(the 
pusako remains) as long as sun, moon, and stars move, as long as clouds 
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are white and crows are black, as long as water flows downhill" (Wilken 
1926: 417; cf. Van Vollenhoven 1918; Dt. Maruhum Batuah and Bagindo 
Tanameh 1954: 55). It frequently happens that redemption is demanded 
af ter several generations. This regularly leads to conflicts, in parti-
cular, if the original transaction cannot be proven any more (see 
already Wilken (1888) 1926: 417 f. Such a case will be described in 
Chapter 5: 249 ff.). To redeem,menebusi, means, that the property is 
fetched back to the original holder in exchange for the pawning money. 
Redemption in this sense is in the name of the ka:um: as pusako tuY'Un 
temurun it can be distributed and allocated again. 
c. Memperda lami - To "Deepen" the PaWning 
If the kaum of the pawner is not able to repay the redemption money, 
there is another mechanism to keep the pagang gadai relationship a 
going affair. This is called memperdalami gadai, to "deepen" the 
pawning. It means that the pawner, the mamak who pawned the property or 
his successor, approaches the pawnee with the demand that more money 
should be added to the original sum. 36 The deepening of the gadai also 
involves a ceremony with witnesses, in order to demonstrate who the 
real pusako holder is. If the pawning has been deepened several times, 
the redemption sum may have reached such a value that it is Wleconomical 
for the pawners to redeem their harato pusako. In this way the pawning 
may come close to a de-facto final alienation. But the right to redeem 
the property cannot be abrogated, and what is "economical" may signifi-
cantly change in the course of development. Cases in which the redemption 
is demanded af ter 100 years, are not rare in Minangkabau, though they 
usually result in conflicts and court cases. 
d. Jual Gadai - The "Pawning-Sale" 
In the first half of this century, the concept of jual gadai seems to 
have been employed quite of ten. In contracts making use of the concept 
it was either stipulated that the contract was a "saIe" (jual) for which, 
however, a right of redemption was agreed upon, or that it was a pawning 
(gadai) which was later followed by a sale (cf. Van Vollenhoven 1918: 
204 f., 266; Guyt 1936: 37 ff.; Ter Haar 1934c: 145). The Dutch courts 
of ten interpreted such transactions as sale in the sense of western 
law. Ter Haar has pointed out that such translation/interpretation was 
wrong, and advocated that it should not be used by the colonial courts 
(1934c: 145; also Van Vollenhoven 1918: 627, 1933: 242, 244). He pointed 
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out that the first mode probably was developed - by the Minangkabau as 
weIl as by other Indonesians- in order to circumvent the riba-prohibition 
of Islamic law: The riba-prohibition forbids Muslims to draw profit from 
pawned property (Juynboll 1903: 285 ff., see below p. 198). The pawnee 
in a pagang gadai contract is in a position to draw pro fits (for example, 
from his working the land) from a property object not belonging to him 
which had been given as security for a debt. Devout Muslims therefore 
preferred to clothe their agreement in the form of a sale, which would 
make the property object the property of the pawnee, and, in accordance 
with adat, to make a provision for redemption. Jual gadai cases there-
fore should be regarded as a no rma I means of pawning with no time-limit 
stipulated (Ter Haar 1934c: 145) or a "deepened gadai" (Guyt 1936: 
39 f.)37 as the right to redeem the pusako property cannot be abrogated in 
adat: "jua indak dimakan bali - sando indak dimakan gadai". 
e. Kisah Gadai - The Transfer of the Gadai 
The pagang gadai relationship between the original pawner and pawnee can 
also be ended by the "transfer of the gadai", mangisah or pindah gadai. 
The initiative for such a transfer can come from both parties. 
1. The pawner (panggadai) may be of the opinion that the pawnee has kept 
his property long enough. The relationship should be terminated, other-
wise the pawnee might claim that actually the property is his harato 
pusako, hoping that the original transaction cannot be easily proven any 
more. If the pawner does not have enough money to redeem the property 
by him- or herself, he or she can decide to kisah gadai, to transfer the 
gadai to another person who is willing to take over the property. If A 
has pawned rice-fields to B for 3 rupiah he can transfer the gadai to 
C. C will pay 3 rupiah to A, with which A pays back the original pawning 
sum to B. This transaction is often used to effect a "deepening" of the 
gadai, e.g.,if Ademands 5 rupiah from C, repays 3 to B, and keeps 2 for 
himself. 
2. The initiative mayalso come from the pawnee (pamagang). If he does 
not need the rice-field anymore and wants his money back, he will offer 
the fields to A for redemption. If this offer is not accepted as A has 
not enough money to redeem the saJ.Vah, B himself can initiate the t,rans-
fer of the gadai to C. In this case he always should offer the fields 
to A first. If A feels by-passed by the transfer of the gadai, or some 
of A's group members are not content with it,they hav~, of course, 
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always the right to redeem the property from C, too. If the original 
pawner, the kaum A through its mamak kepaZa waris, has not sufficient 
money to redeem (menebusi) , one of the kaum members may redeem the 
fields. This is called menebusi only if the redemption is in the name 
of the kaum. A "good" family member should, of course, redeem the pro-
perty in the name of the whole group which formerly held it as harato 
pusako turun temurun. But he cannot be prevented from redeeming it with 
his or her own money (pancaharian) for him- or herself, if the whole 
group is unwilling to do 50. Such a redemption is also called "kisah 
gadai" and follows the kisah gadai rul es . 
f. The Consequences of the Pawning Transactions for Diachronie Transfers 
of Property Relationships 
The types of pagang gadai transactions, and the conditions under which 
they are allowed to take place in adat, have been extensively described 
in the Dutch and Indonesian literature. Little attention has been given 
to the further consequences which these transactions, the transfer of 
the gadai in particular, have for the pawner and the pawnee. But these 
consequences are of fundament al importanee for the understanding of the 
contemporary Minangkabau system of property relationships: 
If apagang gadai transaction has occurred,the property object keeps 
the status of harato pusako for the pawner. The right to redeem or to 
kisah gadai is, as part of the pusako, inherited in the group which 
holds the property as turun temurun. 38 For the pawnee, the "land is 
harato pancaharian", if the money with which he or she pawned it was 
harato pancaharian. In colloquial language, most pawnees will point to 
the property they have pawned and will say "This is my pancaharian". 
Thus it seems that the same property object has the status of harato 
pusako for one party and of harato pancaharian for the other. If the 
question is discussed more intensively, however, it becomes apparent 
th at the Zand is harato pusako of the pawner,but not the pancaharian of 
the pawnee. Harato pancaharian is only the money which has been invested 
in the land, and the right to use and exploit the land which is based 
upon this investment. On this point, there were no differences in the 
answers of the various interviewees, judges, adat experts, or common 
villagers. This pancaharian follows the rules which govern the diachronie 
transfer of harato pancaharian: the rights to use the land are conse-
quently disposable and inheritable as harato pancaharian, but they can 
always be nullified by the redemption of the original pawner. This leads 
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to particular difficulties if one member of the original pawner's kaum 
has transferred the gadai to him- or herself. Although he is a member of 
the pusako holding group, the pawnee's right, which entitles him to the 
use of the property, has pancaharian character. The other group members 
for whom the land also is harato pusako turun temurun always retain the 
right to redeem the property. They can secure a share, corresponding to 
the jurai-distribution in the kaum, by paying a respective part of the 
redemption sum to the group member who had transferred the pawning to him-
self, or to his descendants if some generations should have passed since 
the first transfer of the gadai. 39 
It must further be noted that once harato pusako has been pawned, the 
severe restrictions which adat puts on temporary alienations do not fully 
apply anymore to the transfers of pawnings. When the pawner-kaum as a 
whole wishes to transfer the pawning to a new pawnee, a unanimous decision 
of all kaum members is still required. But the adat restrictions are con-
siderably lessened when individual kaum members wish to transfer the 
pawning to themselves, or if the pawnee wishes to terminate the pawning 
relationship through a transfer to a new pawnee. For if the kaum does not 
redeem the property, it has no right to prevent these transactions. The 
practical consequences thereof, a rather high mobility of pusako property, 
will be described and analyzed in the next chapter. 
4. The Privi~eged Loans of Harato Pusako 
Besides the temporary transfers of harato pusako in the form of pagang 
gadai, adat allows the transfer of some of a kaum's harato pusako to the 
kaum's anak pisang, the children of the male kaum members. These trans-
fers closely resembie a privileged loan. They are temporary in principle 
and involve no, or only a small counter-prestation on the part of the 
anak pisang. They sometimes are clothed in the form of a pawning, in which 
case, however, much less money is demanded from the anak pisang than would 
be asked from another pawnee. In contemporary Minangkabau, such transfers 
go under the term of "hibah of pusako", but in former times other, and 
more differentiated terms were used. 
a. Manggarek Gombak - The Cutting of the Hair-Lock 
In the areas of Solok and Batu Sangkar (Tanah Datar) one pusako trans-
action between the bako and the anak pisang was cal led manggarek gombak, 
"the cutting oH of the hair-Iock" (cf. Duursma 1934: 160 H.). It is 
(was) a transaction in which the rights to use and exploit the property 
were transferred. The bako had to be sakato, and the kaum of the children 
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and their adat elders were invited to a communal meal. During this meal 
and the accompanying ceremony, the bako declared that one wanted to give 
this and that property, say rice-fields, to one's anak pisang. The reci-
pient, who could be a boy or an adult male, but was in all cases a male 
anak pisang, then made his round of the Niniek Mamak, who cut off a 
hair-Iock which was kept as tando, as evidence for the transaction 
(Duursma 1934: 160; Kom 1941: 312). In the area of Batu Sangkar, the 
child gets the use right for his lifetime. Af ter his death, the property 
reverts to his bako. During the time of his possession he may not pawn 
(or sell) it, but may have it worked by share-croppers. In the region 
of Alahan Panjang and Muara Labuh, the property is given to the child's 
jurai in continuity. It becomes the pusako rendah of his jurai members 
af ter his death. If his jurai should become extinct, the property re-
verts to the bako and it is not inherited by the other jurai of the 
recipient's kaum (Duursma 1934: 161). 
b. Sando 
The term sando is not used of ten in contemporary Minangkabau, and 
the historical and present meanings of this concept in Minangkabau can-
not be stated with absolute certainty. Sando is a Sanskrit word, meaning 
"to pawn" ~ "ta pledge", and i t has been incorporated wi th this meaning 
40 in several Indonesian languages. 
There is some evidence that sando was also used more or less coter-
minously with gadai (e.g. in the saying "sando indak dimakan gadai") ,but 
much evidence supports the interpretation that it was used to denote a 
particular form of pawning or gift from the bako to its anak pisang. 
According to Kemal, sando is just another word for pagang gadai, but he 
reports that in the region of Lintau Buo (in Tanah Datar) sando is used 
to denote "pagang gadai transactions with the children seZama huduik 
anak, for the lifetime of the children" (1964: 67). For such transactions, 
also the terms sando agung or sando kudo were used. In a similar way 
the meaning had been explained by adat experts to Guyt, who acted as 
chairman of colonial courts in the 1930'5: "To give land to the anak 
pisang for little money" (1936: 19).41 The most sophisticated elaboration 
in the contemporary Minangkabau expert-literature is given by Dt. Majoin-
do (1956: 91 ff.), which suggests th at in former times sando and its 
different manifestations may have been the basic concept for all trans-
actions over harato pusako. According to Dt. Majoindo, the word pagang 
originally referred to pawnings of "movable property or harato panca-
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harian" only, whereas sando were pawnings of harato pusako in the four 
classical situations in which adat permitted such transactions. He 
enumerates three kinds of sando: 
1. sandoro this is anormal sando (pawning) for dua tahun ketiga, 
which may be redeerred af ter two years. 
2. sando kudo this is a pawning to the children (anak pisang) or to 
other persons with the stipulation that it can only be 
redeemed with the consent of the pawnee. 42 
3. sando agung this is a sando which has been carried out that long 
ago, that people do not remember the original pawning 
sum any more. 
During our stay in CKL, the term sando was used in one case by one 
panghulu with the meaning of a transfer of pusako to the anak pisang for 
little money in a situation where the buah gadang of the pusako holder 
was extinct. 
c. The Hibah of Harato Pusako 
In contemporary Minangkabau, transactions like the ones mentioned above 
are denoted with the label or hibah. Hibah is an Arabic word which means 
gift. In Islamic law, hibah is a complete and irrevocable donation made 
during the lifetime of the donor (Fyzee 1955: 186 f.), but in Minangka-
bau adat the term is used with different meanings: Hibah of harato 
pusako means the transfer of pusako property objects to the anak pisang, 
usually selama hidup anak, for the lifetime of the children, or for the 
children's jurai in continuity. No matter who initiates the transaction, 
(usually fathers who want to give some of their harato pusako to their 
children initiate) , all kaum memhers must agree to it, and the hibah-
transaction must be held in the house of the giver's kaum with the pre-
sence of the four holders of the adjacent property and the panghulu and 
other adat functionaries. If all persons agree to the transaction the 
panghulu of the giver's kaum officially hands over the authority over 
the property to the panghuZu of the receiver's kaum. If such hibah is 
made in punah-s i tuations, e.g. by the last living member of a kaum or 
buah gadang, the warih nan sajari, who would inherit the property if the 
group was extinct, must also give their consent (cf. Dt. Maruhum Batuah 
and Bagindo Tanameh 1954: 51). 
According to adat experts, different kinds of hibah must be dis-
tinguished. The following version is taken from I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 
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(1973: 51), and it corresponds more or less with the explanations of 
hibah which were gi ven us in interviews in CKL: 
1. Hibah laleh: This is a hibah from a man whose group is extinct to 
his children or to kamanakan of the same suku with whom no genealo-
gical relationships are recognized. This kind of hibah practically 
results in an adoption of the beneficiary: "the child is made a 
kemanakan and from now on lives with his or her descendants in the 
suku and the kampuang area, which are the pusako of the father who 
has given the property as hibah". 43 
2. Hibah bakeh: This is a temporary hibah to the children. The length 
of the transfer is stipulated when the hibah is made; it usually ex-
tends until the last of the children has died. aften, the property 
which had been the father's harato pambaoan is used for such a hibah. 
3. Hibah pampeh: This is a hibah from a panghulu to his children or to 
others because he either ''has too much pusako" or his group is ex-
tinct. In this case, a pampgh (Ind.: pampas) , a reimbursement, is 
specified. The children make a token payment at the time of the 
transaction, and af ter the time stipulated in the transaction has 
elapsed, the kamanakan of the giver can redeem the property by paying 
the reimbursement (dengan memberi pampasan) which is much higher than 
the token payment the children had to make (1973: 51 f.). 
In CKL, the latter transactions were known under the name of hibah-
gadai. Hibah for the lifetime of the children (selama hidup anak) and 
for the childrens' jurai in continuity were distinguished. Instances of 
such transactions are described in the following chapter. 
d. A Note on Terminological Development 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the "hibah of pusako with the consent of 
the kaum and the panghulu"is a corranon topic. Experts write about it, 
villagers speak about it, and cases concerning the hibah of pusako are 
quite frequent in the State Courts. This is quite surprising, if one 
considers that, according to older Dutch sources, hibah could only be made 
with harato panaaharian (Wilken 1926: 56, Willinck 1909: 749; Joustra 
1923: 121). According to Willinck,"hibah with respect to harato pusako 
or the ganggam bauntuek are void" (1909:.749).44 
In my opinion, it would be premature to conclude either that Willinck 
was wrong or that the adat has changed in this respect. What has changed 
is the terminological usage. What Willinck wrote on the hibah of pusako 
180 PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONrINUITY 
referred to the kind of hibah which individuals used to make over their 
harato pancaharian: Individuals were allowed to give some panaaharian 
property to tpoir children by way of hibah; if individuaZs wanted to 
make such a hiDah of the harato pusako they held as pambaoan or ganggam 
bauntuek, this would be void - in Willick's time as weIl as in con-
temporary Minangkabau according to the regular court practice. But ob-
viously the term hibah was not used for transactions between the bako 
and its anak pisang in Willinck's time. The transactions themselves, 
however, are not new; it is only that they are now denoted differently. 
Most probably, the hibah categories have superseded the sando categories: 
The most widely remembered meaning of sando: a pusako transfer from the 
bako to the anak pisang for the lifetime of the children,is now covered 
by the term hibah in its most widely practised form, the hibah 
bakeh. 
5. The Gift of Harato Panaaharian 
a. Hibah 
The gift of panaaharian property - usually from a father to his children 
- is cal led hibah. The hibah in adat is different from the meaning the 
hibah has in Islamic law (see pp. 178, 198). In adat, the hibah is car-
ried out by the father during his lifetime, but the transfer of the 
property becomes effective only upon the father's death. Af ter the 
father's death the transfer is definite. A hibah once made can be revoked 
before the death of the pers on making it (Willinck 1909: 747). The pro-
perty objects given by hibah became the recipient's harato pusako 
(rendah) to be turun temurun in his or her jurai (1909: 750).45 The 
degree to which the individual was granted autonomy to make hibah of his 
harato panaaharian has changed considerably during the last 100 years. 
In Willinck's time, around the turn of this century, adat allowed the 
individual to give away about one half of his or her panaaharian proper-
ty by hibah. This transaction, however, had to occur ''with the knowIedge" 
of the individual '5 ahZi warih, and had to be witnessed by his panghuZu 
(1909: 748). In other sources it is reported that such a transaction 
even required the "consent" of the ahZi warih. 46 These restrictions on 
the individual's autonomy have been increasingly lessened in the course 
of time. In the 1930'5 it had become court-Iaw that an individual could 
dispose of all his harato panaaharian without any cooperation of his 
kaum members or the adat functionaries, and in contemporary Minangkabau 
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this freedom of disposition is generally ackowledged. This development 
will be described and analysed in detail in Chapter 6. 
b. Pemberian - Gift 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the concept of pemberian, "the given", "the 
gift", is increasingly used to denote transactions over both harato 
pancaharian and harato pusako. It is used for transfers which become 
effective during the giver's lifetime as weIl as for those, which have 
effect af ter his death. It is not a traditional adat concept to which 
precise legal consequences are attached. In practice, pemberian is used 
to cover those transactions which otherwise are denoted hibah, and the 
same distinction concerning its validity are made which are made for a 
hibah of harato pancaharian and harato pusako respectively. 
6. Umanaik, Wasiyat, Hibah-Wasiyat - Testamentary Gifts 
Written testaments were unknown in adat. People could make "death bed 
declarations" by which they could try to direct the flow of their harato 
pancaharian property, but such declarations had no binding force on the 
heirs, the ahZi warih. Onder the influence of Islam and Islamic law, the 
concept denoting the institution of testament in Islamic law, wasiyat, 
was incorporated into adat. Besides wasiyat, the terms umanat (umanaikJ, 
or hibah-wasiyat are used. The legal consequences attached to testaments 
in adat, are, however, quite different from those in Islamic law (see 
below p. 199 ff.). In adat, a person could not dispose of harato panca-
harian by testament more freely than by hibah during his lifetime. The 
development of the adat concerning testamentary dispositions has been 
parallel to the one concerning hibah and the individual's autonomy to 
dispose of his harato pancaharian in general. 
7. Utang - Debts 
The information about debts and the diachronic transfer of debts accord-
ing to adat is rather scarce. In the older Dutch sources some informa-
tion is given, but in the more recent literature the problem is hardly 
mentioned at all. Interviews yield only very general rules, and there 
are only a few decided cases dealing with debts from which the "adat 
system of debts" cannot be abstracted as a matter of course. 
The basic principle of the adat pusako is expressed in the following 
saying: "u tang si mati dibaie jo harato si mati - Utang pusako dibaie 
jo pusako" (Willinck 1909: 783; R v J in AB 6: 16) - "The debts of the 
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deceased are paid with the property (panaaharian) of the deceased - The 
debts of the pusako are paid wi th the pusako". In adat, two kinds of 
debts are recognized: Debts which an individual has incurred (private 
debts) and debts of the whole kaum. The latter are debts incurred in the 
name of the kaum by the mamak kepaZa wOX'ih or some other kaum member. 
In order to make a debt a kaum debt, it must have been made af ter a con-
sultation with the kaum members, who must be a sakato. If one kaum mem-
ber makes debts and does not ask the approval of his kaum members, his 
debts will be ''private'' ones. Creditors are supposed to know what sort 
of debts their debtors make and to make sure, at their own risk, whether 
the debt is a private or a kaum debt. In nagari life, most cases of debt 
will be quite unambiguous. One cannot make great debts in secret. If 
one does, they must be private debts. The creditor will know it, and 
he will also know that the kaum of his debtor will not do anything 
ab out such debts. In economie activities outside the nagari, this is 
more difficult to ascertain, and one probably has to assume that debts 
are private ones unless the kaum has officially recognized the debt as 
a kaum debt. It is reported, that the creditors had to announce their 
claims at the funeral ceremony, before the inheritance was distributed. 
If they were late with their public announcement, the heirs were not 
obliged to pay the debts (Van Hasselt 1882: 284). In the funeral cere-
monies which we attended in CKL, it was demanded during the ceremonial 
speeches given in the deceased's house, that those who had claims against 
the dead should come forward and announce them, and that the moral debts, 
the utang budi, should be forgiven. But this statement had a formal and 
ceremonial character. It was certainly not meant that the creditors 
should come forward at this moment, but that they should approach the 
heirs af ter the burial and the further funeral ceremonies. 
Private debts must be paid of the hOX'ato panaahOX'ian of the debtor. 
If the debt exceeds the value of the panaaharian, the whole harato 
panaaharian will be used in payment. The hOX'ato pusako of the debtor 
cannot, however, be used to satisfy the creditor. This holds true in 
synchronie and diachronie perspective, during the lifetime of the debtor 
and af ter his death: Only the harato panaaharian of the deceased can be 
used to pay the debts, the hOX'ato pusako or the panaaharian held by the 
debtor' s heirs cannot be held liable (see Willinck 1909: 783 f.; AB 6: 
16).47 HOX'ato panaaharian, which had been given by hibah to the children, 
could not be held liable for the payment of debts; only the aativa were 
transferred by hibah (Willinck 1909: 751,794 f.). 
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The debt relationship as such thus was not continued by the heirs. 
It was and remained attached to the deceased and his or her harato 
pancaharian. The heirs were only responsible to make the payment out of 
the property which the deceased left. The main principle for kaum debts 
was that the person who had made the debt should repay it. But if he 
was not able to do sa, or if he died befare he could do sa, the kaum 
was responsibIe for the repayment with its harato pusako. The kaum mem-
bers are "u tang scuno dibaie, piutang scuno ditarimo" - "debts are paid 
together, and outstanding debts are received together". Adat further 
states "bautang mcunak, kcunanakan mcunbaie - bautang kcunanakan, mcunak 
mcunbaie" - "the debts of the mcunak are paid by the kcunanakan - the debts 
of the kcunanakan are paid by the mcunak" (see Willinck 1909: 783 H., 
Andresen in Kielstra 1892: 273; TNI 1895: 387). 
These rules seem to be more or less valid in contemporary Minangkabau, 
as will be apparent from the following cases. Most problems occur, when 
a kaum member gives the harato pusako, which he holds as distributed 
property, as security for debts or credits given by a bank. Security 
seems to be rarely given, and the question of whether pusako may validly 
be given as security at all is rarely explicitly answered. In interviews 
with judges and villagers the opinion prevailed that it could be given 
if all kaum members agreed to it. 
In case 8 of 1971 in the PN Batu Sangkar, a panghuZu and his wife 
had received a credit from a bank. When they were unable to repay, they 
made an agreement with the bank: They would repay the credit within 60 
days. The panghuZu gave a rice-field as security. Failing repayment, the 
bank should be entitled to sell the field in public. Af ter the 60 days 
had elapsed, the couple could not repay the credit, and the bank enforced 
a seizure of the rice-field through the PN. Af ter this had been done, 
the bank and the panghu Zu were sued by the panghu Zu '5 kaum members, who 
claimed that the seizure was void and illegal: The sawah was not harato 
paneaharian, but hamto pusako tinggi. Already in 1969 the panghuZu had 
made an agreement with the plaintiffs (they claimed) which gave the 
plaintiffs the right to use the field (a ganggcun bauntuek distribution). 
The debt had been made without the knowledge of the plaintiffs as the 
warih of the panghuZu and the ganggcun bauntuek holders of the property 
(lIoZeh karena tanpa setahu dari penggugat2 baik seZaku waris dan kaum 
tergugat maupun yang memegang ganggcun bauntuek berdasarkan persetujuan 
tersebut"). The debts therefore were private debts,and could only be 
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claimed against the panghuZu's harato pancaharian, not against the 
harato pusako ("karena itu menu:rut adat hutang tersebut tidak dapat 
debebankan kepada harta pusaka tinggi tetapi hanya dapat dibebankan 
kepada harta pancaharian pribadi dari X"). Unfortunately (for the anthro-
pologist) the case was stayed and has not yet been decided. 48 
The mIe "bautang mamak, kamanakan mambaie - bautang kamanakan, mamak 
mambaie" mayalso be illustrated wi th a case (27 of 1969 PN Bukit T:inggi) : 
In 1965, the woman A had made debts with the plaintiff in the case. When 
in 1967 some trouble had occurred over the repayment, the parties had 
made up a document in which the debt was acknowledged by the defendant 
(a surat pangakuan hutang). C,the panghuZu of A, had written a declara-
tion (a surat keterangan) which was to serve as jaminan, "security", 
that the debt of his kamanakan A would be speedily repaid (bahwa hutang 
kemanakannya akan segera dibayar). The plaintiff had sued A and C, 
claiming that C, as mamak kepaZa waris of A, was also a party to the 
debt-relationship. The panghuZu defended himself by stating that the 
debt had been a private debt, and that he was not the mamak kepaZa waris 
of A, but had only acted as lineage elder (ninik mamak); in other words, 
that he was not the mamak kaum of A, but the panghuZu of the buah gadang. 
The PN decided, that the panghuZu was liable to pay the debt, as he 
was the mamak kepaZa waris of A, and '~ad also engaged in some activi-
ties to speed up the payment". In appeal, however, (PT Padang case 84 
of 1970) the claim against the panghuZu was rejected: The PT held th at 
the panghuZu had merely "acted as someone who wanted to settle the dis-
pute between the parties" , and that it had not been proven that he was 
a party to the debt-relationship. 
Private debts should be paid by the pancaharian - heirs. In inter-
views it was generally stated that now, when the children inherited a 
man's harato pancaharian, his debts should also be settled by them. 49 
But much depends on "situasi dan condisi", on the particulars of a con-
crete situation. Consider the following case, which had occurred in CKL 
and had been finally decided by the PN Bukit Tinggi (case 42 of 1972). 
The woman R., who was sued by her father' s kamanakan ,claimed that she 
had lent her father some money and that her father had allowed her to 
work '~is" pusako-fields in return. When the father's kamanakan claimed 
the sawah af ter his death, R. fended them off by demanding that they 
should pay her father's debts first. The kamanakan basically agreed. 
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But when no consensus could be reached over the amount of money to be 
paid, they took the case to court. During the hearing of the case, the 
plaintiff kamanakan stressed that there had never been a pawning trans-
action between their mamak and his daughter, but that their mamak had 
"admitted" (mangaku) to one of his (classificatory) sisters that he had 
borrowed the money from his daughter. The court ordered the return of 
the fields in exchange for the payment of the debts by the kamanakan. 
This ruling was based upon the argument, that "if money is given in ex-
change for land, there is a pawning transaction" , and that the plaintiffs 
we re therefore entitled to redeem their harato pusako. 
The interesting aspect of this case is that the idea, that the debts 
could have been private debts which should be inherited by the daughter, 
was completely foreign to all participants and was never raised as an 
argument. For the plaintiff kamanakan, the case was clearly one of 
"debt". There had been no pawning transaction, and none of the witnesses 
heard had made any reference to a pawning ceremony. So we must assume that 
in the eyes of the plaintiffs, the "avowal" of the debt by the deceased 
to one of his kaum members was sufficient to make it a kaum debt; during 
the case it was never mentioned or claimed that the debt had been made 
in the interest of the kaum. But it mayalso be that the villagers take 
a different stand towards the inheritance of pancaharian-activa and 
passiva: Whereas it is considered normal in contemporary Minangkabau 
that the harato pancaharian (activa) are inherited by the children, it 
may weIl be, that wi th respect to debts, the "old" attitude may still 
prevail: that debts are inherited "by the heirs", the kamanakan. The 
court evaded the question of debt-inheritance by constructing a pagang 
gadai transaction; certainly the easiest way out of the problem, but the 
one least in accordance with adat. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ADAT PUSAKO 
In the following section, I shall attempt a brief analysis of the adat 
pusako in relation to three main points of reference: I shall analyse 
the adat system in terms of: 
1. corporateness, examining the relation between corpora te group struc-
ture and property relationships in Minangkabau; 
2. the way in which society's members' autonomy is restricted by adat 
with respect ta property; 
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3. the temporal dimensions inherent in Minangkabau property relation-
ships and its conceptual system. 
The analysis, in this place in the study, has a preliminary character. 
It is intended as an analysis of the ~old" Minangkabau system of proper-
ty relationships which will serve as background and frame of reference 
for understanding the developments which have occurred during the last 150 
years; these later,àevelopments are described and analyzed in the follow-
ing two chapt2rs. I am quite aware of the fact that such a juxtaposition 
of "old" adat and i ts developments leading to the "new" adat is in part 
artificial, yet I see no other way to analyse the changes which undoubt-
edly have occured in Minangkabau. Change and development demand a 
reference to a previous "state", and the anthropologist must construct 
such a state, knowing that he has to throw together various manifestations 
of adat which belong to different historical periods, and which them-
selves are developments rather than steady states. 
1. Corpora te Group Structure and Property Relationships in the Adat 
Pusako 
In my description of the adat system of property relationships I have 
consciously avoided the use of the concepts "corporate" ot "corporate 
group". Since Maine it has become quite conmon in social anthropology 
to characterize the social groups in traditional societies, and lineages 
in particular, as corporate groups, and many anthropologists chose to 
define the corporate group character with reference to common or corpo-
rate property holding (see Goodenough 1951; Leach 1961b; Gough 1961; 
Goody 1962; Smith 1956; Fried 1957). Some of the greatest authorities 
on Indonesian adat law, too, have characterized the legal status of 
social groups, the rechtsgemeenschappen (legal communities),by reference 
to common property holding and administration. Van Vollenhoven, for 
instance, used the criterion of common property to de fine the "familie" 
in Minangkabau, which corresponds to the social groups called kaum or 
buah gadang in CKL (1918: 250). This practice has been followed some-
what uncritically by later authors and, in my view, has given rise to 
some misunderstandings of the adat pusako. If I therefore employ the 
concepts "corporate group" and "conmon" or "corporate property" in the 
following analysis, I do not intend to enter into the discussion over 
their proper conceptual use; my aim is rather to clarify Minangkabau pro-
perty relationships in relation to the ideas expressed by other authors. 
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To define social groups as corporate using corpora te property holding 
as a or the constitutive criterion is, of course, a matter of conve-
nience. If it is done, however, it should fit the ethnographic facts. 
Incongruencies between ethnographic facts concerning social groups and 
their allegedly corporate character stimulated Fortes to his recent 
critical review of the various ways in which the concept has been used 
by other anthropologists (1970a: 291 ff.). Fortes' analysis is a con-
venient starting point for my discussion of the character of the proper-
ty holding groups in Minangkabau. In his analysis, Fortes maintains 
that the decisive characteristic of corporate groups is their defini-
tion as "one", as "one juristic person" in what he calls the politico-
jural domain (1970a: 300,302,308). Cornmenting upon the working con-
cepts of Goodenough, Gough and Goody which are based upon "one property", 
he concludes that property relationships are contingent upon and not 
constitutive of corporate group character. According to Fortes, property 
is the dependent variabIe, the definition of the social group as "one" 
in the politico-jural domain the independent one (1970a: 300). As much 
as I can agree with his review of the works quoted, his conclusion 
remains unsatisfactory. For it fails to distinguish between the two 
levels on which property relationships are usually expressed, the level 
of socio-political authority over property and the level of use and 
exploitation of property. Minangkabau adat allows me to demonstrate that 
the analysis of property relationships in terms of corporateness will 
remain confusing unless both levels are considered separately: 
The Minangkabau buah gadang, and in contemporary Minangkabau the 
kaum, (corresponding to those social groups called paruik or sabuah 
paruik in the literature on Minangkabau) seem to be the corporate group 
par excellence. In adat, these groups are defined as "one" in several 
respects, among which is property-holding. The members of the group are 
urang saharato, people of one property; the mamak represents his kaum 
members in all property affairs; no suit about harato pusako of the 
kaum will be entertained in court unless each party is represented by 
the mamak in his capacity as mamak of the kaum. The mamak is further 
responsibIe for the distributiàn of property within the group, and he 
must act for the group in transactions over kaum-property. In adat, 
there is not just the definition as "one" in terms of the adat-ideology, 
the functions attached to the "one-ness" carry important practical conse-
quences. 
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But within the kaum, there are quite important differentiations be-
tween the members who are of "one" property: 
1. There is the differentiation according to the socio-political status 
of the group members, which also affects their relationships to the 
"one" property. The descendants of former slaves and strangers have no 
equal rights to the property of the group. Though they may inherit the 
property if the blood relatives have died out, they are in principle 
ineligible for the panghuZuship and cannot inherit the sako even if the 
blood relatives are extinct. So far as these factors are concerned, one 
cannot speak of the kaum members as constituting a group which has "one" 
property, or which "functions as an individual iR relation to property", 
like the lineages described by Goodenough on Truk (1951: 29 ff.).50 
2. The "corporateness" of the kaum is not only dissol ved through the 
different social statuses of the group members. Having "one" property 
only applies to that property which is turun temurun for all group mem-
bers. Only in relation to this property have the kamanakan bataZi darah 
essentially the same rights, which are then allocated and distributed 
in the ways described above. But this property may not be the only 
"property of the kaum": There may be property which is the separate 
pusako turun temurun of one jurai based upon the inheritance from their 
mamak, and jurai may have their own pusako in continuity which has been 
given by the bako. 
If we were to adopt Fortes' attitude, the Minangkabau example would 
weIl support his analysis: The kaum is described as corporate group, but 
the group members do not actually form a corporation aggregate with res-
pect to all the property objects which are harato pusako kaum. It would 
therefore be necessary to conclude that what gives the kaum its corpo-
ra te character is its definition as one in the politico-jural domain or, 
as the Minangkabau would say, in adat. But it is much more reasonable to 
examine both levels of property relationships and consider the corpo-
rateness of the group on the level of socio-political authority, and 
use-and-exploitation separately. For on the level of socio-political 
control over property, the kaum is corporate. It is defined as "one" 
with respect to property, and the corporate character becomes manifest 
in many social functions. On the level of use rights and exploitation, 
the kaum is not (necessarily) corporate, but rather there are several 
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jura i , same contained within others, which have their separate harato 
pusako turun temurun within the kaum. The best illustration for this 
two-level conception is the gift of harato pusako from the bako to its 
anak pisang in continuity: The property is officially handed over from 
the bako's panghuZu to the anak pisang's panghulu. From now on, the 
property is pusako of the anak pisang's kaum (buah gadang) and their 
panghulu will exercise socio-poli tical authori ty over i t in the same way as 
over the other harato pusako of his kaum members. On the level of use-
and-exploitation, hawever, only the anak pisang's jurai may use and 
exploit that property. Even if their jurai were extinct, their co-
jurai would not inherit it, but it would revert to the bako. 
What has been said for the corporate "holding" of property also per-
tains to inheritance. As Fortes correctly remarks: 
"Succession, as all authorities insist, is of key importance in corpo-
rate group structure as weIl as, of course, in the continuity of corpo-
rations sole. But it is the instrument for ensuring the corporate conti-
nuity, given the principle of the corporate identity of organized 
pluralities, not the foundation of this principle, unIess, of course, 
we subsume the rules of exclusive recruitment under the rubric of 
succession" (1970a: 305). 
Failure to make the distinction will only lead to a confusion in the 
interpretation of the ethnographic data. Examples of such confusion are 
the statements of Goody on the corporate nature of property relation-
ships among the Lo Dagaa. Although Goody makes it very clear that he 
intends to separate inheritance from des cent (1962: 316), he is led into 
difficulties by his undifferentiated use of the concept "corporation" • 
With respect to inheritance he states, that 
"in the last analysis, these various mechanisms are dependent upon the 
concept of corporation, the idea that all members of the matriclan are 
enti tled to share the dead man' s property" (1962: 354). 
But the practice seems to be different: 
"Implicit in the whole situation lies a potential conflict between the 
idea of joint ownership and the operation of the next-of-kin principle 
of selection, between the claims of a single individual and those of 
the corporate group as a whoIe" (1962: 346). 
If one reads these statements one cannot help but conclude that a 
discrepancy between the ideal norm of corpora te group structure and the 
actual inheritance practice is indicated. But there may be a "conflict" 
only if bath levels of property relationships are fused into one through 
the notion of corporation. 51 But in fact, there may weIl be just two 
sets of norms: one on the level of socio-political authority, where the 
principle of corporateness operates, and one on the level of use rights 
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and their inheritance, where the principle of next-in-kin inheritance 
works. 52 
I would not have restated 50 much of the adat in terms of corpora te-
ness, if the description which I have given of the adat pusako system 
of property relationships corresponded to the descriptions which are 
dominant in the Minangkabau literature. But most authors have not drawn 
the distinctions I have made, and which are, as I have described, also 
drawn in the adat pusako. Most authors have been guided by the influen-
tialstatement of Van Vollenhoven, that only the familie (buah gadang or 
kaum) was a rechtsgemeenschap, alegal community with common property, 
whereas the "family branch or jurai" are notIegal communities (1918: 250). 
This view was also extended to inheritance: If a pers on died leaving 
harta pancaharian, this property feIl to his family (kaum) as family 
property. The whole family became its possessor; the closest relatives, 
the jurai and their mamak, only took "precedence" (voorrang) over the 
other kaum members with respect to the use of the property. Once the 
genera ti on of the persons having this "precedence-in-use" (onderhouds-
voorrang) had died, the property became pusako for all family members 
alike (1918: 261 f.). Smits and Van Bosse, two Dutch colonial lawyers, 
construed the pusako relationship on the model of the Germanic Gesamt-
handseigentum with its institutions of accrual and decrease: Each time 
a family member died, the remaining members' shares increased, and each 
time a new member was bom into the family, the other mernber's shares 
in the pusako decreased (quoted in Willinck 1909: 769 ff.). 
These interpretations contradict our data and would certainly be 
wrong for contemporary Minangkabau. But already Willinck had explicitly 
stated that only the jurai of the deceased had a right to the former 
harato pancaharian of their mamak, and that the other kaum members (in 
the kaum's other jurai) would only inherit the right to use and exploit 
the property if the jurai was extinct (1909: 574 f., 782 f.). Willinck's 
statement was shortly afterwards confirmed by Sarolea (1920), who focuss-
ed his research on exactly this question and came up with the same re-
sults as Willinck. Van Vollenhoven's statement is probably based upon 
less differentiated sources, and it must be noted that he expressed him-
self with caution, writing "that it seerns" (naar het schijnt) that all 
family members had anequal right to the property af ter the generation 
of '~recedent-users" had died. Later authors were less cautious; they 
either took over Van Vollenhoven's statement unreflectedly, or contented 
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themselves with rather undifferentiated statements that "pusako was 
owned both comnumally and individually" (cf. Kalm 1976: 71). 1 nrust also 
contradict Evers who in his recent (and otherwise very interesting) 
analysis of land tenure in Padang claims to have "detected" the separate 
holding of harta pusaka by a woman and her descendants as a ''new'' type 
of cornmunal landownership (1975: 107).53 As has been sufficiently de-
monstrated (and will be illustrated in the following chapter) this type 
of pusako holding is by no means new. It may be more evident, since in 
contemporary Minangkabau the level of adat socio-political authority 
has been superseded to some extent, and the relationships on this level 
are less effective than they used to beo 
2. The Limitation of the Society's Members' Autonomy 
Minangkabau adat limits society's members' autonomy in different ways. 
1. The autonomy of all ~linangkabau, individuals and groups, is limited 
in the name of the community through its general adat TUles, in 50 far 
as 
a) harato pusako may not be alienated permanently, 
b) temporary alienations may only occur under specified circumstances: 
in the four classical situations in which a pagang gadai is allowed, 
or if it is based upon a particular social relationship, like the 
gifts of the bako to its anak pisang. 
2. The autonomy is, under the preconditions of 1., fully granted to the 
groups, and in these cases the individual's autonomy is restricted by 
the groups • The groups may do what they want, if they speak as "one", 
when they are sakato. If the individual wants to exercise autonomy over 
the property objects which he has a right to use and exploit, he nrust: 
a) as member of the pusako holding group, try to achieve a sakato of 
his group, 
b) as holder of panaaharian, secure the consent, saizin, or the "knowIedge", 
satahu, of his group members. 
3. In most of the cases mentioned under 2., an addi tional requirement 
is tre ''knowledge and participation" of the adat-functionaries and wit-
nesses in the transaction. 
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The validity of transactions, in which society's mewbers exercise 
their autonomy over property objects, thus is measured in two ways: 
First, it is evaluated in reference to general law, in a process of ab-
stract evaluation; and, it is also validated in a social process. The 
character of these social processes has been excellently analysed by the 
Dutch schalars of adat law, who referred to them as "gesteunde naZeving" 
(Van Vollenhoven 1931: 247 H.) or "preventieve rechtszorg", preventive 
law application (Logemann 1924: 128, see O1apter 1: 35 f.). These func-
tions are also inherent in the social processes in Minangkabau, which 
require the consent of the kaum and the participation and witnessing of 
the adat-functionaries. However, in social life one has not only to do 
with successful processes. Adat prescribes that a sakato must have been 
reached if the transaction is to be valid. It does not, however, pres-
cribe that sakato must be reached. As a general principle, each kaum 
member has the right to withhold his consent and prevent the sakato from 
being reached. What determines the outcome, positive or negative, of the 
musyawarah process rather are moral, political, and economie factors, 
which, of course, are adat, too. The outcome is "tergantung situasi dan 
condisi"; i.e., it depends on the situation and the circumstances. The 
principle of decision making is based upon the presupposition that the 
ac tors will do the '~roper" thing in each concrete situation, and what 
is proper can only be determined in the interaction of the participants 
in a concrete situation. It would therefore be quite dangerous to ab-
stract general principles from such decisions (see O1apter 1: 37). Indi-
vidual aims and motivations are readjusted though the pressures - maral, 
political and economie - which others can bring to bear upon the indivi-
dual. In the last resort, the higher authorities can be used to exert 
this pressure. If the kaum withholds its consent (seen from the indivi-
dual) or if one kaum member does not want to be sakato (seen from the 
kaum) the exercise of the participants' autonomy can be evaluated by 
those ''who know better" according to the value and authority system. The 
aggrieved person(s) can bring the problem before the panghuZu, the suku 
council or the nagari council (following the hierarchy bajanjang naiek -
batanggo turun, see O1apter 2: 91 f.). These authori ties will determine , 
whether there was a ''proper'' or an "acceptable" reason for the respective 
pers ons to withhold their consent or to insist on their intention to make 
a specific transaction. The council can either order the others to 
cooperate, or even decIare the trans act ion valid itself without their 
cooperation (see Dt. SanggoenoDirajo 1924: 118 ff.; Guyt 1936: 80. In 
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CKL the same views are expressed.). But there are also restraints that 
will prevent the conflict being taken to the higher authorities, or 
which will prevent the higher authorities from deciding definitely. For 
conflicts should be settled within the group. One would become malu, 
ashamed, if otherswere to take notice of it, or even if others decided 
the conflict. It would also be ~ sign of poor mamakship, if the mamak 
could not lead his kamanakan to a sakato. The result is, that conflicts 
linger undecided within the group: one cannot come to a sakato, but one 
does not want to have others mix with the problem. Likewise, the nagari 
council will be loth to interfere in the matter, for "pusako sakato 
niniek mamak": pusako troubles should be decided by the lineage elders, 
and the Karapatan Nagari has ''more important things to do" than to be 
busy with some quarrel between people who do not know what is proper. S4 
It is important to note, that there is only a gradual difference in 
this respect between the no ti on of "consent" (saizin) and of the "know-
Iedge" (satahu) which is required in such cases. The "satahu", literally: 
''with one,or common, knowing", is extremely difficult to translate. The 
most appropriate English translation probably is "taking cognizance" or 
"acknowledge". Most Dutch authors translated it with "kennis" or "mede-
weten". But satahu does not refer to abstract knowIedge. It is not suf-
ficient for the validity of a transaction that the mamak and the adat 
elders "know" of it. Satahu, too, refers to a social process in which 
knowledge must be given and accepted, and in which knowledge can also 
be refused. Refusal to accept knowledge is usually expressed through 
one's absence in the ceremony which must be held if the transaction is 
to be validly carried out. Even if one knows fully about the transaction, 
i.e., if one has been informed of it, if one does not appear in the 
meeting, then one does not "know" in adat, one does not (yet) accept 
responsibility for the validity of the transaction. The distinction between 
"consent" and "knowIedge" made in western law does not correspond to this 
adat distinction. Satahu and saizin are both variants of the same kind of 
process. They indicate different degrees of necessary cooperation of the 
group members and adat functionaries, but both imply a "consent"-requirement 
which must be fulfilled in the social process of giving consent or taking 
cognizance (cf. Logemann 1924: 123). 
It is obvious that the concrete functioning of these principles will 
be seriously influenced if the factors which motivate the individual 
participants' interactions in these processes change and if new forms 
of morality and authority develop. The problem of change and its impact 
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on the prineiples just deseribed will be dealt with in the following 
chapters. 
3. The Temporal Dimension in Minangkabau Property Relationships 
The dominant attitude towards time inherent in the eoneeptual system 
of the adat pusako is one of infinite eontinuity. This finds its primary 
expression in the notion that all property is pusako turun temurun, 
which deseends and deseends as heritage in an endless proeess. The basie 
adat eategories of property, the various kinds of harato pusako, are, 
as it were, distinguished in the diachronie dimension: the kinds of 
harato pusako are distinguished aeeording to their mode of aequisition in 
the past, and further by the relative distanee in time from the moment 
of their aequisition. 
There are also property eategories which do not embody this dimension 
of infiniteeontinuity: harato panaaharian, harato suarang, harato dapatan 
and harato pambaoan. The legal status of these property objeets is 
temporary; it is tied to the individual's lifetime or to the duration 
of the marriage. Onee the individual has died or the marriage has been 
dissolved, the legal status eannot be maintained but the property ob-
jeets beeome absorbed in the endless proeess of turun temurun as harato 
pusako. In Minangkabau thinking on property, these temporary legal 
statuses are of less importanee if eompared to the eontinuity of the 
pusako. The harato panaaharian are "drawn into" the diachronie dimension: 
they beeome harato pusako tambilang ameh or harato pusako tambilang basi, 
or, in the more modern eoneeptual usage, harato pusako rendah. In the 
system of pusako eategories, the harato panaaharian are harato pusako. 
Clearly, this equation of harato panaaharian with harato pusako tambilang 
ameh or harato pusako rendah is only possible in the diachronie dimension. 
In the synchronie dimension, related to the lifetime of the individual, 
it would not make sense: For the individual property holder, harato 
panaaharian and harato pusako are definitely different eategories of 
property to which different legal eonsequenees are attached. 
The dominanee of this diachronie thinking, in which the individual 
property holder is more or less ''blended out", most clearly beeomes 
apparent in the way in which Minangkabau think and speak about in-
heritanee. Here, the equation of harato panaaharian with harato pusako 
is very frequently made. When the villagers explained to us their system 
of inheritanee and stated that self-aequired property in eontemporary 
Minangkabau is inherited by the children, this was frequently expressed 
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by saying that "the hCll'ato pusako rendah are inherited by the children" 
C~Cll'ato panaaharian diwarisi oZeh anak", or "hCll'ato panaaharian jatueh 
kapado anak"). At first we fOlmd these statements puzzling, for we con-
strued them according to our, western, thinking about inheri tance, which 
is prospective: The hCll'ato pusako rendah are, i.e. will be, inherited 
by the children. But this did not, of course, make any sense in the light 
of what we knew about inheritance in Minangkabau. Further discussion 
with villagers then revealed unfailingly that, of course, property ob-
jects which had the legal status of hCll'ato pusako rendah now, would 
never be inherited by the children but by the kamanakan - for the proper-
ty is pusako. The statement: "hCll'ato pusako rendah are inherited by the 
children" thus would have to be translated as follows: "Property objects, 
the legal status of which will be hCll'ato pusako rendah af ter their 
holder, to whom they are still hCll'ato panaaharian, has died, will have 
been inherited by the holder 's children". The Minangkabau speaker pro-
jects himself into the future in order to speak of future events as 
already having occurred in the past. He does so by equating hCll'ato 
panaahCll'ian with hCll'ato pusako rendah, by projecting the legal status 
of the property into the future, which presupposes a future event, in-
heritance, to have happened. If we were to translate this thinking into 
the western system of tenses, it would correspond to the future perfect 
tense. 
This kind of speaking ab out inheritance is quite frequent and it is 
by no means limited to the common villagers. One of our informants who 
had received a modem education and held a post in the state administra-
tion, used to refer to the hCll'ato panaaharian of his still living father 
as "my father' s hCll'ato pusako rendah which will be inherited by us, his 
children". The same attitude is also manifest in the following statement 
given by a State Court CPN Batu Sangkar case 39 of 1969): 
". " bahwa oZeh kCll'ena di Minangkahau ada dua maaam hCll'ta pusaka datam 
pembahagian pokok, yaitu hCll'ta pusaka tinggi dan hCll'ta pusaka rendah, 
dimana perbedaanya terZetak pada asaZ usuZ haI'ta2 tersebut, yaitu bahwa 
hCll'ta pusaka tinggi berasaZ dari hasiZ aanaang Zetih dari generasi asaZ 
yang bertaZi dCll'ah menurut garis ibu dan turun kepada generasi daZam 
garis ibu juga, sedang hCll'ta pusaka rendah adaZah hCll'ta2 yang diperoZeh 
bukan sebagai hasiZ aanaang Zetih oZeh nenek moyang sendiri, meZainkan 
mungkin deperdapat kCll'ena jaZan beli maupun karena hubungan2 hukum Zain." 
"In Minangkabau there is a basic dimsion of two kinds of pusako proper-
ty, namely between hCll'ta pusaka tinggi and hCll'ta pusaka rendah • The 
difference between the two lies in their origin: The hCll'ta pusaka tinggi 
originate from the work of our ancestors in the mother's line and are 
handed down the generations in the mother's line as weIl. The hCll'ta 
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pusaka rendah, on the other hand, do not originate from the work of the 
ancestors but have been acquired by sale or by other legal means." 
Here, the statement that the harta pusaka rendah is property which 
has been bought cannot be read as meaning that bought property is now 
harta pusaka rendah. It becomes harta pusaka rendah only af ter the buyer, 
for whom the property was pancaharian, has died. The intervening inherit-
ance is implicit in the court's statement; and the judge implicitly 
definesthe basic distinction of property in the diachronic dimension. 
Another exarnple of this attitude is the use which is made in Minang-
kabau of the concept of warih. In Arabic, warith means heir, and in 
Islarnic law, as in western law, one has the status of an heir only af ter 
the death of the deceased. In Minangkabau, warih is also used to denote 
the living matrikin of the speaker. This led Dutch scholars to the con-
clusion, that in Minangkabau, the concept warih could not be translated 
as heir. Van Vollenhoven stated quite explicitly that the wareh in Aceh and 
the warih in Minangkabau are the "blood relatives" (bloedverwanten) and 
the "associates of the mamak" (mamak-genooten) and that these words do not 
implyany thought of inheritance (1918: 178, 262). I cannot agree with 
his statement. People do think of inheritance when they use the concept 
warih; not only in situations where warih denotes persons who would be 
considered heirs also in western understanding, but also when it is a 
referenee to pers ons or groups still living. Besides, the different 
categories of warih (sajari, satampo, saeto, sadapo, see above p. 99 
clearly suggest, that the warih need not be "mamak-genooten", i.e. kaum 
mernbers, but that they mayalso belong to quite different, though 
matrilineally related, social groups. What Van Vollenhoven probably 
wanted to make clear was that, according to the western logic of proper-
ty and inheritance law and its ego-centric distinction of the synchronic 
and diachronic dirnension, there carmot be a holder-heir relationship 
between living pers ons , i.e. in the synchronic dimension. SS But if we 
adopt the Minangkabau marmer of thinking in terrns of the diachronic 
dimension, also living persons can be called heirs because "they will 
have been heirs". It should also be added, that in western colloquial 
language, the reference to living pers ons as "heirs" is not uncornrnon. 
This dominant diachronie thinking about property relationships in the 
adat pusako is one of the most important elements of the Minangkabau 
social system. lts importance will become more obvious when the changes 
in the Minangkabau social system and in the conceptual system of proper-
ty relationships are described and analysed in the following chapters. 
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C. ISLAMIC LAW 
In this section, the basic principles of Islamic property and inherit-
ance law shall briefly be described. The emphasis is on Islamic law 
proper; the adaptation of Islamic legal concepts and institutions into 
Minangkabau adat will be discussed later in Chapter 6. 
1. MAL~ MILK - PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP 
The concept milk, which more or less corresponds to the western notion 
of ownership, involves the right to the most complete and exclusive use 
and disposition recognized in Islamic law. The property objects, material 
and irrnnaterial, to which the milk peTtains, are called mäl, the holder 
of such a relationship mälik or rabb (see Schacht 1964: 134 ff., 135). 
The concepts milk and mälik are used for property relationships to 
things and to the rights to usufruct (Schacht 1964: 135), but a distinct-
ion is made between the rights which give control over the substance of 
the object (the 'ayn) and those which legitimate the making of profits 
from the substance (the manfa'at pl.manafi') (Fyzee 1955: 194). Proper-
ty is not distinguished according to its mode of acquisition in the 
sense of a distinction between self-acquired and ancestral/inherited 
property. With respect to most legal transactions there are no different 
rul es for movable and immovable property (Fyzee 1955: 194). 
11. PROPERTY WITHIN THE CONJUGAL FAMILY 
The conception of individual property is central to Islamic law. The 
property acquired during the marriage by both spouses is regarded as 
the individual property of the spouse who has acquired it by sale, 
gift, inheritance etc. (Juynboll 1903: 208). The notion of a joint 
effort is not recognized (cf. Gautama and Hornick 1972: 46). The hus-
band has the obligation to care for his wife's (wives') living. This 
obligation ends in principle with the dissolution of the marriage, and 
is only extended to the iddah-period, which in the case of divorce 
covers the time of threemenstrualperiods. In Indonesia the iddah-
period is usually 100 days (cf. Fyzee 1955: 181 ff.). 
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111. PROPER1Y TRANSACTIONS AND THE PROHIBITION OF RIBÄ 
Islamic law allows permanent alienations of property such as sale and 
barter (bay'3 shira'). Temporary transactions such as pawning (rahn) 
are allowed, but are subject to the ribä-prohibition. The prophet had 
spoken very harshly of the ribä, usury, the taking of interest from 
other people's property (Koran 11, 276). It has consequently become a 
firm principle of Islamic law, that it is forbidden to make profit or 
take interest from uses made of property objects which have been given 
as security for borrowed money (Juynboll 1903: 273). This greatly 
affects pawning-transactions: The pawnee may not take benefits from the 
property objects; in the case of pawned land, e.g., he may not use and 
exploit it. He is merely allowed to sell it t if the debtor does not 
repay his debts on the specified day (Juynboll 1903: 273).56 
IV. HIBA - OONATION 
Islamic law makes a sharp distinction between donations between the 
living and those which become effective af ter the property holder's death, 
the testamentary dispositions. The main distinction is that during his 
lifetime the property holder may dispose of all his property by donation , 
hiba, whereas in testamentary dispositions only one third of his proper-
ty may be freely disposed of. 
The hiba is the donation of a property object; to be exact, the 
donation of the substance ('ayn) of it. Donations of the profits or 
benefits which may be drawn from property objects are called 'ariya 
(Fyzee 1955: 187). Donation is the transfer of the right to the 
substance of the property object without return and without consideratian. 
In order to be valid, it must have contractual form: It must be offered 
(?jQb) and accepted (~abul). In general, the possession of the object 
must be delivered at once (Fyzee 1955: 187, 198). In the cases where 
donor and donee live in the same house or in the cases of hiba between 
husband and wife, or between parents and their son, immediate deli-
very of possession is not required, but there must be at least an un-
equivocal manifestation of the donor's intention to transfer the ex-
clusive possession of the property objects (Fyzee 1955: 199 f.). 
Donations are in principle irrevocable.Once completed, they can only be 
revoked by the intervention of a court of law or with the consent of the 
SYSTEMS OF PROPERTI RELATIONSHIPS 199 
donee (Fyzee 1955: 223 f.). 
V. WA8IYYA - TESTAMENT 
The autonomy of the individual to dispose of his or her property by 
testament (w~iyya) is limited in Islamic law. Only one third of the 
property (af ter the subtraction of debts and other liabilities) may 
be disposed of in this way. The rest of the inheritance must fall to 
the legal heirs whose intestate inheritance is laid down in the Koran 
(Juynboll 1903: 255; Fyzee 1955: 303). The making of a testament is, 
however, regarded as mandûb, advisable, by the syarak. Testamentary dis-
positions may not be made to one of the intestate heirs, for according 
to the interpretation of the Islamic jurists, testaments may not inter-
fere with the inheritance portions as they are laid down in the Koran 
(Juynboll 1903: 256). 
The same restrictions also pertain to donations which are made during 
the last illness, the "sickness of death" (mcm:fu'l-mawt). Such donations 
are subject to the formalities and conditions of a hiba and all restrict-
ions pertaining to the wa~iyya (Fyzee 1955: 314 f.; Juynboll 1903: 257). 
VI. WAKF - PROPERTI OF "THE DEAD HAND" 
The concept wa~f (Ind.: wakaf, wakap) literally means "detention". In 
Islamic law it denotes 1) State lands which are used for charitable pur-
poses and which are inalienable, and 2) pious endowments. In Indonesia, 
wakaf is only used in the latter sense. By wakaf, property objects are 
given to "the dead hand", i.e., they are exempted from business dealings 
with the destination that their use and profit shall flow to a certain, 
mostly pious or religious goal, or to a certain group of people (Fyzee 
1955: 231 f.; Juynboll 1903: 274). It is the basic motive for the wakaf 
that the property object will belong to God and that its usufruct be 
dedicated to specified persons of a charitable purpose in general (Fyzee 
1955: 235). Only persons who are entitled to dispose freely of their 
property maymake a wakaf. The object given must be definitely speci-
fied as weIl as the beneficiaries of its profits. The use to which the 
property is dedicated must be permissible in law (Juynboll 1903: 275 f.). 
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VII. FARAIDH - INTESTATE INHERITANCE 
The Islamic inheritance law (Ind.: hukum faraidh) is derived from the 
inheritance portions which are laid down in the Koran. In Arabic, these 
portions are cal led faridah, pl. fara'iq. The Koranic heirs are cal led 
''members of the fardh - portions (dzCllJJU'l - farä 'ü!)". As the knowledge 
of the fixed portions is the most important and complex part of Islamic 
inheri tance law, the inheri tance law as a whole has become known under 
the name of 'ilm al-fara'iq (Ind.: ilmu hukum faraidh) , the science of 
the inheritance portions (Fyzee 1955: 337; Juynboll 1903: 246). 
The Islamic law of intestate inheritance is a combination of the pre-
Koranic Arabic tribal inheritance law and the new legal rules which we re 
revealed to Mohammed by Allah. Before the establishment of Islam, the 
Arabic tribes had an agnatic inheritance law. Only the 'a?abät, the 
agnates, were entitled to inherit. This law was changed by Mohammed. The 
Koranic verses (IV, 12-15, IV 175) do not contain a completely new regu-
lation but only change the traditional system (Juynboll 1903: 239, 241; 
Fyzee 1955: 329 f.; Schacht 1964: 169 ff.). 
The basic principle of intestate inheritance law is that the Koranic 
heirs must first get the share determined in the Koran, and that there-
after the rest falls to the 'al!abät. In the Koran, a fixed portion is 
given to the daughter, both spouses, and the brothers and sisters. The 
range of the Koranic heirs has been extended by ''The Learned" to include 
the son's daughters, the grandparents, and the matrilateral and patri-
lateral half-sisters (Juynboll 1903: 250). Some of the Koranic heirs 
lose their right to a fixed portion if they inherit together with a son 
(sons), and can in this case only inherit as 'a?abät. In terms of in-
heritance law, the 'a~abat recognized as heirs are the close male agnates 
and four specified female agnates: the daughters, the son's daughters, 
the full sisters and the half-sisters (Fyzee 1955: 339). 
It is impossible to give a full overview here of all possible combi-
nations that may occur. They can be found in the relevant literature 
(see Juynboll 1903: 251 ff.; Fyzee 1955: 336 ff.) and are a constant 
reminder of the prophet 's aphorism "that the laws of inheritance are one 
half of useful knowIedge" . Here, only a short overview will be gi ven: 
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The Koranic Heirs: 
1. The daughters have, as Koranic heirs, the right to ! of their parent's 
inheritance. A set of more than one daughters inherit 2/3 together. 
If the daughter(s) inherit together with a son, they are not entitled 
to their Koranic portion but only inherit as 'a~abät af ter the dis-
tribution of the other Koranic shares. TIleir portion then is one half 
of what the sons inherit (Juynboll 1903: 251). 
2. The same rules apply for the son's daughters respectively. 
3. The father of the deceased is always entitled to 1/6 of the in-
heritance. He can, in addition, inherit as 'a~abät, unless he is ex-
cluded by the closest agnates, the deceased's descendants. 
4. The grandfather'sKoranic portion is 1/6, but he is excluded by his 
son, the deceased's father. If the grandfather inherits together with 
the deceased's brothers, he inherits as 'asabat on the same level as 
the brothers. 
5. The mother's portion is 1/6, if she inherits together with children, 
son's children, or two or more brothers and sisters. In allother 
cases her portion is 1/3 of the inheritance. 
6. The grandmothers' share is 1/6. But the father's mother is excluded 
by the father, and the mother's mother by the mother. 
7. The full sister's share is 1, two or more sisters together inherit 
2/3. If sisters inherit together with a full brother, they only in-
herit as 'a~abat and receive half of their brother's share. Full sis-
ters are excluded by the sons, son's sons, and by the father. As 
'a~abät, they inherit on the same level as the grandfather. 
8. Patrilateral half-sisters inherit like full sisters, but are excluded 
by full sisters who together inherit 2/3. If there is one full sister 
and one half-sister, the full sister gets ! and the half-sister 1/6 
of the inheritance. 
9./10. The matrilateral half-brothers' and -sisters' part is 1/6. If two 
or more come together, they inherit 1/3 together. They are excluded 
by the children, the son's children, the father, and the paternal 
grandfather. 
11. The widower's portion is 1. If he inherits together with a child or 
ason's child, his portion is 1/4. 
12. The widow'sportion is one half of what the widower would inherit, thus 
1/4 and 1/8 respectively. If there is more than one widQw, they share 
the widow portion together. 
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Af ter these portions have been given to the Koranic heirs, the 'a?abat 
take the rest in the order of: descendants, rnaJ.e descendants' children, 
father, grandfather and siblings. There may be cases in which the Koranic 
heirs consume the whole inheritance and nothing will be left to the 
'a?abat, e.g., when a man leaves both parents and two daughters: 2/3 
should be inherited by the daughters and 1/6 each by the parents. There 
mayalso be cases where the portions of the Koranic heirs amount to more 
than 1, e.g., when someone leaves a husband and two sisters, who should 
inherit ! and 2/3 respectively. The solution for such situations is to 
increase the denominator to make it equal to the surn of nurnerators and 
allow the individual nurnerators to remain constant, thus achieving a 
proportionate decrease of the share of each heir. This artificial i~­
flation is called 'a:uZ. 'ca,)Z, which means literally "increase". lts 
real effect, however, is the proportionate reduction of the shares 
(Fyzee 1955: 355). If the Koranic portions amount to less than one and 
there are no 'a~abät to take the rest, the rest returns to the Koranic 
heirs in propertion to their shares. This situation is called radd, 
"return" (Fyzee 1955: 256). 
VIn. DEBTS 
In Islamic law, the deceased' s property does not become the indivisible 
common property of the heirs. Debts can only be claimed against the de-
ceased's property, and the individual heirs are effected by such claims 
only in proportion of their shares (Juynboll 1903: 242; Fyzee 1955: 326). 
It is the theory of Islamic jurisprudence, on which the rights of inhe-
ri tance are based, that even af ter his death the deceased' s rights in 
his property still inhere in him to the extent necessary for meeting the 
funeral expenses and the legal obligations which he had incurred during 
his lifetime (Fyzee 1955: 326). The heirs themselves therefore are not 
liable for the debts of the deceased, the debt-relationships are not 
continued by the heirs. However, they can only claim their inheritance 
portion af ter the proportionate reduction of the debts from the in-
heritance. 
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D. WRITIEN LAW 
The Dutch law of property and inheritance, laid down in the Civil Code 
(Burger Zijk Wetboek, B.W.) and elaborated in court decisions and books 
produced by legal experts, had been received in the Colony of the Dutch 
Bast Indies in 1848. It has already been mentioned, that the Minangkabau 
adat was in principle left untouched by Dutch property and inheritance 
law, and by wri tten law in general. However, some exceptions were na:Ie by 
1a6 Wri.ch na:Ie inroads :into tre adat system of prq>erty relationships. These laws, 
which mainly affected the property relationships to land, shall be des-
cribed in the second part of this section. At first, a brief outlinemust 
be given of the Dutch system of property and inheritance law. For the 
few legislative enactments that affected the Minangkabau system of pro-
perty relationships were based upon it. In addition it must be remember-
ed that, even if the applicability of Dutch law was restricted to a few 
exceptions in the ZegaZ context, it still was existent in Minangkabau 
as a cultural phenomenon: The villagers had some very vague notions of 
it, and the administrators and judges in the Dutch colonial courts, as 
weIl as the judges in the contemporary State Courts, had been socialized 
within this system; factors which are weIl of importance for the analysis 
of the change which has taken place within the adat system. 
I. 1HE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DlITCH PROPERTI AND INHERITANCE LAW 
1. Eigendom - Ownership 
Eigendom, as defined by art. 625 B.W., is the capacity to use a property 
object freely and control it and dispose of it in the most absolute way 
(voZstre~ewijze), provided such actions do not violate the law or other 
public regulations, and under the condition that they do not violate 
the rights of other persons. It embodies the greatest degree of autonomy 
over property objects that is conceded to the individuals in Holland and 
it is the quantitatively most complete relationship. 57 As the relatively 
most complete right it embraces allother kinds of property relationships 
in the sense that allothers must be derived from the eigendom. As Pitlo 
has stated, it would, however, be wrong to consider this elasticity as 
the criterion of the eigendom. For relationships which have provisional 
character in relation to the eigendom can also be residual relation-
ships in relation to lesser provisional rights. This is, e.g., the case 
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with the inheritable lease, erfpachtrecht, in relation to the right of 
usufruct, vruchtgebruik (see Pitlo 1965: 125, 1966: 302 f.). In practice, 
the eigendom can be reduced to the letters of the concept, if comprehen-
sive provisional relationships are derived from it, or in the case where 
eigendom is given as security for debts, where the new owner is severely 
restricted in his autonomy over the eigendom-object (Pitlo 1965: 123). 
The basic characteristic of eigendom is that the eigendom-relation is 
unlimited in time, whereas all other property relationships are provi-
sional in time (Pitlo 1965: 123, 126).58 
2. Mede-Eigendom - CommunaZ OWnership 
Eigendom can be held by individuals but also by more than one person. 
In the latter case, the eigendom is cal led mede-eigendom. The explicit 
treatment of mede-eigendom in Dutch law (in the B.W.) is less systematic 
than in other contemporary western legal systems (e.g. in German law) , 
but the Dutch law shares more or less the same rul es which obtain in 
most contemporary laws and which all are a mixture of the late Roman 
and the Germanic tribal laws. Two basic forms of mede~eigendom are 
distinguished: 
1. property, where the fact of common eigendom holding is the only legal 
bond which unites its owners. This is derived from the Roman condo-
minium and is called "free communal ownership", vrije mede-eigendom 
(in German law: Miteigentum, in English law: joint ownership)j 
2. property, where the fact of common eigendom holding is the effect of 
a different cause, if there is another legal bond which united the 
owners, such as the fact of being heirs to the same person. This is 
derived from the Germanic "Gesamthandseigentum" (Dutch: gezamenhandse 
eigendom) which is called ''bound communal ownership", gebonden mede-
eigendom (In German law: Gesamthandseigentum, in English law: common 
h " ) 59 owners lp . 
The two forms of communal eigendom are subject to different legal 
consequences with respect to the divisibility of the eigendom relation-
ship and to the degree of the autonomy granted to the individual communal 
owner. Division is the legal action by which the common or joint owner-
ship is dissolved. Vrije mede-eigendom can always be divided. For ge~ 
bonden mede-eigendom there are no uniform rules. The division of in-
heritance, one form of gebonden mede-eigendom, for instance, can always 
be demanded (art. 1112 1 B.W.), whereas marital property cannot be 
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divided as long as the marriages persi~ .. As a general rule it may be 
stated that the division is always possible if the legal bond which 
. h . d· I d 60 unltes t e owners 15 1550 ve . 
As regards the autonomy to dispose of mede-eigendom, there is a basic 
difference: With respect to vrije mede-eigendom,each owner has his share 
in the communally owned objects, which is itself a separate property 
object of which he can dispose of freely (Pitlo 1965: 150). With respect 
to gebonden mede-eigendom, each owner has the full right to the whole 
eigendom-complex, but is restricted by the equally full rights of the 
others. The individual cannot dispose of this kind of "share" (Pitlo 
1965: 150). But the law is not explicit in this respect. The gebonden 
mede-eigendom developed out of the Germanic Gesamthandseigentum. This 
was characterized by the rules, that only all owners could dispose of 
the property together, that no individual owner could dispose of his 
share, and that there was the institution of accrual, aanwas. Aanwas 
meant that if one of the owners left the common bond of property holding, 
his ideal share feIl to the other owners (Pitlo 1966: 467). The insti-
tution of accrual has in the meantime been abolished in most forms of 
communal property. In inheritance, accrual still occurs if, in the case 
of testamentary dispositions, one of the testate heirs has predeceased 
the others. His part accrues to the other testate heirs (art. 1049 B.W.; 
Pitlo 1965: 151). 
3. Marital Property Relationships 
Unless the spouses make different prOVISIons in a contractual agreement 
(huwelijksvoorwaarde) 61 , the marriage creates a form of communal proper-
ty which does not correspond to the two forms of gebonden or vrije mede-
eigendom. 62 The communal marital property (algehele gemeenschap van 
goederen, art. 93 B.W.) includes the spouses' property before marriage 
and in principle all property which they acquire during marriage. Property 
acquired by one of the spouses by donation or inheritance in principle 
also becomes communal property, unless the donor or testator has ex-
plicitly directed otherwise (art. 94 B.W.). As in gebonden mede-eigendom, 
there are no definite fractions of the two owners in the individual 
property objects or the property as a whoIe, but the communal holding of 
the property relationship is sharply dissociated from the rights of 
control and disposition: Each spouse has the full right to control and 
to dispose of those property objects which came into the communal pro-
perty from herjhis side (art. 97 I B.W.), and each spouse can invalidate 
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a legally relevant action of the other spouse over property objects 
which he/she had brought into the conmunal property, unless it was an 
"act ion of ordinary control" (daad van gewoon behee'l') or unless the 
third party acquired the property bona fide (art. 98 11 B.W.). 
4. Inhentanae 
In Dutch law, the individual's capacity to be a holder of a property 
relationship ends with his death. The deceased's property relationships 
are continued by his heirs. This transfer is effected in and through 
law. This holds true for both intestate and testate forms of inheritance. 
Unless the property holder makes directions as to who shall continue his 
property relationships, the law provides the rules which determine who 
th h . 63 e e1rs are. 
a. Intestate Inheritance 
The Dutch law of intestate inheritance calls the following groups of 
relatives as heirs in successive order (see Pitlo 1966: 430 ff.): 
1. The first group is constituted by the spouse and the children, each 
of whom inherits one half of the property. In the case of several 
children, the childrens' portion is divided into equal shares. If the 
deceased leaves no children or no spouse, the spouse or the children 
respectively receive the whole inheritance (art. 899, 899a B.W.). 
The principle of representation functions in the descending line: For 
a predeceased descendant, his or her share is taken by his or her 
descendants (art. 888, 889 B.W.) • 
2. If there are no persons of the first group, the heirs of the second 
group inherit. This is constituted by the parents and the siblings 
of the deceased. In principle they are each allotted an 
equal share: The parents inherit 1/4 each and the rest is divided in 
equal shares among the siblings. But if there is only one sibling, 
the parents and the sibling inherit 1/3 each of the property (art. 
901 B.W.). The principle of representation is also applied to the 
heirs in this group. 
If there are no heirs of the first two groups, the inheritance is 
divided. One half is for the patrilateral, one for the matrilateral re-
latives (art. 900 I B.W.). They inherit in the following order: 
3. In the two groups of relatives, the direct ascendants have priority. 
They form the third group, whereby the cIos er ascendant excludes the 
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more distant one (art. 900 11 B.W.). 
4. Only if there are no direct ascendants, the lateral relatives (zij-
verwanten) come to inherit, who form the fourth group of heirs. Here, 
too, the closest relatives exclude the more distant ones. Relatives 
are recognized as (potential) heirs until the 6th degree. If there 
is no heir in one of the groups, the whole inheritance is inherited 
by the other group of heirs. If there are no relatives to the 
sixth degree, the inheritance falls to the State (art. 879 11, 1172 
ff. B.W.). 
Before 1923, the law of intestate inheritance put much greater em-
phasis on kin as heirs. The range of relatives who could be heirs ex-
tended to the 12th degree. The inheritance by the spouse was virtually 
excluded, for spouses were only called to inherit if there were no re-
latives. Only in 1923 (with the introduction of art. 899a B.W.) was the 
spouse given the same status as the children,and the range of the 
relatives who could inherit was restricted to include relatives to 
the 6th degree only (Pitlo 1966: 430). 
b. Testate Inheritance 
The property holder can also direct his property to fall to other pers ons 
than the legal heirs in a testament. Testaments are revocable until the 
death of the property holder and only take effect with and through his 
death. The testator can invest the beneficiaries as heirs, whose status 
then equals the status of legal, i.e. intestate heirs. But he can also 
make a legaat, a legacy, by which he allots some of his property to 
specified persons. The legatees do not have the status of heirs but only 
are given a claim against the heirs with respect to the property speci-
fied in the legaat. 
5. Donation and Contractual Inheritance 
In Dutch law, donations are contracts. The donor gives property to the 
donee irrevocably and without contraprestation (art. 1703 1 B.W.). 
Donations may only be made inter vivos (art. 1703 11 B.W.) and with 
respect to property which is held by the donor at the time of the dona-
tion (art. 1704 1 B.W.). The new family law of 1969 (S. 1969: 257) in-
troduced an important exception to these general principles: It allows 
spouses to make donations to each other in the marriage property agree-
ment (huwelijksvoorwaarde, art. 146 I B.W.). These donations may com-
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prise a part or the whole of the donor-spouse's inheritance (art. 146 
11). Such donations are in principle irrevocable (art. 146 111) and 
need not be explicitly accepted by the donee (art. 146 IV B.W.). Al-
though the law treats these transactions as "donations" (giften), they 
amount, in fact and in law, to the investment of the donee-spouse as an 
heir. In the case of such donation, the donee-spouse does not acquire 
a claim against the heirs, but becom:5 heir him- or herself: The prin-
ciple of saisine (see Note 63) applies in the same way as in the case 
of testate or intestate inheritance (Klaassen, Eggens and Luijten 1973: 
332) . 
6. The Restriation of the Individual's Autonomy 
The individual's autonomy to dispose of his property by testament or 
donation is quite severely restricted in Dutch law. The most decisive 
restrictions are contained in the rules which protect the so-called 
legitimarissen (art. 960 H. B.W.), the "legitimate heirs".64 The law 
allots to some persons the right to a legitimate portion of the in-
heritance. This is a fraction of the portion which these persons would 
have inherited if the property holder had made no testament. The pers ons 
thus protected are the direct lineal descendants and ascendants of the 
property holder: Legitimarissen therefore are found in the first three 
groups of intestate heirs: In the first group the children or their 
descendants, in the second the parents, in the third group the other 
direct lineal ascendants of the holder. The spouse, although placed in 
the first group of intestate heirs is (other than e.g. in German law) 
no legitimate heir. 
The legitimate portions are the following: Legitimate heirs in the 
ascending line are always entitled to 1 of their intestate share as 
legitimate portion (art. 962 B.W.). For children, there is a different-
iated regulation (art. 961 B.W.): If there is only one child, it is 
entitled to 1 of its intestate share. Two children are entitled to 2/3 
of their share, and ~n the case of three or more children, the legitimate 
portion amounts to 3/4 of the intestate portion. 
The rul es protecting the legitimarissen primarily pertain to the field 
of testamentary dispositions. However, the testamentary dispositions 
which violate the rights of the legitimarissen, are not automatically 
void. They aan be invalidated at the request of the legitimate heirs to 
the degree necessary to fulfill their claims (art. 967 B.W.). If there 
are no legitimate heirs, the testator can dispose of all his property 
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by testament (art. 964 B.W.). But the retroactive restriction of the 
individual's autonomy does not only affect testaments. It can also 
affect donations which were made in accordance with the donor's legal 
capacity and which had become effective during his lifetirne. Art. 967 
B.W., which lays down the legitimate heirs' right to invalidate the 
testator's legal actions, makes no distinction between testaments and 
donations inter vivos: It speaks of "gifts, either made by testament or 
by donations inter vivos". And art. 960 B.W. provides that the legitimate 
portion of the legitimarissen "is that part of the deceased's property, 
of which the deceased was not entitled to dispose by donation during 
65 his lifetime and by testament". In order to assess the value of the 
"total inheritance" and the fractions that constitute the legitimate 
portions, all property which the deceased holder has given away as 
donation during his lifetime will be added to the actual inheritance 
(art. 968 B.W.). There is no temporal restriction. In principle, aZZ 
donations can be included. 66 But these donations will be taken into 
account only insofar as they are necessary to fill up the legitimate portion. 
Primarily, the property disposed of by testament is used. If donations are 
taken into account, one starts wi th the last one and, if necessary, pro-
ceeds further into the past according to the chronological order of the 
donations (art. 971 B.W.). 
I I. WRITTEN LAW IN MINANGKABAIJ PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS 
The inroads which written laws have made into the Minangkabau system of 
property relationships have mainly affected property relationships to 
land. 
1. The Decree of 1853 Concerning the Pusako-Eigendomsakte 
In 1853 a Governmental Decree was issued for the West Coast of Sumatra, 
which allowed the establishment of an "eigendoms-akte", an ownership-
deed for irnmovable property, the so-called pusako-eigendoms akte (Gou-
vernementsbesluit 7.3.1853, S. 1853: 14a). Irnmovable property which was 
harato pusako could be registered as eigendom and partly became subject 
to Dutch law. Art. 2 of the Decree said: 
"In the case of a transfer of a part or the whole of some irnmovable 
property which belongs to a rnember of the Native population of Sumatra's 
West Coast, and of which an ownership-deed has been established, the 
highest local authority shall issue the docurnents of evidence which may 
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be required for the inheritance, the division of the deceased's estate, 
or for other transfers, af ter a consultation with the competent regents, 
suku- and family heads."67 
The registration was carried out by the Governor's office. The oldest 
living fernale of a kaum was usually registered as owner. Af ter her death, 
the names of her daughters were entered as new owners and heiresses. A 
rernark was added that the property had been received as inheritance 
(ten erfenis) (Sarolea AB 27: 277). The Decree was amended in 1910. The 
task of registration was transferred to the reahter-aommissaris, the 
"examining rnagistrate", and the method of registration was changed. The 
whole kaum was entered as owner specified by its mamak kepaZa waris who 
acted as family head (Sarolea AB 27: 273, 1920: 124). Some of the legal 
consequences of such registrations seem to have been generally acknow-
ledged. The harato pusako registered could be mortgaged and traded out-
side the native world. The borders of the property were also registered 
in the kadaster, the land registry. But in principle such property be-
came subject to Dutch formaZ law only, i.e. the substantive legal conse-
quences attached to such property remained those of adat law (Sarolea AB 
27: 275). This mixture of Dutch law and adat gave rise to very conflict-
ing interpretations. In the sixth Chapter it will be shown how these 
were resolved in practice. 
2. The Agrarian Aat of 1870 
A similar provision was introduced for the whole Colony in 1870 through 
the Agrarian Act (Agrarisahe Wet, S. 1870: 55), which contained a 
series of amendments to art. 62 R.R. (1854) (later art. 51 l.S.). Art. 
62(7) as amended by the Agrarian Act read as follows: 
"Land, which is held by a native Indonesian with the right of miZik 
shall, upon proper application of its owner, be converted into land 
with right of eigendom; with such conditions and limitations as shall 
be prescribed by Ordinance and noted on the land deed, i.e. conditions 
regarding the owner's responsibility towards the State and village, and 
limitations of his power to sell such land to non-natives" (Gautama and 
Hornick 1972: 76). 
This law was implemented for Java and Madura in 1872 (S. 1872: 172). 
Only individual holders were permitted to convert miZik rights into the 
new form of "agrarian ownership", agrarisahe eigendom (Gautama and 
Hornick 1972: 87). Although it was a right in "Indonesian" land, it had 
to be registered at the Colonial Land Registry and could be mortgaged 
according to the rules of the Dutch Civil Code. But the convers ion 
provisions were 50 complex that only few Indonesians took advantage of 
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the provision (Gautama and Hornick 1972: 87). 
3. The Ordinance Prohibiting the AZienation of Land 
In 1875, an Ordinance was enacted (Grondvervreemdingsverbod, S. 1875: 
179) which prohibited the alienation of land held under adat rights to 
members of the non-Native population groups (cf. Gautama and Hornick 
1972: 83). 
4. The DecZaration of State Domain 
The most radical violation of the adat system of property relationships 
was contained in the so-called Domain-Declaration. Art. 1 of the Agrarian 
Decree in which this declaration was contained68 provided "that all land 
which is not proven to be held with the right of eigendom shall be 
deemed to be the domain of the State". 
The main purpose of this provision was to provide the Colonial gavern-
ment with a legal basis for conveying western (Civil Code) rights in 
land to foreign entrepreneurs. For according to Dutch property law, only 
the owner of land could transfer (provisional) Civil Code rights. The 
position of the State therefore had to be converted into that of an 
owner (eigenaar) (cf. Gautama and Hornick 1972: 80). For Sumatra, a 
separate domain declaration was issued in 1874, which differed some-
what from the general declaration which was implemented on Java and 
Madura. Art. 1 said: 
"All wasteland in the Sumatran districts under direct Government rule 
(GouvernementsZanden) are part of the State's domain, unless members of 
the indigenous population exercise rights over it which are derived from 
the right of reclamation of unused land (ontginningsrecht). Except for 
the cultivation rights of the population, the right of disposal is ex-
clusively vested in the Government. ,,69 
This meant for Minangkahau that the tanah uZayat was considered to fall 
under the domain of the State. 70 But in practice, the Government of 
West Sumatra was very reluctant to enforce these provisions as they were 
50 much in contrast with adat (cf. AB 11: 88, and the story in Chapter 
5: 259 ff.),71 
5. Mortgages 
In 1908 a law was enacted which permitted Indonesians who held "Indone-
sian" land, i.e. land held in accordance with adat or agrarisch eigen-
dom, to give mort gages (credietverban~) on their land to specified Euro-
pean banks (S. 1908: 542, 1909: 584, for details cf. Gautama and Hornick 
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72 1972: 108 ff.). The banks were only specified in 1937 (S. 1937: 191). 
6. The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 
The Government of Indonesia'made an effort to abolish the dualistic 
landlaw with the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (Undang2 Pokok Agraria, law 
S of 1960, LN 1960: 104).73 The new law is professed to be based upon adat 
law, but adat law is applicable only in so far as it does not contradict: 
the national interests of the State, 
the principles of Indonesian socialism, 
the regulations of the Basic Agrarian Law, 
- other statutory regulations, 
stipulations based upon religious law (art. S). 
The provisions of the Basic Agrarian Law are, however, to a great extent 
modelled on western property law. The law recognizes some clearly defined 
relationships to land, the most inclusive of which is the hak milik, 
which more or less corresponds with the Dutch eigendom (Gautama and Har-
sono 1972: 39 ff.). All previously existing land rights are to be con-
verted into the rights prescribed by the law. Hak milik can come into 
existence in three different ways (see Gautama and Hornick 1972: 97 f.): 
1. Rights under adat law, which recognized hak milik (in adat), e.g. in 
the form of newly cultivated land, can be registered under the Basic 
Agrarian Law if the holder can prove that he has complied wi th the 
adat provisions. 
2. The Government may grant hak milik to citizens or corporations out of 
the State Land. 
3. Most hak milik is created by a conversion of property rights which 
existed before the introduction of the Basic Agrarian Law. According 
h . " 74 th f . h f' d to t e converslon-provlslons e ormer rlg ts 0 e~gen om, agra-
risch eigendom and milik (inlandsch bezitsrecht) can be automatically 
converted into hak milik, provided that the holders of the old right 
are also qualified to hold the new rights. 
Of the many further provisions concerning the sale, transfer, and 
pawning of land, one provision is of particular importance. Section 7 
of law S6 of 1960 (reprinted in Harsono 1973: 236) reads: 
"AgricuHural property held wi th the hak gadai (which has been pawned) 
for 7 years or more at the time at which these regulations come into 
force, has to be returned to its owner within a month af ter the last 
harvest, without any enforceable claim to the uang tebusan (the pawning 
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SlUTI)." 
The introduction and irnplementation of the Basic Agrarian Law and its 
innlUTIerable regulations has had little success 50 faro In Minangkabau 
in particular, hardly any land has been registered under the new pro-
visions (see below Chapter 5: 281 ff.). The provision affecting the free 
return of pawned property af ter 7 years was applied by some courts during 
the first period af ter the introduction of the law (case 318 of 1963 PN 
Padang, 65 of 1963 PN Payakumbuh). Since the middle of the 60's,however, 
the courts have stopped enforcing the provision as it is obviously un-
suitable for the situation in Minangkabau. 75 
The old regulations concerning mortgages on Indonesian land were not 
repealed by the Basic Agrarian Law, and at present there is some legal 
uncertainty (Gautama and Hornick 1972: 109) as to which rules should 
govern the field of securities given for loans. Most state banks in West 
SlUTIatra still accept harato pusako land as security, if all kaum members 
have given their consent. These credit relationships are partly governed 
by adat law, partly by Dutch law and government regulations . 
7. The Marriage LCIlJ) of 1974 
Some regulations concerning marital property law were introduced by the 
new marriage law which was enacted in 1974 and which is to be applied 
uniformly throughout all Indonesia since1.10.1975 (Undang2 PerkCllJ)inan, 
Law no. lof 1974. On the law see Prins 1977, Soewondo 1977, Ismuha 1978). 
In principle, the marital property relationships remain based upon 
adat. Property acquired during the marriage becomes common property 
(harta bersama). Husband and wife may dispose of this property only if the 
other spouse agrees to it. Property brought into the marriage by one of the 
spouses (harta bCOJJaan) , as we 11 as property acquired by one spouse during 
the marriage by way of gift or inheritance, remains under the exclusive 
control of the spouse concerned, and each spouse can dispose freely of 
his or her property (art. 35 and 36). Upon divorce, the common property 
is divided according to the "law of the parties", i.e. according to the 
adat law, religious law, or other law which applies to them (art. 37). 
For polygamous marriages the rules are the following: The second and 
further wives have no rights to the property which already had been acquired 
by their husband and his first wife. All wives have an equal right to the 
property which has been acquired af ter their respective marriage (art. 65).76 
Men ploughing 
Women planting riee 
rnAPTERFIVE 
THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE I: THE FlJLFILMENT OF THE RlNCTION 
A. INfRODUCTWN 
In this chapter I shall describe and analyse instanees in which Minang-
kabau women and men are engaged in property affairs; episodes in people's 
lives in which they successfully or in vain attempt to establish situ-
ation-images of continued property relationships. I shall try to re late 
as much as possible of the socio-economie and socio-political background 
in which the events took place, and I shall also indicate the kind of 
information upon which my reconstruction of the stories is based. This 
may help the reader to understand better the activities in the stories, 
and at the same time provide him with at least a minimal check on the 
interpretation which I have given to them. 
The stories told in the first part of this chapter have been orde red 
according to the networks of interpersonal relationships which are 
typical in Minangkabau; typical in so far as all processes of diachronie 
transfers must occur in them. The classification of the stories thus 
closely corresponds to the one by which the Minangkabau themselves would 
indicate the context in which actual cases of diachronie transfers take 
place. These are: 
1. The relationships within a kaum. 
2. The relationships between two or more kaum. 
3. The situation where a buah gadang is extinct. 
4. Relationships between two or more social strata. 
S. The relationships between children and the (their father's) kamanakan, 
between anak pisang and bako. 
6. The relationships between children, particularly between the children 
of one man and different wives. 
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These stories show the Minangkabau as actors in the social processes 
which involve the relationship between the behaviour of the individuals 
and the factors which influence it,and the conceptions through which 
they explain and justify their actions and wishes. To borrow the words 
by which Turner has characterized the social drama: 
'1he social drama itself represents a complex interaction between norma-
tive patterns laid down in the course of deep regularities of condition-
ing and social experience, and the immediate aspirations, ambitions, 
and other conscious goals or strivings of individuals and groups in the 
here and now" (1968: XXV). 
This complexity is of a particularly high degree in Minangkabau, as 
there is a plurality of cognitive and normative patterns that can be em-
ployed by the individuals. As Tanner has pointed out, legal pluralism 
in Minangkabau (as, of course, elsewhere) "provides interesting oppor-
tunities of dispute strategy" (1969: 46), and this certainly applies to 
the dispute strategies in property and inheritance affairs. Yet,as has 
been outlined in Chapter 1, we shall adopt a wider perspective: Legal 
pluralism provides opportunities for the strategy of establishing new 
unproblematic situation-images in general. The social processes which 
achieve this goal may involve disputes, but they mayalso be quite un-
exciting trouble-free affairs. Though most of the stories in the first 
part of this chapter have a highly dramatic form, they are not treated 
as "social dramas" (Turner) or ''property dramas" of the kind which 
Turner has analysed among the Ndembu (1957, 1968: 91 ff.). The analysis 
of the processes of diachronie transfers does not use the morphology of 
human behaviour as its referent, but the ''naked'' function of diachronie 
transfers of property relationships, which is dramatic only inasmuch 
as it involves "schism and continuity" àf property relationships. 
The stories will illustrate nearly the whole range of the modalities 
by which property relationships can be transferred in Minangkabau. It 
will be seen that the actors employ the various conceptions provided by 
the three systems of property relationships and, of course, their own 
innovative syncretisms. In this respect, too, the stories can be taken 
as apt illustrations of Minangkabau inheritance behaviour. They cannot, 
however, be understood as indicating the statistically dominant behaviour 
as far as the content of the concrete solutions of the processes is con-
cerned. I am quite aware that for a complete understanding of property 
and inheritance affairs in Minangkabau such impressionistic stories, 
impressionistic when considered in relation to the statistically domi-
nant outcome, are not sufficient.1 One would have to know the functional 
THE FULFILMENT OF THE FUNCTION 217 
value of: 
the various modalities of diachronic transfers in relation to the 
overall maintenance of property relationships through time, 
the cognitive and normative conceptions used in the various diachro-
nic transfers, 
the agents of socio-political authority who validate the new situa-
tion-images of continued property relationships. 
Further, we would like to have a differentiated picture of: 
the conceptions employed by the main actors in these processes as weIl 
as of those conceptions in which the new situation-image is finally 
conceived, 
the kind of property objects involved in these processes, their legal 
status, their natura I characteristics, and their economic value. 
Finally, we should demand a quantitative statement on the question of 
what makes people (of which sex, age, traditional or modern social 
status and of which economic means) employ which mechanism of diachronic 
transfer, which cognitive and normative conceptions, in what sorts of 
circumstances? 
In the second part of this chapter I shall try to deal with these 
questions. There, I describe and analyse the various modalities of dia-
chronic transfers in isolation, and I shall try to indicate the func-
tional values of the factors which I just have mentioned. Yet I am 
afraid that the questions which I have outlined above must largely re-
main unanswered. The available data, including the data we have collect-
ed during our field research, are much too meagre to yield a systematic 
quantitative description and analysis. Systematic statistical research 
would by far have exceeded the manpower of our husband and wife team, 
and it would also have presupposed most of the knowledge which is laid 
down in this study. Some statistical data can be given, but for the rest 
I must rely on a qualitative analysis, which should, however, be related 
to the wider frame of reference which has been outlined above. 
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B. STORIES OF PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE AFFAIRS2 
I. 1HE SITUATION IN A KAUM 
In what follows I shall describe the property relationships within the 
kaum on whose harato pusako we lived during our stay in CKL. The genea-
logy of the kaum members and the location of its harato pusako and the 
houses of the kaum members are shown on the following charts. The numbers 
in the text refer to the "cases" which will .be discussed aft er the des-
cription. 
1. Thp History of the Kaum of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang 
Sometime in the last century, a man came to Candung with sisters and kamana-
kan. He was a stranger (orang datang). As he wanted to settle permanent-
ly in the nagari, he had to associate (maZakok) with one of the existing 
panghuZu. He was accepted as kamanakan (dibawah pusek, bataZi budhi) by 
Dt. Hitam, one of the oldest panghuZu of hindu Guci 111 Saniniek. Dt. 
Hitam gave land, the T 1 (the strip of land number 1 on the map, p. 221), 
to his new kamanakan, which was located in the area of the former tanah 
uZayat (1). Af ter some time, the new kamanakan's group increased, and it 
was decided to give it the status of a buah gadang. The stranger (or his 
kamanakan, or his grandnephew?) was given a panghuZu title, Dt. Kayo, 
and he forthwith was considered one of the 100 recognized members of the 
Karapatan Adat Nagari (2). The group built two rumah gadang at first, 
one near the Simpang Tigo and one in the place where now houses 3 and 4 
are located. Some time later, a rich man from suku Guci '~ecame punah 
(extinct)" (perhaps it was a buah gadang that became extinct) and he 
accepted Dt. Kayo as heir - wi th the consent of the other buah gadang 
of Guci 111 Saniniek (3). Through this, Dt. Kayo received much new hara-
to pusako: The T 2 and T 3 lands in the area of Salasa and some II\Ore 
land in the area of V Kaum, some hundred meters to the west in the naga-
rio Some of his kamanakan (a jurai) II\Oved to V Kaum; then they tore down 
their rumah gadang near the Simpang Tigo and built a new rumah gadang 
in V Kaum. This is said to have occurred in 1870. Later, one of their 
jurai moved to the area of Batu Balantai and built a rumah gadang on 
land which they had bought. When the first Dt. Kayo had died, the jurai 
in Salasa and the one in V Kaum both wanted to install the successor. No 
consensus cculd be reached, 50 i t was decided that the buah gadang of Dt. Kayo 
should be split, and that bo1h groups should install a Dt. Kayo. The one in Salasa 
was called Dt. Kayo nan Gldang (Dt. Kayo the Great One). the one in V Kaum Dt. 
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Kayo nan Ketek (Dt. Kayo the Small One) (4). The division of the pro-
perty seems to have gone without difficulties: Dt. Kayo nan Ketek kept 
the property in V Kaum, plus some additional fields in Salasa near their 
old rumah gadang, and the rest was kept by Dt. Kayo nan Gadang. 
The group of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang, about which I shall mainly report 
here, continued to live in their rumah gadang. As the kamanakan increas-
ed, additional small houses were built by the sisters and daughters 
during the course of time. The rumah gadang was, however, only torn 
down in 1972. 
Rancak, who hàd married a man from suku Pili, had obtained some land 
from the bako of her children, by hibah, to be turun temurun in her 
jurai (5). A rumah gadang was built, which bumt down twice, and finally 
house 10 was built. At present, Kanang, her daughter Mumi and Mumi 's 
current (her third) husband live there with their only child. I. Gagah, 
the mamak of the kaum, long a widower, lives in the surau in Pakan Kamis. 
Syamsiah, the daughter of Nurmi, built a house (H 9) on T 3, where 
she now lives with her two daughters and their husbands. When Fatimah 
married, the house was too small for the new family, and Fatimah went 
to stay with her husband who lived in a different part of the nagari. 
This was the only case of a "virilocal" marriage we came across in this 
part of CKL, and people hastened to say that it was for the time being 
only, and that they were ashamed that such a thing should happen at all. 
During our stay in CKL, the house was torn down and reconstructed. M-
terwards, Fatimah and her husband moved in there too. 
Selamah, the mother of Jusri built a house (H 1) on T 2. Later, an-
other house was built, H 2, when Selamah's daughters had married. Jusri 
kept H 1, her sister Sul lived in H 2. In H 1 now live Jusri and her 
daughter Nursilahwith her husband and their two children. Nursilah's 
husband's five children from his first marriage are frequent guests in 
their house. In H 2lives si Mar with her five children. Her father, 
Angku Payuang Ameh (suku Sikumbang) stayed there during the last years 
of his life, and he died in this house during our stay in CKL. 
Dawiah and her children built house 5. Her daughter Dewi spent many 
years outside the nagari, as her husband, Dt. Batuah Rajo (suku Selayan) 
was a teacher. She is a widow now and mostly lives in Payakumbuh where 
her youngest daughter, si Mah, who is still unmarried (24 years old) , 
is a midwife. The other daughter of Dawiah, Kalek, died early, and there 
was enough room in H 5 for the whole family. Rakiah, who married Dt. 
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af ter her marriage. She and her husband, who is an administrative officer, 
spent many years outs ide the naga.r>i. When they returned to the nagari , 
they built house 6. H 6 was originally built as a rice-mill (huIler, a 
rice-mill with a motor-engine; water-mills are kieir pooi), which Dt. 
Batuah Rajo had set up. But the business did not go weIl, and now they 
use the H 6 as their house. In H 5 at present live Etek and her children. 
Rakiah's half is used as a surau for the boys of the kaum: Rakiah's two 
eldest sons, Etek's son and some of their friends sleep there. Etek's 
husband is a rare guest in the house as he usually stays with his first 
wife. 
House 7 had only been built in 1973 by Dewi and her jurai. It is the 
house of si Mah. Since si Mah is still unrnarried and works in Payakurnbuh, 
it was ternporarily used as a surau, too. Rakiah and Dt. Batuah Rajo had 
thought of moving in ternporarily, if it had not been for the trouble with 
their neighbours, Elok and Pak Rajo. They had also thought of renting it 
out to the school children, the nurnerous pupils from other parts of 
Minangkabau (and Indonesia) who had come to CKL to study at the famous 
Islamic School. As the house was not yet fully finished and furnished, 
we were able to rent it and stayed there during 10 months. 
Jarnilah and Jinah continued to live in the rumah gadang. Jarnilah even-
tually built a small house on the field T 3: 15. But there had been 
trouble about this, and 50 she built a new house, H 3, in which now Elok 
and Elok's husband with their 6 children live. When Elok and her older 
sister, Nursiah, married, a new house was built for Nursiah, H 8. Af ter 
Nursiah's death, her children continued to live there. The oldest, Subai-
dah, aged 20, is already married and has a son. Jinah and her daughters 
were the last ones to live in the rumah gadang. When the rumah gadang 
had becorne too old and had to be torn down, Upiek built house 4, in 
which she lives with her husband and her youngest son. 
The other kaum members live more or less permanently in the rantau. 
lti and her brother, the present Dt. Kayo nan Gadang, live in Pakan Barn. 
Dt. Kayo only rarely visits CKL. Iti's only son has died, and it is doubt-
ful whether she will return to the nagari. Mantari Basa, Elok's brother, 
spent several years with his mamak Dt. Kayo in Pakan Baru, but returned 
in 1970 to marry and farm. St. Mantari Intan, the son of Jusri, is mar-
ried in CKL, but mainly stays in Padang as a trader. Dewi and si Mah live 
in Payakumbuh, but it is hoped that si Mah will marry soon and return to 
CKL to live in H 7. Dewi's son, St. Batuah, lives in Padang, where he is 
a lecturer in biology at the University. He seldom visits CKL, but is 
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frequently visited by Rakiah's children. Si Jon, the oldest of his 
kconanakan, has started to go to the secondary school in Padang and cur-
rently lives with his mconak. Jas and Syamsinan, the sisters of Upiek, 
live in Jakarta, and Upiek's eldest son is living with them. 
According to all group members, definite genealogical relationships 
exist between the two kaum of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang and Dt. Kayo nan Ketek; 
it is not remembered (or said) who the common apical ancestress was. But 
some other kaum members of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang who live in Pakan Kamis 
in house 11, are said to have no genealogical relationships with this 
group. It took us a very long time (about 4 months) to find this out. 
We were always told that one was saninik, "of one grandmother", wi th 
them. Understandably, we were not able to trace this ninik in the genea-
logy for we were told later that the group had moved to CKL from the 
Payakumbuh area and had associated (maZakok) with Dt. Kayo. When they 
settled in CKL, they had been given the T 4 as pusaka. The T 4 did not 
belong to Dt. Kayo before, but to a different buah gadang of suku Guci 
I II Saniniek. This pusaka, too, was now "under Dt. Kayo". 
Quite recently, the kaum had been enlarged by Lambok. Lambok is the 
wife of the mantari, the medical assistant. She originates from nagari 
M. where she had belonged to suku Guci. When she came to CKL, she 
approached Anku Kayo,the (now deceased) brother of Syamsiah in house 11. 
A. Kayo accepted her as kamanakan, but this was done without the know-
ledge of I. Gagah, the mconak-kaum. Only when A. Kayo had died, had Lambok 
approached I. Gagah and had been formally accepted as a kaum member. She 
and her husband live in house 12, which they have rented. They have not 
been given any land, for the kaum is much too poor to be able to give 
land away. But Lambok and her husband do not want to farm anyway, as her 
husband has his job. Lambok fulfils all social and kinship obligations 
of a kamanakan of Dt. Kayo. 
2. The Sacia-PaZiticaZ Status of the Graups 
"According to adat", all kamanakan of Dt. Kayo are still "one". Al though 
the two Dt. Kayo-groups were frequently spoken of as if they were sepa-
rate buah gadang, in terms of adat there is only one buah gadang Dt. 
Kayo. If Dt. Kayo '~as to go to adat" or to represent this kamanakan 
formally in the nagari , only one Dt. Kayo, "the Dt. Kayo", can go. Which 
of the persons wearing the ti tle Dt. Kayo should represent the group 
has to be decided by the two, and in principle they should rotate the 
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exercise of the panghulu-function. In the present situation, however, 
Dt. Kayo nan Ketek should,as he alone has been instalIed as panghulu. 
Dt. Kayo nan Gadang had been invested with the title af ter his mamak's 
death with the intention of making mati batungkek budhi (see Chapter 2: 
87). But he has not yet carried out the installation ceremonies, and 
therefore is not regarded as a "panghulu" , although he may wear the 
title. As Dt. Kayo nan Ketek lives in Aceh as a trader, his functions are 
performed by his panungkek, Dt. Mantari Basa nan Ketek. He attends most 
occasions, also those where only a panghulu should go according to adat. 
But as there are 50 few panghulu installed in CKL, people are glad to have 
at least a "Datuek" attend the meetings. Dt. Mantari Basa nan Ketek is 
the son of a panghulu, and he is married to a descendant of the last 
Tuangku Lareh of Candung, whose kaum is small and rich. All their harato 
pusako are given to "kamanakan" in share-cropping. Dt. Mantari Basa is 
an officer in the Forestry Department in Bukit Tinggi and thus has his 
additional independant income. He is said to be ambitious, and it is 
rumoured that he wants "to change with Dt. Kayo" in Aceh, i.e., that Dt. 
Mantari Basa should be installed as Dt. Kayo. Dt. Mantari Basa '5 official 
leadership of all kamanakan of Dt. Kayo is very much resented by the ka-
manakan of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang. 
"Dt. Kayo" thus is still "one", and according to adat the whole group 
still consists of urang saharato sapusako, people of one pusako-property. 
But the pusako has been officially divided. The group and property split 
is said to have occurred in the 20'5 of this century. The two groups are 
treated as kaum, and both have a mamak kepala waris. In the tax register 
of CKL, Dt. Kayo nan Ketek and I. Gagah are registered as such (6). With-
in the kaum of Dt. Kayo nan Gadang, the next split is imminent. There 
are definite tendencies that the descendants of Nurli will form one kaum 
for themselves: Pakih, the husband of Subaidah (house 8) of ten referred 
to Nurli as the ancestress of his wife's kaum and tended to leave out 
the descendants of Nurmi and Rancak. The feeling of ''not belonging to-
gether" anymore has also increased. During one of her very outspoken 
characterizations of her kaum members, Elok stated that "actually" they 
were already two kaum: "their" kaum (the descendants of Nurli) and the 
one with the descendants of Rancak and Nurmi. Elok had had trouble with 
1. Gagah and Kanang: When her sister Nursiah had died, "they" had not 
come to the burial. When Murni, Kanang's daughter,married, Elok did not 
go to the ceremony. When Rakiah joined the discussion, there was a dis-
pute, for Elok and Rakiah did not like each other, and neither did their 
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husbands. Rakiah: ''You are lying. We are one kaum, and I. Gagah is our 
mamak kepala WariB". Elok: ''Yes, fonnerly we were one kaum, but now we 
are two. Our kepala kaum is Dt. Kayo. As he is in the rantau, St. Man-
tari Tntan, the son of Jusri, should be the kepala kaum. But as he stays 
in the rantau, too, the actual kepala kaum is Mantari Basa (her brother). 
Kanang and I. Gagah are a different kaum al ready , and Syamsiah (house 9) 
belongs to them, too. When they looked for a bridegroom (cari menantu) 
they did not ask us; and from us, nobody goes there anyrnore, not even 
Jusri, who is the eldest of our kaum". This was not quite true: When the 
house of Syamsiah was broken down and reconstructed (later), most of the 
kaum mernbers were there to help cook, arnong them Jusri, Elok, Etek, 
Rakiah and Upiek. 
But the next split is imminent. If the mernbers of the kaum Dt. Kayo 
nan Gadang wish to adhere to the kok limo kali turun-rule, they will 
have to wait for some more time. For the women, who are to be chosen as 
the apical ancestresses of the new kaum, only have four generations of 
descendants. But in about 10 years, the girls of the youngest generation 
will have married and have children, and then Nurli wil 1 have limo kaZi 
turunan, five generatioffi of descendants • The split will probably occur 
then (7). 
3. The FPoperty Relationships 
It is not easy to recall how the relationships to their harato pusako 
have been for the generations of kaum members. Not all is rernernbered, 
and probably part of what is rernembered was considered by our infonnants 
to be ''without interest" for us. Besides, qui te different versions are re-
mernbered. At present, the relationships between the jurai are bad, 
and as the brief history will show, they had been bad also in the older 
generations . 
In tracing back the history of the harato pusako of Dt. Kayo we can 
go back as far as the generation of St. Tungkek and his three sisters. 
The kaum split and the official division of the pusako between the two 
Dt. Kayo had not occurred then, and we can assurne that the T 1,2 and 3 
were the ganggam bauntuek of the mother of Nunni, Nurli and Rancak. Their 
mother was still weIl off with all these harato. When the children were 
young, there was no reason to distribute the property; the daughters 
would work with their mother on their pusako. When Rancak married 
a man from suku Pili, her husband's kaum decided to give the young couple 
rice-fields as pambaoan, and a place to build a house on pusako of suku 
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Pili. Later, it was decided that this property should be, as haI'ato 
hibah, turun temurun in Rancak's jurai. If her jurai should become extinct, 
it would revert to the buah gadang which had given the property. So when 
Rancak married, she was provided for. 
Nurli also married. She had four daughters, 50 she was given a rather 
large share of the property, the T 1. St. Tungkek, the only male kaum 
member, was allowed to use the T 2 for himself. Nurmi must have been 
still young and unmarried, for the difference in relative age is con-
siderable: Nurmi's daughter Syamsiah is not much older than Rancak's and 
Nurli's grandchildren Kanang and Jusri. So there was no immediate need 
to provide Nurmi with pusako, and she probably continued to work with 
her mother on T 3 (8). 
St.Tungkek had pawned the T 2 (in 1915) to a man from suku Caniago, 
St. Tanameh. St. Tanameh later married Se I amah , St. Tungkek' 5 kamanakan. 
When afterwards St. Tanameh and Selamah had children, and none in the 
kaum wanted to redeem the fields for the whole kaum, Selamah "redeemed 
it for her children" (menebusi untuk anak) (9). 
It was not clear whether Selamah paid the redemption money to her hus-
band, or whether her husband transferred his haI'ato pancaharian in this 
way to his children. The effect is the same: the T 2 is haI'ato turun 
temurun of the whole kaum, but through the investment of the money, only 
Selamah andher jurai are entitled to use and exploit the pusako. This 
was recognized by the other kaum members. But it was equally clear, that 
any other kaum member could, in theory, regain a part of the T 2 by pay-
ing a share of the original pawning sum to Selamah, i.e. now to her des-
cendants. 
The T 2 was forthwith only worked by Selamah and, af ter her death, by 
Jusri and Sul. Af ter Sul '5 death, Jusri took over the complete control 
of the T 2 and does not share it with her sister's daughter si Mar. The 
T 2 is now worked by Nursilah and her husband. Sometimes, it is given in 
share-cropping, also to other kaum members. It is the common opinion, 
that si Mar will come up with her claim af ter Jusri's death, and all 
kaum members think it very ''bad'' that Jusri is 50 greedy as to cheat her 
own child (ZD) of her inheritance. The reason why si Mar avoids the con-
flict with Jusri and does not yet press her claim to the T 2 is that she 
herself is rather weIl off. She uses none of her kaum's haI'ato pusako, 
except when it is her time to work the T 1 (see below). Her father Angku 
Payuang Ameh had been a rich man. He had taken nuch scauah as pawning 
(as pamagang) for her benefit (10). When Angku Payuang Ameh died in 
her house in 1975, there had been no trouble about his inheritance. 
Si Mar continued to work the scauah he had taken in pawning for her. 
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Some other fields, which Angku Payuang Ameh had allowed her to work, 
had actually been taken in pawning for his kamanakan, for he had given 
the pawning-document to them. It was expected that the kamanakan would 
"take back" these fields af ter the next harvest, and nobody expected si 
Mar to oppose this. The harato pancaharian of Angku Payuang Ameh had been 
kept in the houses of his three wives, and each family kept what had been 
in their house (11). 
When in the 1920'5 the split of the two kaum Dt. Kayo occurred, the 
harato pusako were divided (dibagi) , and each kaum now had its own hara-
to pusako. At that time the children of Nurli and Rancak already had 
children and most probably the first grandchildren. Nurli's son had becor.le 
Dt. Kayo, one of the two who were instalIed af ter the split. The proper-
ty, which formerly was held as ganggam bauntuek, now became the harato 
pusako of the kaum and had to be distributed by way of ganggam bauntuek 
between the jura i of the new kaum. Dt. Kayo seems to have been astrong 
mamak and had the decisive voice in the meeting in which the property 
relationships were rearranged. He favoured himself and his sisters, and 
paid much less regard to the children of his mother's sisters (12). The 
T 1 was given as ganggam bauntuek to Nurli and her children. It was 
decided that Nurli's children should use the T 1 per daughter in rota-
tion (bagilir, baZega) for sawah-years. This seems to have been done over 
the years, and the original schedule is still adhered to: The T 1 is 
still "sawah balega" for the jurai formed by Nurli' 5 children (13): 
When i t is "Jamilah' 5 turn", Elok works the sawah, helped by her chil-
dren, Subaidah, and Subaidah's younger sisters. Elok's brother, Mantari 
Basa, helps with the heavy work (ploughing, threshing). The harvest is 
shared between Elok and Subaidah. Mantari Basa is given a small share, 
as he normally works on the pusako of his wife. 
When it is "Jinah's turn", Upiek works the sawah. As she is the only 
of Jinah's daughters who lives in the nagari, she takes the whole harvest. 
It is too little anyway to give a share to her sisters in Jakarta. 
When it is "Dawiah' 5 turn", normally none of Dawiah' 5 daughters or 
granddaughters works the sawah. Dewi is too old, does not like farming, 
and lives most of the time in Payakl..Dl1buh anyway. Her daughter Rakiah, 
who also spent some time outside the nagari, also does not like farming. 
She has a small trade, selling rice, coconuts, oil, and salt in front of 
her house three times a week. She does not earn very much - according to 
her husband -, but he is glad because it keeps her busy. She is disliked 
for her sharp tongue, and only has a few customers. aften, even her 
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cousins do not buy from her. Dawiah's other daughter, Kal ek , is dead, 
and her daughter Etek also does not like farming. She prefers to work 
in a snop at the main road in Candung, which is considered a shame for 
the whole kaum. Etek with her four children is badly off, as her husband 
completely neglects her and does not make great financial contributions 
to the household. So when it is Dawiah's turn, the land is usually given 
in share-cropping, mostly to Upiek. The harvest is divided. Upiek keeps 
one half and the other half is divided between Rakiah and Etek. 
When it is "Selamah's turn", Jusri, Nursilah and si Mar work the 
sCMah, and the harvest is divided between Jusri and si Mar. 
The T 3 was also divided when the kaum split occurred. The fields 
T 3: 4-6 we re given to Dt. Kayo nan Ketek and are now farmed by the 
mother of Dt. Mantari Basa nan Ketek. Fields 1-3 are held by I. Gagah 
''wi th money". I have not been able to find out whether these fields had 
formerly also been given to Dt. Kayo nan Ketek and later were pawned and 
then redeemed by I. Gagah. In any case,it is acknowledged that I. Gagah 
holds the pusako wi th money. He has gi ven i t in share-cropping to Fati-
mah, the daughter of Syamsiah and granddaughter of Nurmi (house 9). 
Nurmi's jurai had been neglected by Dt. Kayo when the kaum property was 
distributed. Nothing was given to her. Only af ter her son, A. Tumanggung, 
had grown up, he defended his mother's and his jurai's rights against 
Dt. Kayo and demanded a share of the harato pusako. Dt. Kayo refused, 
and the trouble resulted in a lengthy dispute which was finally decided 
in the State Court. Here Dt. Kayo lost, and the fields T 3: 14-18 were 
given to Syamsiah and A. Tumanggung as their harato pusako, which was 
now regarded as their ganggam bauntuek (14). 
Dt. Kayo himself had kept control of the fields T 3: 7 - H 9. These 
fields he gave to his daughter Sur by way of hibah for her lifetime (15). 
This hibah-business hag had the most unpleasant consequences. Dt. Kayo 
had married a woman from T. from a very different part of West Sumatra 
and brought her to CKL. His wife ''had no suku", and it was cautiously 
hinted that she was "jenis keerrrpat", of the fourth kind of kamanakan , 
i.e. a descendant of former slaves. As she had no suku, she was also 
rot adopted into a suku in CKL. Their daughter Sur was incorporated into 
the suku of her father, and had become a Guci-woman. The Guci and her 
father's kaum were, however, further treated as her bako. Dt. Kayo had 
given the fields T 3: 7 - H 9 to this Sur. When she married, Sur wanted 
to leave the house which had stood close to H 2; she probably did not 
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feel very comfortable 50 close to her "sisters" and her bako. She "stu-
pidly" wanted to exchange the hibah-property for money and she pawned 
the property, either to her bako, or to other people. ~fuen Sur later 
wanted to redeem the property, there was trouble, for Jusri and Syamsiah 
( House 9) also wanted to redeem it (or, Jusri and Syamsiah wanted to re-
deern i t and were not allowed to do 50 by Sur). In any case, this part of the 
story has not become clear despite several interviews and informal chats. 
Syamsiah, A. Tumanggung, and Jusri claimed that Sur had no more rights 
to this pusako. According to most vi I lagers , Sur had been in the right. 
The hibah had been in accordance with adat, and Sur had the right to the 
sawah, i.e., to use and exploit it, to pawn and to redeem it, as long 
as she lived. Only af ter her death would the property revert to her bako. 
But Jusri and Syamsiah took the case to court. They took it straight to 
court, and there was no previous at tempt to settIe the dispute in the 
nagari. ~le would have been terribly ashamed if this dispute between the 
children and their bako had been discussed in the Karapatan Adat. The 
other kaum members, too, did not join in the dispute, feelinz ashamed at 
Syamsiah's, Jusri's, and A. Tumanggung's behaviour. In the first in-
stance, Jusri and Syamsiah lost, as all witnesses from CKL confirmed the 
validity of the hibah. But they appealed the judgement, and the appeal 
court reversed the judgement. For the other kaum members the reason was 
clear: bribery. A further appeal of Sur to the Supreme Court proved un-
successful. So Jusri and Syamsiah had won more sawah (16). Jusri took 
the fields T 3: 7-10, Syamsiah the fields T 3: 11 - H 9. Jusri works 
this land with her daughter. Syamsiah, however, had to pawn most of her 
property in order to finance the suit against Sur. So the fields T 3: 
14-17 had been pawned to people of suku Pili, and af ter the suit, field 
T 3: 13 was pawned to Dewi. It is currently used by Dt. Batuah Rajo, 
Rakiah' 5 husband, who plants peanuts on i t. 
Jusri thus was quite rich in cornparison with her kaum relatives, and 
this was very rnuch resented by the others, who regarded her as greedy 
and unsocial. She had all this sawah, but she did not think of sharing 
it with her sisters! She even cheated her own daughter, si Mar. The 
other kaum members also thought it unjust that Jusri insisted on taking 
part in the rotational use of the T 1. This ought to be changed: all of 
Nurli's descendants were ganggam bauntuekholders and the use of the 
sawah should be rearranged. Elok's elder sister Nursiah had demanded 
that a meeting be held and the use of the T 1 be reconsidered. But then 
Nursiah had died. r. Gagah was a weak man, and Dt. Kayo was in Pakan 
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Baru and did not care about his kamanakan anyway. Besides, he was a 
brother of Jusri and would not do anything against her. But perhaps 
af ter Jus ri , 5 death ... (17). Matters had been worst when 
the decision was taken to build a house for si Mah (H 7). It had been 
planned to build it on field T 1: 6, which was not used for rice-culti-
vation, but for bananas and some cinnarnon trees. But Jusri, who more or 
less controlled this property, too, had refused. She had made a scandal 
and torn her blouse! Her younger brother, Dt. Kayo, was unable to con-
vince her that the house must be built there; 50 finally the house was 
built where it now stands, on the T 1. A whole rice-field had to be 
used for this, which was very much resented by the other kaum members, 
for the kaum did not have rrruch s(J);)ah anyway. The real blarne was put on 
Jusri and Dt. Kayo, but rrruch of the resentment was directed against Dewi, 
who had "stolen" the s(J);)ah and did not mind losing i t for the kaum, as 
she herself did not farm and did not depend on farming (18). 
Feelings were still bad when we moved to CKL. Elok and Pak Rajo,in 
H 3, had "forbidden" Rakiah and her husband Dt. Batuah Raj 0 to use their 
yard as a path to H 7. They did not like each other, anyway. Raki ah , her 
mother, and Dt. Batuah Rajo were thought to be giving themselves fine 
airs, being too good to work on the s(J);)ah, sending their children to 
secondary schools, and trying to become important in village polities. 
Dt. Batuah Rajo had been instalIed as panghuZu two years ago, he was the 
tambang adat and chairman of the Karapatan Adat Nagari • Besides, he was 
an administrative official in the information department in the nearby 
capital-nagari of the Kecamatan. Pak Rajo was a good friend of the WaZi 
Negeri, who was an "enemy" of Dt. Batuah Rajo. There had also been 
trouble about the house with Syamsiah and Dt. Mantari Basa in Pakan 
Karnis (H 11), who held the T 4 between H 7 and the road. Although i t 
was fully accepted that they held the T 4 for their exclusive use, there 
was a constant bickering between Syamsiah and Rakiah concerning the 
exact border between T 1 and T 4 in front of H 5 and 6, where Syamsiah 
had planted bananas on field T 4: 8. Rakiah claimed that Syamsiah had 
used about 30 cm of T 1, Syamsiah said she had not. I. Gagah had not 
been able to achieve peace, and it was said that Syamsiah had even gone 
to the police in this matter. It was in the context of such_,a quarrel, 
that we heard for the first time that Syamsiah and her jurai were not 
real kamanakan at all. So when Rakiah and Dt. Batuah Rajo wanted to make 
a small road from the main road to H 7, Syamsiah had said no. The field 
(T 4: 7) in front of the house had been pawned some years ago, and Dt. 
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Batuah Rajo had offered to redeem it, but Syamsiah had refused. Dt. 
Batuah Rajo had offered to pay a yearly rent just to get a small 
strip of land for the path, but Syamsiah had refused again. 
This was the situation when we moved to the nagari • We had met Dt. 
Batuah Rajo in the Camat's office, and the Camat had asked him to help 
us to find a house in eKL. H 7 stood empty, but there was the problem 
of the path. It was decided by Dewi's jurai that we could have the house 
but only if the house would get a path to the road. It needed apath, 
for we had a car. If the car could not be parked close to the house, 
the children would play with it, steal things etc. and they would suffer 
shame (maZu). The mamak rumah, St. Batuah, safelyaway in Padang, thus 
had the case stated to the Camat. The Camat, eager to find us a house, 
ordered the WaZi Negeri to settIe the dispute. But the WaZi Negeri 
"could not" settle the dispute. He probably had not the slightest in-
tention of doing 50, for Dt. Batuah Rajo was his enemy; should he help 
to have his enemy triumph over his friend, Pak Rajo? So it took some 
time until we could move in. Only some pressure from the Camat, and the 
understanding that we would pay rent, finally changed the mind of St. 
Batuah and his jurai. There was much talk about the path during our stay, 
but nothing had changed when we left. Syamsiah and her family were bad 
people, Rakiah said, for they wouldn't give them land for a path. Of 
course they were willing to give land for the path, even without money, 
but not "in this way", said Syamsiah. Weren't they of one kaum? Shouldn't 
there be a proper musyawarah? But to that Rakiah would not agree, said 
Syamsiah. Both were terribly ashamed that such guests as we were, who 
were nearly kaum members by now, should be treated this way through the 
fault of the other, said both. But nothing happened (19). 
But not only Rakiah had had trouble with Syamsiah of H 11. Syams iah , 
the daughter of Nurmi in H 9, had had trouble, too. For Angku Kayo, the 
brother of Syamsiah of H 11, had planted bananas on plot T 3: 18 and 
built a pondok (small stal I) there. Syamsiah's (H 9) claim, that it was 
her land, had not bothered him a bit. I. Gagah, the mamak kaum, had again 
not been able to settIe the dispute, and 50 one had brought the problem 
before the Kerapatan Negeri: Ana, Syamsiah's daughter, represented by 
I. Gagah, against Angku Kayo (case 8 of 1973). The case was heard by the 
adat section of the KN, and Ana won, i. e " Angku Kayo was ordered to 
give the land back and Ana was ordered to pay some compensation to Angku 
Kayo as he had "taken care" of the land, and for the bananas which he 
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planted. Ana had agreed to this solution and had signed the proposed 
settlernent, but Angku Kayo had refused to do the same. They had then 
gone to the Camat to have their quarrel solved. The Camat also decided 
that the land belonged to Ana. Angku Kayo had again refused to accept 
the settlernent. But then Angku Kayo had died, and Ana took back the 
land, unopposed by Syarnsiah's jurai(20). 
But that was no~ the only quarrel about property in the kaum. Kanang, 
the daughter of Nari (H 10), also feIt cheated by the (aId) Dt. Kayo. 
The T 1, for instance, was their harato pusako turun temurun as weIl that 
of the others' (Nurli's jurai). There was no reason for their exclusion 
frorn participating in the rotational use of the rice-fields. In fact, 
they had not got anything of the kaum's harato pusako. Kanang and Murni 
would just inherit the fields T 3: 1-3 af ter I. Gagah's death. 
And now there was even trouble about their sawah, the harato hibah. 
In former times, when Rancak still lived, the fields had been given to 
Syarnsiah (H 9), because Syarnsiah had been in greater need. But then, when 
Syarnsiah had this disgraceful dispute with Sur, her son, St. Mantari Basa, 
had pawned the fields to a wornan from suku Caniago. He had done 50 in 
secret, pawned the fields but then taken them back in share-cropping 50 
that nobody should become aware of the transaction. This "pawning", 
of course, was void. Yet Murni had taken a friendly attitude towards her 
cousin. She had approached him and offered to redeem the fields together. 
But St. Mantari Basa had refused. I. Gagah had, once again, not been able 
to settIe the dispute between his kamanakan. SA she had just taken the 
fields back and planted chili-peppers on them. She would not pay anthing 
to that Caniago-woman; let St. Mantari Basa see for himself how he would 
manage. And she had enlisted support. She had gone to the Wali Ne ge ri , who 
belonged to suku Pili, and he had advised her to go through with her plan 
and use the fields. If anybody could decide in this matter, the Wali Negeri 
had said, it would be people from suku Pili, for suku Pili had originally 
given the fields to Rancak as harato hibah until her jurai should become 
extinct. And if this should happen indeed - Murni until now only had a son -
then ane would marry her son to a daughter of the Wali Negeri, and the 
land would thus return to suku Pili (21). The Wali Negeri~ however, did 
not belong to the buah gadang of suku Pili which originally had given the 
property to Rancak. 
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4. Swrunary 
Within this short history of the kaum of Dt. Kayo, we can detect at 
least 21 cases, which have been marked by numbers: 
1. We have seen the development of the group through time: It started 
as kamanakan who associated with an already settled buah gadang (1), 
and which later was given independent buah gadang status (2). Af ter some 
more time, the buah gadang split into two kaum (6), and, most probably at 
three generations af ter the first split, the kaum will split again (7). 
2. We have seen the basic mechanisms at work by which the members' re-
lationships to their harato pusako are regulated: The allocation of the 
property objects within the ganggam bauntuek holding group (8), which 
was, af ter the kaum split, changed into a ganggam bauntuek distribution 
among the jurai of the newly formed kaum. The original allocation within 
the ganggam bauntuek holding group is more or less still effective for 
the DDDDs of the original ganggam bauntuek holder. The decision through 
which the property objects had been allocated in the group (13) could 
in principle be changed and the property relationships rearranged; the 
efforts were partly successful (14) and partly in va in (17). 
We have also seen the main factors which influence the musyawarah 
processes in which the allocation and distribution should be carried 
out: The demographic structure of the group and the personalities of 
the main actors. Whereas the first allocation within the ganggam baun-
tuek holding group was still guided by the principle of need (8) - on 
the basis th at it could be changed if the needs should change - in the 
later ganggam bauntuek distribution (12) and in the allocation within 
the new ganggam bauntuek holding jurai of Nurli (13) the principle of 
need was surpressed, and the panghuZu clearly favoured his close re-
latives. Jusri, the oldest woman in the group, could successfully block 
all attempts to come to a redistribution or reallocation which would have 
been disadvantageoUs to her property interests (17, 18). The behaviour 
of Dt. Kayo, Angku Kayo, and St. Mantari Basa shows that men have few 
scruples in using their stronger position vis-à-vis women in whose jurai 
there is no strong male personality (20, 21). But decisions taken in a 
given power-situation can be changed again, once the power balance has 
changed. So Ana took back the land when Angku Kayo had died (20), and 
everyone hoped that there would be a more just reallocation in Nurli's 
jurai once Jusri had died (17). The weak personality of I. Gagah, on the 
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other hand, led to a multitude of troubles between the kaum members (18, 
19,20, 21). These stories are a good illustration of how the musyawarah 
principle works in practice: It has lost in force (if it ever had more 
force) in the sense that it has become more difficult to bring ab out 
consensual decisions. But it clearly continues to function in the oPPO-
site sense: If no consensus is achieved, then nothing will happen, no 
decision will be taken, and the problems will remain unsolved. 
3. Most mechanisms and modalities of diachronie transfers have been em-
ployed by the kaum members: A group was adopted as heirs (3), the pusako 
was allocated within a ganggam bauntuek holding group (8, 13), the 
ganggam bauntuek was distributed (12) and was inherited automatically. 
Harato pusako was given by hibah to the anak pisang in continuity (5) 
and there was a hibah for the lifetime of the children (15). Land was 
taken in pawning for the benefit of the children (10), and harato pusako 
was redeemed for the children (9). And there occurred quite unproblematic 
inheritance of harato pancaharian (11). Besides, marriage was used (9) 
or planned (21) to make the future flow of property unproblematic. In 
those cases where trouble arose, a wide range of agents of dispute-
settIement was invoked once the mamak and the panghuZu had been unwilling 
or unable to settIe the matter to the satisfaction of the disputing kaum 
members: The WaZi Ne ge ri (21), the KN (20), the Camat (20), and the State 
Courts (14,16), including the Supreme Court (16). 
11. INfER-KAUM RELATIONSHIPS AND PROPERTI 
Relationships between two or more kaum with respect to property usually 
become problematic in the following three situations: 
1. A kaum split has occurred, and the new kaum have to divide the former-
ly common harato pusako and make provisions for the succession to 
the sako. 
2. A kaum is punah, extinct, and the inheritance question has to be 
settled between the kaum which claim to be genealogically related to 
the extinct one. 
3. Harato pusako, which have been pawned some time ago, are claimed by 
the pawnee-kaum as their own harato pusako turun temurun. 
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These situations will be illustrated with one story each. The stories 
illustrate those cases which make up the greatest bulk of property dis-
putes in the State Courts, and they throw light upon the most important 
problems of property and inheritance in contemporary Minangkabau. 
1. The Kaum-Sp Zit 
This story starts as a dispute over a panghulu title. Oisputes over 
sako of ten turn out to be disputes over harato pusako and vice versa. 
If the contestant has successfully established his right to the gala 
sako, this will give him astrong position in future disputes over the 
pusako property which are known to belong or to have belonged to the 
panghulu in question. This holds particularly true for nagari with Koto-
Piliang adat where the rule, "that the sako and the pusako always must 
belong together" in the same group, is still qui te strictly upheld. In 
nagari with Bodi-Caniago adat, the opposite of ten happens: Here disputes 
about harato pusako of ten turn out to be disputes ab out a panghulu title. 
In CKL, there were atthe time at least two cases which were treated 
as disputes over harato pusako, but everyone knew that the main contes-
tants, the mamak kepala waris of the contending kaum, wanted to establish 
their right to be instalIed as panghulu. 
The events which are described in the following story did not occur 
in CKL. I have extracted them from three judgements, in which the dispute 
between the contending parties was decided. 3 The following diagram shows the 
genealogical relationships between the parties. 
Ot. B 
Barudin Ot. B 
Langadang Ot. B 
si 
Ojaridjis 
Pakihi Ot. B 
~ Lampakih Ot. B 
Marah Insan Ot. B 
CASE 1951~ 
CASE 196~ 
Rasjid Ot. B 
Munir Ot. B 
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In 1910, the woman si Perak brings a suit against Lampakih Dt. B. 
before the Rapat of the Tuangku Laras of IX Kota. She is assisted by 
one Haj i AR, who acts as ''her friend" and advocate (kepala kata). Haj i 
AR is a distant relative of si Perak, "a waris who would inherit if Perak 
should become extinct" (waris timbang punah, artinya nan akan meulas). 
Perak claims that the gala Dt. B. is ''hers''. In former times, it had 
descended to her granduncle (MME) Barudin, and from him to her mamak 
Langadang. Af ter Langadang's death, the gala had been inherited by his 
younger brother Pakihi. Pakihi had died in 1908. At present, there was 
no suitable member in her kaum who could be instalIed as successor. But 
now the defendant had "just 50" assumed the gala Dt. B, without any 
rights to it. She therefore demands that the Rapat should decIare that 
the gala may not used by the defendant. 
The defendant does not contradict Perak with respect to the history 
of the gala. But, he asserts, he is still of one family (berkarib) with 
Perak, and has not yet divided the property with her jurai (belum mem-
bagi harta). As he is the oldest and most suitable member of the kaum, 
it is quite normal for him to be invested with the gala of his mamak 
Pakihi. 
Bath parties bring witnesses, all of whom agree about the history of 
the gala. But two of Perak' 5 wi tnesses ''have heard people say" th at the 
gala is actually wom by si Hajun, the brother of Haji AR. A third wit-
ness even knows for sure that si Hajun has been invested with the gala. 
The witnesses of the defendant teIl a different story. Si Hajun had 
tried to be invested with the title, but his efforts had failed. Three 
witnesses decIare that they were present when the defendant was invested 
with the title on the graveyard of Pahiki. And all nine witnesses of the 
defendant agree that Perak and the defendant have "family relationships" 
and that, in former times, they had the same rumah gadang and the same 
family graveyard. 
On the basis of this evidence, the Rapat of the Tuangku Laras does 
not find it difficult to decide the case. If the defendant is indeed 
of one family with Perak, it is quite in order that he had been invested 
with the gala Dt. B. It is therefore declared to be right and valid in 
adat (dibenarkan dan disyahkan) that he wears the gala Dt. B. 
41 years later, Djaridjis, the grandson of Perak, sues Rasjid Dt. B., 
the grandnephew of Lampakih Dt. B. in the State Court. Both men appear 
as mamak kepala waris of their respective kaum. Djaridjis' claim is the 
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following: 
In 1908, his ninik Langadang had died. His grandmother, Perak, had 
made an agreement with the defendant's granduncle, Lampakih, according 
to which Lampakih was allowed to use the gala Dt. B. for the time being, 
but that the title must be retumed to her kaum once his (Djaridjis') 
brother, who then was only two years old, had come of age. But when 
Lampakih had used the title for two years, he had transferred it to his 
kamanakan Marah Insan, without the consent of Dj aridj is' kaum. When 
Marah Insan died in 1949, the defendant, his kamanakan , had assumed the 
gala, again without asking for the consent of Djaridjis' kaum. As the 
title is the sako of his kaum, Djaridjis now wants it back. His second 
claim concerns 7 large (turnpak) rice-fields. These fields had been used 
by the defendant's kaum since 1865 on the basis of share-cropping. As 
long as his grandmother had lived, Lampakih and Marah Insan had always 
given the due share to Perak. But af ter Perak's death in 1919 they had 
stopped. Djaridjis now reclaims the fields and demands compensation for 
the 32 years during which the half-share had not been paid. 
The defendant does not deny that Djaridjis and he are the rightful 
mamak kepala waris of their kaum. But for the rest he disagrees. The 
gala Dt. B. is, in these days, not the property of the plaintiff's 
(sekarang tidak hak sako turun temurun dari Djaridjis) but of his kaum, 
and he can easily prove that his granduncle and uncle have wom it before 
him. The witnesses which are heard in court all state that they have 
heard from their mamak that the sako Dt. B. is the defendant's sako, but 
that they cannot exactly say what the relationships are. 
The PN Solok rejects Djaridjis' claim on the grounds that his evidence 
is not sufficient to substantiate it. The claim for the sawah is not 
mentioned at all in the judgement. Djaridjis appeals, and in the appeal 
faces the kamanakan of his former opponent, the new Dt. B. His appeal 
is rejected on the ground that suits over sako cannot be tried at all 
in the State Courts. The problem of the sawah is again not mentioned. 
Discussion: 
What started as a kaum-intemal dispute has two generations later 
developed into a dispute between two kaum. Both Djaridjis and Rasjid/ 
Munir Dt. B consider themselves mamak kepala waris of their kaum. Their 
arguments center around the question of which of the two kaum owns the 
gala Dt. B. The problematic situation-image is thus presented as an 
altemative, which is retrojected into the past. But in the past, this 
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alternative did not exist, as there was only one kaum to which the an-
ces tors of both disputants belonged. 
Djaridjis unsuccessfully presented his claim to the court. But we 
can,if somewhat speculatively,assume that he would have had a much bet-
ter chance if he and the court had possessed the knowledge which we have, 
namely a copy of the judgement of the Rapat of the Tuangku Laras. Djarid-
jis must have had no copy, for if he had he would have presented it as 
evidence, and he would have been able to give a better account of the 
relationships between the parties. Although an agreement between Perak 
and Lampakih Dt. B of the kind maintained by Djaridjis was not mentioned 
in this judgement, and although the Rapat had confirmed Lampakih Dt. B 
as rightful panghuZu, the State Court would have become aware of the 
following: 
(a) that in 1910 there was only one kaum; 
(b) that the gaZa had descended in Perak's and Djarisjis' jurai; 
(c) that Pampakih could wear the title only because there were no 
suitable male members in Perak's jurai at that time; 
(d) that a kaum split had occurred in the meantime; 
(e) and that it now had to be determined to which of the two newly 
formed kaum the gaZa should belong. According to the adat Koto-
Pilang (the nagari S. has adat Koto-Piliang) there would have been 
no doubt: The sako has to be kept in the jurai/new kaum to which it 
originally belonged, and this was Perak's jurai and the kaum now 
formed by her descendants. 
The defendant in the 1951-case did have a copy of the Rapat's judgement 
(we got it from his kamanakan and made a copy of it for ourselves) but 
he preferred not to present it as evidence. For although his granduncle 
Lampakih had been confirmed as rightful panghuZu, he was probably afraid 
that the study of the judgement might lead the State Court to the same 
conclusions about which we have just speculated. So Rasjid Dt. B relied up-
on his position and thewestern law of evidence, which proved to be 
sufficient. 
That the claim concerning the harato pusako, the rice-fields, was not 
even mentioned by the courts, is probably due to the fact that the 
courts, too, regarded this matter as dependent on the sako-question. It 
would be highly improbable that the sako-holding group would take 7 
turnpak of sawah in share-cropping from a poorer jurai. As it was proved 
that Dt. B's jurai was the sako-holding one, the claim of Djaridjis was 
THE FULFILMENf OF THE FUNCTION 239 
not very convincing. 
The case further illustrates how much demographic factors may in-
fluence the potential activities in property and inheritance affairs. 
If Perak had had a brother or an adult son in 1910, the first case would 
never have happened. It took her grandchildren 41 years, or 32 years 
af ter her death, to get into a position in which they could face the 
Dt. B and to try to rearrange the property relationships and to demand com-
pensation for the 32 years in which the half-share had not been paid. 
In this case, Djaridjis lost. But in similar cases such attempts may 
be successful, with property relationships rearranged aft er 30 or more 
years, and compensation paid for such periods. 
Cases of this kind also contain an important lesson for the anthropo-
logist. What looks like a settled case in a given historical situation, 
may be completely different some time later. If the anthropologist is 
lUcky, he may observe whether a judgement in a property dispute is 
carried out or not, and he will draw his conclusions about the "effec-
tiveness" of such judgements. But who stays in one society for 30 years 
or more? It would have been premature to abstract definite principles 
of property law and social control from the 1910-case, for on its basis 
the 1951-case would have been decided differently. And it may be equally 
premature to abstract principles of a general kind from thc 1951-case. 
lmagine Djaridjis, or one of his kamanakan, finding a copy of the judge-
ment of the Tuangku Laras I Rapat and starting a new case on the strength 
of this evidence ... 
2. The Punah-Situation 
When a kaum is extinct, or when there are only male kaum members left, 
the question of the inheritance of the kaum property has to be solved. 
The "typicaI" situation shows two or more kaum, represented by their 
mamak kepala waris, claiming to stand in the closest genealogical rela-
tionship to the one which is or becomes extinct. Disputes about the 
harato pusako of extinct kaum do not necessarily start af ter the death 
of the last kaum member. The related kaum which think that they might 
have a chance, start their strategies as early as possible, of ten with 
the help of the last members of the extinct kaum. 
The following story tells of such a case. It concerns the property 
of one Haji Batuah (HB), whose kaum is extinct. HB's kaum is one of the 
many kaum În the buah gadang of Dt. Bagindo of suku Sikumbang in CKL. 
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The relationships within this buah gadang are 50 complex, that a rough 
outline must be given of its composition before the story can begin. On 
the diagram given on page 241, the relationships of the 11 component 
kaum have been sketched. Originally there was one Dt. Bagindo who lived 
in3 Kampuang and who was the panghulu bahindu of Sikumbang Tangah. At 
some time, one group of kamanakan of Dt. Bagindo moved to the Batu Balan-
tai, and at some later time the Batu Balantai-group also established a 
Dt. Bagindo • At least as far badc as 1884, there was T. Dt. Bagindo in Batu 
Balantai. Whether the 3 Kampuang-and the Batu Balantai-group had agreed 
upon a system of title-rotation, or whether they made a definite split 
(baju sehelai dibagi dua) is not quite clear. In the excerpts of the 
nagari-tambo which we examined, there were usually two Dt. Bagindo 
mentioned. On the other hand, it was clear to all contemporary infor-
mants, that the "real Dt. Bagindo was H. Batuah", i.e., that the title 
was (should be) turun temuY'Un in HE' 5 kawn. 
The contemporary buah gadang of Dt. Bagindo consists of 11 (or 13) 
ka:wn. According to adat, they are still "one" - though there is evidence 
that in former timesthey were regarded as two buah gadang. In the ori-
ginal 3 Kampuang-group, three main branches are recognized: 
1. The one of H. Batuah, which is nowextinct; 
2. the one which currently is under A.M. Dt. Bagindo, which comprises 
4 kaum resident in different parts of the nagari; 
3. the one which is currently under Z. Dt. Bagindo, which comprises 
4 ka:wn of which the two most important ones are still resident in 
3 Kampuang. The Batu Balantai-group consists of three ka:wn, two of 
which are resident in Batu Balantai, whereas another, under the 
panungkek Dt. ~mntari, had at some time moved to Lubuk Aur. 
'The eldest Dt. Bagindo who was still remembered was D. Dt. Bagindo, 
who belonged to the group of the present Z. Dt. Bagindo. His successor 
was S. Dt. Bagindo, who belonged to the group of the present A.M. Dt. 
Bagindo. Informants agreed, that as H. Batuah/his kawn ''had not wanted" 
the title, it had been given to the other two branches which agreed upon 
the system of gadang balega, of title-rotation. Independently, the Batu 
Balantai-group had established a Dt. Bagindo in 1936. In the 1960'5, 
both S. Dt. Bagindo and H. Dt. Bagindo died, and af ter their death there 
was considerable trouble about the succession. The group of Z. Dt. Bagin-
do claimed back the gala according to the system of rotation, but the 
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Besides, the Batu Balantai-group also wanted to install a successor to 
H. Ot. Bagindo. Finally, all three were instalied, the result of the 
management by the juaro adat of the hindu, Bandaro Hitam (a kamanakan 
of Z. Ot. Bagindo) and of Ot. ~arajo, the panghuZu ? suku of hindu 
Sikumbang Koto Ambalau which was "sapusako" with the hindu Sikumbang 
Tangah, and who therefore hal to act as organizer (pitungguek) of the 
installation ceremonies. Af ter the installation ceremonies one juaro 
adat died, another is still (1975) ill, and Bandaro Hitam was ill for 
several months - which everybody attributed to the workings of poison 
(which we are inclined to believe). 
The situation is "impossible" for most adat experts in CKL. For there 
are "three cocks in one ricepot" - "tigo ayam saZasuang", i.e. three 
panghuZu in one buah gadang. This shows, that (at least in contemporary 
CKL) the buah gadang is still regarded as "one". If "Ot. Bagindo" has 
to act in adat, only one of the three persons wearing the title of Ot. 
Bagindo can go. When the three Ot. Bagindo were installed in 1968, an 
agreement was drawn up in which the function of the "one Ot. Bagindo" 
was divided amongst the three newly instalied persons: A.M. Ot. Bagindo 
is the panghuZu bahindu, B. Ot. Bagindo is the panghuZu babuahparuik, 
and Z. Ot. Bagindo is the panghuZu babuahgadang. But everyone agrees 
that the "reai" Ot. Bagindo, the descendant of the original kawn of Ot. 
Bagindo in 3 Kampuang, is H. Batuah. 
Haji Batuah is aged 83 and currently living in Padang. He is the 
last kaum member and there have been discussions about his inheritance 
for several years. We heard about the problem for the first time when 
Ot. Bagindo nan Balapieh (Ot. BNE),a panungkek of A.M. Ot. Bagindo, came 
to our house in January 1975. Actually he had wanted to meet Ot. Batuah 
Raj 0, the tambang adat and chairman of the Karapatan Adat Nagari • As Ot. 
Batuah Rajo had gone out, he dropped in on us to have a chat. He had 
with him a copy of an amicable settiement, written in Dutch, which had 
to do with the property of HB. For HB had finally decided, that he, Ot. 
BNE, should be his heir. As a token of his seriousness, he had given him 
the document. In former times, HB had never wanted to give it to him, but 
now HB was old, and the document had fallen to him. If possible, he 
wanted to have it translated into Indonesian; and he knew that my wife 
was Dutch. 
HB had had a dispute with A. Koto Tinggi in 1939 about some harato 
pusako. This dispute was settled by amicable agreement by the 
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Landraad in Fort de Kock (Bukit Tinggi), rather to the disadvantage 
of HB. Dt. BNB hoped that the document, the amicable agreement, would 
mention the borders between the harato pusako of HB and A. Koto Ting-
gi, for he foresaw trouble about his inheritance, as some property of 
HB was pàwned to the kaum of A. Koto Tinggi. When the translation 
showed that no borders were mentioned in the document, but that re-
ference was made to a map which neither HB nor DT. BNB had in pos-
session, Dt. BNB' s enthusiasm over the document was blown away. He 
had become aware that it probably could be better used against him 
than to his advantage. 
The land which he was going to inheri t from HB would not be for him 
alone, but also for his kamanakan • The wife of Dt. Panghulu Raj 0, one 
of the most influential panghulu in CKL, for instance, would also get a 
share, as she was one of his kaum members. Dt. Panghulu Rajo did not 
know yet, but he wanted to inform him soon. Dt. Panghulu Rajo would come 
to our house tonight? What a chance, then he, Dt. BNB would also come 
to talk things over with him. For the inheritance of the property of HB, 
this Dt. BNB clearly foresaw, would not go without trouble. For there 
were other people in suku Sikumbang, who claimed that they were more 
closely related to HB than he was. In particular, there was Upiek, the 
younger sister of (the now deceased) A. Koto Tinggi. She and her family 
were his enemies. In 1971 he had had a court case with her. Upiek had 
won in the first instance, as she had bribed the judges, but he had ap-
pealed. But this showed what kind of people one had to reckon with. 
We had been able to study the court records before we moved to CKL 
(case 30 of 1971 PN Bukit Tinggi). The property disputed by Dt. BNB 
and Upiek in 1971 had already been the subject of a dispute between 
A. Koto Tinggi and S. Dt. Bagindo in 1943, during the Japanese occu-
pation. S. Dt. Bagindo had lost the case, which was decided by a de-
cisive oath. A. Koto Tinggi had sworn that the harato pusako in 
question belonged to his kaum (S. Dt. Bagindo had not expected that 
A. Koto Tinggi would dare to do so). The land which was in dispute 
between Upiek and Dt. BNB in 1971 , according to Upiek, was part of the pro-
perty which her brother had won in 1943. It had not been given back 
(it was located in Batu Balantai) and Dt. BNB's kaum had built a new 
rumah gadang on it. Dt. BNB had also been instalied as panungkek of 
A.M. Dt. Bagindo in this house, and no protest had come from A. Koto 
Tinggi's kaum. But in 1971 they claimed, that the property had only 
been ''borrowed'' to Dt. Bagindo and later to Dt. BNB. The elders of 
the hindu had tried to settie the case. It was decided that the dis-
puted pusako should be exchanged with a rice-field in 3 Kampuang 
which belonged to Dt. BNB's kaum and which was pawned to Upiek. How-
ever, in spite of several new meetings and discussions of the problem, 
the matter was not finally settled, and Upiek had gone to the State 
Court. 
At a later meeting in our house (4.4.75) the matter was discussed 
again, and Dt. BNB complained ab out the "justice" which one got in the 
State Courts. Judges were corrupt and let things happen which were 
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contrary to adat. In his case against Upiek, the PN had declared the judge-
ment executable, and he had indeed been forced to tear down the rumah 
gadang on the disputed harato pusako, something which could never have 
happened without the approval of the KAN, no matter who was in the right. 
Dt. panghulu Rajo confirmed this. It had been the fault of the panghulu 
(A.M. Dt. Bagindo) who "had not stood in the middle" between his disput-
ing kamanakan.Whoever was in the right in the matter, it would have been 
the task of the panghulu to decide the question of the rumah gadang. 
But obviously, Dt. Bagindo had taken sides against Dt. BNE, his own 
panungkek. 
Some days later, Dt. Batuah Rajo, the chairman of the Karapatan Adat 
Nagari, came to our house. He wanted our advice (the only case in which 
our advice was asked). He put the problem abstractly: X makes a document 
giving Y power of authority (surat kuasa) over his property. X is still 
living. The content of the document is, that Y may administer X's 
property during X's lifetime. He, as tambang adat and chairman of the 
KAN, had been asked to take cognizance (mengetahui) of the document. 
Would th ere be any reason not to do so? We cautiously ventured the 
opinion that if the problem of inheritance was not touched, and if the 
giver of authority was entitled to give authority, he probably could do 
50, and that in this case the tambangadat could probably take cognizance 
of the document as weIl. The real problem was, Dt. Batuah Rajo confided 
to us, that he already had signed the document. It was a letter of HB 
to Angku Bagindo nan Tungga, the mamak kepala waris of Dt. BNE's kaum. 
The letter had been written on official paper (atas zegel) and had been 
signed by HB, his children, the Wali Jorong (village district head) of 
3 Kampuang, and some of the distánt kamanakan of HB. Therefore he, Dt. 
Batuah Rajo, had thought it quite in order to sign the letter, too. Ad-
mittedly, A.M. Dt. Bagindo and the Wali Negeri had not signed it. 
Actually, A.M. Dt. Bagindo at first had been willing to do 50, but then 
had refused, since he "is an enemy" of Dt. BNE. And now "they" wanted 
to depose him as tambang adat, saying that with his signature under the 
document he had violated adat. He had just heard it from his father 
in Bukit Tinggi, for they had not dared to teIl him directly. Dt. Batuah 
Rajo was quite concerned: "They want to depose me, but they have no 
right to do 50. The tambang adat can only be deposed by the KAN. This 
is a matter of written law, anyway. The letter has been written on offi-
cial paper, it is valid. Everyone can give authority to other persons. 
And according to the Constitution (of the Republic) I can sign such a 
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letter". And to Dt. BNB, who had come later, he said: "If they think 
that they can depase me like that"they have erred. TeIl this to your 
friends from suku Sikurnbang and to Bandara Hi tarn" . 
Dt. Batuah Rajo did not like the case anyrnore. He had stepped into 
trouble and prepared his defence in reference to a different stand-
ard of validity: written law and the Constitution. We gat the irnpres-
sion that this statement was also a hint of the farces standing 
behind the Constitution: the governrnent adrninistration. Dt. Batuah 
Rajo as adrninistrative official in the inforrnation departrnent, was 
part of this adrninistration. 
As background inforrnation it must be known that two years ago, A.M. 
Dt. Bagindo had been deposed as tambang adat and replaced by Dt. 
Batuah Rajo. Thus A.M. Dt. Bagindo was his enerny. The change in the 
tambang adat-ship had mainly been the work of Bandara Hitarn, the 
juaro adat of Sikurnbang Tangah, one of the most influential and 
clever politicians in the nagari. 
The WaZi Negeri was also an enerny. SA was the head of the General 
Section of the KN, who had defeated Dt. Batuah Rajo's grandfather 
(FF) in a property dispute (see "The Extinct Buah Gadang"). The head 
of the Religious Section of the KN, was a close friend of the WN and 
was married to a sister of Upiek, the opponent of Dt. BNB whom Dt. 
Batuah Rajo had supported by taking cognizance of the document. 
In the meantime, Dt. BNB had received a new letter, this time from 
a child of Haji Batuah, asking to procure more money. A sawah, which 
had been pawned to a woman from suku Guci, should be "deepened" (dida-
Zami). But the woman refused, and sa one would have to redeem it (mene-
busi). But the other Sikumbang people opposed this, the kaum of A. Kata 
Tinggi and Bandara Hitarn in particular. 
Menubus,to redeem,is redernption in the name of the original holder. 
Sa if Dt. BNB redeemed the sawah, this would have meant that he acted 
as a kaum member of HB. If the other potential heirs of HB let this 
happen, the act could easily prejudice the question of who is the 
heir of HB. 
They had even held meetings now in the hindu Sikumbang Tangah, only 
to keep him, Dt. BNB, from receiving the rightful inheritance. He had 
not attended these meetings. But he had asked the advice of Dt. Panghulu 
Rajo. To make a"letter of authority"is permissible, Dt. Panghulu Rajo 
had said. Only to make him heir (kasih waris) in this document would be 
against adat. For in matters of inheritance, the ''property constitution" 
(the corian barih, Chapter 4: 146) would have to be consulted first. It 
must be ascertained who is most closely related to HB, and this would 
be in part determined by the location of their harato pusako. Dt. 
Batuah Rajo had advised Dt. BNB to write a letter to HB, asking hirn to 
decIare in writing that he, Dt. BNB, was the closest relative (kaum), 
and that he, in particular, was more closely related to hirn than was 
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Bandaro Hitam. Dt. BNB then had cal led a meeting of his kaum to decide 
upon the future strategy. For nearly all of HB's property was pawned 
and it would require a lot of money to redeem it. But still, they had 
decided to go through with the matter.(The property had been pawned for 
altogether 77 gold pupiah (pupiah emas). 1 pupiah emas was at the time 
worth ab out 30,000 pupiah. 1 kg of meat cost 700 pupiah, 1 kg of ri ce 
90 pupiah.) 
The next time we heard about the case was from Bandaro Hitam (9.6. 
1975). Yes, there was a lot of trouble again in Sikumbang Tangah, but 
he, Bandaro Hitam, had settled it all. Haji Batuah had made a letter of 
authority, in which he had invested Dt. BNB as his heir. But this was 
not proper (patut),as there were other people who we re more closely re-
lated to HB. The problem had been decided anyway already in 1956, when 
they had discussed the inheritance of HB in a large meeting. It had been 
decided that the inheritance would be a matter of the branch of the Dt. 
Bagindo in the 3 Kampuang-group only, for it and the Batu Balantai-group 
had already divided their pusako. lVithin the 3 Kampuang-group, there 
were threebranches, the descendants from three grandmothers: the one of 
Haji Batuah, the one of A.M. Dt. Bagindo,and the one of Z. Dt. Bagindo. 
Since Haji Batuah was punah, his property should be divided between A.M. 
Dt. Bagindo and Z. Dt. Bagindo. Dt. BNB was a kamanakan of A.M. Dt. Ba-
gindo and could only get a share of the property in this capacity. But 
actually - this was hinted at for the first time - Dt. BNB (his ances-
tress) was not even of the same buah gadang as Dt. Bagindo. He had only 
been fetched (diambiZ) as panungkek (some generations ago) by Dt. Bagin-
do. This had been possible, as they were saparuik. 
We asked whether it was written in the document that Dt. BNB was 
indeed invested as heir? Oh no, they would never dare to put it so 
directly. But it was written that Dt. BNB got authority "as ahZi waPis" 
(sebagai ahZi waPih) , and this could not be allowed. If it had been 
written "to take care, or to administer" (memeZihaPa atau mengupus saja) 
this would have been in order. But it was "sebagai wapih" - and, indeed, 
Dt. BNB had already acted as if he was the heir of HB. Af ter he had 
received the letter of authority from HB, he had transferred a pawning 
from a Guci-woman to someone from suku Caniago (Dt. BNB had not told us 
that). 50 he had acted as waPis, and this could not be tolerated. A.M. 
and Z. Dt. Bagindo therefore had invalidated (membataZkan) the trans-
action and the letter of authority. They had approached the WaZi Neg~Pi 
and the .waZi NegePi had after some time decided to ask him, Banda-
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ro Hitam, to look into and settIe the matter. He had then convened a 
meeting of all lineage elders of Sikumbang Tangah (of all 8 buah gadang) 
for a rrrusyCJ);)arah. Dt. BNB had been present, but had not dared to say 
anything. In the meeting it had been decided that the original decision 
taken in 1956 should be adhered t~. 
Another, and hardly less grave matter, however, Bandaro Hitam added, 
was the fact th at Dt. Batuah Rajo had signed the letter of authority. 
This was a great error in adat, but Dt. Batuah Rajo was still young (he 
was a few years older than Bandaro Hitam) and unexperienced. But he al-
ready had talked to him, and Dt. Batuah Rajo had realized his error. He 
had advised him to withdraw his signature. 
The inheritance of HB and Dt. Batuah Rajo's signature had become a 
nagari-wide political matter. When we visited Dt. Maharajo, one of the 
panghulu 7 suku,sometime later (29.6.75), it seemed that the move to 
depose Dt. Batuah Rajo had made some progress. They had organized a 
meeting of the 5 hindu in Candung (Dt. Batuah Rajo was from Koto Lawas). 
This meeting had taken place in the house of Dt. Mangkuto (who acted as 
head of the adat section of the KN). The Wali Negeri, A.M. Dt. Bagindo, 
Dt. Mangkuto and Bandaro Hitam had participated. They had already found 
a new candidate for the chairmanship of the KAN: himself, Dt. Maharajo. 
But he did not want this position, and certainly not in this way, and 
50 he had refused the invitation to the meeting. 
Dt. Maharajo's refusal to cooperate triggered off more political 
trouble. Some time ago, it had been decided that a new juaro adat 
should be instalIed in the hindu of Dt. Maharajo. The successor had 
already been selected. But now Dt. Mangkuto, who was of suku Pili 
which was part of the hindu Sikumbang Koto Ambalau, had instigated 
some of Dt. Maharajo's kamanakan to oppose the installation. Bandaro 
Hitam was, of course, behind this, too. Whereupon Dt. Maharajo 
started a carnpaign to depose Bandaro Hitam as juaro adat. The problem 
had not been settled when we left the nagari. 
According to Dt. Maharajo, Dt. Batuah Rajo had "apparently" been 
wrong in this matter. But his error was not yet clear (kesal-ahannya 
belum sempurna) as it was rumoured that he already had withdrawn his 
signature. If he had done 50 indeed, this would mean that he was not 
wrong any more (berarti dia tidak salah lagi). In our discussionwith 
Dt. Maharajo, we tried to ask some hypothetical questions with respect 
to the making of authority over harato pusako. Could one give such autho-
rity, even if it were for one's own lifetime only? No, he answered, for 
the ones who have to receive the property of Haji Batuah were, the three 
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Dt. Bagindo. (The first and only time where all three Dt. Bagindo were 
mentioned.) We again tried to frame our questions in a way that they 
should not imply any connection with future inheritance, but without 
success: In each case the property must go to the Dt. Bagindo. It must 
go to the ahZi waris. Even for a lifetime only, such authority may not 
be given (untuk hidup saja, tidak boZeh. Harus ahZi waris). Dt. BNE had 
no right at all to mix in this matter. The problem could only be solved 
by a musyawarah of the three Dt. Bagindo and Bandaro Hitam. 
Dt. Panghulu P~jo expressed a somewhat different view (21.6.1975): 
The kaum of HE was punah, the buah gadang was not. So HE was perfectly 
entitled to indicate someone (a kaum) from his buah gadang as his heir, 
e.g. Dt. BNE. This must, of course, happen with the cognizance of the 
lineage elders; without their cognizance it could not be done. However, 
they could not do anything against it, they were forced to consent to 
this (terpaksa setuju). 
This was the last that we heard about the property of Haji Batuah. 
The case had come to a preliminary end, and Dt. BNE had obviously lost 
the first round. But the problem will be resuscitated when HE dies, and 
there will be a lot of trouble and most probably the case will go to 
court. Only then will Dt. BNE know what his letter of authority is worth. 
Discussion: 
As an example of property and inheritance polities the story speaks for 
itself. Only two brief comments must be made: 
1. The story illustrat5well how the principle that the panghuZu must 
take cognizance works in practice. Clearly, A.M. and Z. Dt. Bagindo 
"knew" about the letter of authority. But that was not sufficient, they 
had to take approving cognizance, and they were not willing to do so 
(yet). The importanee is also shown by Dt. Batuah Rajo's signature as he 
only could acknowledge the letter without having to "consent" to it. 
Yet his signature was taken very seriously, so seriously that his oppo-
nents in nagari polities could at least construct aplausible reason 
for his deposal(as tambang adat. Taking cognizance, here meant an im-
permissible validation of the letter by the highest adat functionary; 
impermissible, as the validation could only be given aft er the panghuZu 
had taken cognizance. Without their approval, the letter "could not" be 
valid in adat. On the other hand, the Dt. Bagindo just had to take cog-
nizance, for HE couZd invest Dt. BNE as his heir. 
1HE FULFlIMENf OF TIIE FUNcrION 249 
But the social processes by which it lastly is determined whether it 
was right of the three Dt. Bagindo to withhold their acknowledgement, or 
whether i t was wrong that Dt. Batuah Raj 0 signed the letter, do not 
function successfully any more in the nagari. In the higher foTUm6 of 
decision making, the State Courts, these processes cannot be reproduced. 
The evaluation of validity in adat therefore more and more becomes a 
matter of the political life: the one wielding most power for the time 
being will be the one who is right - for the time being. 
2. The case also illustrates how individual and group autonomy over 
harato pusako is restricted. HE was punah, and in this situation 
he was quite free to dispose of his property. He had pawned nearly all 
his kaum's harato pusako quite unimpeded by the other kaum of Dt. Bagin-
do. But the transactions he had carried out were temporary in character, 
and they did not prejudice the question of his inheritance. If he had 
transferred the pawning from the Guci-woman to the people from Caniago, 
nobody would have cared - for the transaction would not have lost its 
ternporary character. The letter of authority was given to Dt. BNB only 
for the lifetime of HE - it was to have a temporary character, too, but 
that was not accepted. The letter was immediately drawn into "di achrony " , 
into the dimension of inheritance, by all concerned, including Dt. BNB, 
and it was subjected to all restrictions that pertain to a transaction 
which is to have the character of a definite diachronic transfer of pro-
perty relationships. Whatever Dt. BNB did, even during the lifetime of 
HB when he could not yet - in our understanding - be considered his heir, 
e.g. the transfer of the gadai, was not considered valid, as it would 
have shown Dt. BNB as heir in the adat conceptualization of inheritance. 
3. The Inter-Kaum Pawning Case 
Inter-kaum disputes of ten center around pawnings. If some time has 
elapsed since the original transaction and if the original witnesses 
have died, it frequently happens that the members of the original pawnee's 
kaum claim the harato in question as their own harato pusako turun temu-
run. The pawner or his descendants then have to prove that the property 
indeed had been pawned. This is rather easy when the parties belong to 
different suku, for it will be difficult for Guci people to maintain, 
say, that a rice-field surrounded by fields belonging to suku 
Sikumbang people, is their harato pusako turun temurun. But it is diffi-
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cult to prove if the parties belong to the same suku or even to the 
same buah gadang. 
The following case arose in the buah gadang of Dt. Bagindo - and we 
meet with familiar faces again. The contending mamak kepaZa waris were 
Bagindo Hitam, the w.1ZS of Bandaro Hitam and then (1961) juaro adat of 
hindu Sikumbang Tangah, and Angku Bagindo , the elder brother of Dt. Raj 0, 
one of the panungkek of (the then still living) H. Dt. Bagindo of the 
Batu Balantai-group. 
A, Bagindo had wanted to redeem a rice-field, which had been pawned 
(50 he said) by his granduncle (MME) to the granduncle (MME) of Bagindo 
Hitam. Bagindo Hitam had apparently (this is based upon information from 
Dt. BNE) at first acknowledged the right of A .. Bagindo in principle, 
but the parties had failed to come to an agreement over the redemption 
sumo Bagindo Hitam had demanded 12 rupiah emas, A. Bagindo had offered 
only 4 rupiah emas. The efforts to settIe the case in the nagari proved 
a failure, and A. Bagindo took the case to the State Court. He feIt 
optimistic, for he had as evidence the pawning register which had been 
kept by the Tuangku Laras of Candung during the years 1873-1897. The 
entry for July 29, 1887 was the following: 
"At this time there have come three men. One is Tapa Dt. Bag indo , suku 
S., negeri and Laras Candung, who lives in Batu Balantai, and the name 
of the second is si Buruk gala Bandaro nan Panjang, suku, negeri, and 
Zaras and residence as before; and another man named Idris gala Sutan 
Bandaro suku Sikumbang, negeri, and Zaras Candung, who li ves in Candung 
(3 Kampung). They have come here to decIare that they have pawned sawah, 
eleven piring, situated in Ladang Lawas, which bring a harvest of 25 
sumpit, and this is pawned for 500 rupiah. The one who is pawner (yang 
menggadaikan) is Dt. Bagindo, the one who is pawnee (yang memagang) is 
Sutan Bandaro. It is their agreement that if the sawah is to be redeemed 
(batahuran) this must be done with 500 rupiah, too. They have made this 
agreement before two witnesses, and these are also signing the 
letter 50 that the state of things may be clear". 
The names and the titles of the parties and the witnesses are written, 
and the signatures consist of a cross. 4 
Besides this document A. Bagindo submitted two genealogies as evi-
dence. According to the genealogy of his kaum, he was the ZDS of Tapa 
Dt. Bagindo, and this was not disputed by his opponents. According to 
his genealogy of the defendants' kaum, Bagindo Hi tam was the son 'of 
Rasiah, who was the daughter of Rasimah, the sister of the Idris St. 
Bandaro mentioned in the entry in the register. The defendants, however, 
claimed that the land in dispute was their harato pusako turun temurun. 
The land mentioned in the pawning register was not the land in dispute 
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at all. Besides, there had never been an I. St. Bandara in their kaum, 
and the alleged pawning had thus not been with their kaum at all. 
Witnesses were heard. Two witnesses, among them H. Dt. Bagindo, the 
panghuZu of the plaintiff, confirmed that indeed I. St. Bandaro and 
Rasimah had been siblings. But to whom the property actually belonged, 
they unfortunately did not know. Two other witnesses, old men from suku 
Sikumbang who lived in 3 Kampuang, stated that they had never known or 
heard of a St. Bandara. 
The PN (case 36 of 1961 PN Bukit Tinggi) rejected the claim. The 
plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven that the disputed sawah was in-
deed the sawah which had been pawned in 1887. Besides, the pawning re-
gister was na real evidence, as the parties had only made crosses and 
not given their own signatures. 
What had happened? According to the information given by Dt. BNB, 
A. Bagindo should have won the case. For Bagindo Hitam had originally 
acknowledged that the sawah belonged to A. Bagindo's kaum. The witnesses, 
toa, had been prepared to give evidence in favour of A. Bagindo. But in 
court, Dt. BNB concluded, the witnesses '~ad suddenly sat beside Bagindo 
Hi tam". The reason for this was obvious to him: Money. 
When we started to discuss this case with Bandaro Hitam, the MZDS of 
Bagindo Hitam and his successor as juaro adat, it seemed at first that 
we would not get much information from him. Bandaro Hitam remembered the 
case quite differently: Yes, there had been a surat gadai in this matter, 
and if he remembered correctly, it had been handed in by Bagindo Hitam 
as evidence th at he had already redeemed the sawah in question. For you 
must know, he instructed us, if you pay back the money, you also get the 
letter back, and the chairman of the PN wanted to see some evidence that 
the sawah really belonged to our kaum. Originally, the sawah had been 
pawned to people of suku Guci, if he remembered correctly ..• and his 
voice trailed off. But we had gotten quite weIl acquainted with Bandara 
Hitam. Mter some time he gave us more confidence and warmed up." Yes, 
i t was A. Bagindo who had claimed that i t was his sawah. And Hasan Dt. 
Bagindo, it is true, had also stated that the sawah was the harato pusa-
ko of A. Bagindo. But we said that the sawah belonged to Bagindo 
Hitam (to our kaum). Said Hasan:'It belongs to A. Bagindo'. Said my 
mamak: 'No, these are not the harato of A. Bagindo. A. Bagindo's pusako 
are still under the control of Hasan Dt. Bagindo - ahhhitu!' Now Hasan 
was not stupid, for he had been a prokroZ (unofficial advocate managing 
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court affairs for villagers). When he heard this, he changed his mind 
and said that the property belonged to us, indeed. That is how it was 
at the time". 
With the latter remark, Bandaro Hitam implied that A. Bagindo may turn 
against H. Dt. Bagindo and demand more property from him, and that 
it might be wis er for H. Dt. Bagindo to side with Bagindo Hitam in 
order to have an ally if this should indeed happen. The expression 
"ahhitu", "ah, that", or "ah, there you see" is made when the speaker 
has made a point. The point in question was the cleverness of Bagin-
do Hitam, that he had made H. Dt. Bagindo aware of the implications 
of his statement. 
"And when the pengadiZan inquired about our genealogy, and who Ba-
gindo Hitam's mother was, Hasan answered: 'Rasimah'. Said my mamak: 'No. 
Her name is Dasimah' (thus a different woman). He said 50 in order to 
be quicker than Hasan, to invalidate and to turn around his statement 
(untuk mencepàtkan dan membataZkan dan mcmuta~). Said Hasan: 'Rasimah'. 
But my mamak was even quicker: 'Dasimah, not Rasimah'. In order to in-
validate Hasan's information. For if the information was not invalidated, 
then we might have lost the case. This is the basic principle in dis-
putes: The information of the opponent must be immediately invalidated. 
Even if it is true it must be contradicted straight away. This is a 
tactic of the dispute ... haaah. In the Karapatan Nagari, this cannot 
be done, but in the State Court it may (can) be done. For if it is not 
invalidated, it is a sign that the information is true, and we lose. 
(Mamak saya Zebih cepat Zagi. Dasimah, tidak Rasimah. Haah. Untuk mem-
bataZkan kete~angan Hasan Dt. B. KaZau tidak dibataZkan, nanti kita 
kaZah. pokoknya keterangan Zawan bataZ terus. WaZaupun betuZ, bataZkan 
terus. Ini taktik perkara, haaah. KaZau di KAN, tidak bisa. KaZau di 
PengadiZan, boZeh. KaZau tidak dibataZkan, tanda betuZ keterangannya: 
kita kaZah). " 
This way, A. Bagindo's claim was defeated, as the court was not sure 
whether there were genealogical relationships indeed between Bagindo 
Hitam and the St. Bandaro mentioned in the document. The kaum of Bagindo 
Hitam had got "its" sawah. 
However, the problems concerning the sawah did not stop. ~Vhen Bagindo 
Hitam had died there was trouble again, but this time within his kaum. 
The fields only "belonged" to Bagindo Hitam as he had "redeemed" them. 
When he had died, the harato were taken by Bagindo Putih, the MyZS of 
Bandaro Hitam, and Bagindo Putih did not want to share the property 
with the jurai of Bandaro Hitam. The matter was first discussed in the 
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suku, and people thought that Bandaro Hitam was right to claim half of 
the property for his jurai. But Bagindo Putih did not accept this. So 
Bandaro Hitam went to the WaZi Negeri, who also said that he was right: 
The property must be divided between the descendants of the two mothers 
in the kaum. Finally the dispute was ended by the Camat. Since 1974 the 
fields have been divided, and Bandaro Hitam has had his right. He him-
self uses the fields as sawah niniek mamak, as "his own" sawah which is 
allotted to him for his expenses as juaro adat. It is usually worked 
by one of his wives. 
When he had had the trouble with Bagindo Putih, the WaZi Negeri had 
"taken care" of the harvest which was in dispute, too. Af ter Bandaro 
Hitam had won his case, the WaZi Negeri did not want to return the 
harvest. So Bandaro Hitam went to the Police who came to Candung to 
settIe the matter, and the WaZi Negeri had to return the rice. He did 
not want to and said that he did not know where the rice was af ter such 
a long time. But Bandaro Hitam had said: "If the mice have eaten it, 
please show me the ashes (abu) as proof. Ahhhi tu!" 
111. 1HE EXTINCT BUAH GADANG 
When buah gadang become extinct, most of their harato pusako has already 
been pawned by the last group member(s). Their autonomy over their hara-
to pusako is generally recognized, as there are no more persons who are 
"of one common pusako". The last members of a buah gadang can also adopt 
other people as their heirs much easier than in cases where kaum become 
extinct. In particular, they can adopt their baZahan, persons who in 
former times had belonged to their group and had moved to a different 
nagari later. But even if most pusako has been pawned, the inheritance 
of a buah gadang is still of considerable economic interest, as there 
is always the right to redeem or to transfer the pawnings. Besides, if 
one is at least saparuik with the extinct buah gadang, one has a good 
chance to acquire its gaZa sako. But the best strategy to becorne heir 
to a buah gadang is, of course, to claim that oneself or one's kaum is 
a member of the buah gadang, and that there is no problem of inter-
buah gadang inheritance at all, but just of inheritance between kaum 
which are still saharato sapusako - of one pusako property. The easiest 
way is to oppose transactio~ which are carried out by the last buah 
gadang members on the ground that one I s consent had not been asked 
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although one is of the same buah gadang. Such claims are facilitated by 
the partly untraceable relationships between the kaum and buah gadang, 
in particular between groups where no panghuZu has been instalIed for 
generations . aften, panghuZu A has represented ''his'' kamanakan of buah 
gadang B in adat, as B has no instalIed panghuZu. If buah gadang A be-
comes extinct, the group members of B may "remember" very well that A 
was "their" panghuZu, too. Although it is aften nearly impossible to as-
certain who the closest group of relatives of an extinct group is, there 
are criteria by which the reliability of claims can be tested. This will 
also be illustrated in the following story,which tells about the buah 
gadang of Dt. Tuah and the problems connected with the inheritance of 
its harato pusako. 
The buah gadang of Dt. Tuah, suku Guci in the hindu Guci Tangah, to 
all appearances was nearly extinct. The last Dt. Tuah, who had been 
married in Lasi, the neighbouring nagari, and who died there, had not 
been replaced. Af ter his death, only two brothers were left in his jurai, 
Haji Barudin and St. Pangeran. Haji Barudin had died recently, too, and 
now St. Pangeran, aged 72, was the last member of the buah gadang. He 
was a rich man, for Dt. Tuah had belonged to the 60 original panghuZu 
who founded CKL, and the first Dt. Tuah (now there were 4 buah gadang) 
had been one of the panghuZu ? suku. St. Pangeran was a very well known 
but controversial figure in CKL. He took an active part in nagari politics, 
and acted as chairman of the General Section of the KN. According to 
his friends, he was a great adat expert, and in conversation - with us 
or in adat atmosphere - he was an inexhaustible source of adat sayings, 
for which he was greatly admired. According to others, he was not a 
"good CKL-man": He was 72 years old, yet he "behaved like a young man". 
He dyed his hair black, and liked to attend pig-hunts with his two ex-
pensive hunting dogs. He had been the first one (or the first one re-
membered) to break the rule of nagari-endogamy, for which he was duly 
punished at the time. St. pangeran was quite aware of the fact that 
many people did not like him, and he took his precautions. When he was 
ill, he went to the medical assistant to get same pilIs. Of course, the 
native doctor (dukun) could have helped him better, but he probably 
would be bribed by his enemies to poison him. The problem of his inheri-
tance was a matter of great concern in CKL. St. Pangeran himself lived 
very modestly in CKL. He had pawned most of his buah gadang's property, 
and also had sold some fields, and he had transferred most of his capital 
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to his wives and children. But he had not yet made final arrangements 
about the inheritance. He had shielded all criticisms off by saying 
that he had kamanakan in nagaPi B. in district 50 Koto, who were a bala-
han of his, and he thus apparently would not even leave the property 
which was left to the related Guci people in CKL. 
But the thing with the balahan was a dubious affair for most villa-
gers, and there were only a few who believed him. The inheritance of 
St. pangeran became problematic, when one Hassan Angku M.Ido from 
suku Guci Tangah claimed, that he was actually a kamanakan of Dt. 
Tuah, too, and that St. Pangeran had no right to sell or pawn harato 
pusako without his consent. This finally developed into a court case, 
which will be reported presently. But before the case went to court, 
there had been an attempt to settle the matter in the KAN, where the 
problem of the balahan had also been discussed. 
As a matter of adat, St. Pangeran had, of course, the right to.adopt 
his balahan. Dt. Maharajo and Dt. Panghulu Rajo explained to us, what 
procedure would have to be followed in this case: If St. Pangeran had 
a balahan indeed in 50 Koto, and if his buah gadang was indeed extinct, 
he could transfer his harato pusako to them. But the balahan must be 
true kamanakan, i. e. kamanakan batali darah of the ancestor who in 
former times had been a kamanakan of Dt. Tuah. These kamanakan then 
would have to move to CKL. For "pusako cannot move" (pusako indak bulieh 
pindah). The balahan must be accepted as heirs (dionjokkan dan memper-
lihatkan sepertiahli waPis) in a formal ceremony which must be val ida-
ted by "CKL", i. e. by the 12 hindu. If St. pangeran wanted to adopt his 
balahan he would have to notify the juaro adat of his hindu. The juaro 
would then report to the tambang adat. The tambang adat would discuss 
the matter with the other panghulu of suku Guci. If they consented, the 
matter would be brought to the notice of the nagaPi - in a meeting of 
the 12 hindu. If CKL also consented, the ceremony would be held in the 
rumah gadang of St. Pangeran. St. Pangeran would only have to care for 
the provision of the ceremonial meal, the organization of the ceremony 
would be in the hands of the juaro adat. 
But when the question of the balahan was discussed in the KAN, the 
panghulu still had many doubts. Particularly, Dt. Panghulu Rajo had 
questioned St. Pangeran "in a way that he did not dare to eat or to 
drink" (this was told by Dt. Panghulu Raj 0 himself) : 
Q: ''What are your connections with the people in nagaPi B.?" 
A: "They are my ba lahan" • 
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Q: ''What is the title of their panghuZu?" 
A: "Dt. Bas a" . 
Q: "Is there no Dt. Tuah or Dt. Tuah Basa?" 
A: ''No''. 
Q: ''Where is their harato pusako in CKL? Do they have harato pusako in 
CKL? " 
A: ''No''. 
"So, you see", Dt. Panghulu Raj 0 concluded, ''he had no proof at all 
that he really had a baZahan in nagari B. If the panghuZu of his alleged 
baZahanhad been a Dt. Tuah or Dt. Tuah Basa, it would be rather obvious 
that they were a baZahan of Dt. Tuah in. CKL, indeed. But with a Dt. Basa 
- where is the connection? And if they were a real baZahan, there should 
still be some s(]};)ah pusako of them in CKL". 
In the KAN meeting, St~ Pangeran had neither accepted any other moda-
lities for the inheritance of his property which hwi been indicated by 
the panghuZu. He did not want to make sando agung: to give his property 
to his children. Af ter their death, it would then fall back to the suku. 
Neither did he want to make sando kudo: to pawn (gadai) it to his chil-
dren. And he also did not accept the last possibility mentioned by Dt. 
Panghulu Rajo: "Tuan St. Pangeran boZeh bagundik ka urang Guci - St. Pan-
geran, you may take a concubine from Guci. Choose a woman and marry her". 
As the exogamy prohibition would be violated, a ceremony would have to 
be held and St. Pangeran would have to slaughter a buffalo for the cere-
monial meal. But the breach of exogamy would be healed by the ceremonial 
meal and the marriage would be validated by CKL. The harato pusako thus 
could be saved for suku Guci. But St. Pangeran did not want this. On the 
contrary, shortly aftelwards he married a young woman from suku Caniago. 
And then there was still the problem of Angku Mudo,who claimed to be 
a kamanakan of Dt. Tuah. In the KAN they had not been able to settIe this 
question, and Angku Mudo had brought the case to the State Court. His 
mamak, Angku T., he claimed, had controlled the s(]};)ah in dispute and had 
always taken its harvest. But af ter Angku T's death, St. Pangeran had 
sold the s(]};)ah to KB from suku Selayan. But he could not do '50: For he, 
Angku Mudo, and St. Pangeran were of two jura i in the same kaum. Between 
the two jurai there had never been a distribution of the harato pusako 
in the IDallller of ganggam bauntuek, the property had just been used to-
gether (beZum pernah diZakukan pembahagian terhadap harta hutan tinggi 
secara ganggam bauntuek masing2 jurai atau anggota kaum Zainnya, meZain-
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kan dimiliki secara bersama2 saja dalam kaum). As the property which 
had been sold was harato pusako turun temurun in their kaum, he claimed 
that the sale was void and that the property should be returned to the 
kaum. 
According to St. Pangeran, Angku Mudo and he were not sakaum saharato 
sapusako. His own panghulu was Dt. Tuah. The panghulu of Angku Mudo was 
Dt. Panghulu Ali. His own graveyard was in J., the one of Angku Mudo in 
1.L. They were of different rumah gadang, too. The pusako of Angku Mudo 
had no corrnnon borders with his. Angku Mudo had never participated as 
waris in pawning transactions. Finally, if St. Pangeran should die, his 
closest heir would be St. Rangkayo, not Angku ~fudo. The second defendant, 
the buyer of the property, stated that it was true that he had bought 
the sawah. This had been in 1962, and he had bought it from H. Barudin, 
the elder brother of St. Pangeran, with the consent of Dt. Tuah who then 
was still alive. 
Witnesses were heard: Some gave very vague statements: They '~ad 
heard" that the parties were sekaum or sesuku. Another witness stated 
that,when he had married a kamanakan of Angku Mudo,Dt. Tuah had acted 
as adat guardian (wali adat) for his wife. But according to another 
witness, an adat expert from CKL, this did not mean that Angku Mudo was 
a waris of Dt. Tuah. For according to the marriage law, one must have 
the consent of the panghulu for the marriage. As the panghulu of Angku ~Wo 
was not instalIed, Dt. Tuah had taken his place. Thus if Dt. Tuah had 
acted as adat guardian, one must very weIl differentiate whether he had 
done 50 in his buah gadang or in the suku Guci in general. There were 
other points which had to be weighed carefully: All Guci nan 4, (the 
four buah gadang Dt. Tuah and the other buah gadang, including Dt. Pang-
hulu Ali) had, in the colonial era, ''paid the debts of Dt. Tuah". I.e., 
they were people 'who payed debts together, and who received outs tanding 
debts together" (utang samo dibaie, piutang samo ditarimo). But according 
to the same expert, this did not necessarily mean that they all were 
waris. For the maxim: "mamak dipintu utang, kamanakan dipintu bayaran" -
"If the mamak stands at the door of debts, the kamanakan stand at the 
door of the paying", was valid in the whole suku: If the kaum of Angku 
Mudo had contributed to the payment of the debts, this did not mean that 
he was a waris. 
Another incident, however, was considered to be much more important: 
Two witnesses declared that Angku Mudo had, af ter Dt. Tuah had died in 
Lasi, ''brought the mattress" to Lasi in order to fetch the corpse of Dt. 
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Tuah to his rumah gadang and to carry out the mati batungkek budhi-pang-
hulu installation. But this had failed. (Kaum Penggugat ada membawa 
kasur ke Lasi guna mejemput mayat H. Dt. Tuah tetapi kasur tersebut 
tidak dipakai, dan begitu juga usaha penggugat untuk membawa mayatnya 
kerumah penggugat untUk melakukan batungkek budi gala Dt. Tuah ti dak 
berhasil). This was a clear sign that Angku Mudo and Dt. Tuah were not 
of one kaum. For even if Angku Mudo had not succeeded in bringing the 
corpse of Dt. Tuah to his house, he would have had to be successful in 
his at tempt to succeed Dt. Tuah if he really had been of one kaum with 
Dt. Tuah and St. Pangeran. If the latter had opposed the succes-
sion, his opposition could have been overridden by a decision of the 
Guci nan 4 or the KAN. 
The Court rejected Angku Mudo's claim. It accepted that Dt. Tuah was 
the panghulu of St. Pangeran (which was undisputed) and that Dt. Panghulu 
Ali was the panghulu of Angku Mudo. This alone already showed, that Angku 
Mudo and St. Pangeran were not of one kaum anymore (tidak sekaum lagi) , 
as it is impossible "that two cocks are within one ricepot" (karena 
tidak mungkin dua ekor ayam gadang selasung); that there are two pang-
hulu within one kaum. Another point was that the mattre.ss had not been 
used. "For the mattress which is sent to fetch the corpse rust be used 
if the deceased is a close kamanakan, a member of our kaum". 
Discussion: 
We should note the different uses of the terms denoting the groups; of 
jurai, kaum and buah gadang. The court consistently spe aks of kaum, and 
the parties adapt their arguments partly to that usage. But it is quite 
clear, that what the court understands under "kaum" is a buah gadang in 
CKL, not the group which is called kaum in CKL. The statement that there 
cannot be two panghulu in one kaum, would be senseless in reference to 
a CKL kaum, i t only makes sense to a group under a panghulu, which in 
CKL is the buah gadang. 
St. Pangeran could thus successfully establish in court that his buah 
gadang was extinct and that Angku Hudo could not prevent him from dis-
posing of the property. In fact, St. Pangeran had not done anything -
it had been his elder brother who had sold the sawah. What will happen 
af ter St. Pangeran's death is still open. If he does not adopt his 
balahan, the other Guci nan 4 will inherit his property. Who exactly 
will get it, is uncertain. It is a matter for the other three buah gadang 
of Dt. Tuah to handle; they must discuss this question. 
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It is extremely difficult to get information about property relation-
ships between individuals or groups which belong to the different social 
strata within the same buah gadang or kaum. Or rather, it is very easy 
to get abstract elaborations of the adat in this matter, on the classi-
fication of the kamanakan, on their respective rights and duties, etc. 
But it is difficult to have these illustrated by concrete examples in 
which these relationships have become relevant. For "one does not speak 
about it". Referring to living persons or groups as the descendants of 
former strangers or slaves, is impolite and insulting. It would make the 
pers ons referred to maZu, ashamed, and it is one of the basic principles 
of adat morality that one may not make other people ashamed, 'maZu indak 
buZieh diagieh". What is a likeable trait of adat makes things difficult 
for the anthropologist who, though willing to conform to the adat and 
its forms of politeness, is nevertheless very much interested in such 
"unpleasant things". The degree to which he is told about i t depends very 
much on chance and on how far he is trusted; trusted that he will not 
teIl others what one has told him. If information is given at all, it 
is usually clothed in subtIe hints and allusions the understanding of 
which of ten presupposes the knowledge which the hints contain. This bar-
rier is quite strict for discussions of the status of the orang datang, 
strangers, and it is very strict for the status of the descendants of 
farmer slaves. If the relationships between the strata are good, and if 
the legal cansequences of the relationships are not questioned, then the 
status differences will generally be explicitly denied. But sometimes, 
references to the lawer status of others must be made: when there is 
trouble about property. In emotionally heated discussions, the threshold 
of maZu is more easily crossed; and it has to be crossed when the legal 
cansequences of the inter-strata relationships have become problematic. 
1. The Deseendants of SZaves and Their Mamak 
Problems between the kamanakan bataZi darah, the blood relatives of the 
group ancestress, and w~eir kamanakan dibawa Zutuik arise when the lat-
ter do not acknowledge their duties towards their former masters or 
asSlD1\e the same rights as the kamanakan bataZi darah. The following 
story tells of such "impudent" kamanakan. It was extracted from AB 11: 
74 ff. and took place in the nagari Selayo in the beginning of this 
century: 
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On December 3rd 1901, I. gala Raja Kecil Besar (RKB) instituted pro-
ceedings before the Rapat of the Tuangku Laras against his kamanakan 
dib(7J;)a lutuik under their mamak, Muara gala Bagindo nan Hitam (BN!-!). The 
kamanakan of BNH were the descendants of a female slave whom the ~ of 
the plaintiff had bought. The conflict concerned the harato pusako which 
had been given to the defendants for their living. RKB complained, that 
the kamanakan dib(7J;)a lutuik denied their (slave- )descent and claimed 
equal right to the harta tua of his lineage, and that they had allowed 
themselves acts which were the privilege of owners whereby the danger 
had arisen that the property would be lost to the family (the kamanai"n 
had pawned the property). He had therefore demanded that the property 
should be returned to him. If the kamanakan dib(7J;)a lutuik stopped their 
disrespectful attitude, they would, of course, be given s(7J;)ah again. 
The Rapat of the Tuangku Laras endorsed RKB's claim (10.12.1901). 
The defendants, however, did not comply with the judgement. So the plain-
tiffs invoked the authority of the Dutch district officer (Assistent 
Resident, AR). The AR also endorsed the judgement and ordered its 
execution by the police. The defendants did not appeal the judgement 
but adopted another strategy: They made an application to the AR, asking 
that the adat functionaries should be orde red to grant them some part 
of the nagari's tanah ulayat in ownership (eigendom; what probably was 
meant was to give them their own harato pusako). When the AR refused to 
do 50, they made an official petition to the Governor General of the 
Dutch East Indies: The Government, which had freed them as slaves, should 
also give them some land in the nagari. The AR advised against such a 
measure. He remarked, that the kamanakan dib(7J;)a lutuik could not break 
the bonds that tied them to their mamak, even if they had been freed 
as slaves. And it would be contrary to adat, if they we re given tanah 
ulayat by the government. 
The ensuing debate between the Dutch administrative officials illus-
trates weIl the reality of socio-political control over ulayat property 
in the West Sumatran nagari as weIl as the position of the mamak vis-à-
vis his kamanakan dib(7J;)a lutuik. The highest judicial functionary of the 
Colony, the Directeur van Justitie in Batavia (Jakarta) expressed his 
view in a letter to the Governor of West Sumatra (8.12.1903) in which 
he disapproved of the attitude taken by the AR: 
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1. If the AR had stated that a grant of the tanah ulayat was contrary 
to adat, this was a very incorrect view of the problem. For the tanah 
ulayat feIl under the Domeinverklaring of 1874, according to which all 
land not held in eigendom had been declared the domain of the State. 
If the rights of the panghulu were to be recognized at all, they were 
in any case subject to the rights of the Government flowing from the 
Domain-Declaration. Perhaps a grant of eigendom could not be given, but 
a grant of heritable lease (erfpacht) should certainly be possible. If 
in the nagari there was no more tanah ulayat, then one could find some 
in the neighbouring nagari. 
2. The request should in any case be favourably received. For the Govern-
ment had abolished slavery, and what would remain of the new freedom, 
if the descendants of slaves continued to be economically dependent on 
their former masters? Would they not be completely subject to the whims 
and the grace of their masters? The petitioners wanted to be free, to 
be free completely, and yet there were Dutch administrative officials 
like the AR who insisted that the abolition of slavery could never break 
the relationships between slaves and their former masters! The Govern-
ment should support the rights of the former slaves as much as possible. 
The Directeur van Justitie concluded that it would be most appropriate if 
the petitioners would be granted some ulayat land, either in eigendom 
or in erfpacht. 
The AR andtheResident of the Padang Highlands contradicted his view 
and elaborated the adat-position in their reports to the Governor (AR 
to Resident 16.1.1904, Resident to Governor of West Sumatra 3.2.1904). 
They advised that the petition should be rejected: 
1. In adat, the panghulu as representatives of their families had the 
hak ulayat (beschikkingsrecht). This was, of course, contrary to the 
Domain-Declaration, which had transferred the right to dispose of ulayat 
land to the Government. But the Domain-Declaration had been brought as 
little as possible to the attention of the adat functionaries, and the 
Government itself had wisely never pressed the enforcement of the Domain-
Declaration in West Sumatra. That had been a wise policy, and it certain-
ly should be adhered to in cases of this kind. Besides, the Government 
itself did not completely comply to the rules of the Domain-Declaration. 
For there had been a regulation for West Sumatra tha~ if a parcel of the 
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ulayat were to be granted, this should be done only af ter consultation 
with the population, and that the grantee should, as a sign of the re-
cognition of the panghulu's rights, pay him the bunga kayu-fee (see 
Chapter 4: 143 ). The administrative officials had even been prohibited 
from registering agrant if the demanded fee had not been received by 
the ones entitled to it (AB 11: 88). One should therefore consider the 
following: If property was given to the petitioners of family A, next 
would come the kamanakan dibawa lutuik of family B and C etc. One would 
have to realize further, that all these kamanakan would be persons who 
had broken the relationships wi th "their" families and who would conse-
quently have been expulsed from their families and from adat - what 
would their position be in the nagari? And the panghulu, who highly 
valued their right to the fees, would certainly not be willing to accept 
it from "such people" who stood outside adat. If the Government were to 
disregard all these factors, the consequences would be unforseeable ... 
2. Both officials also pointed out that, though the abolition of slavery 
did set people free, it could not do away with the mamak~amanakan 
relationship. As one could not become a slave in one's own nagari, all 
descendants of former slaves were, in addition, also strangers in the 
nagari. If they were willing to stay in the nagari af ter their freedom, 
they had to be accepted as kamanakan by one of the lineages. Once 
adopted, they would be given property for their living, but this property 
would always remain the harato pusako of their mamak's lineage. Strangers 
could be given some harta tua, original harato pusako, when their 
mamak's lineage was extinct, but kamanakan dibawa lutuik could never 
inherit such property or the sako of their mamak (AB 11: 82). 
Thus if the relationships between the mamak and the kamanakan dibawa 
lutuik were broken, at the same time the le!!itimation on which the 
latter possessed the property would vanish, for their kamanakan status 
was their only legitimation to property in the nagari. 
The status of kamanakan dibawa lutuik was in some respects, not so 
different from the status of kamanakan batali darah. These, too, owed 
obedience and respect to their mamak. and they, too, could be expelled 
from their family and could be deprived of their harato pusako (dibuang) 
if they persistently behaved disrespectfully towards their mamak. The res-
pect which BNH and his kaum members owed to RKB was due to their position 
as kamanakan. not as kamanakan dibawa lutuik. (NB: The officials here 
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forget that the kamanakan (batati darah) become mamak themselves in 
time, whereas the kamanakan dibC1J.,)a tutuik remain kamanakan for ever.) 
Their petition should therefore be rejected. 
And i t was rej ected by the Govemor General of the Colony on the 
bas is of these advisory opinions. By Decree of 24.6.1904 it was decided 
that: "taking into consideration that the petitioners would be given 
enough property for their living by their mamak, if they behaved ac-
cording to adat, there was no reason for the Government to take any 
measures in the case". 
2. The Desaendants of Strangers 
It is difficult, for the reasons already stated, to assess the extent 
to which, in contemporary Minangkabau, status differences and their 
legal consequences in property affairs are still observed. In theory 
(which is derived from interviews) nothing has changed. But there are 
only a few cases in which the inter-strata relationships and their legal 
consequences do become relevant in a dispute. The following case, which 
was decided by the PN Batu Sangkar in 1970 (case 1 of 1970) is an 
indication that the courts still recognize the status differences. 
The plaintiff, one Dt. Tan Maj 0 Lelo (TML), claimed that the ti tle 
wom by the defendant, Dt. Maminjun (M), was the title of his kaum. 
When his mamak was still alive, the title and some harato pusako of his 
kaum had been "borrowed" by the defendant's kaum. Now he reclaimed both 
ti tIe and property. The defendant denied this and replied that both 
title and property were turun temurun in his kaum, and that Dt. TML had 
the status of stranger (orang datang) in his lineage and therefore no 
rights at all to the pusako and sako. 
During the process, the following document was introduced as evidence. 
It was a "MusYC1J.,)arah Decision Letter" (surat keputusan kebutatan) of the 
lineage elders of the suku of both parties: 
We, the ninik mamak of suku X nagari X, 
1. Having considered: 
a. The results of the MLJBES of all West Sumatra of 1966, 
b. The results of the Decision of the Kerapatan Adat Nagari X about 
the termination of the panhutuship in adat of Dt. M, 
2. Having read the MusyC1J.,)arah Decision Letter of the kaum of Dt. TML, 
3. Taking into consideration the genealogy which has been forwarded by 
Dt. TML, herewi th decide: 
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The gala which is used by B. Dt. M. is transferred (memindahkan) 
to B. Dt. 1ML, and the gala Dt. 1ML is transferred to si L. 
Signed: We, the ninik mamak of suku X. 
1. Dt. BNH. 2. Dt. BNK. 
According to this document, the title of Dt. M. had been transferred 
to the plaintiff 4 years ago. Why then did he claim? It seems that the 
transfer had not worked. B. Dt. M. had continued to use the title and 
to exercise the function of panghuZu. So the plaintiff tried a new course 
of action. In his argumentation, he did not rely on the document just 
quoted, for from the document one would rather infer that the defendant 
was the real Dt. M. And he also did not seem to have much faith in the 
validity of the transfer. Why, is illuminated by a document which was 
introduced as evidence by the defendant: A letter of Dt. BNK, one of 
the signatories of the 1966-document: 
'Herewith I decIare that I withdraw my signature under the letter which 
is called Musy(J);)arah Decision Letter of the Ninik Mamak of suku X. I do 
50 for the following reasons: 
1. What is cal led the decision letter, in reality does not exist, as 
there never was a meeting and a musy(J);)arah of the Ninik Mamak of suku X. 
2. This so-called decision letter was just given to me for my signature. 
3. I was forced to sign this letter, and I know that it contained no 
truth and did not fulfil the requirements of adat. But at that time 
I was forced by Dt. 1ML who had become WaZi Jorong (village district 
head) then, and thus for the sake of my security I signed the letter 
which was put before me". 
"At that time" was theaftermath of the GESTAPU, the attempted "coup 
d'état" of 1965, af ter which the members of the Communist Party were 
persecuted throughout Indonesia. At the MUBES of the LKAAM of 1966 it 
was decided that members of the PKI could not be panghulu any more. Pres-
sure was brought upon the nagari to conform to this ruling, and the result 
of this probably was the decision letter of the KAN mentioned above, by 
which the panghuZuship of Dt. M. had been stopped. Dt. TML, apparently 
a follower of the New Order, had become village district head, using 
his new power to make property- and title polities. But, as his court 
suit shows, adat was stronger. 
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His claim was rejected by the court. The court's main argument, which 
had been taken over nearly word for word from a rejoinder of the defendant, 
was: 
'The plaintiff obviously has. no right to the title. Both parties are 
members of suku X, but the positions of Dt. M. and Dt. TML cannot be 
said to be equal. Dt. TML (the title) does not belong to the sako/gala 
which are functional (fungsioni l) in the payung Dt. M. Dt. TML belongs 
to the payung of Dt. M., but one cannot say that he is someone 'who 
sits equally low, and who stands equally high' (duduk samo rendah, tagak 
samo tinggi). His position is rather like that of a waris orang datang, 
who in former times has been accepted as kamanakan by Dt. M.". 
This is rather strong language for a Minangkabau judge. But 
the reference to the lower status of the plaintiff had to be made, as to 
explicate the reasons on which the judgement was based. (Incidentally, 
the advocate of the plaintiff threatened to file a libel act ion against 
the defendant's advocate because his client had been called an orang 
datang.) 
V. 1HE GlILDREN - KAMANkKAN CONFLICT 
The "classicai" conflict in Minangkabau inheri tance affairs was the 
situation in which the children and the kamanakan of a deceased panca-
harian holder disputed the inheritance of their father's/mamak's harato 
pancaharian. In contemporary Minangkabau, these cases more or less 
belong to the past, as it is now generally acknowledged that "harato 
pancaharian are inherited by the children". Of the 492 property disputes 
brought before the PN Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar, and Payakumbuh be-
tween 1968-1974, only 42 cases (8.5%) concerned pancaharian inheritances. 
In the 25 cases in which the property was disputed between "the children 
and the kamanakan", the legal status of the property object - pancaha-
rian or pusako - was in dispute. Once the legal status of property ob-
jects as harato pancaharian has been unequivocally established, no more 
disputes between children and their father's kamanakan arise. But as has 
been mentioned earlier, this general rule must be qualified. As far as 
pawnings are concerned, all will depend on the question of to whom it 
was that the pawner/pancaharian holder had intended to give the pawnings. 
The answer depends on the location where the ceremony was held, or to 
whom the pawner had given the document by which the transaction was 
evidenced. In addition, the rule only applies to harato pancaharian 
which are "pure" pancaharian and which have not been acquired with the 
help of harato pusako. 
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1. The Disputed Legal Status of Harato Panaaharian 
In CKL, there had been only one case recently where the property of a 
father had been disputed between children and kamanakan, and it con-
cerned pawnings. This was the case between Bagindo Endah,the son of Haji 
Amir of suku Caniago, and Taher St. Palimo of suku Caniago who claimed 
to be a close kamanakan of Haji ~r.The dispute was ab out two rice-
fields which Haji Amir had controlled during his lifetime, and which 
Bagindo Endah had worked since 1954. According to Bagindo Endah the 
reason for this was that he had loaned 5 rupiah emas to his father, and 
in exchange his father had let him work the fields. Besides, the fields 
were his father's harato panaaharian and should be inherited by him any-
way. It was true that the fields belonged to the harato pusako of Haji 
Amir's kaum, which was now extinct, but they had formerly been pawned 
and Haji Amir had redeemed them with his panaaharian-money. 
Taher St. Palimo claimed that the fields were harato pusako of Haji 
Amir, and that he and his kaum were the heirs to that property. About 
pawnings and redemption he had never heard anything, and he doubted it 
as there were no written documents. Besides, nobody had ever heard that 
Bagindo Endah had loaned money to Haji Amir. His mamak, at least, had 
never mentioned such a thing. 
The Wali Negen had unsuccessfully tried to settle the dispute, and a 
musyawarah had been held in the hindu Caniago 5 Rumah under the chairman-
ship of Dt. Panghulu Rajo. The panghulu and elders who participated in 
this meeting had decided that the fields were harta tambilang emas, for 
Ot. Panghulu Rajo had known of the pawning transaction which had taken 
place in 1942 and of Haji Amir's redemption in 1947. As redeemed proper-
ty it was tambilang emas and should be inherited by the children. The 
heirs of Haji Amir had, of course, always the possibility of redeeming 
the fields from Bagindo Endah. But Taher St. Palimo had refused to 
accept this decision, and the case had gone to the Camat. The Camat had 
confirmed the right of St. Palimo. As Bagindo Endah did not think of 
giving the fields back, Taher St. Palimo took the case to the State Court 
(case 9 of 1968 PN Bukit Tinggi). Here the problem became even more com-
plicated, as another kamanakan of Haj i Amir, Ishak St. Palimo had in-
stituted proceedings against Taher St. Palimo at the same time, claiming 
that his kaum was the real heir of Haji Amir (case 18 of 1968 PN Bukit 
Tinggi), whereas Taher was of a different kaum and even buah gadang. 
Many witnesses were heard in court. Most stated that Taher St. Palimo 
was the closest heir to Haji Amir, and that he andhis kamanakan Malim 
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Palimo had acted as Haji Amir's heirs in several instances. Bagindo 
Endah held to his version. Although Dt. Panghulu Rajo substantiated the 
story of the pawning and redemption, the court was not convinced, for 
there was no further evidence, and Dt. Panghulu Rajo had "only heard" 
it. For the alleged borrowing of the 5 rupiah emas there was no evi-
dence either, and 50 the court decided that the property had been hara-
to pusako and should be inheri ted by the kaum of Taher St. Palimo, in 
disregard of the decision of the panghulu of Caniago 5 Rumah. 
It should be known, that among the suku elders of Caniago 5 Rumah who 
had given this decision, Ishak St. Palimo acted as representative of 
Dt. Palimo. One of the wives of Dt. Panghulu Rajo was a kamanakan of 
Dt. Hitam, the mamak of Bagindo Endah. 
Bagindo Endah appealed (case 20 of 1972 PT Padang). His appeal was 
rejected and little was added to the judgement of the PN. But when we 
left CKL in the autumn of 1975, Bagindo Endah still worked the fields, 
and there was talk about a further appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Discussion: 
In this case, the kamanakan won. But we can note that the panghulu (of 
the kamanakan) were willing to acknowledge the harato tambilang emas 
status of the property, even though the land was still harato pusako of the 
recipient's father's kaum. It would not have been the land, which Bagin-
do Endah would have inherited, but the money invested in it. If Bagindo 
Endah had been able to prove the redemption by his father, the court 
would probably have awarded the property to him. 
2. The "Impw>e" Harato Panaaharian 
In the following story, the legal status of property objects is in dis-
pute, too. The dispute does not concern the alternative, pusako turun 
temw>un or panaaharian, but the character of the panaaharian-status. The 
story is from the records of the Religious Court in Bukit Tinggi (case 
238 of 1972): 
In 1972, a young man approached the Religious Court with a claim 
against his bako. His father, who had been a merchant in Medan, had 
recently died and he had Ie ft some property in the nagari; 4 fields 
which he had bought (worth 234,000 rupiah) and another field which he 
had pawned (worth 26,000 rupiah). These fields had been bought and 
pawned by the father wi th his own money. The property therefore was the 
private property of his father (hak milik dari bapak) and should be 
divided according to Islamic law. As the kamanakan of his father occu-
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pied these fields and did not want to deliver them to him, he had been 
forced to bring the suit befare the court. 
His father's kamanakan did not deny that their mamak had indeed bought 
and pawned the fields in question. But they stated that when their mamak 
had gone to Medan in 1927, he had been given same money, two ringgit 
emas, by his mother. The money had been acquired through the sale of 
rice of his mother's (jurai's) harato pusako. Befare he had left, his 
mother had made an agreement with him: "If the money which I give to 
you should increase, whatever you do with it and whatever you buy with 
it, will be the property of my grandchildren in this house"(i.e. of 
the grandchildren by her daughters. Her son's children would be anak 
dirumah Zain, children in a different house). The kamanakan put in a 
counterclaim: The property mentioned by the plaintiff was not the only 
property which their mamak had left. There was a house in Medan (worth 
4 Mill. rupiah), his trading store (worth 6 Mill. rupiah), and same more 
rice-fields which their mamak had pawned, partly in his own name, partly 
in the name of his wife (all together worth about 62 rupiah emas). They 
claimed all this property, as it was harta pusaka tinggi (karena 
keseZuruhannya adaZah harta pusako tinggi). 
Witnesses were heard. Two aId men stated that they had been present 
when the plaintiff's grandmother had made the agreement with her son, and 
that its contents were as stated by the defendants. Other witnesses con-
firmed that they had sold or pawned to the plaintiff's father and that 
this was done in the house of the defendants. With whose money the fields 
had been bought, however, they did not know. 
The Religious Court did not decide the inheritance question, but 
denied its jurisdiction and advised the parties to have the matter judged 
by the State Court. The reaction of the Religious Court is very interest-
ing. One would have expected that it would eagerly accept the chance to 
try a case over the inheri tance of harato pancaharian, for undoubtedly 
the money of the plaintiff' s father had been acquired as a result of his 
trading activities in Medan. But the court adopted a very cautious and 
conservative approach. It had been proven by the parties, the court 
stated, that the fields in question had indeed been pawned and bought. 
But it had not been proven that the money with which this was done had 
been in the "fun ownership" (hak mUik penuh) of the plaintiff' s father. 
As the witnesses had stated, the money was derived from the harato 
pusako CadaZah barasaZ dari harta pusaka). 
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The court rejected claim and counterclaim "as the money of the buyer 
and pawnee of the fields was not the full ownership of the plaintiff's 
father, but was part of the defendants' harato pusako ( ... uang pembeZi 
dan pemagang sawah2 tersebut tidak hak miZik penuh oZeh bapak penggugat, 
termasuk harta pusaka dari tergugat)." The court thus explicitly acknow-
ledged that the money was no "normal" pancaharian which would be in-
herited in accordance with Islamic law, or at least by the children. 5 
Although it was not explicitly mentioned by the court, I should like 
to drawattention to the witnesses' statements that the transactions had 
been carried out in the defendants' house, in the house of the kamanakan. 
This alone was strong evidence that the pawned or bought property was 
destined for the kamanakan and not for the children. 
VI. 1HE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 1HE GlILDREN 
Since the potential conflicts between the children and the kamanakan 
over their father's/mamak's harato pancaharian have lost in importance, 
a new problem has arisen. Once it has been acknowledged that the harato 
pancaharian are inherited by the children, the question arises: by which 
children? This can be particularly problematic, if the deceased had been 
married to several wives during his lifetime and has children by more 
than one wife. The following story deals with such a situation. It shows 
afather acting in it, and for a change it is a story almost free of con-
flict. The central figure is Haji Hassan, the son of Angku Mudo (in the 
story of "Extinct Buah Gadang") and father of Dt. Batuah Rajo. 
Haji Hassan was (in 1975) 72 years old. He was rather weIl off and lived 
on Bukit Tinggi, and he only rarely visited his nagari. His gaZa is St. 
Nagari, but since he made the pilgrimage in 1957, he does not use the 
ti tIe any more but prefers to be addressed as "Pak Haj i". H. Hassan had 
married four times (see diagram). The first marriage had been with 
Fatimah from suku Selayan. This had been a matrilateral CCM,for his 
mamak, Haj i Mahmud, had been married to his wife' 5 mother . Wi th Fatimah 
he had three sons, one of whom had already died. About Dt. Batuah Rajo 
we have already heard; his younger brother Dahlan lives in Jakarta. The 
second marriage had been with Upiek from suku Guci. This had been a 
patrilateral CCM. He had a son from this marriage, but the marriage had 
already been dissolved for some time. The third marriage, to Haji Jamilah 
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from nagari BT (ca. 8 km from CKL) , had also been dissolved af ter some 
time. Haj i Jamilah had borne him one daughter, who lived in Batu Taba. 
His last marriage was with Enap, who was also from suku Selayan, but 
from a different buah gadang than Fatimah. Since Haji Hassan lives in 
Bukit Tinggi, his two wives stay with him in turn. His grandchildren 
(by Dt. Batuah Rajo) visit him regularly, but prefer to do 50 when their 
grandmother stays there. Amir, the second oldest of Dt. Batuah Rajo's 
children,goes to school in Bukit Tinggi, and he lives with his grand-
parents when his grandmother is there. When it is Haji Hassan's younger 
wife '5 turn, Amir goes to Buki t Tinggi by bicycle, but there seem to be 
no great rivalries between the two wives of Haji Hassan. 
Haji Hassan had been an administrative official. He had spent most 
of his active service in Jambi. He had saved money, and he had bought 
a house in Jambi. He had bought his house in Bukit Tinggi in 1951, 'when 
houses were still cheap". Since his retirement he lives in this house 
and rents the other rooms out to schoolchildren. The house has 19 rooms, 
and Dt. Batuah Rajo estimates its value as 3 Mill. rupiah. It had been Dt. 
Batuah Rajo who had told his father: "Sell sClLJah, pawn sClLJah, and buy 
houses in Bukit Tinggi. They are cheap now, but in the future they will 
be worth a lot". Besides, Haj i Hassan "owns" two surau. One is harato 
pusako which he inherited from his mother, the other one is harato panaa-
harian. He also controls some of his buah gadang's harato pusako. The 
fields had formerly been pawned, and Haji Hassan had redeemed them. He 
has given them in share-cropping to others and thus gets ! of the 
harvest for himself and his children. When he dies, this pusako will be 
inherited by his kamanakan. Besides, he has also invested some money in 
his wife's (Fatimah's) harato pusako. Fatimah's four grandmothers had 
common harato pusako, about 80 sumpit worth. When they grew old, they 
wanted to pawn it and, as should be done, the sClLJah was first offered 
to people from their own suku. "In the end", Fatimah had it all. She 
either had pawned it or transferred the pawning to herself with the 
money of Haji Hassan - who had married the daughter of his mamak. When 
the other kaum members grew short of sClLJah, it was decided that there 
was to be a redistribution. Each of the four jurai should have an equal 
part again. This was decided in a fflUsyClLJarah, in which the four tungga-
nai (jurai-heads) and Haji Hassan participated. Of course,the other 
jurai had to pay their share of the original redemption money to Fatimah. 
Fatimah's SClLJah was not worked by herself but was given in share-crop-
ping to (other)'kamanakan. Mter her death, Dt. Batuah Rajo will inherit 
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it (so he presumed), and af ter his death his kamanakan will get it. In 
addition, Haji Hassan had also bought a sawah from a man of suku Guci. 
There had been some trouble about that, as another person had claimed 
that he was a kamanakan of the Guci -man and that the seller had no right 
to sell the sawah to Haji Hassan without his consent (the same situation, 
only in reversed roles, in which Haj i Hassan' s father had been vis-à-vis 
St. Pangeran). But, as Dt. Batuah Rajo put it: 'We were clever, for 
we had registered the sale and the land under the Basic Agrarian Law. It 
was entered into the register that the sawah was harta pancaharian and 
should be inherited by the children. So when the kamanakan of that Guci-
man wanted to make trouble, we just showed him the document from the 
Land Registry (Kantor Agraria) and he could not do anything ab out it". 
The case did not develop into a real dispute (sengketa). 
In parenthesis we may note that Dt. Batuah Rajo had in previous con-
versations been very outs poken against the Basic Agrarian Law. Yes, 
the govevnment wanted the ninik mamak of Minangkabau to have their 
land registered, but the ninik mamak did not like that. For they were 
afraid th at the property would then become harato pancaharian and be 
inheri ted by the children. We asked him, whether he, as panghu Zu of 
his buah gadang, had registered his buah gadang's harato pusako? Oh 
no, nobody had registered any land in CKL, for in CKL "adat still is 
very strong". We always got this reply when we asked about registered 
land in CKL. But some weeks later, Dt. Batuah Rajo smilingly confided 
to us under great secrecy, that actually, they had been the first 
ones to register property. Of course, the others did not and should 
not know. As we found out by checking the land register ourselves, he 
had not been the first one. Two plots, comprising 1899 m2, had already 
been registered by others. 
Before Haji Hassan went to Mekkah in 1957, he had made a testament 
and given directions about how his property should be distributed af ter 
his death. In 1970, a new testament was made, as there was some more pro-
perty which had to be cared for. The testament had been made during a 
big family meeting. All his wives, all children and his kamanakan had 
been present. The testament had been signed by all of them, and it had 
also been signed by the WaZi Negeri and the Head of the Sidang of the 
buek in which Haji Hassan's kaum was resident. Most of his property will, 
according to the testament, be inherited by his children. The divorced 
wives will not get anything, but the children of the divorced wives will 
be treated in the same way as the other children. The most valuable pro-
perty, the houses, will be divided into five equal shares. They are, as 
Dt. Batuah Rajo put it, harato pusako rendah, which according to Islamic 
law are inherited by the children. According to hukum faraidh, the girls 
should actually only get ! of the boy's portion, but in his family all 
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children would get an equal share. In the testament Haji Hassan had also 
stated that,if one of the children should predecease him, his or her 
portion would fall to his or her children instead. He had also made spe-
cific regulations about his harato pusako. "For if he had wri tten: 'for 
the kamanakan in general " there would have been only trouble", and 50 
he had specified the kamanakan who would inherit his harato pusako. 
Everyone had been content with the testament. 
Discussion: 
1. We see that the testament - in principle a unilateral declaration -
here is made in a process of preventive law application. The participa-
tion of the children and kamanakan signifies their assent to the terms 
of the testament. The participation of the Wali Negeri and the Head of 
the Sidang is to validate the testament in the name of the community. 
2. Haji Hassan introduced the principle of representation als 0 for 
his male children. Thus if one of his sons should predecease him, his 
property would be inherited "patrilineally", although it is harato pusako 
rendah. To whom the portion that falls to his children will eventually 
go af ter their death, is of course still open. Af ter Haji Hassan's death, 
the property will have the status of harato pusako rendah and should 
then be inherited by (the childrens') kamanakan. For his daughter, it 
will most certainly become harato pusako turun temurun in her jurai. But 
the sons may weIl attempt to give it to their children. 
3. We should also note Dt. Batuah Rajo's use of the term harato pusako 
rendah. He refers to his father's property in this way, although it will 
only have this legal status af ter his father's death. A good example of 
what I have called the "future perfect-perspective" in property relation-
ships (Chapter 4: 195). 
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C. 1HE MJDALITIES OF DIACHRONIC TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
I. IN1RODUCTORY NOTE 
In the first part of this chapter, several proces?es of diachronie trans-
fers of property relationships have been described in their social con-
text. People were seen to ernploy various means to bring about property 
transfers, and to legitimate their ends in terms of the cognitive and 
normative conceptions provided by the Minangkabau legal systems. In the 
following part of this chapter I shall discuss these means in isolation 
and try to indicate their functional value for the maintenance of proper-
ty relationships through time in general. As had been discussed earlier 
and as had also become apparent from the stories just told, diachronie 
property transfers are not automatic processes predetermined by law. 
The law restricts the individuals' autonomy, but it also leaves some 
room for the exercise of autonomy. The death of the property holders is 
no fixed time mark in these processes. It marks the end of the holders' 
activities but not the beginning of the would-be heirs' efforts. The 
Minangkabau are very property conscious. They know that the problem of 
diachronie property transfers will present itself sometime, ultimately 
upon the holders' death, and they will give the problem some thought, 
both as holders and would-be heirs. They will form some objectives and 
they will think about the means by which these objectives can be accom-
plished. The holders will think about the persons whom they would like 
to see as heirs or donees; the would-be heirs or donees want to be heirs 
or donees - and they all will devise some strategies. This is not to 
irnply that the format ion of the ends logically or temporally precedes 
the reflection of the means. For the means, provided by prescriptive, 
facultative, and optional legal rules are known to the actors already 
when they start thinking about the objectives, and this will generally 
shut out obviously irnpossible objectives which cannot be accomplished 
by any of the available means. Thus the law will influence the de-
liberations and the consequent actions of the persons engaged in the 
processes of diachronie transfers as it lays down the means by which 
these processes can be carried out. But the exercise of the autonomy, 
the "doing something about it",will gene rally be influenced by non-Iegal 
factors. The emotions, intentions and actions through which the autonomy 
is expressed, will be influenced by morality, religion, the behaviour 
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of others, and the concret~ socio-political and economie situation in 
which the actors live. Ouring the historical period about which we 
have information, the law and these other factors have changed con-
siderably. The most obvious changes which we can observe in the field 
of property relationships are an increasing individualization of proper-
ty relationships and growing efforts to have them transferred to one's 
children. The data on the concrete means employed by the Minangkabau 
have to be seen and understood against this background. 
I I. THE MEANS OF 1HE HOLDERS 
1. The Means 
Property holders have several means at their disposal which they can 
use to influence the diachronie transfer of their property relationships. 
1. They may actively exercise their autonomy in order to anticipate the 
diachronie transfer during their lifetime or to replace the rules of 
intestate inheritance by their own directions. They may do 50 within the 
limits set by law, and,of course,may also try to do 50 in violation of 
the law. The concrete means provided by adat have already been described: 
a. Anticipation of the diachronie transfer may be by donation which be-
comes effective during the holder's lifetime and by the investment of 
his or her property in other forms of property for the direct benefit 
of his or her preferred pers ons , such as the planting of cash-crops 
for the children, the buying of property for the wife and the chil-
dren, and the transfer of pawned property to the wife and childrèn. 
b. The replacement of the intestate inheritance rules can be achieved by 
way of hibah (which is revocable until the property holder's death) 
or by testament, wasiyat. 
c. The holders mayalso preset the stage for future inheritance by 
changing the legal status of property objects; a possibility now only 
given for land which can be converted into hak miZik under the Basic 
Agrarian Law and to which then the rules of pancaharian inheri tance 
will apply. 
2. The holders may, of course, do nothing at all and leave the matter 
of the diachronie transfer to the surviving kin and the rules of intes-
tate inheritance. 
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3. The holders may further influence the diachronic transfer of property 
relationships in a manner which adjusts interpersonal relationships in 
such a way that the general rul es for inheritance will bring their pro-
perty to their preferred persons. The mechanisms employed in this are 
adoption and marriage. 
Which kind of use the property holders make of these possibilities, 
depends on a variety of factors, some of which will briefly be dis-
cussed here. The central theme in the deliberations of the individuals 
is, of course, the wish to get one's property into the hands of one's 
preferred persons. Who these are depends on the concrete set of kin and 
friends which the individuals have and the emotional and rational moti-
vations which select among these persons. As a general principle it can 
safely be stated that both men and women prefer their children as heirs 
or donees of their property. Failing children, it is usually one's 
siblings who are the preferred persons. For women, especially, this is 
quite normal given the social system. Men, however, are faced with the 
dual emotional and social obligations towards their children and their 
kaum-relatives. The decision "to do something about inheritance", to 
some extent depends on the individuals' assessment of a need to do some-
thing about it; in this respect, there is a considerable difference be-
tween men and women. Women's property more or less always ends up with 
their children, and women see no need to exercise their autonomy to 
support or to speed up the inheritance of their property by their chil-
dren. For men, this is different. For during the times when the inherit-
ance of pancaharian property by the children was not yet law, they had 
to exercise their autonomy in order to achieve their objective, for 
otherwise their property would fall to the kamanakan. What kind of means 
they chose partly depended on the kind of property they had. Hibah was 
usually employed for the transfer of things like land and houses (see 
p. 280). The transfers cal led anticipatory action required money which 
could be invested for the benefit for one's preferred persons. 
From the individual male's perspective, both hibah and anticipatory 
actions have disadvantages and advantages. Anticipatory actions which 
become effective at the time of their transaction have a particular 
appeal, for they are less likely to be attacked by the kaum members. For 
the actual contract lies in the synchronic dimension, although its 
effects are diachronic. The contract is between a man and a third party, 
and it involves prestation and contraprestation. The man does not make 
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a gift, he has to pay. His partner does not receive a gift, for he has 
to make a counterprestation. The beneficiaries of the transaction, the 
persons to whom the third party makes his prestation, are not parties 
to the contract. On what legal basis could they be attacked? The Minang-
kabau are well aware that these transactions are "tricky". In interviews, 
they were often characterized as wetsontduiking, "circumvention of (in-
heri tance) law", but, as was generally recognized, too, i t was a circum-
vention by legal means. There is however a catch to it. For once a man 
has invested money for the immediate benefit of his wife and children, 
it is "gone". Such property is not considered to make part of the harato 
suarang, and if the marriage should end in divorce, the invested proper-
ty is irrevocably gone. The divorce rates in Minangkabau are the highest 
in Indonesia, and all Minangkabau are aware of the instability of mar-
riages. The men not only run the risk of losing their property in the 
case of divorce. Once the marriage is dissolved,where must they go and 
live? Unless they remarry, the only place is the surau or the house of 
their sisters. But will they be welcome there, when they have, as a bad 
mamak, transferred all their property to their wives and children, and 
have even been 50 stupid as not to make sure that they could keep it in 
the case of divorce? Minangkabau men will therefore generally make use 
of anticipatory actions only when they feel that their marriage is in 
order, or if they want to transfer property to their children no matter 
whether their marriage to the children's mother will be dissolved or not. 
Hibah, on the other hand, or testaments have the advantage that the 
property holder keeps control over the property as long as he lives,for 
he can always revoke the hibah or testament. The disadvantage here is 
that hibah or testaments are much more likely to be attacked by the 
kamanakan. In contemporary Minangkabau this is probably less the case 
than it used to be, but at the time when the requirements for the 
validity of such transactionswere stricter, the making of hibah very 
of ten resulted in conflicts between the children and the kamanakan, 
although the hibah itself was used as a means to prevent the conflict 
about a man's panaaharian inheritance as far as possible. The stereotype 
of the children and the kamanakan disputing their father's/mamak's hara-
to panaaharian has persisted into contemporary Minangkabau, although the 
inheritance of panaaharian by the children is not generally disputed 
any more. Ihus men often exercise their autonomy (even if the intestate 
inheritance law would also bring their property to the beneficiaries of 
their hibah, testament or anticipatory action) in order "to make sure" 
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and prevent conflicts between their relatives. To quote a recent judge-
ment: "It is already customary in Minangkabau that a husband who wants 
to give property stemming from his harta pancaharian to his wife and 
children, does 50 by way of hibah in order to prevent future trouble" 
(case 49 of 1970 PN Bukit Tinggi). Even most of the judges in the 
State Courts whom we interviewed use this means in order to make sure 
that their property wi1l go to their children and not to the kamanakan 
although they regularly ruled that harato pancaharian is inherited hy 
the children. 
Besides these rational motivatio~ I think that other impulses also 
lead Minangkabau men to make use of their autonomy even if they 
need not do 50 to achieve their objectives. This is, however, rather a 
speculation and cannot be supported by concrete data. I think that 
many men make a hibah or testament "for the fun of it", taking gratifi-
cation from the exercise of autonomy as such. Minangkabau men have 50 
long strived for autonomy in property and inheritance matters that they 
now, when they have achieved this goal, have the feeling that it would 
be a pity if they did not make use of it, even if their objective 
- to have their property inherited by their children - is also reached 
by intestate inheritance. The attitude increases that "as a modern 
Minangkabau man you owe yourself a hibah or testament". This attitude 
is further supported by Islamic law and religion. The syarak regards 
the making of a testament as advisable, man~ub(Fyzee 1955:301). Islamic 
law here provides a rationalization for making testaments, and it may 
also even motivate men to make testaments at all. In this way, Islamic 
law plays an important role in Minangkabau inheritance as it influences 
men to exercise their autonomy in a specific way.6 However, it does not 
operate as law but rather as a moral code. For the testaments made in 
Minangkabau would regularly be void in terms of Islamic legal conceptions. 
In Islamic law, testamentary dispositions may only comprise 1/3 of the 
inheritance and may not be made for the benefit of the legal (Koranic) 
heirs, whereas in Minangkabau generally a large amount of one's harato 
pancaharian is disposed of, and most of it is given to the new legal 
heirs, the children (who also would he among the Koranic heirs). 
2. The Exercise of Autonomy 
a. The Replacement of Inheritance Rules by Individual Autonomy 
It is difficult to give concrete data on the degree to which the Minang-
kab au property holders have exercised their autonomy to determine the 
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diachronic transfer of their property by way of hibah or wasiyat. Hibah 
and wasiyat practices seem to have been IIlUch more conmon in the coastal 
areas than in the three districts in the highland (Francis 1839: 111; 
Willinck 1909: 746), and in the highlands the frequency of donations and 
testaments probably varied considerably from nagari to nagari. Verkerk 
Pistorius reported that in the district of Sijunjung no case of hibah 
had occurred during the last 20 years, i.e. approximately between 1860 
and 1880 (Pandecten V: no. 1502), whereas Kroesen stated in 1874 that 
at least as far as newly cultivated land (as harato pancaharian) was con-
cerned, it was rare if such land was not given to the children by hibah 
(1874: 20). At the end of the 19th century it seems to have become cus-
tomary in many regions for Minangkabau men to give about one-half of their 
harato pancaharian property to their children (Andre sen in Kielstra 1892: 
274; Kroon 1909: 112; Wilken 1912 vol. I: 318; Willinck 1909: 775 f.). 
At the meeting of the Tuangku Lareh,which was held in Bukit Tinggi in 
1910, different practices were mentioned. In some areas, like VII Lurah 
(the present area of Tilatang Kamang) and Sijunjung, about one half of 
the pancaharian property was said to be gi ven to the children, whereas 
in IV Koto (in Agam) dealers were said to give all their property to 
their children. It was further stated that also among farmers and admi-
nistrative officials there was a tendency to have the children profit 
from their harato pancaharian (AB 6: 212 f.). Schrieke in 1928 mentioned 
that it was possible to obtain control of one's father's self-earned 
property or part of it by means of hibah or umanat (1955: 118 f.), a 
statement echoed by Maretin (1961: 192 f.). De Josselin de Jong quotes 
Van Ossenbruggen who had noticed the growing popularity of hibah in the 
1920's (1951: 115). Tanner, who spent 3 years in Minangkabau in the 
1960's,reported that the hibah was not particularly common (1971: 274), 
but that new ways of transferring property were increasingly used, for 
example the buying or building of property for the wife and the children 
(1971: 275). 
The only statistical data available have been collected in 1971 by a 
team of the University of Padang (Sa'danoer 1971). During this short 
survey, 1401 respondents were interviewed about the manner in which they 
had recei ved harato pancaharian: whether in the capacity of children, 
kamanakan, or "others"; and whether as inheritance (warisan) or by hibah 
or by hibah-wasiyat. Only cases in which the property received had not 
yet been inherited for a second time,were included in the sample. 272 
cases were drawn from the capital Padang, the rest was collected in a 
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sample of nagari. Although these data have to be treated with the utmost 
caution7,for an interpretation of inheritance practices and social 
change in general they offer some quite interesting clues. The bulk of 
the cases in which harato pancaharian was transferred or inherited con-
cerned land and houses, which together formed 93.2% of all cases. In 
35.5% the pancaharian consisted of houses, in 57.9% of land (unspecified), 
and in 23.3% of irrigated rice-Iand. 8 Money only constituted 0.5% of all 
cases (Sa'danoer 1971: 11). 
45% of the respondents had received the property as inheritance 
(warisan) , 51.5% by hibah, and 3.5% by hibah-wasiyat. In the following 
tabIe, which gives the overall result of the survey, and which has to be 
read wi th the cautionary remarks made above, 9 the percentages refer to 
inheritance and hibah respectively. Hibah and hibah-wasiyat are not 
differentiated. 
Recipients / Form of Intestate Hibah Hibah and 
Transfer Inheritance Inheritance 
Olildren 399 (64%) 522 (68%) 921 (64%) 
Kamanakan 202 (32%) 149 (19%) 351 (25%) 
Others 27 (4%) 102 (13%) 129 (11%) 
628 (100% ) 773 (100% ) 1401 (100%) 
These data stem from different periods. The dates of the transfers 
are given in the report (1971: 9), but the distribution given in the 
table above has not been differentiated for the different periods. If 
the data are periodicized, we get the following picture. 
Period Inheritance (100%) Hibah (100%) 
Children Kamanakan Others Children Kamanakan Others 
- 1924 51.0 49.0 47.4 47.4 5.2 
1924-1934 65.1 34.9 72.2 22.2 5.6 
1934-1944 53.0 40.2 6.8 63.4 24.7 11.9 
1934-1949 56.2 38.4 5.4 63.6 25.0 11.4 
1949-1964 71.1 26.3 2.6 68.8 21.2 10.0 
1964-1970 63.6 32.5 3.9 76.2 13.8 10.0 
The data indicate a slow trend in favour of the children,as has fre-
quently been mentioned in the literature in a more general way. The 
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peaks in the period between 1924 and 1934 very weIl correspond to the 
report by Schrieke that the 20'5 and 30'5 were characterized by a period 
of economic upsurge and extension of individual autonomy, partly in vio-
lation of adat, by gifts of pancaharian property to the children. It 
should be noted that the increase of "inheri tance by the children" is 
accompanied by an equally strong increase in "hibah to the children". 
This supports my hypothesis that the active exercise of autonomy in 
favour of the children (the preferred persons) is largely independent 
of its functional necessity. 
b. Convers ion of Property Relationships 
In Minangkabau, little use has been made of the possibility to convert 
land held under adat rights into land held under Dutch civil code rights 
or, more recently, into hak miZik as recognized by the Basic Agrarian 
Law of 1960. Sa far as land with pancaharian status is concerned, the 
registration as hak miZik would offer na difficulties for the holder. 
In the case of pusako land, the consent of the applicant's ahZi warih 
and his or her panghuZu is necessary. 
From the Land Registry in Bukit Tinggi, where (at the time of our 
check in 1974) the registrations had been entered for 1964-1972, the 
following picture emerged: In the district of Agam, excluding jungle, 
forest, and land without vegetation, only 0.074% of the remaining area 
had been registered (90.4 ha out of 122,268 ha). If the registered area 
is related to the total area used for rice-cultivation (35,149,4 ha), the 
percentage increases but yet remains an insignificant 0.257%. 
At the time we checked the Land Registry, only two plots of land had 
been registered in CKL; the registration mentioned in the story of Haji 
Hassan (p. 269 ff.) had not yet been entered. The two registrations com-
prised 1,899 m2, which amounts to 0.017% of the area used for rice culti-
vat ion in CKL. More use had been made of this means in the town of Bukit 
Tinggi. Here, 0.85% of the total area had been registered (21 ha out of 
2,490 ha). If related to the sawah area within the precincts of the 
town, the percentage increases to 2.35%. But judging from the average 
size of the registered plots in Bukit Tinggi, primarily houses and house 
sites would have been registered. The ave rage size for the registrations 
in Bukit Tinggi is 820 m2, whereas it is 5,909 m2 in Agam. 
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c. Anticipatory Transfers 
Few concrete data can be offered on the frequency of anticipatory trans-
fers. Tanner (1971: 275) reports their increase, and this is our general 
impression, too. In contrast to the exercise of autonomy by the means 
of hibah and wasiyat, most anticipatory actions, like buying or pawning 
for one's wife and/or children, require money. Opportunities to convert 
one's money into permanent forms of property more or less exist in the 
towns only, as in the nagari the sale of land or houses is still severe-
ly restricted and very rare (see map on p. 284 ). However, in the nagari 
money can be converted into temporary rights to use and to exploit pro-
perty. It can be invested in cash producing crops like cinnamon or clove 
trees, and it can be invested in rice-land through the process of 
pawning or the transfer of pawning. This kind of anticipatory action 
requires, of course, a relationship to the property object which admits 
of such exercise of the autonomy. In Minangkabau adat, this was the 
relationship to haPato panaaharian. The individual was free, to some 
extent, to do whatever he liked with the property which he had acquired 
by his own efforts, and the freedom granted to him has increased in 
the course of time. However, we must emphasize that such freedom nowa-
days more and more extends to property objects which have the legal 
status of harato pusako, but which are "panaahaPianized" temporarily 
through the inves tment of panaaharian property in the pusako, of one' s 
own or of other people's kaum. The trees planted for the children on 
one's own harato pusako with one's panaaharian money, are harato panaa-
harian. The land on which they stand is harato pusako held by one's 
kaum, but in order to reacquire the possibility to use and to exploit 
the property, one's kaum members must first 'Tedeem" the property: they 
must pay to the holder or his panaaharian heirs the value which has been 
invested in the property. This is a general rule, of course, and the 
concrete sum of money used for redemption should be agreed upon in a 
musyco.Jarah and, failing an agreement, by the agents of decision making. 
Similarily,one gets panaaharian-like rights to use and to exploit rice-
land by virtue of the investment of money in a pawning or a transfer of 
pawning transaction, no matter whether the property object, i.e. the 
land, is one's own harato pusako or the pusako of a different kaum. 
These panaaharian-like rights to use and to exploit property are, 
hCMever, temporary in two ways: For one, they can be nullified and re-
converted into money if the members of the pusako holding group decide 
to redeem the property. Such redemptions, however, of ten resul t in a new 
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fonn of panaaharianized pusako holding, as the redemption in the name 
of the kaum (tebusan) is seldom made. Mostly, the redemption turns out 
to be a transfer of the pawning, through which the panaaharianized re-
lationship to the property object is maintained. It is then either held 
as "private pusako" of the kaum member who has transferred the pawnee's 
rights to him- or herself, or it is given to the kaum member's preferred 
person in an anticipatory act ion. The panaaharianized use-rights are 
further of temporary nature insofar as they themselves are subject to 
the pusakoization rule. Af ter the death of a female holder, the rights 
become harato pusako rendah for her children to be turun temurun i~ their 
jurai. In the case of male holders, the rights (in contemporary Minang-
kabau) become harato pusako rendah for their children, too, unless they 
had been intended for the kamanakan. However, men most frequently 
transfer these use-rights directly to their children in an anticipatory 
action. In both cases, this inheritance of the father's or mother's use-
rights remains temporary, as the rights can always be nullified if the 
holders of the pusako redeem the property. However, while the transfer of 
the use-rights to the children is temporary, the transfer of the money 
invested in these rights is definite. When the property is redeemed by 
the pusako holders, the children receive the pawning sumo 
It is therefore rather difficult to give a concise description of the 
legal status of the land in a nagari. Except for some small plots, all 
land is harato pusako (see p. 284) but can at the same time be used and 
also be inherited (in a general manner of speaking) as harato panaaha-
rian, and the land used on the basis of panaaharian-like rights can be 
reconverted into proper harato pusako at the next moment. 10 Once land 
has been pawned, the use-rights are quite mobile and can be transferred 
again without paying regard to the adat restrictions on pawning. What is 
pawned today, may be transferred or redeemed tomorrow. Unfortunately, I 
have not been able to collect sufficient reliable infonnation on the 
frequency of such changes in property holding. With the help of the map 
(p. 284) I can merely give a synchronic impression of the kinds of 
property relationships pertaining to land in one part of the nagari. 11 
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CKL. Except for the house sites and the land north of the railway-line, 
the land is used for ri ce cultivation. The fields generally yield one 
harvest per year. Af ter the fields have lain fallow for some time (3 to 
12 weeks) , the villagers use them for vegetables, peanuts, or maize be-
fore rice is planted again. 
All fields shown on the map have the status of harato pusako, re-
gardless of the kinds of relationships that legitimate their use and 
exploitation. Altogether, at least 50 kaum belonging to 41 buah gadang 
are involved as pusako holding groups. The unrnarked fields are 'worked 
by the kamanakan", i.e. by kaum members who have received the use-rights 
through the traditional mechanisrns of distribution and allocation. These 
fields are sometimes given to other persons in share-cropping. Share-
cropping arrangements are of ten made for one planting season only, and 
the pusako holders change the share-croppers frequently. My guess is 
that no more than about 10% of the area is regularly given in share-
cropping. Only a small nurnber of fields is held by kaum mernbers 'with 
money", but a rather large nurnber of the fields is pawned to pers ons be-
longing to other kaum. The pawned fields and those held with money to-
gether constitute the potentialof property which is highly mobile and 
which may change hands unrestricted by the adat rules pertaining to the 
alienation of pusako property. On the map I have only considered those 
transfers of which I arn certain; there may be more about which I have 
not been told. The villagers generally stated that in this part of the 
nagari cornparatively little land was pawned. 
The hibah transfers shown on the map all concern hibah of harato pusa-
ko to the anak pisang. In all cases, the land given is to be turun temu-
run in the childrens' jurai and only to revert to the original pusako 
holding group if the childrens' group should become extinct. The map 
further indicates that sales of land (at least in this part of the 
nagari) are rare and only involve land used as, or adjacent to, house 
sites. 
3. From Status to Contract in HistoricaZ Perspective 
As long as the pancaharian-like rights to use and exploit property ob-
jects pertain, the objects are, for the purpose of use and exploitation, 
held individually. Through time, this individualization is undone again 
by the pusakoization rule, but even then the objects are held by only 
one jurai of the group for whom the pusako status is of common pusako 
turun temurun. Within this individualized jurai then the same traditional 
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mechanisms of distribution occur, like the bagi bauntuek and the alloca-
tion of dapatan and pambaoan. This is certainly done if the holders are 
females. If the holders are males, however, the pusakoization process is 
or may be deferred for another generation through the anticipatory action 
and, until then, the pancaharian-like right to use and exploit the pro-
perty may weIl have been transferred again. The mechanism by which this 
increasing individualization of property relationships, also to property 
objects with the legal status of harato pusako, has become possible, even 
without violations of adat law, is the process of the transfer of pawn-
ings. lts medium is money. We may well assurne that the relative impor-
tance of such potential pancaharianized pusako and of harato pancaharian 
in general has increased with the growing monetarization of the Mînang-
kabau economic sys tem. 
Through the medium of money, property relationships have to a growing 
extent moved from rights hased upon the status of kaum member to rights 
based upon the contracts of pawning and transfer of pawnings. This de-
velopment is a neat example of what Maine had characterized as the move-
ment from status to contract (1905: 151). It is not the processes of the 
bagi bauntuek, of the allocation of dapatan and pambaoan which legitimate 
the individuals' relationships to use and exploit property objects, but 
the money which had been invested in the property objects. That money 
and the increasing monetarization of the Minangkabau economic system 
havehad an important impact on the Mînangkabau social system and on the 
system of property relationships in particular, is of course no new in-
sight. It has been stressed by previous authors, notably by Schrieke 
(1955), Maretin (1961), and Kahn (1975, 1976). Kahn in a recent study 
has demonstrated the degree to which the Minangkabau local economic sys-
tem has been influenced and affected by the economic systems outside 
Mînangkabau (between the Netherlands and the colony, between Indonesia 
and Mînangkabau, and between Mînangkabau and the world market in general) • 
Schrieke, Maretin, and Kahn all assumed that the decisive period, in 
which money made its greatest impact on Mînangkabau property relation-
ships, was the time following the abolition of the system of forced cul-
tivation in 1908 and the introduction of a tax system. MOney was required, 
and credit facili ties were opened for Minangkabau villagers . Wï th the 
removal of the restrictions on rice cultivation and the admission of 
foreign commodities a free commodity production developed in Mînangkabau 
(Schrieke 1955: 98; Kahn 1976: 90 f.). All of this resulted in an econo~ 
mic revolution (Schrieke) and an irrevocable breakdown of the adat system. 
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According to Kahn, it had been the policy of the colonial government in 
the period before, when the system of forced cultivation was 
practised, to rnaintain the isolation of the village cornmunities and hence 
to preserve the illusion of the autonomy of the nagari in West Sumatra. 
Dutch economic policy airned at preventing the penetration of external 
economic influe~ through irnports. A developed cornrnodity sector would 
have meant a dernand for irnports, and the Dutch were worried about the 
effects of this on local conditions. Hence the rice-policy of the Dutch 
was aimed at preventing rice from becoming a cash-crop, and rice-produc-
tion was artificially kept at the subsistence level (Schrieke 1955: 97; 
Kahn 1976: 83). According to Kahn's analysis, this policy more or less 
safeguarded or even created the "traditional" Minangkabau social and 
economic system with its holdin~of common harato pusako by groups and 
the kaumjbuah gadang functionaries as administrators of the communal 
property. 
But in rny view, both the Dutch policy and Kahn's analysis are based 
upon a fallacy. The process of individualization and monetarization of 
property relationships began at a rnuch earlier stage, narnely during the 
period of the system of forced cultivation, although it had even 
earlier roots as weIl. It did not corne out of the blue, when cash-needs 
we re created in 1908 and a market was developed for commodities. It 
rather began with money that one had and with which one had to do some-
thing: The Minangkabau were forced to cultivate coffee which then was 
sold to warehouses run by the colonial adrninistration. Coffee was 
grown individually (Kahn 1976: 82) and the money acquired through the 
sale of coffee thus was held individually and could serve individual 
property interests. As the cultivation of rice above the subsistence 
level had been discouraged by the Dutch, no one did more than the neces-
sary rice cultivation. No new rice-Iand was cultivated, but one aimed 
to plant as rnuch coffee as possible. As the import of new commodities 
had been restricted by the Dutch, the Minangkabau were more or less 
forced to invest the money they had received from the Dutch for their 
coffee within the nagari; and in the nagari there was virtually only 
one possibility to do 50, namely in the processes of pawning, redernption, 
and transfers of pawning. As the pawning register of CKL suggests, 
pawnings were not infrequent: For the years 1874-1893, 177 transactions 
were registered, in some years (1884, 1885, 1893) 20 or more. The money, 
the redemption money, was usually expressed in the currency introduced by 
the Dutch, in Dutch rupiah, and not in the gold standard which was used 
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formerly and which is also used now. As this money was held individually, 
it was - we may assume - also much more easily and frequently put to 
individual investments; investments for oneself, one's jurai, one's pre-
ferred persons. One probably saw little reason to redeem pusako for the 
whole kaum if the other kaum members had their individual money, too. 
If, on the contrary, rice had been allowed to become a commodity, the 
money acquired through the sale of rice from common harato pusako, would 
have been "the fruit of the pusako" and held in common; the likelihood 
that it would have been used to redeem pawned harato pusako for the 
whole kaum would have been much greater. So quite a different result was 
achieved than had been intended by the policy of the Dutch and than had 
occurred according to Kahn's analysis. Instead of maintaining the tradi-
tional system with its common property holding groups, the foundation was 
laid for the superimposition of property rights based upon money trans-
actions over the traditional system of property relationships 
based upon status and their distribution and allocation as ganggam 
bauntuek, dapatan, and pambaoan. 
The monetarization of property relationships brought with it an in-
crease in individual autonomy. It did not, however, mean that the tempo-
rary use and exploitation rights to (pusako) rice-Iand had acquired a 
fixed price. This is evident from the entries in the pawning register 
of CKL. In 155 of the 177 entered transactions , the "prices" could be 
ascertained, as the pawning sum and the value of the land demanded for 
or given for the pawning sum are mentioned. The value of the land is 
expressed in the average amount of harvested rice in terms of sumpit. 
One sumpit is ca. 31 kg. In the following table the prices are expressed 
as the ratio of sumpit of rice per 10 rupiah Belanda (Dutch rupiah). The 
table on p. 289 shows, that the amount of land given/demanded for a 
certain amount of money differed considerably. The diversity of "prices" 
emerges even more clearly if the total number of one year's pawning 
transactions is examined: 
In the year 1884, for instance, the ratios sumpit/ 10 rupiah we re 1.31, 
1.5, 1.0, 1.5, 1.5, 2.85, 1.33, 1.8, 1.23, 2.5 for pawnings between mem-
bers of the same suku, and 1.25, 1.0,0.85, 1.76, 1.17,2.0, 1.81,2.4, 
2.3, 1.66, 1.33 for pawnings between members of different svku. These 
data indicate that the price of the use-rights does not vary with the 
economic value of the property objects. We may assume that the amount 
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Pawning Transac~ in CKL 1874-1893 
Year Minimum Maximum Nurnber of 
(swrrpi t rice per 10 Dutch rupiah) transactions 
1874 0.52 
1875 1.2 1.87 3 
1878 1.0 1.25 2 
1879 1.05 3.2 3 
1880 1.0 1.7 2 
1882 0.66 1.4 2 
1883 1.8 3.0 (6.0*) 4 (5*) 
1884 0.85 2.85 21 
1885 0.62 3.2 21 
1886 0.7 3.3 13 
1887 0.61 1.2 5 
1888 0.64 3.2 9 
1889 1.0 2.66 9 
1890 1.08 4.28 13 
1891 1.0 2.4 11 
1892 0.83 4.0 15 
1893 0.6 2.5 20 
* In one case, land was pawned to a member of a neighbouring nagari, in 
which case the ratio was considerably higher than for pawnings in CKL. 
of land asked/demanded for a given sum of money depended, indeed, on the 
social relationships between the parties, as is stressed by ~1inangkabau 
informants. It was low when the pawning was between close kin, and it 
was high when it was between unrelated persons. The concrete relation-
ships between the parties are unfortunately not mentioned in the regis-
ter, and we were not able to reconstruct them during our stay in CKL. 
The suku affiliations of the parties, however, were given. A comparison 
of the averages of the 94 inter-suku with the 62 intra-suku pawnings 
shows a slightly higher average for inter-suku pawnings, 1.698 swrrpit/ 
10 rupiah compared with 1.557 swrrpit/l0 rupiah. However,we cannot infer 
too much from these data. For the parties in intra-suku pawnings, such 
as e.g. in suku Sikumbang, may be quite unrelated, whereas inter-suku 
pawnings may be between close kin, e.g. the bako and the anak pisang. 
Perhaps a little more significant is the fact that the average for 
pawnings between pers ons living in Candung and Koto Lawas (N=21) is even 
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higher, 1.72 sumpit/10 rupiah. The assumed correlation between increas-
ing prices and the distance in social relationships is most clearly borne 
out in the one case in which property has been pawned to a member of a 
neighbouring nagari, where the relation is 6.0 sumpit/10 rupiah. 
It is very difficult to assess the extent to which this situation has 
changed. We could not gather comparative statistical data for contempo-
rary practices. A pawning register was said not to exist and we did not 
get access to whatever pawning documents might have been kept in the 
office of the WaZi Negeri. The information given by informants comprised 
several general principles. It was repeatedly stated that little had 
changed and that the amount of land asked for a given sum of money still 
depended very much on the social relationships between the parties, and 
that the pawning sum could not be regarded as an equivalent for the eco-
nomic value of the pawned harato pusako. 12 On the other hand, most people 
stated that there was a sort of thumb-rule for pawnings in contemporary 
CKL, that one should give land worth 3 sumpit of rice per harvest for 
the sum of two rupiah emas (ca. 60.000 rupiah in 1975). This may be a 
rule for pawnings between unrelated persons. 
The situation is very complex. For lack of adequate statistical data 
I can only try to throw some light on the most important aspects of this 
complexity. People undoubtedly are aware that one can make money out of 
land and invest it more profitably in other valuables. (Remember Dt. 
Batuah Rajo's advice to his father: Pawn your harato pusako and buy 
houses in town, p. 271). This encourages people to pawn land to others, 
but also to redeem harato pusako of their kaum which had been pawned to 
others, wi th the view of"deepening"or transferring the pawning at a higher 
price. The contemporary economic value, measured in money, is generally 
higher than the pawning sum agreed upon several years ago~ If the pawning 
sum was expressed in Dutch money, the risk of the considerable inflation 
is to be carried equally by both pawner and pawnee, following an authori-
tative judgement of the Supreme Court which usually is adhered to (No. 
92 K./Sip./1952, published in Santoso Pudjosubroto 1964: 41 ff.). Nowa-
days, most pawning sums are again expressed in terms of gold-rupiah 
(rupiah emas) which do not inflate but provide a stable standard: During 
one year, the price of one rupiah emas rose from about 30.000 to 37.000 
rupiah of the national currency. Redemption of pawned harato pusako thus 
is economically interesting, and many of the longest and expensive court-
suits were concerned with the problem of which party had the right to 
redeem some harato pusako which had for long been pawned to other people. 
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In former times, the initiative for pawnings came from those kaum 
which were in need of money. The money was supplied by the "rid1er" 
kaum who received the land as security, but the '~oorer" kaum usually 
still had enough land for their own subsistence. With the population in-
crease and the increase of cash-needs, this situation has changed. Mem-
bers of poor kaum, such as the kaum of Dt. Kayo (in the story p. 218 ff.), 
which probably had enough hapato pusako to supply all kaum members with 
sufficient land for their subsistence three generations ago, now are 
forced to leave the nagapi or to take other people's land on the basis 
of pawnings oi share-cropping arrangements. The richer kaum nowadays 
act as pawners to an increasing extent. But the poorer kaum not only 
need land, they also need money. This situation has led to an increase 
of transactions which probably were unknown or extremely rare in former 
Minangkabau: The poor give their land to the rich in exchange for money, 
and the rich give the land back to the poor on the basis of a share-
cropping agreement. This opens the way for "secret" transactions, as the 
land does not change hands (see the land pawned by St. Mantari Basa to 
the Caniago-woman in the story of the kaum Dt. Kayo, p. 232). In addi-
tion, and more importantly, it opens the way for the systematic exploi-
tation of the poor by the rich, which increases with the degree to which 
the social and kinship relations upon which most transactions over 
hapato pusako are still based, lose their emotional and moral quality. 
If land is pawned, the money acquired by the transaction is usually 
- in the case of a richer kaum acting as pawner - invested outside the 
nagaPi or just spent (see story of St. pangeran, p. 253 ff.). On the 
other hand, there is a constant influx of money into the nagapi from 
outside. Those villagers who have gone mepantau and have succesfully 
made money as traders or through other activities, usually redirect some 
money to the nagaPi and have their sisters and wives redeem pawned hapa-
to pusako. This money thus is generally put to the benefit of the kaum 
by the Minangkabau in the pan tau, who of ten have a rather nostalgic and 
conservative attitude towards their nagaPi and Minangkabau adat (cf. 
Naim 1974). 
Though all these mechanisms keep the land rotating in pawnings and 
redemptions at an increasing speed, and although they all lead to an 
increasing temporary individualization of the relationship to haPato 
pusako, yet they reinforce the system of the adat pusako. The rules of 
property holding by matrilineal groups and the inheritance of relation-
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ships to harato pusako in the matriline are constantly restated and 
applied in these cases. 
4. The Adaptation of InterpersonaZ ReZationships to Property Strategies 
There are two basic ways to adapt interpersonal relationships to proper-
ty strategies,and to adjust them so that they will bring the property 
to the preferred persons. The two basic means employed in this are 
adoption and marriage. 
a. Adoption 
In traditional Minangkabau society, adoption meant the incorporation of 
one or more persons into a jura i as new kamanakan. This was and still 
is done when the danger arises that the group will become extinct,or 
when there are no male group members who can effectively lead and re-
present the group. Through the adoption, the continuity of the sako and 
the harato pusako within the group can be ensured, and the danger th at 
it pass to other groups or to group members of lower social and politi-
cal status is avoided. As has been mentioned above (Chapter 2: 62) the 
persons preferred as adoptive kamanakan are those who are matrilineally 
related to the adoptive kaum. But it is also possible, that a male kaum 
member can adopt or initiate the adoption of his own children, his son, 
into his kaum as his kamanakan. This is generally allowed when the chil-
dren '~ave no suku" (see the story of the adoption of Sur, Chapter 5: 
228) and when the man is the last living member of his kaum (see Chapter 
4: 179, I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1973: 51 on the hibah ZaZeh).13 Data on 
such adoption-practices are rare, but the adoption of anak pisang into 
their bako seems to have been the exception. Besides, they usually re-
sulted in trouble, as the other kaum within the buah gadang of the adop-
tive kaum tend to challenge the validity of the adoption and its 
legal property consequences in the adoptive kaum af ter the person having 
initiated the adoption had died. This happened in one of the few 
publishedcases which was decided by the LR Fort van der Capellen in 1936: 
The plaintiff had married his father's kamanakan. Af ter the older members 
of his wife's and father's kaum had died, a ceremony was held, accompa-
nied by the slaughtering of a buffalo, at which it was publicly declared 
that the plaintiff would receive the title of Chatib Adat of his wife's 
kaum,and that he was forthwith adopted in her kaum. The plaintiff's wife 
and daughter died in the course of time,and he and his granddaughter 
were the only kaum members left. Af ter his wife's death, the panghuZu 
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of the other kaum/buah gadang within the suku challenged his right to 
act as mamak kepaZa waris in his father'sjwife'sjgranddaughter's kaum 
and to take control of his new kaum's hapato pusako. The witnesses heard 
in the case we re able to convince the court that the plaintiff had 
merely been given the title of Chatib Adat on the occasion mentioned, 
but that he had not thereby been adopted into the kaum and consequently 
had no right to act as mamak kepaZa wapis; the mamak kepaZa wapis-ship 
on the contrary had to be taken over by the defendant(s) , the most 
closely related mamak in the plaintiff's granddaughter's suku. As the 
plaintiff could not prove his claim, he lost his case (reprinted in 
Bepita PengadiZan Tinggi no. 1, 1968: 33 ff.). 
The adoption of children by a married couple was unknown in Mînang-
kabau adat. Childless marriages of ten resulted in divorce; the man 
looked for a new wife, the wife for a new man or she consoled herself 
with her other (ZCh, MZDCh) children. Only recently has it been stated 
that according to Minangkabau adat law the adoption of children by a mar-
ried coup Ie is permissible and th at adopted children have the same 
legal status as real children 50 far as the parents ' property is con-
cerned (PN Padang case 278 of 1961 in Bepita PengadiZan Tinggi no. 1, 
1968: 23 ff., 24). In a later case, the PN Batu Sangkar (case 7 of 1974) 
acknowledged an adopted child as heir and descendant of his adoptive 
parents, but specified that the adopted child could not be considered 
an heir with respect to harato pusako inheritance. In contemporary 
Minangkabau, adoption can therefore be used as a means to have one 's 
hapato pancaharian inherited by one's preferred persons (chosen by adop-
tion) and prevent it from falling to the kamanakan. But as yet, adoptions 
are rare in Minangkabau. In the period 1968-1974, there were ónly 26 
applications for adoption of children in the jurisdictional districts of 
the PN Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar, and Payakumbuh. Of these, 2 were sub-
mitted by Chinese parents and 13 by Indonesians of other ethnic groups 
mostly persons serving as administrative and military officers in Minang-
kabau. As rumour had it, all these applications concerned the adoption 
of their illegitimate children. Only 11 applications were submitted by 
Minangkabau. 
b. Marriage 
The other and more important means to adjust interpersonal relationships 
to property strategies is marriage. In Chapter 2, I have already mentioned 
what types of marriage are considered ideal. Cross-cousin marriages (CCM) are 
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best suited for property strategies. In nearly every discussion of CCM 
with villagers, the value of these marriages for property and inheritance 
strategy was mentioned. Also, when future property relationships were 
discussed as such, informants would bringup the topic of CCM themselves 
(see the stories pro 218 ff. and 253 ff.). The property argument is also 
regularly mentioned in the anthropologists' analyses of the function of 
the CCM for the Mînangkabau social system (e.g. by Maretin 1961: 193; 
Fischer 1964: 103). 
If we deal with CCM as a means to re ach one's objective in property 
and inheritance affairs, we have, of course, to consider primarily the 
point of view of those persons who ar range the marriage. In Minangkabau, 
these pers ons are not the marriage partners but their elder kin. Before 
we assess the functional value of CCM in property affairs we therefore 
must briefly recall the context in which Minangkabau marriages are 
arranged. In adat, a husband is sought for a girl. It is the responsibi-
lity of her kaum to find the husband. A kaum meeting must be organized 
in which the girl's mamak and her mother(s) will have the most important 
voice. The girl's father and her bako are not completely excluded in the 
processes of looking for her future husband, and the girl's father and 
his mamak and sisters will also regularly participate in the meeting in 
which the candidates, the potential urang sumando, are discussed. But the 
girl's kaum will have to decide and have the final word (for a recent 
illustration of such a meeting in contemporary Minangkabau, see Tanner 
1971: 289). The diagram below shows that the participants not only re-
present the girl' s kaum and bako, but that at the same time the mamak 
and father of the cross-cousin who might be selected as spouse, are 
present. 
(1) patrilateral CCM 




(2) matrilateral CCM 
pulang ka anak mamak 
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We must proceed from this constellation when we consider the functional 
value of CCM,in the traditional Minangkabau social system. Let me dis-
cuss the value of patrilateral CCM first, where a woman's husband is 
her matrilateral cross-cousin. 
The mconak who has to find a husband for his female kconanakan, is 
very likely to think that his own son would make a good choice: His 
harato pancaharian ought to be inherited by his kconanakan, yet he would 
like to have his children profit from it as weIl. In particular, he 
would like to care for his sons; his daughters will be provided for 
anyway in their kaum, but his sons must go out to look for (mancari) 
property. His harato pancaharian ought to become harato turun temurun of 
his jurai, by being transmitted through his female kconanakan. So 
the marriage of his son to his female kconanakan would solve his problem. 
His son will profit from his harato pancaharian as the husband of 
his female kconanakan, and in the end the property will become harato 
pusako turun temurun in his femalekconanakan's jurai. Through the orga-
nization of a patrilateral CCM the mconak will be a "good mamak", he can 
"carry his children and lead his kconanakan", as adat demands of him. He 
can satisfy his wife and children, prevent the proverbial conflict be-
tween children and kconanakan, and yet direct his property to his prefer-
red person, his son. 
The patrilateral CCM also has its advantages in strategies concerning 
harato pusako. Through organizing such a marriage, the mconak will in-
crease his chances that his kaum will agree to give him harato pconbaoan 
to work with his wife and children, or that his kaum may consent to 
give the property to his children as harato hibah. For there is no danger 
that the beneficiary will try to make off with this land, as the male 
anak pisang will marry one of the kconanakan. Besides, the marriage would 
lead to economie continuity for two consecutive generations. At first, 
the mconak would work his harato pambaoan together with his wife and 
children. His daughters would soon start to live and work in their 
mother's jurai, but the sons would continue to work with their father. 
The son would then marry and continue to work on his father's, i.e. his 
wife's,harato pusako. When having children himself, he would continue 
to work with his children on the same land, now the pusako of his chil-
dren. 14 By making his children, his sons in particular, economically de-
pendent on him, the mconak can also exert some pressure so that they might 
care for him when he is old. 
Of course, it is not just the mconak's considerations which matter. 
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But the arguments just mentioned will also be considered ideal by the 
females of his kaum. They can be generous to their anak pisang, as they 
should be according to adat and one need not be afraid that the property 
will be lost or be used by "strange" persons. In addition, it is good 
to have a husband returned from the kaum to whom one has given a hus-
band a generation before. 
If a matrilateral CCM is arranged, i.e. if the female kamanakan should 
be married to her patrilateral cross-cousin, her mamak will be less 
interested, for such a marriage does not offer him any possibility of 
directing his property to his children. The girl's husband will not be 
related to him, unless, of course, the mamak himself had contracted a 
patrilateral CCM one generation before. The mamak's sisters would not 
be opposed to such a marriage, for it would mean that in two consecutive 
generations they would get an upang sumando, and perhaps some hapato 
pambaoan for their children, from the same group for nothing. But just 
this factor would be likely to lead the boy's kaum to oppose such a 
marriage. 
There would, however, be an advantage for the girl's fathep in a 
matrilateral CCM. He could give hapato pancahaPian to his daughter and 
have his male kamanakan, his potential successor as mamak, profit from 
it. He thus could avoid the children-kamanakan conflict to some extent. 
As a mamak of his male kamanakan he could also press his kaum to give 
hapato pambaoan to his male kamanakan and thereby have his daughter 
profit from it. In this way the marriage would provide him with an 
additional channel through which he could help, but also control, his 
male kamanakan. I should like to stress that this is a consideration 
of "the fathep" in the context of marriage-arrangements, and not of 
"the mamak". The mamak cannot "give his daughter away" to his male 
kamanakan; this will be done by his daughter's mamak! 
Whereas the patrilateral CCM could strengthen the bonds between 
father and son/mamak and female kamanakan, the matrilateral CCM would 
rather strengthen the relationships between father and daughter/mamak 
and male kamanakan. 
It is very difficult to assess which use has been made of CCMs in 
Minangkabau, as there are hardly any statistical data on the subject. 
In the older sources it is stated that both forms of CCM are considered 
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to be ideal marriages and that a slight preference is given to the patri-
lateral CCM (Van Eerde 1901: 394; Besseling 1904: 349; see also Fischer 
1964: 102 f.). For the contemporary situation we have to rely on the few 
statistical data available. They suggest that little use is made of CCM 
at all, and that of the two forms contracted, there is a definite pre-
ponderance of matrilateral CCM. Thus Kahn reports that in Sungai Puar, 
out of a sample of 838 marriages, 43 or 5.13% were matrilateral and 10 
or 1.2% were patrilateral C(}1. Thomas reports from Gurun, that out of a 
sample of 1527 marriages, there we re about 70 or 5% matrilateral and 35 
or 2% patrilateral CCM (Kahn 1976: 78; Thomas 1977: 99, 105, provisional 
figures). lVith most authors I would agree that CCM were contracted more 
frequently in former times. The consideration of the future spouses are 
nowadays much more taken into account than formerly,and the marriages 
on the suka sama suka basis, on the basis of mutual love, increase. But 
I think that, in addition, the decrease in C(}13should be directly related 
to the change in the adat conceptions of property relationships. With 
the increase of individual autonomy in property affairs, marriage as a 
means to direct property to one's preferred persons became less important. 
The need to reduce or prevent the conflict between children and kamana-
kan over their father's/mamak's property has also lost its importance 
as this problem was being solved by the changing law of intestate in-
heritance. 
It is my further content ion that in former times the patrilateral CCM 
was the more widely used form and that the preponderance of the matrila-
teral CCM is a more recent phenomenon. As several authors have hypothe-
sized the opposite development of the frequency of CCM, I must explain 
my hypothesis in some detail. 
The patrilateral CCM is the ideal marriage for those persons who 
according to (old) adat have the 'greatest influence on the choice of 
marriage partners, for it serves their interests best. I think that it 
is justified to proceed from this argument, not only if we consider the 
value of a CCM in terms of the organisers' interests, but also if we view 
CCM in relation to the structure of the Minangkabau social system in 
which CCM and the individual marriage-organisers operate. The Minangkabau 
social system is structured and maintained through time as the prin-
ciple of matrilineal des cent withinfixed territorial frameworks(see Chap-
ter 2). As far as possible, real matrilineal descent connections are 
used to s tructure groups and property holding units in continui ty. hhere 
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this is not possible, social relationships which are to be used in the 
context of continuity are assimilated to and expressed in the idiom of 
matrilineal descent. Marriage is not used to structilre the relationships 
between groups in perpetuity; on the contrary, permanent intergroup 
relationships are constructed by common exogamy, by ''non-marriage''. The 
Minangkabau social system may be said to be based upon the principle of 
''no (permanent) exchange": Group membership and property holding in con-
tinuity are achieved through the operation of the matrilineal des cent 
principle, and property and persons (spouses, father's children) cannot 
be transferred permanently from one group to the other except by rationa-
lization and justification of the transfer through matrilineal descent. 
The Minangkabau husband is only loaned to his wife's group, and 
the relationship established through his marriage is temporary. Equally 
temporary is the relationship based upon patrifiliation. Property trans-
fers based upon marriage and patrifiliation share this temporary nature. 
Within the stabIe framework of matrilineal descent the living individuals 
are given a rather large degree of autonomy to adapt their social and 
property relationships in a temporary way. As there is no fixed system 
of exchange, people are free to "trade" spouses and property as they 
wish. The right of the kaum to ask cross-cousins in marriage for their 
female kaum members is quite consistent with this picture. In the absence 
of a system of bilateral obligations, this option (Chapter 1: 24) is the 
only legally guaranteed means to recover what one has given. The right 
to demand a marriage partner from those to whom one has given a marriage 
partner before, which is allotted to one group as an option, is the con-
sequence of the absence of a compelling system of rights and obligations 
to receive and to give marriage partners. What use is made of the option, 
i.e. whether the kaum looking for a husband for their female kamanakan 
will try to get a cross-cousin as urang sumando or not, will then depend 
on the intentions and short-term interests of those kaum members who have 
the right to exercise the option. What their considerations are likely 
to be I have already outlined and I have also discussed why the patri-
lateral CCM offers advantages to the girl's kaum members, her mamak in 
particular: In those times when the man's harato panaaharian still had 
to become harato pusako turun temurun in his awn jurai, a patrilateral 
CCM was the best means to have his children profit from the harato panaa-
harian, too. The strengthening of the bond between father and son, to 
which such a marriage contributed, was also much more "necessary" econo-
rnically, as the married young Minangkabau man had no fixed social and 
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economic posltlon in his or his wife's kaum, whereas his sisters from 
the start were socially and economically integrated in their kaum. 
The matrilateral CCM, on the other hand, is much more in the interest of 
the pers on acting as father in the marriage arrangement. The change in 
importance and frequency of CCMs in the direct ion of growing preponderance 
of matrilateral CCMs therefore can be taken to reflect the growing im-
portance of the father's authority over his children. It can also be 
taken to reflect a greater part played by the individual spouses in the 
organization of their marriage: From their point of view the patrilateral 
CCM is not an ideal affair, as in the case of divorce not only their 
marital relationships but also their relationship to the bako would be 
affected, whereas a matrilateral CCM would be "safe" in this respect 
(cf. Thomas 1977, for a similar conclusion). We would assume that this 
consideration also plays a much greater role in the more recent period 
of Minangkabau history than in earlier times when the marriage partners 
had but little or no say at all in the marriage arrangement. 15 My inter-
pretation of the former importance of patrilateral CCM and the growing 
importance of matrilateral CCM in more recent times is in accordance 
with all that we know about social conditions in early Minangkabau and 
social change, and it is also supported by the available data, both 
for the past and the present, concerning the preference for and the 
statistical frequency of CCM. 
Other authors, however, have hypothesized the opposite development. 
The basis for their assumption is De Josselin de Jong's (1951) cautious 
hypothesis, that an asymmetric connubium based upon prescriptive matri-
lateral CCM formed the foundation of Minangkabau social structure. He 
assumed that "although nowadays marriage wi th the FZD is considered very 
acceptable, the really ideal marriage and the one that underlies the 
Minangkabau social structure is the matrilateral C~'(1951: 62). The 
patrilateral CCM is, according to his interpretation, a rather recent 
development. This hypothesis has been followed somewhat uncritically 
and with much less caution by later authors, who, however, did not 
adduce any additional ethnographic data by which it could be justified 
(see Maretin 1961: 190; Umar Junus 1964: 300 ff.; Kahn 1976: 78). The 
available data rather contradict their hypothesis, for the statement 
that the patrilateral CCM is the more ideal and frequent CCM in con tempo-
rary Minangkabau is clearly inconsistent with the statistics given by 
Kahn and Thomas, which show the matrilateral CCM as preponderant. As far 
as the "development from matrilateral to patrilateral CCM" is concerned, 
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which is mainly based upon arguments with respect to property, it turns 
out to be a grave misinterpretation~ Maretin writes: 
"In order not to incur the displeasure of his kinfolk, a man sometimes 
built a house for his son, under matriclan laws belonging to his wife's 
family, and gave him into marriage to his ZD. In this tendency to con-
clude marriage to his sister's daughter, we clearly observe the increas-
ing part pZayed by the father's paruik, in other words the gradual trans-
formation from matrilineali ty to patrilineali ty" (1961: 193, i talies 
added) . 
But Maretin's analysis which has heavily influenced Kahn's later 
interpretation of the Minangkabau social system and which has been 
praised as being part of "some modern Soviet anthropological work 
(which) has been intellectually stimulating as weIl as ethnographically 
up to date" (Firth 1975: 42, 56) completely obscures the issue: Maretin 
seems to have overlooked the fact that in Minangkabau a husband is se-
lected for a girl. The "father who gives his son in marriage to his 
sister's daughter" is the mamak of the group which arranges the marriage! 
Patrilateral CCM therefore means that the mamak's kaum dominates the 
marriage arrangements. If the father's paruik were dominant, this would 
indicate a preponderanee of matrilateral CCM. Thus,if the development 
leads from the mamak's (mamak's kaum's) influence to the father's 
(father's kaum's) influence - a proposition with which I fully agree -
then its course would be opposite to the one suggested by Maretin, 
namely from patrilateral to matrilateral C(}!, a development supported 
by the statistical data available and by the social developments in Minang-
kabau in general. 16 
IIL 1HE MEANS OF 1HE WOULD-BE HEIRS 
1. The Means 
The objectives of the would-be heirs and donees are clear. They want to 
become or to remain donees and heirs, as individuals or for the groups 
of which they are members. The range of activities to further these ends 
greatly dependson whether the property holder has exercised his autonomy 
over his property or not, and whether he still can do 50. 
If the property holder still lives and can exercise his autonomy 
the would-be heirs (here aft er abbreviated as WBHs) may try to influence 
the holder to exercise his autonomy in their favour, or, depending on 
the situation, influence him to abstain from an exercise of autonomy 
which would be disadvantageous to them. If the holder exercises 
1lIE RJLFILMENf OF 1lIE RJNCfION 301 
his autonomy, this willoften require collaborative action on the part 
of the WBHs intended as beneficiaries. However, other persons, too, may 
feel themselves to be WBHs, and take adverse action against such antici-
patory transfers or the individually directed flow of property. The 
typical charge of these others then, is that the transaction in question 
was not valid in law as it violated the adat rules,which demand the know-
ledge or consent of the relatives, adat functionaries, etc. The time at 
which the adverse action is taken can differ. It may be done at once, 
still during the lifetime of the holder, in order to invalidate the 
transaction from the start (as we have seen in the stories about the 
property of St. Pangeran and Haji Batuah) ,but it mayalso be done af ter 
some time when the WBHs consider it a good opportunity. 
But the greatest number of cases in which inheritance strategies of 
WBHs become public involve situations in which they assert their status 
as heirs according to the rules of intestate inheritance. In the system 
of the adat pusako, where from the point of individuals no definite 
border exists between the synchronic and diachronic dimension of property 
relationships, such assertions can already be made during the holder's 
lifetime. This is generally done either by cooperating with the holder 
"as his heir" at formal occasions in which the holder 's ahZi warih have 
to participate, or by taking adverse action against the holder when he 
exercises his autonomy. As was clear in the story of Angku Mudo and St. 
pangeran (p. 253 ff.), the assertion of one's own status of heir lies 
in the charge that the holder was not entitled to dispose of his proper-
ty without one's consent. 
For their strategies the WBHs can draw from a large arsenal of con-
ceptions provided by the three legal systems, and they can also use a 
variety of institutions which can validate their status as heirs. A de-
tailed description and analysis of these two sets of strategies would 
go beyond the scope of this study. Here, only the most important aspects 
can be mentioned. 
2. The Legitimation of the WouZd-Be Heirs' CZaims 
The conceptions with which the WHBs rationalize and justify their claims 
and behaviour are usually taken from adat. References to Islamic law or 
to written law as systems which would or should be used to cover the 
evaluation of the whole situation-image are practically never made. In 
CKL, we did not hear of any such case. The few exceptions we know of 
are more or less confined to those cases in which property disputes are 
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brought before institutions that apply Islamic law; as already has been 
5 tated, such cases are extremely rare. What happens-; however, is that 
elements of western or Islamic law are used in combination with adat 
conceptions. The degree to which this is done, differs with respect to 
the aspects or spheres of the evaluation process. 
a. Standards of Validity 
The WBHSgenerally evaluate the validity of property transfers in terms 
of the conceptions provided by adat. References to written law are ex-
tremely rare, and we observed such a reference in just one case: Dt. 
Batuah Rajo's claim that the surat kuasa made by Haji Batuah was valid 
according "to written law and the constitution" and that he, Dt. Batuah 
Rajo, therefore could not be blamed for having taken cognizance of it 
(see p. 244). Islamic law is sametimes adduced in order to support the 
general principle that donations and testaments may be made at all and 
that such transfers are not subject to the consent of the donator's/ 
testator's matrikin. Reference to the specific Islamic legal conceptions 
pertaining to the validity of hibah or wasiyat, however, is never made. 
Most probably this is because also the application of these conceptions 
would invalidate most transfers made in order to evade the adat restric-
tion. As the State Courts systematically refuse to apply Islamic legal 
conceptions,and as the individual autonomy to dispose freely of harato 
pancaharian is recognized now as new adat law, also the general refe-
rences to Islamic law have become very rare. 
Within adat, several standards of validity are used by the WBHs. With 
respect to transfers of harato pusako, the standard - consent and/or 
knowledge of all ahZi warih and the panghuZu - has been rather stabIe. 
The WBHs usually do not operate with the consent - knowledge distinction, 
although it is of ten made by the courts. If the WBHs deviate from the 
adat standards, they generally do 50 in secret, hoping (or enforcing 
with non-Iegal means) that the transfer will go unchallenged. The stand-
ards of validity of harato pancaharian transfers have been set unequivo-
cally by now, but in a few cases people still fight the new standard, 
unrestricted freedom of disposition, with the old one according to 
which the consent and/or the knowledge of the kaum members is required. 
The argument is usually raised in the kamanakan vs. children dispute. 
Only in one case decided by the PN Bukit Tinggi (case 49 of 1970), it 
was "the children" who (in vain) tried to invalidate their father's 
transfer of harato pancaharian to his other children with the argument 
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that the transfer had not received the consent of the (father's) pang-
hulu and ahli warih. 
b. Relevance and Legal Consequences 
In the sphere of legal consequences which specify the relevance of death 
for intestate inheritance one can observe a slightly different picture. 
Adat concept i ons dominate here, too, and no use at all is made of statute 
law. But elements of Islamic law are used to a somewhat larger extent, 
especially in people's statements that the harato pancaharian are inhe-
rited or should be inherited according to hukum faraidh. Most people 
who say this are clearly aware of the fact that hukum faraidh con ta ins 
a much more complicated distribution of inheritance portions, and that 
their reference to Islamic law is a partial one only. If the argument 
that the children should inherit according to Islamic law is raised in 
disputes, the invocation of Islamic law is always made only for the 
legitimation of the children's claim and never for the legitimation of 
other persons who would be heirs according to Islamie law.'7 Even if 
the inheritance of the children in general, as current inheritance 
practice or as normative demand, is legitimated in terms of Islamic law, 
the actual distribution between the children is not carried out in 
accordance with the Koranic rules. In Islamic law, male heirs receive 
twice as much as female heirs, but the common practice is that the chil-
dren get equal shares,or that the female heirs receive more than the 
mal es "in accordance with adat". Thus Haji Hassan, in the story told 
earlier (p. 272), explicitly had stated that his property should be in-
herited in accordance with hukum faraidh, yet he distributed his pro-
perty in more or less equal shares. Even in the case of the inheritance 
of I. Canduang, the foremost Islamic scholar of CKL, the Islamic rules 
of distribution would not be adhered t~. His harato pancaharian had not 
yet been finally distributed among his heirs, but his children, amongst 
them the Tuan Kali of the Sidang and the head of the Islamic School in 
CKL who also was a lecturer in Islamic law at the I~lamic University in 
Bukit Tinggi, stated that in principle his sons and daughters would re-
ceive equal shares. Our counterpart, Sdr. Narullah Dt. Perpatih nan Tuo 
S.H., reported to us the same practices from nagari 111 Balai. 
Most Minangkabau, however, conceive of the inheritance of harato 
pancaharian by the children as the "new" adat. This view is also held 
by the State Courts,which never make reference to Islamie Law but only 
304 PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTINUITY 
to adat when they legitimate the inheritance right of the children. 
Occasionally, one may even hear that the inheritance law had not changed 
at all, and that hapato pancaharian have always been inherited by the 
children in accordance with adat. Such opinions were only expressed by 
experts with a reputation of being adat-purists, probably in order to 
minimize the influence Islam may have had on Minangkabau inheritance 
practices. 18 The consequent court practice and the affirmation of the 
children's inheritance rights are probably what led to the situation 
that inheritance arguments are only very rarely based upon Islamic law. 
The degree to which this was done in times in which the children's 
inheritance was not a matter of fact, unfortunately is not known. 
Principles of Islamic law are occasionally also used to legitimate 
one's relationships to hapato pusako. Tanner reports a case in which the 
internal distribution of a kaum's property was in dispute. One of the 
disputants tried to achieve a re arrangement with the argument that 
"according to sYaPak, inherited property is divided" (1969: 45). But the 
reference and its intended consequences were further discussed by all 
disputants in the adat context of the eventual division of the haPato 
pusako between the sisters' jupai. 
c. Legally Relevant Knowledge 
In most cases of diachronic transfers of property relationships the 
general legal conceptions are not problematic. The standards of validity 
by which transactions effecting diachronic transfers are judged, the 
specification of the legal consequences attached to death in terms of 
the applicable legal system and in terms of its detailed distribution 
and inheritance rules, are accepted as self-evident in most cases. It 
is important to emphasize that this holds true as a general rule for all 
cases of diachronic transfers of property relationships, whether they 
are disputed or not. What generally is problematic in property and in-
heritance disputes is the content of the situation-image to which legal 
consequences are to be attached or which should be evaluated in terms of 
validity. As the research of K.v. Benda-Beckmann in the State Courts of 
Minangkabau has shown, about 80% of all disputed cases are more or Ie ss 
concerned with the question of what has happened in a concrete situation 
or who is related to whom in what way. The principle of matrilineal des-
cent is legally relevant insofar as it determines the persons who are 
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to inherit pusako property; the status of heir is specified in terms of 
genealogical posi tions. The abstract question of ''who are the heirs" in 
adat is usually unproblematic. What is problematic is the determination 
of the individual persons whose actual kinship relationships are legally 
relevant for the diachronic transfer of property rights. What is required 
to solve these questions is the knowledge of the genealogical relations 
between persons and groups. Most cases which are seriously disputed are 
inter-group cases of the kind I have described in part B of this chapter, 
where pawned property or the harato pusako of an extinct kaum is at stake. 
The relevant transactions and genealogical relationships are of ten uncer-
tain, and are only remembered, if at all, by some panghuZu or other adat 
experts. But even if they are remembered, they of ten cannot be proved. 
Most disputed cases therefore are decided with help of the legal con-
ceptions which lay down what constitutes the situation-image to be 
evaluated for legal consequences, i.e. by the rules of evidence in the 
widest sense. As the study of K.v.Benda-Beckmann will demonstrate, it 
is here that written law exerts its greatest influence on the decisions 
taken by State Courts in matters of property and inheritance. The pro-
cedural law in the State Courts, including the law of evidence, is a 
modified version of Dutch procedural law, which puts quite different 
demands on factual propositions in terms of plausibility, probability, 
credibility and certainty than does adat. It is here that the position 
of the adat experts in the nagari is still 50 important, for they are 
regularly called as expert-witnesses in nagari internal disputes and in 
court cases. One also he ars more of bribery of witnesses than of cor-
rupt judges. As some of the stories illustrate, the villagers are weIl 
aware that different standards operate in the nagari and in the courts, 
and they make skillful use of this in their dispute strategies (see 
Bandaro Hitam's account of his mamak's case, p. 251 ff. On dispute 
strategy, see also Tanner 1969, 1971). 
3. The Agents of VaZidation 
The establishment of one's status as heir or donee is not only a matter 
of the conceptions through which it is done, but also of the forum in 
which these conceptions are applied in concrete cases. It is not suffi-
cient to be able to legitimate one's status in terms of the generally 
acceptable conceptions. One must also get the others to accept the 
situation-image of continued property relationships, and if the others 
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refuse it, to seek its enforcement with the means available. This mainly con-
cerns disputed property transfers. In undisputed cases the matter is 
rather simpIe. Transactions or unilateral dispositions carried out 
during the lifetime of the property holder are validated in a ceremonial 
process in which the kaum members, the mamak, the panghuZu or other adat 
functionaries,participate. In cases of inheritance, it is the meeting 
of the kaum of the deceased in which the inheritance, the new distribu-
tion, or the reallocation of the deceased's property objects are vali-
dated. A special process of validation is only necessary for the dia-
chronie transfer of the sako, when an installation ceremony must be held and 
the new office holder must be acknowledged by "the nagari" (see Chapter 
2: 86 f.). 
When diachronie transfers are disputed, however, the disputants can 
turn to several agents for the validation of their claims. The hierarchy 
of the adat institutions in the nagari has al ready been described. Be-
sides, there are institutions of the local government system, the Kera-
patan Negeri and the WaZi Negeri. Outside the nagari, the State Courts 
can be invoked. Besides the institutions which are officially legiti-
mated to mediate or to judge in property disputes, there are others like 
the Camat and the military and police officers posted at the Kecamatan 
capital, who are not 50 legitimated but who nevertheless can be, and are, 
invoked as agents of decision making. 
In the nagari, the adat hierarchy is still adhered to to some extent. 
Several agents, the Karapatan Adat Nagari in particular, refuse to hear 
cases until the lower agents have tried to settIe the disputes. However, 
due to the many vacancies of panghuZu offices, the disputants of ten can-
not keep to the ideal bajanjang naiek ("one must go up the steps") hier-
archy of adat. Some panghuZu and juaro adat are quite active in dispute 
settIement and do not hestitate to handle cases of persons not belonging 
to their buah gadang or hindu adat. The frequency of their activity in 
dispute settIement, and their successes in particular, to a great extent 
determine their prestige and authority in the nagari. But of ten disputes 
are taken directly to the higher agents of decision making, the WaZi 
Negeri or the Kerapatan Negeri. The choice, or rather the first choice, 
of an agent very much depends on factors such as kinship relations and 
other social relations one has with the agents, and the relative amounts 
of political and economie power held by the agents, or which one can 
bring to bear upon them. In principle, Minangkabau disputants 
choose the agents from whom they expect the most positive result, 
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and they do not have many scruples about using the various power sources 
inside and outside the nagari. There seems to have been little change in 
this respect. Already in the older Dutch sources it is reported that the 
officially recognized panghuZu and those who held the offices of village 
mayor or Tuangku Laras used their power in ways contrary to adat to en-
rich themselves and their jurai/kaum or children to the disadvantage of 
others. The same is true for contemporary Minangkabau. The power of the 
police and the military is of ten brought into disputes, especially, but 
not only, in disputes between members of different kaum. Each change in 
the power structure triggers off a multitude of disputes or the reopening 
of disputes, and the disputants try to gain as much as possible from the 
shift in political influence of either their opponents or their friends 
who have acted as agents of validation. The most clear examples come 
from the time of the Japanese occupation, the Dutch military actions, 
the PRRI rebellion in 1958-1961, and the change from the Sukarno to the 
Suharto regime (see Tanner 1969: 45 and the story on p. 263 ff.). 
The State Courts are regularly employed in property strategies (see 
also Tanner 1969, 1971). The disputes that reach the courts have in 
nearly all cases been discussed in one of the nagari-institutions, but 
of ten people go straightforwardly to the court if the first attempt to 
settIe the matter in the nagari has failed (compare the story of St. 
Pangeran, p. 253 ff.). Although the number of cases which are decided 
by the courts cannot be related to the actual number of undisputed and 
disputed cases of diachronic transfers(since adequate data on the latter 
are unavailable), the court records offer some interesting clues. Dis-
putes concerning the diachronic transfers of harato pancaharian are rare 
as compared with disputes over harato pusako. Only 8.4% of the courts' 
case load involves disputes about harato pancaharian, whereas at least 
54% of the cases are concerned with harato pusako transfers. 19 Of the 
disputes over harato pusako transfers (N=270), 42.5% were between mem-
bers of the same suku, 34.5% between members of different suku, and 23% 
we re between members of the same and different suku. However, only 31 
cases, or 11.4% of all cases over harato pusako, concerned disputes be-
tween kaum relatives; the rest of the cases involved disputes between 
different kaum of the same suku or between kaum of different suku. These 
data support the villagers' statements that disputes between 'mamak and 
kamanakan" should be avoided as much as possible, and that one would be 
ashamed if such disputes could not be solved at the lowest possible 
level of decision making. The data also support the hypothesis presented 
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by several anthropologists and sociologists, that in cases where the 
parties are linked in multiplex relationships (Gluckman), the solution 
of a conflict is sought, and generally achieved, on the lowest possible 
level and in the terms of an amicable settIement, without the invocation 
of the "foreign" courts and their inflexible law (see Gessner 1976: 202 
ff. on intra-family disputes in Mexico; cf. also Gluckman 1973; Kuper 
1971). 
Once the disputes have come to court, however, there is only a small 
chance for an amicable settIement. Only 11.4% of the disputes concerning 
harato pusako were solved by a perdamaian, an amicable settIement pro-
posed by the judge and accepted by both parties; in comparison, 16.6% of 
the other cases brought to the State Courts were settled amicably. And 
once the dispute has come tocourt, there is a definite tendency to push 
it up the court hierarchy. Of the 238 cases decided by the PengadiZan 
Negeri in Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar and Payakumbuh in the period 1968-
1974, 129 cases (54%) were appealed. The motivations to appeal are 
various. Appeal is a good means to win time during which the property 
can be used and exploited; it is also a means to exhaust one's opponents 
financially. The statistical data which we collected at the PengadiZan 
Tinggi in Padang also show that there is a good chance that the PN judge-
ment will be reversed in appeal. Of the 576 appeal cases (83% of which 
involved pusako property) decided by the FT Padang between 1966-1974, 
the PN judgements were reversed in 41% of the cases. In 45% of the cases, 
the judgements were confirmed, and in 14% they were "improved", diper-
baiki, i.e. slightly amended without basically being changed. Further 
review applications to the Supreme Court do not - statistically - pay 
off. Of the 105 PT judgements attacked, only 5.7% were reversed, where-
as in 90.5% of the cases the FT judgements were confirmed (rest unclear). 
The diversity of the agents of validation means that the contending 
parties of ten have different situation-images of transferred property 
relationships validated by different agents, at the same time or succes-
sively. Cases tumbIe from one temporary settIement to the next temporary 
settIement. It is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
settlements, as cases that appear to be settled may be reopeneà the 
next moment and the previous settIement may be changed completely. In 
terms of the official hierarchy of the agents of validation, the court 
system is the highest agent and its validations can be executed with the 
help of the administrative machinery. According to our research in CKL, 
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court judgements are adhered to with only a very few exceptions. But also 
court cases can be, and frequently are, reopened af ter some time. In 
principle, the colonial and'national courts consider themselves to be 
bound by the rule that in the same matter only one decision may be given 
(ne bis in idem). But in practice this rule is not generally adhered 
to. One reason for this is that during the periods of political unrest 
(Japanese occupation, Dutch military actions, PRRI rebellion, the change 
of the regime in 1965) a great many court recordswere destroyed. 
Another reason is that it is not difficult for the parties, or the des-
cendants of the original parties, to present a new situation-image to 
the court even if the same legal question is to be solved anew. 20 
A Minangkabau bride 
Women eating af ter the harvest 
CHAPTER SIX 
1HE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE II: 1HE PROOOCfION OF 
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS IN HISTORlCAL PERSPECflVE 
A. INI'RODUCfORY NarE 
I. 1HE PROIUCTION OF LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
Before I described the systems of cognitive and normative conceptions 
which pertain to property relationships and their maintenance through 
time in Minangkabau (Chapter 4), I had asserted that the material pre-
sented needed further differentiation, a) in terms of the various 
authorsjproducers of concrete and general legal conceptions, and b) in 
terms of historical development and change. I shall try to give this 
differentiated account in this chapter. For lack both of space and of 
adequate data, I cannot, however, present as full a differentiation 
as would be indicated by the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 1; 
neither do I want to repeat myself unnecessarily. By way of introduction 
I shall therefore briefly indicate how the materials of this chapter 
relate to the data already given and to my analytical framework as out-
lined in the beginning of this study. 
In this chapter, I shall not try to cover wholly the system(s) of 
property relationships, but shall restrict myself to those topics which, 
in my view, are central to property relationships in Minangkabau: The 
general legal conceptions pertaining to the exercise of society's 
members' autonomy in property affairs and to intestateinheritance, and 
the conceptual system in which the Minangkabau think and speak about 
property relationships. Furthermore, I shall not devote equal attention 
to elements of the plural systems but rather concentrate on the develop-
ment of adat/adat law. As has been shown in the previous chapters, there 
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has been little room for the clash of the three systems of property 
relationships in Minangkabau; that is, little room for clashes in a pre-
defined legal and judicial context. In the courts' practice, adat is 
more or less the only system used to legitimate decisions in property 
and inheritance affairs. The same can be said for the popular practice 
(see Chapter 5). Yet the relations between the systems of property re-
lationships des erve more attention than would seem to be warranted by 
the limited number of concrete situations in which the systems actually 
clash. For although the contradictions of the systems are rninirnized in 
the legal and juridical context, familiarity with all systems is always 
there as a cultural and political factor (see Chapter 3). The judges and 
administrators in the colonial courts who legitimated their judgements 
in terms of adat had been socialized in the system of western law, and 
they understood the adat system through the logic inherent in their own 
system. The same holds true to a large extent for the Indonesian judges 
in the contemporary State Courts who have been trained in western law 
during their study at the university. We shall see that this is an im-
portant factor influencing the development of and the changes within 
the adat system. The relations between adat and Islam also are of great 
relevance. For with the introduction of the Arabic language and the 
Islamic legal systern, adat was to some extent redefined in Islamic legal 
concepts. The conflict and integration of adat and Islam played an 
important role in local poli tics, and the issue of inheritance was its 
main topic. Before I describe and analyse the change which has taken 
place within the adat systern, I shall therefore deal with the clash of 
systems. 
But given even these restrictions, a completely differentiated analysis 
would have to operate at least with a set of three closely interrelated 
and partly overlapping contexts: personal, processual, and substantive. 
On the persona Z Zeve Z, we would distinguish the authors of legal con-
ceptions according to their differentiated social roles. For Minangka-
bau this would mean that we would have to distinguish between at least: 
1. the common people (with additional sex and age differentiation), 
2. the adat experts (panghuZu and cerdik pandai in particular), 
3. the adat functionaries in their capacity as official ac tors in the 
processes of reactive and preventive law application (with additional 
differentiation as to the various institutionalized forms in 
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the nagari) , 
4. the judicial functionaries in the colonial and national State Courts, 
S. the political representatives of the population on supra-nagari 
levels, 
6. the authors of literature on adat and adat law (with additional dif-
ferentiation between Minangkabau, Indonesian, and foreign writers). 
On the proaessuaZ ZeveZ, we would have to distinguish the social 
processes in which legal conceptions are produced. For Minangkabau, this 
would mean that we would have to distinguish: 
1. the concrete engagement of persons as parties in property and 
inheritance affairs, 
2. the acting as adat functionary in such a process, 
3. the social processes of reactive and preventive law application (with 
additional differentiation between at least the court proceedings, 
proceedings before the institutions still legitimated through adat 
constitutional law in the nagari, and those nagari-institutions legi-
timated by local government laws) , 
4. the social processes aiming at introducing new legal conceptions out-
side the processes of law application (legislation, conferences), 
S. the publishing of a book on adat/adat law, and 
6. the interview process. 
On the suhstantive ZeveZ, we nust distinguish: 
1. between statements which proclaim to give a correct interpretation 
of legal conceptions and those which aim at a description of existing 
legal conceptions, 
2. between concrete and general conceptions. 
These legal conceptions, differentiated according to the authors and 
through the social processes in which they are created, share the same 
properties by which law is characterized, but they are different social 
phenomena which should not be confused. In actual description and ana-
lysis, it is probably inevitable that data are lumped together across 
the borders drawn by the distinctions mentioned, but i t should be kept 
in mind that they are lumped together. In this chapter I cannot make as 
nuch use of this set of distinctions as I would wish. llich of the rele-
vant material has already been presented in a rather undifferentiated 
manner in the previous chapters, and I do not wish to repeat myself too 
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much,but rather concentrate upon the most essential aspects of the system 
of property relationships. Other restrictions are imposed by the availa-
bIe material, for it of ten does not make the differentiations we would 
require. For the analysis of the histor~development of the property 
law in Minangkabau, my main material consists of court-cases and lite-
rature in which it is not always clear whether the data are a descrip-
tion of legal conceptions or whether they refer to actual behaviour. The 
material presented in Chapter 5 can be used in this context, too, al-
though much is concerned with concrete rather than with general legal 
conceptions . 
I I. CONCRETE AND GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AND 1HE PROBLIM OF CHANGE 
The distinction between concrete and general legal conceptions, already 
discussed in a rather theoretical manner in Chapter 1, here becomes 
relevant in practice. Whether concrete decisions embody and restate 
general legal conceptions is a matter for empirical investigation, and 
it demands a prior investigation of the doctrine of decision-making, 
i.e. of those genera I legal conceptions which pertain to the application 
and the change of general conceptions in concrete cases. As we shall deal 
with the change of general legal conceptions in this chapter, I shall 
give some information here about the doctrines of decisionmaking and change 
in adat/adat law which should be kept in mind when the actual judgements 
are discussed. 
In Minangkabau, different doctrines of decision making operate in 
adat institutions and in the colonial/national courts. The adat doctrine 
of decision by common deliberation (musyawarah) leading to a unanimous 
decision (sakato) has already been briefly described (Chapter 2: 92 f.). 
The decision makers are relatively free in their evaluation of situation-
imagesand in their determination of legal consequences within the frame-
work of rather vague and flexible general substantive legal conceptions; 
but they are bound by same rather strict procedural genera I concept-
ions. As the exercise of their autonomy is the essential element of the 
doctrine, the concrete result of one decision making process cannot be 
extrapolated to a similar case later; it is imperative that in the later 
case the decision makers exercise their autonomy anew and, possibly, 
with a different concrete result. But the, or rather some, general adat 
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concept i ons on which the decision makers base their decision are regular-
ly restated during the process. The formalized and ceremonial speech of 
the decision making process largely comprises combinations of general 
adat conceptions, which are thus explicitly restated even if their truth 
is self-evident for all concerned. What cannot be extrapolated is that 
the concrete result of the decision would always follow from their re-
statement. 
In the colonial and State Courts, however, a different doctrine of 
decision making is used, a doctrine of "law-application". The courts' 
judgements must be legitimated with reference to preexisting law. The 
doctrine has its origin in western law, where it was designed for the 
application of the written law. In Indonesia, it has been adapted to the 
conditions in which the courts have to apply unwritten adat law; par-
ticularly with the implicit or explicit acceptance of Ter Haar's de-
cision theory, according to which the adat law is embedded in "authorita-
tivedecisions within and without disputes", made by the adat functionaries 
and the court judges (see Chapter 1: 35). But independently of the question 
of what the "true" sources of (adat) law are, the theory remains one of 
"law-application", i.e. a theory working with the assumption that law is 
preexistent, and asking the judge to find that law and apply it to the 
facts, leaving him little discretion in the process cf application. I 
have cammented upon the theoretical implications of this theory earlier 
in this study (Chapter 1: 37 f.). In practice it meant and means that the 
process of common deliberation and exercise of autonomy, which is 50 
closely interrelated with the concrete substantive conceptions in adat, 
is not reproduced in the courts. The genera I substantive adat conceptions 
thereby acquire a much more rigid character and are divorced from the 
procedural adat conceptions. Although the doctrine of decision making is 
hardly ever made explicit in court judgements, our interviews with the 
judges in the contemporary State Courts revealed that they adhered to 
a hybrid form of Ter Haar's decision theory. They did not care too much 
about the true sources of law; adat is adat, and only becomes adat law 
through its application in judgements, for adat law is adat which has 
sanctions (Van Vollenhoven). The extent to which general adat conceptions 
are explicitly restated in court judgements, varies. As has been mentioned 
before, the greatest number of cases involve disputes about the content 
of situation-images, whereas disputes about standards of evaluation or 
general legal consequences are rare. In those cases where the general 
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adat conceptions are self-evident for all participánts in the court process, 
they are of ten implied in the parties' reasonings. The judgements gene-
rally contain only a brief statement that they follow from, or are in 
accordance with, the adat law of Minangkabau, without the actual general 
conceptions being restated in detail. However, when general adat con-
ceptions are in dispute between the parties, their correct interpre-
tation is usually given explicitly by the judges in the judgement. 
Generally , the "correct" interpretation is implicitly legitimated by the 
judges' socio-political status as authorized decision makers and admini-
strators of the law. However, when the judges themselves want to deviate 
from existing general conceptions, this deviation - the change of legal 
conceptions - usually is given additional legitimation. And here, in the 
matter of change, the difference between the adat theory and the courts' 
theory and practice is most marked. 
Adat has its own theory of change. In principle, adat (or certain 
manifestations of adat (see above Chapter 3: 115 f.), "do not rot through 
the rain and do not crack in the sun" (indak Zapuek dek hujan - indak 
Zakang dek paneh). Even if the adat rules are old, they never lose their 
actuality: "If a kain (cloth) is used, it gets wom - if adat is used, 
it remains new" (kain dipakai usang - adat dipakai baru). Yet adat can 
change and be changed: "Every time there is a great flood, the shape of 
the bathing place changes" (sakaZi aie gadang, sakaZi tapian baraZieh). 
Adat must be adapted to changing circumstances. An adat saying states 
(Nasroen 1957: 39 f.; R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 93 f.): 
Usang Usang dipabaharui What is wom mus t be renewed 
Lapuek-Zapuek dikajangi What is rotten, must be cleaned 
Nan eZok dipakai What is good, must be used 
Nan buruek dibuang What is bad, nrust be thrownaway 
Kok singkek mintak diuZeh What is (too) short, should be lengthened 
Panjang mintak dikarek What is (too) long, nrust be shortened 
Nan umpang mintak disisit What is too spacious, nrust be made smaller 
Change in adat and of adat genera I conceptions can occur in two ways: 
There is the adat nan teradat , the adat which changes wi th time 
and place and adapts itself to changing circumstances as a reflexion of 
changing behaviour patterns. No formal social process of changing adat 
conceptions is necessary in this case (see Chapter 3: 116). But adat 
conceptions of more important and legal character can be changed only by 
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decisions of the adat cOlmcil. Through the rrrusyClJ,)arah of the nagari 
leaders i t becomes adat nan diadatkan, "adat which is made into adat", 
or kato rrrupakat, "the rule made by rrrupakat". All instance of such change 
is the aboli tion of the rule of nagari - endogamy, which was decided in 
many nagari af ter Independence in the 1950'5. So far as we have been 
able to find out, there have been no such decisions in the field of pro-
perty and inheri tance law. 
The courts treat the change of legal conceptions differently, but the 
way in which they have done 50 has not been uniform during the last 100 
years. The idea seems to have once prevailed among Dutch lawyers and 
judges.that, if a given situation could not be dealt with in terms of 
already existing adat conceptions, the lacuna had to be filled with 
Dutch law and not with a development of adat. It only seldom happened 
that judges were concerned with the question of whether a hypothesized 
new rule or legally relevant action could be subsumed under a category 
of adat which, according to adat theory, is amenable to change and 
adaptation to changed circumstances. 1 In the late periods of Dutch 
colonial judicial administration, and also af ter Independence, the 
judges generally contented themselves with the knowledge that adat can 
change. All additional legitimation for stating changed adat conceptions 
flowed from their theory about adat law and their position as judges: 
Adat law is the law of the people, reflecting their customary behaviour 
patterns and their feelings of just and right behaviour. When the be-
haviour patterns and the feelings of justice change, adat changes wi th 
them. The judges leave no doubt that they are the ones entitled to 
ascertain this change, and that they are charged with the task 
to state whether social change only has occurred or whether this social 
change has brought about change of the lClJ,), too (compare Lev: 1962). 
Social change not in accordance with the judge's concept ion of how the 
law should be, must, in their view, be denied the force of legal change. 
It sometimes happened and continues to happen that the judges draw upon 
the expert evidence of adat experts in the nagari in order to determine 
change, but in recent times they do no more than refer to the unsub-
stantiated "fact, that it is already customary •.• " or "that it is a 
wel! known truth of contemporary Minangkabau society •.• " (cf. p. 330 f.). 
Reference may be made to higher ranking law, toa, as e.g. to the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Indonesia and the Panca Sila, the five basic 
principles of the state ideology, in order to change adat conceptions. 
Such legitimations of change have played an important role in the change 
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of inheritance conceptions in other areas of Indonesia. 2 As we shall see 
later in this chapter, however, the most decisive changes of the Minang-
kabau adat conceptions of property relationships and diachronic transfers 
have been changed in a rather laconic way. 
B. 1HE CLASH OF 1HE SYSTEMS OF PROPERTI RELATIONSHIPS 
I. ADAT AND WESTERN LAW 
The first situation in which adat and westernjwritten law collided in 
the field of property relationships was in the introduction of the pusa-
ko-eigendomsakte (ownership deed) in 1853 (see Chapter 4: 209). From the 
few available sources it is not possible to assess whether Sarolea's 
statement, "that everyone agreed that through the registration such 
pusako-land became subject to Dutch formal law only" (AB 27: 275) holds 
true for all stages of Minangkabau legal history. It may have been correct 
in his time, around 1928, 75 years af ter the introduction of the regulation. 
Right af ter its introduction, however, two cases involving pusako-eigendom 
caused quite a stir in the colonial administration. 3 
The Case of Puti Priaman - LR padang. 9.6.1856 
Puti Priaman, the woman whose inheritance was in dispute, had had two 
daughters, Puti Dewi and Puti Maley. Puti Dewi already had died but her 
daughter, Puti Dihan, and her granddaughter, Puti Banghong Reno, were still 
alive. Shortly before her death, Puti Priaman had gone to a notary public 
in Padang and made a testament. She had bequeathed all her property, in-
cluding some pusako-eigendom, to her granddaughter Puti Banghong Reno. 
In her testament she had also appointed an executor. It was this executor 
who filed the suit before the court. He complained that he could not 
execute the testament. He had sold a part of the deceased's estate, but 
the panghulu council had not recognized this transaction as valid and even 
refused to accept him as executor of the testament. For all this, the 
executor asserted, Puti Maley was responsible. 
Puti Maley, the disinherited daughter, claimed that she was the sole 
heiress of her mother's property. As the "executor" was trying to violate 
her inheritance rights, she had applied to the panghulu council for an 
investigation of the matter, and the rapat had acknowledged her exclusive 
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rights. 
The LR held that "according to adat, Puti Maley was the only heir to 
her mother's estate, and that her mother's testament was void". The court 
orde red that the name of Puti Maley was to be entered as the name of the 
new owner and universal heiress in the register (" ..• dat volgens de 
hadat poesakka tot eenige en universeel erfgename in de nalatensohap van 
Puti Priaman ... "). 
The Case of Si Djidjah - LR Padang, 15.7.1859 
Si Djidjah, a woman, complained before the court that her brother had 
donated a piece of land with a house on it, to his son. But this proper-
ty had been the property of their common brother, who was dead, and 
therefore was their common inheritance. As she, Si Djidjah, was the 
legal heiress to that property, her living brother had had no right to 
donate it to his son. 
The court held that, according to the Malayan law of inheritance, the 
heritage was received by brother, sister, brother's children (?), sis-
ter's children, mate mal aunt and matemal uncle. Such inherited pro-
perty could only be sold, pawned, or otherwise alienated for the benefit 
of the so-called waris, the blood relatives (stamverwanten). As the pro-
perty in dispute was inherited property, the plaintiff's brother was not 
entitled to donate it to his son, and the donation therefore was void. 
These judgements caused quite a st ir in the Dutch administration. The 
Govemor of Sumatra's west coast had quite a different opinion on these 
matters, and he applied to the Govemor General of the Colony to have 
the judgements annulled. In his letter to the Government he explicated 
his legal view: 4 
" ... that the land was not subject to the Malayan institutions of inheri-
tance, but thatthe transformation into ownership had ocurred in accor-
dance with European law, to which the native authorities, who had wit-
nessed the convers ion , had given their consent . 
... on this legal basis, a member of the native population group of Suma-
tra's west coast is co~letely entitled to dispose of such immovable pro-
perty as he wishes, and his rights are transferred to the subsequent 
possessors, whoever they may be. The Malayan TUles of inheritance have 
to be applied only in the case of intestate inheritance." 
In his view, the judgement of the LR was wrong for the reason that the proper-
ty was eigendom; Puti Priaman therefore had the right to dispose of it 
by testament. To avoid further problems, the Govemor suggested a change 
in the regulation: From now on, all property for which an eigendoms-
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akte has been made, should be subject to European law; the native heads 
should be cautioned of these consequences at the time the eigendoms-akte 
was established. 
The Governor's proposals were not weIl received in the capital, as 
they were incompatible with the colonial policy.S His legal opinion, 
however, was fully shared by the highest legal official of the Colony, 
the Procureur Generaal of the Supreme Court: 
"There can be na doubt that, since the parties have been established as 
owners by European officials, and since ownership is a purely European 
institution, the consequences attached to it have to be governed by Euro-
pean legislation. The Lancwaad Padang has not so TIRlch erred in its 
application of the law of ownership concerning immovable property, but 
rather in its application of the Malayan law of inheritance, to which 
it conceded such a wide range of applicability, that any other transfer 
of ownership, based upon inheritance rights (except intestate inherit-
ance) would be void. "6 
The remark of the Procureur Generaal is exactly to the point: The Minang~ 
kabau inheritance law (the law of diachronic transfers) would recognize 
as valid only intestate transfers of property relationships. If it were 
upheld, the synchronic dimension of Dutch property relationships would 
be almast completely superseded by the diachronic concept ion of adat: 
The individual autonomy granted to the individual eigendom holder in 
Dutch law, manifest in the capacity to bequeath or donate the eigendom, 
would not be able to unfold. Whereas the Procureur Generaal and the 
Gavernor wanted the Dutch synchronic dimension of property relationships 
to prevail, the Landraad Padang upheld the dominant diachronic one of 
the Minangkabau adat. 
A good 100 years later, in the new combination of adat and western 
law of the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the roles of the temporal dimen-
sions are reversed. Although the law is professed to be based upon 
adat law, the specific property relationships and legal statuses of proper-
ty are modelled on western law. The hak milik status of property objects, 
the most complete farm of individual rights in land, which is translated 
as ownership (Gautama and Harsono 1972: 39), has no time-limit. Synchrony 
and diachrony are, as in western law, distinguished by reference to the 
individual's lifetime. During his lifetime, he has the full autonomy of 
the ownershipjeigendom holder: he can transfer his right to another party, 
he can donate it, he can dispose of it by testament. Only in the case of 
death will the hak milik be inherited by the legal heirs (Gautama and 
Harsono 1972: 39, 61 f.). Adat only determines those legal heirs. Theore-
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tically, it is possible to have property held by a matrilineal group 
registered as hak milik/ownership under the new law. But in Minangkabau 
hardly any property has been registered 50 far (see Chapter 5: 281). 
For in general in West Sumatra, hak milik property is, for inheritance 
purposes, treated as harato pancaharian and is "inherited by the 
children". Once registered as hak milik, the legal status of the property 
does not change with or af ter inheritance, i.e. it would not become 
harato pusako, but be treated as hak milik/harato pancaharian in perpe-
tuity. It is obvious that a conversion of adat rights into hak milik 
rights would be the doom for the adat pusako, and this is fully realized 
by the villagers and lineage elders.? In spite of frequent exhortations 
by the Government, nobody has had his or her kaum's land registered, for 
one "is afraid th at the land will become hak milik and then be inherited 
by the children", as several informants in CKL put it. 
11. ADAT ~~ ISLAMIC LAW 
Since their Islamization, the Minangkabau have always been confronted 
with an alternative system of property relationships. The relation be-
tween adat and Islam in Minangkabau has changed considerably during the 
course of history between what might be cal led phases of adaptation, 
open conflict, and skilful ideological integration. 8 ~1atters of proper-
ty and inheritance were an important topic in that relationship, and 
those Minangkabau who were or are engaged in propagating strict adherence 
to the Islamic religion, have always demanded that the Islamic TUles of 
inheritance law should be applied. The development of the relationship 
between adat and Islam will briefly be sketched: 
In the period following the Islamization of the Minangkabau population, 
Islam was mainly adopted as religion,and to a large extent it surpressed 
the adat conceptions relating to the supernatural and sacred wor ld. In 
secular matters, the adat TUles remained more or less intact. What was 
accepted from Islam was adapted to the system of the adat pusako. The 
number of adat functionaries was increased to include a religious func-
tionary, the Malim or Chatib Adat, but these functionaries were suku 
functionaries, and their office was turun temurun dari niniek ka mamak, 
dari mamak ka kamanakan like all other offices. Religious prescriptions 
concerning marriage and burial were incorporated, not to the exclusion 
of, but rather as an addition t~, the existing adat TUles. The system of 
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property relationships was more or less kept intact and the rul es of the 
adat pusako pertaining to property were not changed. However, social and 
legal relationships were expressed to an increasing degree in terms of 
the Arabic language andin legal terms of Islamie law like hak, 
milik, warih, hibah, wasiyyat. This probably gave adat a more systematic 
character (as there are no data on pre-Islamic adat, this is, of course, 
speculation, cf. Taufik Abdullah 1966: 9 f.); but a comparison of the 
adat expressed in Islamie terms and the meaning these terms have 
in Islamie law quickly reveals that the older adat concept i ons were not 
surpressed by new Islamie institutions. The warith in Islamie law are 
the Koranic heirs and the agnates - in Minangkabau the warih are the 
matrilineal relatives. The hibah in Islamie law is a contract which 
becomes effective during the giver's lifetime, and the individual is not 
restricted as to the amount of his property which he can give away. In 
Minangkabau, the hibah was revocable and became effective only af ter the 
giver's death, and the giver was severely restricted with respect to the 
amount of his gift. The process of adapting Islamie legal concepts to 
adat institutions has by no means ended. In the discussion of the "hibah 
of pusako", for instanee , we have seen that this conception apparently 
did not even exist in the beginning of this century, and that the under-
lying institution of gifts from bako to its anak pisang was formerly ex-
pressed in older adat concepts. Some contemporary experts have taken to 
classifying the adat-heirs in terms of the classification of heirs 
used by the Ithna Ashari school of Islamie jurisprudence: 
1. The waris nasab: in Islamie law they are the blood relatives, consist-
ing of the Koranic heirs who are blood relatives (dhu fard) and the 
agnatic blood relations (the dhu qarabat). In its adapted form the 
term denotes the matrilineal blood relatives in Minangkabau, the waris 
batali darah. 
2. The waris sabab, the pers ons who are heirs for a special reason: in 
Islamie law they are the spouses (the zwajiyyat) and the persons who 
are heirs by virtue of a special legal relationship (the walä) , in 
Minangkabau they are the kamanakan who are descendants of strangers and 
former slaves. 9 
In the beg inning of the 19th century, open conflict broke out between 
Islamie pressure groups and adat leaders. The economie and political 
objectives of the Padri to a great extent were expressed in terms of 
Islamie law (see Dobbin 1977), for which supremacy was demanded: 
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"Syarak mangato - adat mamakai" - "Islamic law orders, adat carries out". 
The relationship between adat and Islam was expressed as "adat basandi 
syarak - syarak basandi kitab 'uUah" - "adat is based upon Islamic law, 
Islamic law is based on the Koran" (cf. Kroesen 1874: 15; Taufik Abdullah 
1966, 1972: 200; Dobbin 1977). Adat was classified with respect to 
its conformity with Islamic law into the adat jahiliah the "adat stenmring 
from the pagan times", and the adat islamiah, the "adat in accordance 
with Islam". Although the Padri were finally defeated by the Dutch, the 
consequences of their reign should not be underemphasized. It has al-
ready been mentioned that in several nagari, amongst them CKL, new forms 
of socio-political organization were established which survived the 
defeat of the movement. 10 Unfortunately, there is no information about 
the influence which the Padri movement had upon the system of property 
relationships in Minangkabau in general. Apparently, even the Padri 
realized that the system of the harato pusako "could not" be abolished 
(HAMKA 1968: 33). 
In the aftermath of the Padri-war, adat regained much of its lost 
ground being actively supported by the Dutch colonial administration which 
used the adat system as the basis for its local government administra-
tion. 11 The relationship between adat and Islam again became one of 
rrrutual tolerance: "Adat basandi syarak - syarak basandi adat" - "adat is 
based upon Islamic law, Islamic law is based upon adat". The spiritual 
reformation also seems to have lost most of its impact. TraveIlers' 
reports from the second half of the 19th century teIl of cockfights in 
the open market, of 'ïmmodest" dressing of women, and of alcohol consump-
tion by Minangkabau officials (cf. Bickmore 1869; Von Rosenberg 1878: 82 
ff.; Carthaus 1891: 63). 
But around the turn of the century, Islam had another renaissance in 
Minangkabau. One of Minangkabau's most famous Islamic scholars, Syeh 
Achmad Chatib, started a new orthodox religious movement, and although 
he never returned from his pilgrimage to Mekkah in his mother-country, 
he exerted a great influence on the following generation of Islamic 
leaders, most of whom had been his pupils. 12 For Syeh Achmad Chatib, the 
rnatrilineal system was haram (forbidden) and the adat pusako with its 
matrilineal inheritance rules was sjubhät, stenmring from the pagan times 
of the adat jahliah, and therefore was halal for Minangkabau Muslims 
(cf. Prins 1954: 145; HAMKA 1968: 33; Anas 1968: 107). Syeh Achmad Chatib 
was unsuccessful insofar as he could not convince his pupils and fol-
lowers that the pusako-system should or could be abolished. Most of them 
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probably realized that its abolition could not be achieved, and they re-
defined the hapato pusako in a way such as to eliminate the conflict 
with Islamic law: The local Minangkabau Islamic leaders treated the haPa-
to pusako as "haPta rrrusabalah" (Anas 1968: 107). This concept,which ac-
cording to Prins (1954: 145) is only employed by Minangkabau Islamic 
scholars, gives the hapato pusako the legal status of'property in the 
dead hand", a kind of wakaf, which cannot be divided or inherited and 
to which consequently the Islamic inheritance rules need not apply ~MKA 
1968: 33; Anas 1968: 107). The concept seems to be related to the con-
cept of rrrushä, "undivided share", which can be validly dedicated as 
wakaf (Fyzee 1955: 247). But the frontal attack was, since then, directed 
against the inheritance of the hapato pancahapian by the kamanakan. It 
has continuously been demanded by Islamic leaders that the hapato panca-
hapian should be inherited according to hukum faPaidh, and the problem of 
pancahaPian-inheritence has been, and still is, one of the major issues 
in Minangkabau local politics. 13 In 1952 and 1968 two conferences which 
dealt with the problem of pancahapian-inheritance were held in Bukit 
Tinggi and Padang, in which local politicians, leading Islamic persona-
lities and adat leaders participated. 14 The 1952-conference had been or-
ganized by a "Deliberation Committee of the Religious Experts, Adat 
Elders, and Intellectuals" (Badan PePrrrusyawapatan Alim Ulama, Ninik Mamak 
dan Cepdik Pandai). The committee was to work out a plan concerning how 
the fatwa, the legal opinion of the Islamic Teachers, that hapa pancaha-
pian should be inherited according to the fiqh, could be carried out. It 
was given the task to de fine what should be understood under "haPta panca-
hapian" and to propose how thc rules of the fiqh could be a ttached to it. 
The proposals of the committee were the following: 
1. The hapta pancahapian are those property objects which 
a. stem from the 
b. which one has 
the exception 
c. which one has 
d. which one has 
e. which are the 
been added to 
nakan. 
pusako in accordance with syapak, 
received by Islamic testamentary dispositions, with 
of hapato pusako, 
received by way of hibah, 
acquired by one's own work, 
fruit (hasil) of the haPato pusako, and which have 
the hapato pancahaPian with the consent of the kama-
2. The committee had come to the conclusion that the kamanakan should be 
allowed to inherit 1/3 of their mamak's pancahapian throughtestamenta-
ry dispositions. The other 2/3 should be distributed among the heirs 
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according to the rul es of the fiqh. The harato pusako should continue 
to be administered in accordance with adat. 
In the case of pancaharian of kinds a - d, the committee advised each 
Minangkabau to make a testament for the benefit of his kamanakan. For 
pancaharian of kind e, a testament for the benefit of the kamanakan 
was proposed as obligatory (cf. Prins 1953: 324). 
The conference which was held in Padang in 1968 built upon these pro-
posals, but finally came up with somewhat different and less ambiguous 15 
conclusions. It was stated: 
1. The valid law for the inheri tance of harta pancaharian is the hukwn 
faraidh, whereas for harta pusaka the hukwn adat shall apply. 
2. All judges of West-Sumatra and Riauw (the I.K.A.H.I., the Judges'Orga-
nization had been a participant in the Conference) are cal led upon to 
take this decision to heart (memperhatikan) (Naim (ed.) 1968: 241). 
About the inheritance law it was said in detail: 
1. The harta pusako in Minangkabau are alegal property complex which is 
administered (diurus) and represented (diwakiZi) by the mamak kepaZa 
waris inside and outside the institutions of dispute settIement (pera-
diZan). The anak kemanakan and the mamak kepaZa waris, who are both 
part of this property complex, are both not the owners (pemiZik) of 
it. 
2. a. The harta pancaharian are inherited by the heirs according to hukwn 
faraidh. 
b. By harta pancaharian is meant: one half of the property which a 
pers on (or rather: a coupIe) has acquired during his/her marriage, 
and his/her "brought property", harta bawaannya. 
c. A pers on may make a testament for the benefit of his kemanakan or 
other pers ons , but only to the extent of maximally 1/3 of his harta 
pancaharian (Naim (ed.) 1968: 243). 
These decisions have been widely publicized throughout ~1inangkabau, 
and the foreigner is of ten told that following the decisions of the Con-
ference the harta pancaharian are inherited in accordance with hukwn 
faraidh. On the level of ideological combat between adat and Islam, Islam 
has finally become a full partner in the "inheritance market" , which has 
been "cartelized" (Berger 1973: 147). Adat controls the pusako, Islam the 
pancaharian. 
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It has already been mentioned, that the judges did not "take to their 
hearf'the decisions of the conference but continued to apply adat law in 
their judgements. But the proposals and decisions of the two conferences 
are nevertheless important. For they constitute a clear attempt to break 
through, on the conceptual level, the system of the adat pusako; aiming 
at the elimination of the renospective-diachronic element in the panca-
harian concept. The harta pancaharian should not be "self-acquired" 
property objects only, but also property which - contrary to the semantic 
implication of the concept - had been received by hibah and testament. 
This would guarantee that harta pancaharian, even if already subjected 
to a case of diachronic transfer, remains harta pancaharian and can 
again be inherited according to hukum faraidh instead of becoming harta 
pusako rendah in line with adat. The consequence that all property in-
herited according to Islamic law (not just the goods inherited through 
testament or received by hibah) would remain harta pancaharian and thus 
inheritable in perpetuity according to Islamic law, has not yet explicitly 
been demanded, but it is the logical next step. 
In the legal and judicial context, the threats to adat pusako from 
outside, from written and Islamic law, have been rat her ineffective. 
But it must not be forgotten that these two systems have provided alter-
native frames of reference toward which the "agents of objectification" 
could orient themselves in their efforts to create new conceptions with-
in adat. The description and analysis in the following section of the 
changes which have occurred within the adat system, will show that quite 
similar ideas have developed within adat. 
C. lliE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADAT SYSTEM: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the individual is free to dispose of his or 
her harato pancaharian. If explicit disposition is not made, the proper-
ty is inherited by his or her children. According to our field data, 
this statement covers both practice and law. There are only a few disputes 
over harato pancaharian inheritance. Of the disputes we heard of in CKL, 
only one case concerned a conflict between a "son" with his father's 
brother over pancaharian-pawnings, and in one case the legal status of 
rice-fields (pancaharian or pusako) was disputed. The former case was 
decided by the Kerapatan Negeri (case 5 of 1973); the latter could not 
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be solved in the nagari and was finally decided by the State Court (see 
Chapter 5: 266 ff.). The inheri tance of harato pancaharian in CKL is not 
problematic. 
Pancaharian inheritances also only play a minor role in the State 
Courts. Of the 492 cases concerning property, which were brought to the 
courts in Bukit Tinggi, Batu Sangkar, and Payakumbuh in the period 1968-
1974, only 42 or 8.4% concerned diachronie transfers of harato pancaha-
rian (inheritance, hibah, wasiyat, distribution among the pancaharian 
heirs). In 25 of these cases, the contending parties were "the children 
and the kamanakan", and in 8 cases the pancaharian inheri tance was dis-
puted between children of the same father (in 9 cases the exact relation-
ships between the parties could not be deterrnined). It must be noted 
that in all 25 cases in which the children and kamanakan disputed their 
father's/mamak's inheritance, the legal status of the property objects 
was in dispute, the inheritance being claimed as harato pancaharian by 
the children and as harato pusako by the kamanakan. Once the legal 
status of property as harato pancaharian has been unequivocally esta-
blished, no more conflicts arise. 
This situation is in definite contrast with nearly all reports given 
by the Dutch scholars in the 19th and 20th centuries, and to the inforw.ation 
referring to past practices given by conternporary Minangkabau. The tenor 
of all reports is that the harato pancaharian are inherited by the kaum, 
the famiZie, the kamanakan. The change which has taken place in adat 
has frequently been predicted (see Van Vollenhoven 1918: 271; Joustra 
1923: 127) and its first rnanifestations have been eagerly noted by 
foreigners as signs of the "inevitable break-down" of the rnatrilineal 
inheritance system and of the Minangkabau social system in general 
(Schrieke 1955: 118 f.; Maretin 1961: 193). Yet these statements of ten 
are superficial and not always supported by ethnographic facts. In 
the following I shall retrace in some detail the developrnent which has 
taken place in the Minangkabau system of property relationships. I shall 
distinguish between intestate inheritance and diachronie transfers made 
during the lifetirne of the property holder(s), as quite different sets 
of conceptions are involved. 
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I. 1HE RECOGNITION OF AUTONCMY IN PROPERTI AFFAIRS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
1. The Individual's Autonomy over Harato Pancaharian 
The exercise of autonomy over harato pancaharian in the form of disposi-
tions during one's lifetime in Minangkabau was predominantly a problem 
for men (Chapter 5: 276). If women wanted to give their harato panca-
harian away - to whom would they want to give it other than to their 
children? As their children would inherit it anyway, what did it matter 
whether or not they gave them their pancaharian property al ready during 
their lifetime Minangkabau adat has not developed any conceptions which 
explicitly deal with this situation; its solution was always self-evident. 
In the case of men, however, the situation was different, for men of ten 
wanted to give their harato pancaharian to persons other than their ahli 
warih. In principle, Minangkabau adat allowed such transfers. There can 
be no doubt th at the relationship to harato pancaharian couZd be diachro-
nically transferred to a man's children during his lifetime; as has been 
mentioned already, even harato pusako held by a man could be given to 
his children. But the mere possibility recognized by adat did not give 
the indi vidual full autonomy over his harato pancaharian. His autonomy 
was restricted by other criteria: In order to be valid, such transfer 
had to be carried out with the cognizance or the consent of his kaum 
members. The actual question therefore is, whether a man could transfer 
his harato pancaharian against the wishes of his kaum members. If the 
literature on this topic is reviewed, it becomes apparent that the 
differentiation just made is usually not considered. 16 The reports 
differ in their statements about how much harato pancaharian may be 
given to the children, how much property is given to the children in 
general, and what the requirements of such a transaction are. As for the 
latter, two general kinds of statements are made: it is either the "know-
ledge" (medeweten, kennis, setahu) of the mamak, the ahli waris, and the 
panghuZu which is necessary to validate the transaction,or the "consent" 
(toestemming, saizin) of these persons. Of ten the TUles given are less 
clear, such as statements that the transfer has to be made with the 
"cooperation" (medewerking) of the kamanakan or that the warih-group 
mustnot be passed" (Korn 1941: 315). Statements, that consent is required, 
are more frequent than those according to which the "knowledge" or "co-
. " 1 . 17 operatlon on y IS necessary. 
It is almost impossible to ascertain what "the people" thought of 
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this question, and it is equally difficult to assess the opinions of the 
panghuZu and other adat experts in the course of time. In 1910, the 
Governor of West Sumatra summoned 18 Tuanku Lareh, 2 panghuZu from 
Padang, and the Minangkabau head of the Teachers' Training College to 
Bukit Tinggi to discuss problems of the adat pusako with them (see AB 6: 
207 ff.). More or less all complained about the adat pusako and demanded 
that it should be changed. Asked about their proposals, the Tuangku 
Lareh were of the unanimous opinion that one part of the harato panca-
harian should "fall tolt the children. There was some dis agreement about 
the amount some considered 1/2, others 2/3, the appropriate amount. They 
thought that in cases where a man had nei ther wife nor children, all panca-
harian should be inherited by the kaum (AB 6: 215). The adat leaders 
stated that they feIt justified to speak for the whole population, and 
alsomentioned that more and more harato pancaharian was surreptitiously 
given to the children. It is, however, remarkable that these Tuangku 
Lareh, who wished for a change in adat, at the same time stated the adat 
conceptions in a quite conservative vers ion. The most conservative voice 
came from the panghuZu of Padang where adat and practice supposedly was 
most progressive. Asked about the requirements for a transfer of harato 
pancaharian by hibah to the children, he said: 
" ... that according to the general opinion, the consent of the waris 
(saizin waris) was required. For the pusako is the basis of pancaharian, 
and the man has grown up on and is living through the help of the pusako. 
The pancaharian thus has to be considered as the 'fruit of the pusako'. 
Without the consent (toestemming) of the waris, one cannot dispose of 
the pancaharian to the advantage of the children. If one of the waris 
does not agree, the hibah is void" (AB 6: 214). 
In pre-war court judgements, the tendency towards increasing indi-
vidual autonomy is most marked. Particularly for the areas in the coastal 
plain the courts promoted this autonomy at a very early time. The RvJ 
Padang stated in a case in 1895: 
"that nowadays, according to the Malayan adat which is in force in Padang, 
each Malayan can dispose by gift inter vivos of his pancaharian, even 
without the cooperation or knowledge of his adat heirs, if the property 
concerned is not property which has been acquired with the help of capi-
tal provided by the family" (Guyt 1936: 85; AB 6: 252,254). 
And a similar statement is found in a later judgement of the RvJ 
Padang from 1932 where it was said: 
"that the adat at the coast •.. in contemporary times recognizes as valid 
the disposition (by umanat) to the advantage of the wife and children, 
even in cases where the rule,that this should not be done without the 
knowledge of the waris, has not been adhered t~, for this TUle has be-
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come obsolete in the course of time" (T 140: 227).18 
However, in a different case the LR Padang, confirmed by the RvJ, took 
to a more restricted interpretation of adat, and demanded the knowledge 
of the waris (cf. T 131: 78). 
Thereare not many published judgements on the adat in the Padang 
Highlands. A decision of the Rapat of the Tuangku Laras of Fort van der 
Capellen (Batu Sangkar) from 1874 demands,that the kaum and the panghuZu 
be given notice of such a transaction (AB 28: 189). In a later judge-
ment of the LR Solok in 1933 it was stated that such a gift of hapta 
panaaharian required the cooperation (medewepking) of the kaum and had 
to be carried out in the presence (ten ovepstaan) of the panghuZu and 
the opang 4 jenis (T 140: 205; cf. Guyt 1936: 79 ff.). It was in the 
aause aeZ~bpe of the inheritance of Dr. Muchtar in 1930, that the princi-
ple was firmly established, that the cooperation of the waris was not 
a requirement for the validity of an umanat for the benefit of wife and 
children (T 131: 82 ff.). This rule was upheld by the judgement of the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies. Later judgements followed suit 
(see LR Fort de Kock 1933 in T 140: 234). Guyt, who acted as judge in 
the LR of Fort de Kock and Payakumbuh in the 30'5 reports that in the 
jurisdictional districts of Agam and 50 Koto it had by then become the 
rule that the panaahaPian holder could freely dispose of his panaahapian 
property, provided that it was no "impure" panaahapian. For as far as 
the latter was concerned, a previous mupakat with the ahZi wapis was 
still required (Guyt 1936: 87 f.). 
In the Dutch colonial courts, unlimited autonomy thus already had been 
established in the 30'5 of this century, and the courts most probably 
were a step ahead of the rules as reported in the literature. In the 
post-Independence period, this practice seerns to have been continued by 
the judges in the State Courts. 19 In the contemporary period (from 1968 
onwards), the courts whose work we studied applied the principle. In case 
49 of 1970 of the PN Bukit Tinggi, in which the harta panaahaPian of a 
trader were disputedl- the court held: 
'Haji A. was a trader, and as such he needed financial mobility. As a 
Minangkabau, he was bound by the rules that obtained in the sphere in 
which he lived. It is a basic truth of the development of the modern 
world, and also of the development in Minangkabau, that the traditional 
bonds between the members of the society undergo change. Haji A. lived 
separated from his kaum, which stayed in a village. He lived, together 
with his wife, in a conjugal family as a trader. It is already customary 
in Minangkabau that a husband who wants to give property which sterns 
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from his harta pancaharian to his wife and children, does 50 by way of 
hibah in order to prevent future trouble. It is reasonable and appro-
priate (sepantasnyaZah) that a member of the Minangkabau legal community, 
who lives together with his wife and children separated from his kaum, 
may dispose of his harta pancaharian as he wishes, the more so if he is a 
trader." 
In a later judgement of the same court (case 16 of 1972) the principle 
was upheld without any remarks that could be interpreted as restricting 
the rule to the urban situation of the trade~ 
In contemporary nagari life this rule is also generally recognized. A 
manis thought to be free to dispose of his pancaharian. Morality however 
requires that he should do 50 af ter consultation with his kamanakan. 
In order to understand fully the importanee of these changes in adat 
conceptions I must draw attent ion to a fact which has, as far as I know, 
been overlooked campletely in all discussions about this change. The in-
dividual's autonomy in contemporary adat is much greater than for example 
in Dutch law or western legal systems in general! As in Dutch law there 
are no restrietions in the synchronie dimension, but neither are there 
restrietions in the diachronie dimension, unlike in Dutch law where, for 
the protection of the "legitimate heirs", the exercise of the autonamy 
can be retroactively invalidated (see Chapter 4: 208). The two judge-
ments just quoted illustrate that a dramatic change has occurred in the 
conceptualization of diachronie transfers. Heavily influenced by Dutch 
thinking about property relationships, it actually "overtakes" Dutch 
conceptions. Inheritance now is a matter of processes following death, 
50 diachronie continuation is restricted to inheritance. The hibah is 
treated as purely synchronie, and as in Dutch law, no restrietions are 
placed upon the individual's autonamy, neither as regards the old legal 
heirs, the kamanakan, nor as regards the new legal heirs, the children. 
This was stated quite explicitly in case 16 of 1972 of the PN Bukit 
Tinggi. The plaintiffs, widowand children of the deceased, had claimed 
that the juaZ and hibah transactions, by which the deceased had trans-
ferred most of his property to his other wife and children during his 
lifetime, were void as they had been carried out without their consent. 
The court rejected this argument: 
"It is true that according to Minangkabau adat law, the widow and the 
children are the legal heirs of a husband and father. But the right to 
inherit comes into existence only upon the death of the property holder. 
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So in this case, the plaintiffs' rights had not yet come into existence 
during the deceased's lifetime. The deceased therefore had all freedom 
and legitimation to dispose of his ha~ato pancaha~ian during his lifetime 
without having to ask the consent of the plaintiffs in their capacity of 
wife and children. In the adat of Minangkabau, it has never been the 
case that, as far as dispositions over ha~ato pancaha~an are concerned, 
the consent (pe~setujuan) of the children and the wife we re required for 
the validity of the transaction." 
Though this statement is quite in line with the Dutch concept ion of 
property law, in Dutch law a safeguard of the legal heirs is embodied in 
the diachronic dimension, in the protection given to the legitimate heirs 
In the contemporary adat, there is no such protection. The argument was 
raised in case 49 of 1970 of the PN Bukit Tinggi. The plaintiffs, widow 
and children, claimed that the hibah and jual transactions which the 
deceased had carried out during his lifetime for the benefit of his 
other wife and children, were fictitious actions (pe~buatan pu~a 2, 
scheinhandelingen) , made in order to cheat them of their inheritance 
rights. This raised the question of whether some protection should not 
be given to the wife and children as the "new legal heirs", comparable 
to the one that is given in most western systems. But the court did not 
consider this argument, nor did the court of appeal which upheld the 
judgement (PT Padang case of 52 of 1972). Both courts here recognized 
the complete autonomy of the individual. It should be noted that this 
point was also not considered by the Dutch judges at the time when the 
kamanakan were still considered the legal heirs. 
It is probably premature to abstract "the law" from the few decided 
cases. The situation in the two decisions was probably influenced by the 
fact that the beneficiaries of the transactions we re new legal heirs. 
Though it is, of course, dangerous to speculate in such matters, I am 
quite convinced that the courts would have decided differently if all 
legal heirs had been passed completely in favour of other persons, e.g. 
the man's kamanakan. In interviews, most interviewees took the position 
that same protection should be given to the children, if they were really 
"cheated" of their inheritance. But the legal situation remains open. 
Cases of that kind are rare, both in the courts and in the naga~, as it 
does not frcquently occur th at individuals dispose of more or less all 
their pancaha~ian during their lifetime. 
2. The Autonomy Ove~ Ha~ato Pusako 
In the adat conceptions concerning society's members' autonomy over their 
ha~ato pusako there has been only little change. With respect to pawnings, 
the four classical cases in which adat permitted a pawning of ha~ato 
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pusako by and in the name of the kaum are not adhered to any more, 
either in the courts or in the nagari. The new conceptions are formed 
by the basic principle that nowadays such transaction must be for the 
benefit of the whole kaum and have the consent of all kaum members. But 
apart from this most general principle concerning the exercise of auto-
nomy over harato pusako, somewhat different conceptions are held in the 
nagari and in the courts. 
In the nagari, a differentiated view prevails. In Chapter 4 it 
was mentioned that the exercise of autonomy over harato pusako is prima-
rily the right of the pers ons for whom the property objects are harato 
pusako turun terrrurun, and that by no means all "harato pusako tinggi 
of kaum X" is the harato pusako turun terrrurun for the whole kaum (Chap-
ter 4: 152 ff.). Even if the presence of the mamak kaum is neces-
sary for transactions regarding such property, this cooperation "cannot" be 
withheld, for in principle the pers ons holding their separate harato 
pusako can dispose of it. Villagers therefore maintain that renre-
sentation by a mamak, and not necessarily by the mamak kaum, is required. 
This definitely holds true for synchronic transfers like pawnings and the 
transfer of pawnings. As pusako (one's own or another kaum's) be-
comes pancaharianized to an increasing extent, the importance of the old 
adat restrictions pertaining to temporary or permanent alienations of 
harato pusako decreases. For these transactions actually do not concern 
pusako rights, but the rights to use the property objects on the 
basis of the money invested. They are temporary per se and do not affect 
the residual relationship of the other pers ons for whom the property ob-
jects are harato pusako kaum or harato pusako turun terrrurun: their rights 
can always be reasserted through redemption. The temporary character of 
these rights to use and to exploit also makes the transfer of these 
rights to one's children possible without having to pay attention 
to the constraints upon permanent alienation of harato pusako. However, 
if a permanent and definite transfer of such property is intended, if 
the transfer concerns the residual right to the harato pusako in the form 
of a sale or a hibah, the adat restrictions are held to apply. The trans-
action must have the consent of all kaum members, be carried out by the 
mamak kaum, and be witnessed by the panghulu and other adat elders. 
The courts usually do not make this differentiation, for they adhere 
to the cliché of the "harato pusako tinggi of kaum X", 50 X must be 
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represented in all matters by the mamak kepaZa waris. Por the validity 
of transactions involving harato pusako, therefore, the consent of the 
kaum members and the representation through the mamak kepaZa waris are 
required without exception. Most judgements additionally demand the co-
operation as weIl as cognizance of the adat elders, at least of the 
panghuZu of the kaum. According to our research in the State Courts, 
these conceptions, which pertain to the validity of synchronic and dia-
chronic transfers, are restated in regular court practice. 
But there are indications of a change in the direction of a more dif-
ferentiated view in the courts, too. The PN Batu Sangkar,in a judgement 
which will be discussed in detail later (Case 39 of 1969, see p. 344 ff.) 
proclaims a differential standard of validity for transactions of 
"private harato pusako" and "harato pusako of the kaum". It was held 
that dispositions over "private pusako" - in this case it concerned in-
herited panaaharian which was held by one jurai - in the form of a perma-
nent diachronic transfer (hibah) required only the knowledge of and the wit-
nessing (pengetahuan dan penyaksian) by the other kaum members and the 
panghuZu, but for dispositions over "pusako of the whole kaum", the con-
sent (persetujuan) of the kaum members and the panghuZu was demanded in 
addition. 
This judgement and the new conceptions stated therein should not be 
taken as being representative. As I have shown earlier (Chapter 4: 191 
ff.), it is questionable whether a categorical distinction in 
terms of substantive adat conceptions can be drawn at all between "con-
sent" and "knowIedge" . As the story of Haj i Batuah (Chapter 5: 235 ff.) 
illustrates, in the nagari such "knowIedge" is still conceived of as a 
social process of taking cognizance, i.e. of information given and 
received. Besides, the judgement was invalidated by the appeal court, 
albeit on different grounds. But it does mark a new tendency of thinking 
about property relationships to harato pusako, the further implications 
of which will be dealt with later in this chapter (p. 358 ff.). 
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II. INHERITANCE 
1. The Inheritanae of Harato Panaaharian in Historiaal Perspeative 
a. The Inheritance of Individual Harato Panaaharian 
The legal prescription that a man's harato panaaharian property is 
inherited by his children is quite a new development in Mïnangkabau. The 
frequent statements in the literature which speak of a growing inheri-
tance right in the father's line (Van Vollenhoven 1918: 271; Joustra 
1923: 127; Schrieke 1955: 118 f.; Maretin 1961: 193; De Josselin de Jong 
1951: 115) should be read as referring primarily to growing practices 
of giving harato panaaharian to one's children by way of hibah. In fact, 
until the second world war, in the huge body of literature on the inhe-
ritance of harato paneaharian, not one single statement upon which such 
an interpretation could be based refers to Mïnangkabau proper. The pas-
sage from Kooreman, written in 1892 (AB 11: 147) "that the harato panea-
harian property becomes the property of the conjugal family and is inhe-
rited by the children",refers to Indrapura. The rest of the pre-war 
literature unanimously affirms the rule of adat that!he harato panea-
harian, or that part which a man had not disposed of during his life-
time, becomes the property of his kamanakan as pusako rendah (see Guyt 
1936: 88 with references, and the sources collected in the Pandecten). 
Court decisions, as far as accessible, show a very similar picture. 
Three judgements have been published which have been quoted for an early 
recognition of the childrens' inheritance rights in their father's 
harato panaaharian. But these judgements cannot be said to establish a 
new prescriptive adat rule for paneaharian inheritance. The judgement 
of the LR Padang of 1917, according to which "paneaharian is inheri ted 
by the children" (T 112: 134), concerned the inheri tance from a female 
paneaharian holder (see also Guyt 1936: 89). In 1931, the RvJ observed 
in a rather general manner that, in the area of Padang, harato panaaha-
rian, or at least a part of it, eould in some cases be inherited in the 
father's line (T 135: 313). And the third case concerned property which 
had been pawned by a married couple for the benefit of (ten behoeve van) 
their children. When after the mother's death her (other) kaum members 
claimed the property as harato pusako, the LR Padang Panjang held 
that it went to the children only (T 140: 237). 
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But apart from these three decisions, the published court judgements 
in general are quite in accordance with the statements given in the 
literature: as long as the person has not disposed of his property inter 
vivos, the pancaharian are inherited by his family (kaum) and kamanakan 
(see LR Solo~RvJ (1932) in T 138: 480; LR Padang (1932) in T 140: 240; 
LR Padang and Raad (1929) in T 131: 78). It should further be emphasized 
that this principle was also upheld in the famous case of dr. Muchtar, 
as this case is of ten quoted by contemporary lawyers as marking the new 
inheritance rule "from father to the children". The case concerned the 
validity of a testament (umanat) from a father to his children which was 
disputed by the kamanakan (see also p. 330). The validity of the testa-
ment was ackowledged, but as far as the matter of inheritance was con-
cerned, the Raad held: 
"The court agrees wi th the two advisory opinions and makes the views and 
conclusions expressed therein its own, and therefore states as its 
opinion that the plaintiffs (the kamanakan) would be the only persons 
entitled to the inheritance of dr. Muchtar ... if it had not been the 
case that dr. Muchtar had validly disposed of them.,,20 
It must further be stressed that the two advisory opinions given in 
this case by the leading professors in adat law, Ter Haar and Carpentier 
Alting, also declared that the adat rule of the kamanakan's inheritance of 
harato pancaharian was still intact. To quote Ter Haar: 
'~ conclusion is the following: according to the adat law of the Minang-
kabau society, the money saved by dr. Muchtar is harato pancaharian 
and as such i t falls into the inheri tance of dr. Muchtar and should 
therefore be inherited by Mr. Machmoed, the mamak kepala waris of dr. 
Muchtar's kaum, if it had not been the case that dr. Muchtar had dis-
posed of i t in avalid manner for the benefit of his children" (T 131: 
96) .21 
Before the war, neither in the literature nor in the judgements of 
the courts, was a change in the adat rules of inheri tance of harato 
pancaharian reported. The change came later. Tanner, to whom we owe the 
first post-war data on this matter, reports a case which was decided in 
1961 (1971: 309). In this case a widow had sued her husband's kamanakan 
for her suarang-share. In addition, she claimed that the suarang-share 
of her husband should be divided between his/her children and his kama-
nakan. Whereas the court granted her her own part of the harato suarang 
(as a division of marital property, not as inheritance) the claim to an 
inheritance portion of her husband's surang part for the children was 
denied. The court still in 1961 upheld the principle that a man's harato 
pancaharian are inherited by his kamanakan. The change only came with 
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the other cause célèbre of Minangkabau inheritance law, the so-called 
kincir-(rice-mill) case t which went through all stages in the national 
court system and was finally decided by the Supreme Court of Indonesia. 
Since the three judgements given in this case reflect three different 
opinions on the problem of pancaharian inheritance, and at the same time 
are an interesting example of the interpretations of adat sayings, they 
shouldbe reported in some detail (the three judgements are reprinted in 
"Jurisprudensi Indonesia" 1969 I Ir: 17-33). 
PN padang Panjang, case 11 of 1962 
In this case, a widow and her children sued the kamanakan of her de-
ceased husband for the delivery of a piece of land upon which a kincir 
padi, a rice-mill, was located. This land and the mill, the widow 
claimed, had been the suarang of her husband and herself. The defendants, 
however, claimed that both land and rice-mill were harato pusako and 
had already been the harato pusako of their mamak, the deceased husband 
of the plaintiff. 
Af ter weighing the evidence, the court concluded that the property 
had indeed been the harato pancaharian/harato suarang of the deceased 
and his wife. On this basis, l was awarded to the widow. The otherhalf 
had been the suarang of the husband, and on the inheritance of this 
porti on the court gave the following ruling (also discussed at length in 
Tanner 1971: 309 f.): 
''With respect to the half of Dt. M. (the deceased) we shall decide upon 
a division, thereby giving recognition to the rights of the heirs (hak 
alhi waris) , that is of the heirs who are the children, and of the heirs 
according to adat, who in this case are the defendants. For such a divi-
sion we consider to be just (memenuhi prinsip keadilan): (It is true) 
that according to the system of Minangkabau adat law named mamak kemana-
kan, the kemanakan have the right to a man's suarang part, whereas his 
children do not receive anything. But this principle has already under-
gone change in the direction of the recognition of a right of the 
children. This is revealed by the fact that fathers, before they die, 
of ten make hibah of property to their children. In this case, the de fen-
dants can be lucky to receive 1 of their mamak's suarang part, as they 
are not close kemanakan (kanduang)." 
For the first time it is here made explicit that the development of 
cIos er relationships between father and children not only has led to the 
recognition of a man's autonomy to dispose of harato pancaharian during 
his lifetime, but also to the recognition of an intestate inheritance 
right (hak waris) of the children. 
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PT Bukit Tinggi, case 46 of 1967 
The j udgement was appealed, and in appeal, the PT Buki t Tinggi awarded 
all the property to the defendant kamanakan of Dt. M. However, the prin-
ciple which was established by the PN was not explicitly revoked. For 
the PT reversed the judgement on the ground that the legal status of the 
property had not been harta sua:t'angjpanaaharian, but had belonged to the 
deceased before he married the plaintiff. The PT therefore found it 
appropriate to apply the kata adat: "Harta yang didapati tinggal - yang 
dibC1LJa kernbali-suarang diagih - sakatu dibalah" - "the property which 
has been received, remains - the property which has been brought, returns 
- the sua:t'ang is di vided - the alliance is dissol ved". In the PT' s inter-
pretation, the rice-mill was "harta yang didapati" of the widow, which 
must be left (tinggal) to the defendants, as this was part of the 
inheritance of Dt.M. to be received by his ahli waris, his kamanakan: 
" •.• sehingga dengan demikian maka kinai:t' padi sebagai ha:t'ta yang dida-
pati oleh penggugat ha:t'Us ditinggalkan penggugat ka:t'ena adalah sebagai 
ha:t'ta peninggalan I. Dt. M. bagi ahli warisnya dalam hal ini Te:t'gugat2." 
The judgement of the PT was then appealed before the MA (No. 39K/ 
Sip/1968), which reversed both previous judgements on the following 
grounds: 
1. The PT had given a wrong judgement, as 
- the PT had attached wrong legal consequences to the ha:t'ta tepatan 
(dapatan) according to Minangkabau adat; 
- the ha:t'ta tepatan is the property which has been acquired by hus-
band and wife during their marriage, and must be inheri ted by the 
children; 
- the property which has to be returned to the kaum are the ha:t'ta 
bC1LJaanj 
- according to the development of Minangkabau adat law, there is now 
a division of property into two kinds: harta pusaka and ha:t'ta panaa-
harian. The harta pusaka are the property and riches of the kaum, 
and the ha:t'ta panaaharian are the properties handed down to the 
children by their owner. 
2. The PN had given wrong judgement, as due to the growth of Minangkabau 
adat law an inheritance right of the kamanakan with respect to harta 
panaaharian did not exist anymore. 
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The final message of the MA is clear: The harta panaaharian are in-
herited by the children, the kamanakan do no longer inherit their mamak's 
harta panaaharian. Minangkabau had i ts new adat law for panaa-
harian-inheritance. It is this new rule which is important. Yet the 
courts' interpretations of the adat-sayings so blatantly contradict my 
description and interpretation as given in Chapter 4, that some cornments 
must be made on this conceptual usage and the rationalization of the 
judgements in general. Of course it is not the task of the social scien-
tist to decIare court judgements to be "wrong". But in order to forestall 
any critical cornments upon my interpretation, I should like to point out 
that the conceptual usage of the courts is not supported by either adat 
or logic. This is the less understandable as both the chairman of the 
PT as weIl as the judge in the MA are highly reknown Minangkabau adat 
experts. 
The PT judgement: 
The PT interprets the harta yang didapati (dapatan) as those property 
objects which came into the possession of the widow, but had 
been the property of her husband before his marriage. This is very un-
usual, and I have never heard or read of such an interpretation. The 
harta dapatan in Minangkabau adat is commonly understood to be the pro-
perty the wife brings to marriage, and it remains (tinggaZ) with her or 
her kaum af ter the marriage has been dissolved. The PT rather gives the 
contrary meaning to it: property the husband had before the marriage, and 
to be returned to his kaum. But this is commonly expressed by: 
"pambaoan kembaZi" or "yang dibawa kembaZi" - "wh at had been brought in, 
returns". Although the PT' s interpretation runs contrary to the general 
terminological usage, it must be noted that, if the PT had employed the 
"correct" usage, it would have arrived at the same result. 
The property would then have been "yang dibawa", and had to "kembaZi" , 
be returned, to the defendants in this case. 
The MA judgement: 
The MA judgement increases the confusion. It quite correctly states that 
the property to be given back to the kaum is the harta bawaan 
(pambaoan, yang dibawa). But to the harta yang didapati it attributes yet 
another meaning: property acquired by husband and wife during their mar-
riage, which generally is called harta suarang. On the basis of this in-
terpretation it states that 
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- the PT attached the wrong legal consequences to the concept hapta 
dapatan, 
- the property to which these legal consequences should be attached 
are the hapta bawaan, 
- that the hapta dapatan are the property objects acquired by husband 
and wife, which must be inherited by the children, as it has the 
status of hapato pancahapian. 
The logical fault is obvious: Without reconsidering the factual situ-
ation, which the MA is not expected to do, the ~1A should only have noted 
that the property, which the PT had stated as belonging to the husband 
before his marriage, was not - as the PN had wrongly assumed - hapta 
dapatan but hapta bawaan. The result would have been the same os that 
reached by the PT, whose conceptual usage, however, would have been cor-
rected. But what the MA did was to construe a different factual situation-
image ( i.e. of the rice-mill being property acquired during the marriage 
for which no evidence at all was quoted), under the guise of a reinter-
pretation of the adat concepts. The MA not only failed to correct the 
terminological usage of the PT, but used the wrong term and in its re-
interpreted meaning attached to it the consequences which it wanted to 
lay down. 
A short comment is also appropriate on the laconic manner in which 
the MA established the new conceptions concerning pancahapian-inheritance. 
It refers to "the present stage I)f the development in Minangkabau", a 
statement which is not further elucidated or supported by facts or pre-
cedents. This judgement then is quite contrary to other MA judgements 
concerning changes in inheritance law (cf. Lev. 1962). In a case from 
Pasamah (7/Sip/1953, reprinted in Subekti and Tamara 1965: 198), the MA 
held: 
"In order to state a development in adat law, true evidence based upon 
facts is required, from which the conclusion can be drawn th at a change 
has really occurred. The fact, that here and there a new way of the 
division of the inheritance is used, does not yet mean that the adat 
law has already really changed". 
With the MA decision in the rice-mill case, however, Minangkabau had 
its new genera I adat conceptions concerning the inheritance of hapato 
pancahapian. Whereas the reasoning and the terminological usage employed 
in the judgement is not followed, the new general TUle is quite con-
sistently applied by all State Courts in Minangkabau, sometimes with an 
explicit reference to the MA-judgement (as in case 4 of 1970 PN 
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Payakumbuh, cases 49 of 1970 and 16 of 1972 PN Bukit Tinggi). But in 
case 16 of 1972, the PN Bukit Tinggi stated that "according to Minang-
kabau adat law, the widow and the children are the legal heirs of a 
husband and father". The inclusion of the widow calls for a clarifica-
tion of who the new intestate heirs are, the children, or the widow 
and the children? As far as I can judge this question on the basis of 
the available material, the children only are the heirs of their parents' 
harato pancaharian, but spouses do not inherit from each other. We have 
found no single case (case 16 of 1972 of the PN Bukit Tinggi included), 
in which the widow (let alone a widower) actually inherited her (or 
his) spouse's harato pancaharian. The expression, "the new heirs are 
the wife and childrerr', is sometimes used as a general reference to the 
new inheritance law. But the same speaker, when specifically asked 
whether a spouse is an heir to harato pancaharian, will emphatically 
deny this. He will also point out that the division of the harato 
suarang is a division of the commonly held marital property and not 
inheri tance. The reference "to the wife and children" may well reflect 
the Minangkabau way of thinking of inheritance as of a process occurring 
in a group. By mentioning all members of the increasingly important 
social group, the conjugal family, pancaharian inheritance is assimilated 
to pusako inheritance within the kaum. However, this concept ion has no 
legal relevance (yet). 
b. The Inheritance of Harato Pancaharian in the Polygamous Family 
Since 1968 and with the new inheritance rule for harato pancaharian, 
the classic trouble-cases in which the children and kamanakan of a 
deceased man dispute the inheritance of his harato pancaharian have more 
or less disappeared from the court-scene. But new problems have arisen 
with the new rule. How is the property to be distributed between the 
children, and particularly, how is it to be distributed when a man has 
children by different wives? 
Although there are not many cases in which the problem arises, it is 
the courts' practice (and the opinion of informants) that each child, 
regardless of his or her sex, inherits an equal part (see e.g. case 11 
of 1964 PN Padang Panjang). The general adat rule (see Chapter 4 : 152), 
that a man married to several wives forms separate complexes of harato 
suarang with each wife, is also followed by the courts. This is implicit-
ly recognized in case 11 of 1964 of the PN Padang panjang22 , and clearly 
expounded in the judgement of the PN Payakumbuh in case 4 of 1970: 
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Diagram of the parties' relationships 
PI P2 P3 DI 02 
The plaintiffs P 1-3, children of A by wife C, claimed several property 
objects, worth ab out 1.8 Mill. rupiah, from the defendants D 1-3, A's 
other wife and her two children. By the plaintiffs' interpretation, 
the properties were hapta peninggaZan(heritage) left by their father 
A, who had recently died. The defendants denied this, stating that only 
a few objects had been acquired by A and D3 together; the rest of the 
claimed property objects belonged to D3 in her own right (hibah from 
her sister, inheritance from her mother, etc.). Whatever common property 
there was had largely been acquired by A and D3, who had been married 
from 1929 to 1934 and then again from 1944 until A's death. A's marriage 
to C, on the other hand, had already been dissolved in 1944. 
The court first restated the rule according to which common hapato 
pancahaPian (hapta pancahaPian bepsama)is for the wife and children, 
and then went on: 
"It is a weIl known truth of contcmporary Minangkabau society that men 
who are polygamists usually form separate property units with each wife. 
The children who are bom in one marriage have no right to inherit the 
property of another property unit." 23 
c. Inheritance of Hapato PancahaPian of Childless Property Holders 
According to the new inheritance TUle for pancahaPian in Minangkabau 
adat it is inherited by the children. But what if the pancaharian 
holders had no children? The transfer of property in such cases is, 
of course, of great interest for the discussion of the question to 
what degree the new rules have changed the Minangkabau inheritance 
(or even social) system. Unfortunately (for the social scientist) most 
Minangkabau have children. No court case dealing with the inheritance 
of childless pancahaPian holders could be found, and also in the perti-
nent discussions with villagers and adat experts nobody remembered 
one single case in which there had been no children to inherit the 
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harato pancaharian. 
It therefore was only possible to discuss the problem in hypothetical 
terms to find out some rules on the problem. The answers, however, were 
quite unanimous. If harato pancaharian holders have no children, the 
property will be inherited by the sisters (or by the brothers, the 
kamanakan, or by the mother), i.e. according to matrilineal principles 
(see Guyt 1936: 88 with similar information on these hypothetical 
questions). The widow will not inherit, but may,of course, claim her 
part of tne harato suarang. 
In the case of predeceased children, the principle of representation 
will apply only in the female line: If a pers on leaves grandchildren by 
both male and female children, only the predeceased daughter's children 
will inherit. The predeceased son's children are anak dirumah lain, 
"children in a different house" and will not inheri t. If the pancaharian 
holder dies, his property will be in the house of his wife (wives) and 
her children. Her daughters will remain there and her granddaughters 
also will remain and marry there. But her sons will have to move to the 
houses of their wives, and their children therefore will be "children 
in a different house". 
It should be remembered, however, that the principle of representa-
tion can be introduced by individual autonomy. E.g. Haji Hassan directed 
in his testament that, if any of his children should predecease him, 
his or her part should be inherited by his or her children (Chapter 5: 
273). 
2. The Pusakoization of Harato Pancaharian 
Pancaharian inheritance not only concerns the problem of who shall re-
ceive the deceased's property objects. In addition, the adat rule of 
harato pancaharian becoming pusako upon the death of its holder prede-
termines also the future diachronic transfers of these property objects. 
This "pusakoization of harato pancaharian" - rule is of basic importance 
for the maintenance of the pusako system, for it guarantees that, through 
time and inheritance, all property will be harato pusako. This rule can 
still be regarded as a valid concept ion of contemporary adat, unaffected 
by the changes in the inheritance rules. While in former times the 
harato pancaharian became harato pusako for the kamanakan of the property 
holder, they now become pusako for his children, to be turun temurun in 
their jurai. 
When villagers and judges in Minangkabau speak about the pusakoization 
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of harato pancaharian, they usually do 50 in a rather abstract marmer, 
without reference to a concrete problematic case. Either one speaks of 
property objects which al ready are harato pusako, and there is no (more) 
problem; or one speaks about property objects which still are harato 
pancaharian, and then the problem is not yet acute. People assurne that 
such property will become harato pusako af ter the holder's death. What 
primarily happens in concrete cases of pancaharian inheritance is that 
the property objects "are inherited by the children". Whether they are 
harato pusako and actually treated as harato pusako, will generally only 
become apparent in the more distant future. The courts, the agents of 
objectification from whom we most likely might expect statements about 
the contemporary validity of the pusakoization rule, do not usually deal 
with the question explicitly either. They decide who in a concrete case 
inherits the property, and they usually do not care about what will 
become of it in the next generation. 
However, there are first indications of a further change which may 
not leave the pusakoization rule untouched. Under the conditions just 
described, it is difficult to present rnuch evidence. I have found only 
one case in which the problem is dealt with explicitly:case 30 of 1969 
PN Batu Sangkar. For the presentation of rny hypothesis it is a beautiful 
case, and Iconsider it symptomatic for the development which is going 
on in Minangkabau. Yet one must be careful not to take this single case 
as being representative of contemporary Minangkabau adat in general, nor 
expect that all courts would decide likewise in this matter. 
But since the change of the pusakoization rule is likely to have a pro-
found effect upon the whole system, I shall pay more attention to it here 
than its rarity 50 far would seem to justify. 
The case concerns the inheritance of property objects the legal 
status of which was disputed by the contending parties. The relationships 
between the parties are shown in the diagram on the next page. 





The two plaintiffs, Sjamsiar and Nursillah, are the daughters of Dt. S. 
who died recently, in 1969. They sue their bako, the kaum of their 
father, for the delivery of two plots of land. One plot, A, has a surau 
on it. Plot B is mainly agricultural land, but there is a house on it, 
too. Dt. S. had controlled both plots until his death. In 1963, Dt. S. 
had apparently tried to dispose of the two plots, but in vain, as is 
evidenced by a "Decision Letter" of the Niniek Mamak of his suku. There 
had been some trouble about this attempted trans act ion which had not yet 
been finally resolved. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the property was harato pancaharian of 
their father and should therefore be inherited by them as heirs according 
to Minangkabau adat law. As evidence, they presented a "letter of sale" 
concerning plot B, dating from 1919, of which the most important entries 
are the following: 
Nan manjual (The one who sells) 
Nan mambali (The one who buys) 
It was signed by: 
Upik gadang 
Siring 
Kami nan manjual (we who have sold) : Upik, Engku Etek 
Kami nan mambali (we who have bought): Siring, Duka (the later Dt.S.) 
With this letter they wanted to prove that their father, Dt. S., had 
bought the land in 1919, and that it therefore was his harta pancaharian. 
As additional basis for their claim, they presented a "Letter of Gift of 
Land to the Children" (surat pemberian tanah kepada anak). In this letter 
Dt.S. states that he has given the land to his daughters already during 
his lifetime. Of this letter, however, only a copy was produced. This 
copy bears the signatures of Dt.S. and his daughters. The names and 
titles of the adat functionaries of Dt. S.'s suku are typed on the copy, 
but there are no signatures. 
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The defendants' version wffidifferent: Dt. S. had not bought plot B, 
but Siring and Kanak had done so. Af ter their death the property had 
become hapta pusaka of their kaum. Plot A had not been bought at all 
by Dt. S. but had been given to him as wak af for his kaum by a man from 
suku J. Finally, it should be evident that the plaintiffs' claim was 
unfounded because the other children of Dt. S. had not joined the suit. 
The PN Batu Sangkar considered the problems in the following way: 
- That the other children of Dt. S. had not joined the suit was declared 
irrelevant. 
The plaintiffs had not procured any evidence concerninp, the plot 
A Cthe one with the supau) and this plot did not play a role in the 
subsequent reasoning. 
- With respect to plot B, the court had to determine first: 
1. Whether the property had the status of hapta pancahapicm, or of hapta 
pusaka stemming from the hapta pancahaPian of the defendants' mamak 
CDt. S.). For this question, the letter of sale was decisive. In the 
court's interpretation, the sale had actually occurred between Upiek 
Gadang and Siring, Dt. S.'s mother. The property therefore could not be 
regarded as Dt. S.'s hapta pancahaPian, for 
"in Minangkabau there is a basic division of property, namely between 
hapta pusaka tinggi and hapta pusaka pendah. The distinction lies in 
the origin of the property: Hapta pusaka tinggi originates from the 
result of the hard work of the ~atrilineal ancestors and has been handed 
down through the generations in the matriline. Hapta pusaka pendah, how-
ever, is property which does not originate from the ancestors' efforts 
but has been acquired by sale or other legal means." 
The property therefore was hapta pusaka pendah , being the plaintiffs' 
grandmother's former hapta pancahaPian. 
2. Once the status of the property had been determined, it was then 
necessary to decide whether the property should be regarded as Cbelonging 
t~) the property of the defendants' whole kaum or as the haPta pusaka 
pendah of one kaum member only, namely of Dt. S. As the property origi-
nally had been hapta pancahaPian, the court now had to determine whether Ca) 
it had been inherited by Dt. S. individually (teZah diwaPisi oZeh ibu 
bePnama SiPing kepada anaknya sendiPi Dt. S. pPibadi ..• ) ,or eb) whether it 
had been intended for Dt. S. and his kaum. 
a) If the former were the case, then the following considerations would 
have to be taken into account: 
"That it could not be prohibited in Minangkabau to give property to 
the children, by hibah or other means, which had been hapta panca-
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harian originally and which, according to its development, had ob-
viously and definitely become individual property (hak miZik pribadi) 
of a kaum member. In such a case, the gift has to be carried out with 
the knowledge and the witnessing (pengetahuan dan penyaksian) of the 
giver's as weIl as the receiver's kemanakan in order to foreclose 
future quarrels."24 
b) If, however, the latter was the case, and the property had been in-
tended (ditentukan) for Dt. S. and his kaum. If in this case Dt. S. 
wanted to give the property to his children, then this should have 
been carried out in accordance with adat law, which means that Dt. 
S. needed the consent, the knowIedge, and the witnessing (persetujuan, 
pengatahuan, penyaksian) of his kaum members, including the defendants 
in this court case. 
3. In order to decide which of these two possibilities would apply, !Wo 
facts were regarded as relevant and conclusive: 
a) The house of the defendants stands on the plot B. It had already been 
used by them during Dt. S.' lifetime. 
b) Dt. S. had already tried to sell the land once, but had not succeeded 
as his kamanakan had prevented the sale. 
4. On the basis of these facts the court took the position that the 
property had been intended for (ditentukan) and inherited by Dt. S. and 
his kaum. The rules elaborated under 2 b therefore applied. As the plain-
tiffs could not prove that their father's gift had occurred with the 
consent of the Dt. S.' kaum and in the presence of the adat functiona-
ries, the transfer had been void. The plaintiffs'claim was consequently 
rejected. 
The defendants appealed. The PT took a different view in this matter 
and awarded the property (plot B) to the plaintiffs (PT Padang 36 case 
of 1972). The PT could not agree with the PN that Siring had intended 
the property for Dt. S. and his kaum: 
"For the land, as harta pancaharian of Siring, had af ter her death 
gone over to her child; in other words, to Dt. S. as her one and only 
heir. This was 50 in accordance with the development of Minangkabau 
adat law concerning hal'ta pancaharian. This development, which runs 
parallel with the development of the social structure of Minangkabau 
in general, had already begun before Independence and has continued 
since: The family ties between husband, wife, and children becom~ 
closer while the ties between the kaum members become looser. ThlS 
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has the consequence that the division between harta pancaharian as the 
property of the conjugal family (Keluarga) and the harta pusaka as the 
property of the kaum gets sharper, too. As a result of this development 
harta pancaharian can become harta pusaka of the kaum only if it is the 
wish of the pancaharian holder, i.e., if it can be proven in a clear 
way that the property holder wanted his property to become harta pusaka 
of the kaum and that it should not be inherited by the children, as it, 
in principle, should be".25 
In the case under consideration the defendants had not been able to 
prove this. The transfer therefore had not required the presence and 
the consent of the kaum members but was valid without it. 
The courts take different points of view. The PN still recognizes the 
process of pusakoization of harato pancaharian, although it states dif-
ferential rules concerning the individual' s autonomy over "private 
harato pusako" and over the "harato pusako of the kaum". The PT, how-
ever, seems to be abolishing the pusakoization as a matter of law. It 
declares it to be the exception, and makes it dependent upon the in-
tention of the property holder: the pancaharian holder is free to de-
termine what legal status his or her property is to have af ter his or 
her death! When referring to the property it has awarded to the plain-
tiffs, the court speaks of "property". Tt does not express the legal 
status of that property in terms of adat concepts, for the conceptual 
system of adat cannot accommodate this construction of property. The 
argument, that the ties between husband, wife and children get stronger, 
and that there is a sharper division between harato pancaharian and 
harato pusako is, in my view, not decisive in this case. Nobody would 
have disputed it, and both plaintiffs and defendants assumed that the 
harato pancaharian of Siring were legitimately inherited by her son. 
Actually, with female pancaharian holders such a case does not present 
a problem at all. The problem was that of the legal status of the pro-
perty after it had been inherited by Dt. S. The PT states th at "in 
these times" it depends on the intention of the pancaharian holder 
whether the property is to become harato pusako of the childrens' kaum, 
and finds no such intention in this case. But what is the alternative? 
The property once inherited can hardly be called harato pancaharian, 
for it is no "pancaharian", self-acquired property. On the other hand, 
it cannot be called pusako if its actual legal status is one of 
private property the disposition of which is unrestricted. In practice, 
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this leads to the recognition of property, either as pancaharian 
through the generations and through cases of inheritance, or as a 
kind of pusako rendah, to bè treated as pancaharian with respect 
to its legal consequences. Clearly, the conceptual system of adat has 
no word for such property. 
The PN,with its distinction between "private harato pusako" and "hara-
to pusako of the kawn" ,is also ahead of "classical" adat. The way the 
court arrives at the distinction is much more interesting than the rules 
it lays down with respect to the validity of dispositions of such pro-
perty. For the latter are not unknown in the adat system, whereas the 
kind of distinction made by the court is. According to adat, Siring's 
harato pancaharian would have become harato pusako rendah in the jurai 
of which she is the apical ancestress; i.e., Dt. S. alone would have 
the exclusive right to use and exploit the property during his lifetime. 
Upon his death Siring's jurai would be extinct and the property would 
then be inherited by the other jurai in Siring's kawn, i.e. by the de-
fendants in this case. As it has since long been acknowledged that the 
last members of an extinct group have a rather large degree of autonomy 
over their group's harato pusako, the PN's statement,that a hibah as 
intended by Dt. S. required the knowledge and witnessing of the kawn 
member~ cannot be regarded as very progressive. In posing the alternative 
between the private harato pusako and the harato pusako of the kawn, 
however,the PN adopts a different line of reasoning. This distinction 
is not conceptualized in terms of adat inheritance rules. The legal 
status of the property objects is more or less inferred from what hap-
pened af ter Siring's death, from occurrences af ter the inheritance. 
Where one would assume that the legal status of the property would be 
determined in adat at the time the inheritance occurs, the PN takes 
refuge in an ex-post evaluation. Or what else must we conclude 
from the statement that the relevant facts were that Dt. S. in vain 
tried to sell the land, and that it had been used by the defendants? It 
is definitely not a reference to some presumptive wis hes which Siring 
may have had with respect to her property; the only reference is to the 
social processes which took place af ter her death. As Siring had no 
other children it was quite natural that her sisters and sisters' 
children would use the house, for Dt. S. would live in the houses of 
his wives. The PN makes this ex-post evaluation further explicit by 
speaking of "properties which originate from the harato pancaharian and 
which have, according to their development, become private property". 
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The determination of the legal status of inherited harato pancaharian, 
the traditional process of pusakoization by virtue of adat is thus not 
treated as something occurring automatically any longer, but as dependent 
upon intentions and social processes. In this, both judgements are 
equally dangerous for this key-principle of adat. The only difference 
is that the PN is conservative and leaves the determination more or 
less to the autonomy of the heirsjkaum members, whereas the PT makes it 
dependent upon the autonomy of the pancaharian holder. 
3. The Inheritance of ReZationships to Harato Pusako 
In the concept i ons pertaining to the inheritance of relationships 
(residual or provisional) to harato pusako there has been little change, 
both in the nagari and in the courts. All rights which are based upon 
one's status as a member of a pusako holding group are inherited strict-
ly according to the matrilineal inheritance system described in Chapter 
4: 157 ff. It must be kept in mind, though, that in cases where pusako 
property has been pancaharianized by pawnings or transfers of pawnings, 
only the right to redeem, the hak menebus, is inherited by the matrikin 
in the pusako-holding group, whereas the right to work and exploit the 
property object is inherited in accordance with the rules pertaining to 
the inheritance of harato pancaharian. 
Many conflicts arise about harato pusako which has been given as 
harato pambaoan to a marrying male kaum member. When the man dies, the 
kaum members of ten reclaim the property, whereas the man I s wife and 
children or their kaum do not want to give it back"of ten claiming that 
it is their harato pusako. The adat concept ion of pambaoan kembaZi, 
that "brought" property must return, is in principle upheld in the 
courts and in the nagari. But I have found one case in which, in terms 
of concrete conceptions, the general rule is modified under the special 
circumstances. In case 18 of 1969 of the PN Bukit Tinggi, the plaintiff 
mamak kepaZa waris reclaimed property which had been given as pambaoan 
to his granduncle ~) at his marriage. The court established in the 
course of the proceedings, that the property in question had been harato 
pusako pambaoan of the plaintiff's kaum, indeed, but then proceeded to 
state: 
"As the property in dispute is controlled and worked by the defendants 
for such a long time already, and as there are family relations between 
the kaum of plaintiff and defendant which cannot be severed just like 
that, the court is of the opinion that it is fair (pantas) and natural 
(wajar) if only one half of the property is given back and the other 
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half is kept by the defendants". 
The court thus transforms an originally temporaryjprovisional trans-
fer into a permanent transfer of the residual right. That the judge 
speaks of the 30 odd years, during which the plaintive kaum's pusako 
were worked by the defendants as of "such a long time", well reflects 
the modern Minangkabau attitude towards time and continuity, in which 
30 years are considered to be a "long", instead of a brief period in 
the continuous existence of the property holding kaum. 
D. THE MlNANGKABAU CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS IN 
HISTORlCAL PERSPECTlVE 
I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
The degree of autonomy which is granted to individual property holders 
in contemporary Minangkabau - both in respect of harato pancaharian and 
of harato pusako - is difficult, if not impossible, to express in terms 
of the conceptual system of the adat pusako. In practice, the conceptual 
problems which arise are largely neglected or not dealt with explicitly. 
The courts have to decide concrete cases in which property and inhe-
ritance is disputed. They usually express their judgement in terms of 
the concrete interests and claims of the parties and are not concerned 
with the construction of a new conceptual system. It is symptomatic that 
the PT Padang, when it more or less abolished the principle of the 
pusakoization of harato pancaharian as a matter of adat (p. 347 ff.) 
did not conceptualize the legal status of harato pancaharian which, 
af ter the death of its holder, did not become harato pusako. 
Another way to resolve the conceptual problem is to employ the 
concept of hak miZik. The use of hak miZik is quite frequent in con-
temporary Minangkabau, although it is by no means the statistical rule. 
Characteristic is the judgement of the PN Batu Sangkar already quoted. 
In order to arrive at its concept of harato pusako pribadi, "private 
harato pusako" - a term which does not exist in the adat pusako- it 
had to speak of property obj ects "which have become hak mi Uk pribadi" , 
i.e. private "property", "ownership", "eigendom". Usually, only pro-
perty objects which have the status of harato pancaharian are character-
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ized this way, but as the PN Batu Sangkar shows, the use of hak milik 
is also extended to the harato pusako. 
It is extremely difficult to give an adequate translation of hak 
milik in this usage. The terms hak and milik, and also hak milik, are 
of course not new in Minangkabau. Hak milik is the Indonesian trans la-
tion for the Dutch concept of eigendom, and it is also used in the Basic 
Agrarian Law to denote the most complete form of autonomy over land, 
which to a great extent corresponds to the Dutch concept ion of hak milik/ 
eigendom (cf. Gautama and Harsono 1972: 39 ff., see also Koesnoe 1977: 
207 ff. on the various meanings of the concept hak milik in contemporary 
Indonesia). Hak and milik had also been employed in Minangkabau adat, 
but not in its combined form (see Chapter 4: 162 ff.). But the use of 
hak milik in contemporary Minangkabau is different. The term is used 
as a figure of speech, and its concrete meaning must be inferred 
from the way in which it is used. From its practical usage it 
can be concluded that it shares most of the connotations of the western 
conception of ownership/eigendom: It expresses the highest degree of 
autonomy recognized over a property object. These relationships are 
further reified: Hak milik not only denotes the relationship the hak 
milik holder has to the object, it denotes the object as weIl. It also 
shares the dominant characteristic of western notions of eigendom: it 
is abstract in terms of time. Hak milik is and will remain hak milik in 
perpetuity, no matter how it was acquired or by whom it has been or will 
be inheri ted. 
Reification and the elimination of the diachronic dimension from the 
conceptual world of property relationships are new in Minangkabau adat 
(if compared to the system of the adat pusako as analysed in Chapter 4). 
They are the result of a longer process which shall be described in the 
following, and they reflect the increasing individualization of property 
relationships in the conceptual wor ld. 
II. 1HE ELIMINATION OF DIACHRONY FROM 1HE CONCEPTUAL SYSffi1 AND 1HE 
REIFlCATION OF PROPERlY RELATIONSHIPS 
Hak milik remains hak milik, irrespective of its manner of acquisition. 
lts use permits a "clean" distinction between synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions as tied to the lifetime of the individual, thus making inheri-
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tance the only farm of diachronie continuation. This is, of course, 
quite foreign to the system of adat pusako. The adat pusako distinguished 
property objects in the diachronie dimension. Within this dimension, 
the distinctions were achieved by reference to the mode of acquisition 
of the property objects and the relative distanee in time of such 
acquisition (see Chapter 4: 194). 
Harato pancaharian probably was na ZegaZ concept at all in the early 
adat. It was rather that the categories of harato pusako, i.e., harato 
pusako tambiZang basi and tambiZang ameh, were defined with reference 
to the fact that they had been "pancaharian", self-acquired. Harato 
pancaharian was an expZanans rather than an expZanandwn. One could 
speak interchangeably of tarukoan, newly cultivated land, and pancaha-
rian, self-acquired land. Bath terms indicated the way in which same 
pusako property had been acquired. It is symptomatic of this (hypothe-
sized) state of adat, that in the immense wealth of proverbs and 
adat sayings there was and is not a single one which mentions harta 
pancaharian or pancaharian. Even in the adat saying pertaining to the 
division of marital property,only harato suarang is spoken of, and 
pancaharian again is an expZanans: Harato suarang is such property 
as has been acquired as pancaharian during the marriage. Likewise, 
dapatan and pambaoan contain na mention of harato pancaharian, although 
they may consist in part of the pancaharian which the spouses acquired 
befare marriage. In the whole literature, and during all interviews in 
which I searched for sayings in which reference was made to pancaharian, 
I have found only one, namely in the recent publication of LH. DL 
Rajo Panghulu (1973: 58) :"Anak dipangku jo pancaharian - kamanakan 
dibimbiang jo pusako" - "The Children are carried with the pancaharian 
- the kamanakan are led with the pusako". But this clearly is a recent 
invention, for the line, "anak dipangku, kamanakan dibimbiang", is 
part of a 6-line papatah petitih, which rhymes on the -u and the _iang. 26 
I therefore think it justified to assume that pancaharian was not an 
adat concept denoting a specific legal status of property objects, but an 
acquisitive reference. The time-restricted pancaharian was submerged in a 
conceptual system of property relationships dominated by the diachronie 
dimension. Yet, as an acquisitive concept, pancaharian provided the link 
with an incipient individualization which in the course of time became 
also legally important. 
A new phase of development began with the coming of the Dutch judges 
and administrators. This phase is characterized by a greater importanee 
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given to harato pancaharian and the beginning of the devaluation of the 
diachronic dimension. This was no radical deviation from adat, since no 
alternative terminological system was introduced. It was rather that a 
new way of thinking about property relationships was introduced into 
adat when the Dutch imposed their colonial judicial system on Minangkabau. 
The Dutch lawyers and administrators interpreted the adat system in terms 
of their own basic assumptions on property relationships, property 
relationships being distinguished synchronically and by reference to the 
individual property holder, and the legal status of property objects 
being defined by rights which are reified. The basic division of pro-
perty in Minangkabau adat was consequently seen in the distinction be-
tween harato pusako and harato pancaharian, as only this distinction 
could be used in reference to individual lifetimes. 
This is the dominant tenor of nearly all Dutch publications and 
judgements. The harta. that were pancaharian, were from the start con-
ceived of as '~rivate ownership", individual eigendom. 27 The pusako 
property by contrast, was conceived of as communal ownership held by the 
fami~ie. The kind of ownership most authors had in mind was a form of 
comrnon ownership, the gebonékn mede-eigendom of Dutch law, which had 
developed out of the Germanic notion of the Gesamthandseigentum, 
characterized by the institutions of accrual and decrease. Van Bosse 
and Smits described the harato pusako complex exactly in these terms: 
Each time an individual family member dies, the shares of the remaining 
group members increase automatically. Each time a group member is bom, 
the respective shares of the others decrease automatically. In this think-
ing, there was no room for individual inheritance within the family, and it 
was frequently stated that, in the Minangkabau adat, the institution of 
inheritance devolving upon individuals was unknown, and that it could only 
occur between pusako holding groups, between sabuah paruik (buah gadangin 
terms of CKL), the suku, or the nagari. 28 It was only a minority which op-
posed this view. Willinck, in particular, pointed out the significant dif-
ferences between the harato pusako complex and western notions of common 
ownership. In western law, the individual co-owners always have the right 
to ask for the division of the common property.29 The fiction, that each 
individual co-owner is the full owner of the whole property but re-
stricted by the equally full rights of the other co-owners, cannot be 
maintained for the adat pusako, as the individual can never come into 
the position of full owner of the harato pusako (Willinck 1909: 575 f., 
769 H.). Ia adat, "pusako indak buZiek diagieh", "pusako may not be 
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divided". Should a division occur, this meant a group split, through which 
again only communally held pusako can come into existence. In adat the group 
relationship to harato pusako can not be reduced to a sum of individual 
eigendom. A further decisive difference is that, in adat, the residual 
relationship between the group and the harato pusako is not conceptUally 
specified. We have seen that, besides the ''having'' character, there is 
only a dual characterization of this relationship in terms of the hak 
held by the mamak and the miZik held by the kamanakan (Chapter 4: 162 
ff.). However, the provisional relationships within the pusako complex 
are weIl specified conceptually in the form of dapatan, pambaoan, and 
ganggam bauntuek. The ganggam bauntuek is even treated like a thing 
which can be inherited. In adat, the relationships operating within 
the group-pusako relationship are reified. In contrast, it is the group-
hol der relationship which is reified in the conception of cornmon owner-
ship in western law, whereas the internal relationships are not, and 
not even conceptually, specified but are treated under the general 
heading of "administration" (for German law see par. 2038 BGB). These 
internal provisional relationships could weIl be inherited in Minang-
kabau. Thus there was no question of accrual or decrease. If a new 
kaum member was bom, this did not affect the shares of the other kaum 
members at all. Their part in the ''having'' relationship could not be 
affected, as the birth had no direct relevance for what property objeèts 
they were allowed to use and exploit. The relationships legitimating 
their use and exploitation of the property objects, on the other hand, 
were regulated by the ganggam bauntuek, dapatan and pambaoan. On this 
level, nobody was affected by the birth of a new kaum member, and only 
a few pers ons were affected by the death of a kaum member, namely the 
heirs of the ganggam bauntuek. This again was only emphasized by a 
minority, particularly by Willinck (1909) and later by Sarolea (1920). 
Willinck correctly stated: "It just depends what you call inheritance", 
and called the diachronic transfer of the ganggam bauntuek "inheritance". 
wi th the justification that in Dutch law, too, other rights than eigen-
dom (i.e. provisional property rights) could be inherited (1909: 771 f.). 
The way of thinking in which most Dutch judges and administrators 
approached Minangkabau property relationships did not remain without' 
impact on the conceptual system of the adat pusako. The old distinctions 
of the different kinds of harato pusako, which denoted the property 
objects according to the means and time of their acquisition were ne-
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glected and hardly ever used in court. The concept of ganggam bauntuek, 
not fitting weIl the ideas of communal ownership of harato pusako,was 
increasingly less ernpI oyed, although it was the concept coming most 
close to the Dutch notion of common ownership. This had practical con-
sequences, too. Only with the trivialization of the adat conceptual 
system and of the differential property relationships could notions be 
upheld and enforced such as "that the harato pusako is the property of 
the whole kawn", "that all disputes' over harato pusako must be in the 
name of the kawn and be represented by the mamak kepaZa waris" ,"that 
only the whole kaum and not its subbranches, the jurai, were property 
holding 'legal communities''', "that the harato pancaharian became the 
common property of the whole kaum af ter the death of the pancaharian 
holder" (see Olapter 4: 152, 190). 
Through the construction of a basic division of property on the syn-
chronic level by the Dutch, the concept of harato pancaharian gained in 
irnportance. As one of the basic categories of property, it had to be 
defined in terms of normative consequences in order to contrast it with 
the normative consequences attached to the concept of harato pusako. 
Whereas in former times, pancaharian had been the expZanans for the 
pusako categories of tambiZang' ameh and tambiZang basi, it now became 
an expZanandum, which had to be explained in terms of legal consequences. 
In consonance with this,harato pancaharian also became the dominant con-
cept to be used in marital property relationships. In former times one 
spoke of the harato suarang, which was explained as being the harato 
pancaharian which husband and wife had jointly acquired during their 
marriage. But in the courts one generally spoke of the harato pan ca-
harian of the spouses and was concerned with the legal consequences 
attached to it. With the dominanee given to the synchronic dimension of 
property relationships the diachronic dimension was consequently devalu-
ated. A distinction in the diachronic dimension was still retained - the 
distinction between harato pusako tinggi and harato pusako rendah - but 
in the courts' view this was not the basic distinction of property in 
Minangkabau. 
This interpretation of Minangkabau property relationships has to a 
great extent been continued by the Indonesian judges, mainly Minangkabau 
themselves, who act in the post-Independence State Courts. The old adat 
logic is still applied by some judges. Thus the judge in the PN Batu 
Sangkar whose decision has already been mentioned several times,still 
declared the difference between harato pusako tinggi and harato pusako 
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rendah to be the basic distinction of Minanekabau property categories. 
He employed the diachronic dimension, in which harato pusako rendah and 
harato pancaharian can be equated. Significantly, the judge in this case 
was a panghuZu. Most State Court judges, however, keep to the distinc-
tion in the synchronie dimensio~and adopt a purely prospective atti-
tude towards inheritance as in the MA-judgement in which the new in-
heritance rule for harato pancaharian was established (see p. 338 ff.). 
I should like, of course, to give a more representative picture of the 
correlation between socialization in western law and the dominant 
thinking about property in the synchronic dimension. The judgements, in 
which such distinctions are elaborated at all, are, unfortunately, too 
rare for this to be done. 
It is difficult to assess the influence the conceptual usage in the 
courts has had, and still has, on the conceptual usage in the nagari. 
The villagers still are, and probably always were, somewhat confused by 
the courts' inability to understand their property relationships as far 
as kaum- or buah gadang-internal relationships are concerned - a mis-
understanding mainly resulting from the conceptualization of harato 
pusako as a form of communal ownership. But cases where internal group 
relationships are disputed in court are extremely rare (Chapter 5: 307). 
Most disputes concerning harato pusako are inter-group disputes, general-
ly cases in which pawnings are disputed or the inheritance of groups 
that are extinct. Since the villagers know their adat weIl enough not 
to be misled by the conceptual usage of the courts, it may be assumed 
that they were able to express their claims in a manner that the courts 
could understand, and yet retain their more differentiated conceptual 
system to deal with property relationships in the nagari. Yet the new 
way of thinking about property will have had its general impact on the 
conceptual usage inasmuch as the new style of thought is increasingly 
employed, as it proves to be the most suitable one to express the 
new degree of autonomy over property recognized also in the nagari. 
In contemporary Minangkabau, 50 far as we can judge from our discussions 
with villagers in CKL and other nagari, both attitudes towards property 
relationships and their diachronic transfers are employed. People dis-
tinguish harato pancaharian and harato pusako, but they also speak in 
terms of the pusako tinggi - pusako rendah distinction. The old 
quadrupartition of the harato pusako is still used, but the employment 
of the "shortened" vers ion, "tinggi-rendah", is much more frequent. 
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Through the increasing autonomy over harato pancaharian and finally 
through the establishment of harato pancaharian inheritance by the 
children as matters of law, however, a new threat is posed for the 
remaining distinction in the diachronic dimension. The concept of 
pusako firmly embodies the idea of property which has been and will be 
inherited in the matriline. As long as the kamanakan inherited their 
mamak's pusako, this principle remained unaffected. But it becomes 
difficult to maintain the idea when harato pusako rendah are inherited 
by the children. I have mentioned that this difficulty is partly solved 
by speaking of inheritance with the future perfect-perspective, by 
equating pancaharian and pusako rendah in the diachronic dimension. 
But just because the speakers are forced to employ the diachronic 
dimension, which in Minangkabau thought embodies the pro- and retro-
spective, the statement becomes illogical and impossible, for the conno-
tation of matrilineal inheritance can be attached to the property ob-
jects in question only in one direction. When the prospective heirs them-
selves die, the property which they inherited and which became their 
harato pusako rendah, will be inherited by their kamanakan. But they 
themselves have not inherited in accordance with the principle of matri-
lineal inheritance. In terms of the prospective attitude towards inheri-
tance, which slowly gains dominance in Minangkabau, the statement that 
harato pusako renddz are inheri ted by the children is "impossible" anyway. 
These two factors put a great strain upon the use of the concept harato 
pusako rendah. Combined with another factor, the explicit or implicit 
wish to stop the pusakoization of harato pancaharian in general, this 
leaves little room for the employment of the concept harato pusako 
rendah. The consequence of this, namely the abandonment of the concept, 
has already been demanded. At a conference on Minangkabau adat and his-
tory held in Batu Sangkar in 1969, it was explicitly proposed by a 
Minangkabau lawyer (Damciwar S.H.) that in the Minangkabau adat of 
property relationships only the concepts of harato pusako and harato 
pancaharian should be recognized in the future, and that the concept of 
harato pusako rendah should be abolished. The consequences were stated 
quite explicitly: 
'1be harato pusako (which generally have been cal led harato pusako 
tinggi) which already exist, will be left in peace. I.e., there will be 
no further possibility for the existence of pusako rendah, as this would 
lead to an increase in pusako tinggi ... 31 
.~other important consequence, not explicitly mentioned sa far, 
is that the harato pancaharian which have been inherited have no defined 
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legal status in adat. They cannot be called harato pancaharian, as they 
have not been acquired by their holders' own efforts. They are not to 
be cal led pusako rendah anymore. The conceptual gap is filled by the use 
of hak miZik: Harta pancaharian is hak miZik, and hak mUik remains hak 
miZik af ter it has been inherited. The diachronic dimension is eliminated 
completely. 
It is important to remember that hak miZik is not used only to denote 
the rights of the property holders, but the things themselves as weIl. 
It is the harato, the material property objects, which are denoted as 
hak miZik, not just the relationships the property holders have with 
respect to the property objects. In contemporary Minangkabau the harato -
hak miZik equation is generally used only for harato pancaharian, which 
in this way can be treated as harato pancaharian = hak miZik in perpe-
tuity. But the judgement of the PN Batu Sangkar indicates that also 
harato pusako, at least "private" harato pusako,can be denoted as hak 
miZik. If this tendency should develop into the dominant way of speaking 
and thinking about property relationships, the scene is set for a con-
ceptual system in which hak miZik is the common denominator for all pro-
perty. In this system, a distinction between hak miZik with pancaharian 
character and hak miZik with pusako character, may be maintained. But 
this distinction would only be relevant for prospective inheritance, for 
a limited set of legal consequences. This would mean an essential reversal 
of the log ic of the adat pusako. The rights which formerly did not denote 
things, are now reified, and the property concepts which formerly did de-
no te things are now de-reified and transformed into legal consequences. 
In this reification of the hak miZik concept and the de-reification 
of the harato-concepts lies a great potential for the further develop-
ment of the adat pusako. Once property relationships have been reified, 
it becomes quite easy to change the legal consequences that are attached 
to the property object without changing its legal status. The develop-
ment of the concept of ownership/Eigentum in contemporary Europe provides 
a good example. The concept denotes a property reZationship which ex-
presses the highest degree of autonomy over property objects. But once 
the relationship has been reified, the property objects will remain 
Eigentum even if the legal consequences attached to it are drastically 
changed. In Europe, the individual autonomy over Eigentum-property ob-
jects has been increasingly restricted, yet Eigentum has remained 
Eigentum. If the actual property relationships were to be reified now, 
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probably no one would arrive at a concept that carries the connotations 
which Eigentum as a legal concept had in former times. A similar develop-
ment might occur in Minangkabau. Once the relationships signifying 
individual autonomy have been reified in the new hak milik status of 
property objects, the pancaharian- and pusako-like consequences may 
easily lose their legal character. Pusako may become such family property 
as we know it in western societies; a kind of property which carries 




In this last chapter I shall draw some conclusions from the material 
presented in my study. My main concern is with the change which has oc-
curred in Minangkabau in the domain of property relationships, and in 
this final chapter I want to give my interpretation of this change. I 
shall adopt two different perspectives. In the first part I shall sum-
marize the factors which have contributed to this change and interpret 
their functional interconnections. In the second part, I shall offer my 
interpretation of what this change means in relation to the Minangkabau 
social system in general. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, I 
shall briefly revisit some of my basic assumptions and evaluate them in 
the light of their usefulness for the description and analysis of the 
empirical data on Minangkabau. 
A. 1HE FACTORS OF GlANGE: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON 1HE DEVELOPMENT IN 1HE 
DOMAIN OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS IN MINANGKABAU 
From the materials presented in this study it is obvious that there has 
been a considerable change in ~1inangkabau within the domain of property 
relationships during the historical period over which we can look. The 
most important changes in the law have been described in Chapter 6. They 
involve the development of prescriptive intestate inheritance rights of 
children as regards their father's harato panaaharian and the recognition 
of a nearly unrestricted autonomy to dispose of one's harato panaaharian 
both in the synchronic and diachronic dimensions. The law concerning 
relationships to harato pusako has not changed all that drastically. 
The restrictions pertaining to temporary and permanent alienation have 
362 PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTINUITY 
been lessened but by no means abolished, although in practice these 
restrictions have lost much of their former force through the increasing 
pancaharianization of use-rights to harato pusako. 
The stories told in Chapter 5 show that, in comparison with reports 
in the older Dutch sources, the practice in property and inheritance 
affairs also has changed significantly. Minangkabau men and women act 
quite individualistically and manage property affairs for their own 
interest and for the benefit of their closest kin, their children in 
particular. The interests of the kaum and the more distantly related 
kaum mernbers only play a small role and are generally respected only 
if the pursuit of kaum interests is in the personal interest, too. The 
stories also illustrate the individual motivational attitudes towards 
relatives in property and inheritance matters. Most people express a 
definite preference for small social units, for their conjugal family, 
their spouse, their children and grandchildren. To an increasing extent, 
they are emotionally indifferent towards their other kin. In summa-
ri zing the change I would put the greatest emphasis on this individua-
lization and attachment to small social groups and the complementary 
disintegration of the larger social groups, the kaum and the buah gadang, 
rather than on the change "from the kamanakan to the children". The 
change "from the kamanakan to the children" is the aspect of the indi-
vidualization process seen from the point of view of ~ünangkabau married 
men. It is a very evident illustration, for it transcends the borders 
of matrilineal descent and kaum exclusiveness. But it should not be 
overlooked that from the point of view of women, too, there is a change 
of focus from "one' schildren in the kaum to one' s own children". 
Women definitely prefer their own children to their sister's children 
and act accordingly in property and inheritance affairs; women, too, 
are much more attached to their conjugal family than before. This indi-
vidualization and attachment to smaller social groups is only somewhat 
less evident, as the social group is a segment of the larger social 
group within the framework of matrilineal descent. A certain preference 
for one's own children is, of course, nothing new in Minangkabau. For 
women, it was the normal state of affairs and quite in accordance with 
adat. For men, too, it cannot be looked upon as something unusual in 
"old" adat. It was always recognized in adat that close bonds exist 
between a father and his children, and between the father's kaum, the 
bako, and its anak pisang. As the adat saying states: "Anak dipangku -
kamanakan dibimbiang - urang kampuang dipatanggangkan - jago nagari jan 
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binaso" - "The children are carried - the kamanakan are led - the people 
of the kampung are cared for - in order to safe guard the order of the 
nagari" . 
Villagers who interpreted this saying for us stressed that in adat 
(meaning "aId" adat) it meant that the children had to be carried and 
to be cared for as long as they needed to be carried, i.e. as long as 
they were children and not adults. The kamanakan, on the other hand, 
were to be led throughout their lives. This interpretation brings out 
different emotional attitudes towards one's own children and kamanakan. 
The relationships tawards one's children is warmer and more affectionate, 
the kamanakan are emotionally more remote. These different emotional at-
titudes fit very weIl with the general pattern which anthropologists have 
observed in matrilineal societies. 1 The relationship between MB and ZS 
in particular is one of authority and potential enmity. The picture of 
the nephew waiting for his mother's brather to die in order to inherit 
his property and to succeed to his position of socio-political authority 
was also present in Minangkabau and weIl expressed in the adat saying: 
"mamak badagiang taba - kamanakan bapisau tajam" - "the mamak has thick 
flesh, the kamanakan have a sharp knife" (Nasroen 1957: 87). 
In contemporary Minangkabau, the attitudes towards kamanakan and 
children have changed, and particularly as regards the authority-aspect. 
The relationship between mamak and kamanakan has become less authorita-
tive and more affectionate. The more recent interpretation of the say-
ing "the children are carried, the kamanakan are led" does not make any 
difference in emotional value. It stresses that the children have to be 
carried with what one can carry, i.e. the, generally movable, hapato 
pancaharian, whereas the kamanakan are led where people can be led, on 
the land, i.e. on the, generally immovable, hapato pusako. This interpre-
tation found its expression also in a changed version of the adat saying, 
which has already been reported earlier: "anak dipangku jo pancaharian -
kamanakan dibimbiang jo pusako" - "The children are carried with the 
pancaharian - the kamanakan are led with the pusako" (LH. Dt. Rajo 
Panghulu 1973: 58). The man's relationship towards his children has also 
changed. When the children are small, the Minangkabau fathers are pro-
bably na less affectionate towards their children than in farmer times, 
but when the children grow older, the relationship, especially towards 
their male children, becomes more authoritative, a reflex of the greater 
authority the contemporary Minangkabau father has over his chilQnen. As 
has been mentioned already, hawever, the mamak's loss of author~ty is 
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only in part absorbed by the father's new authority, for much authority 
is wielded by the mother. 
The growing individualization of social and property relationships, 
the attachment to smaller social groups and the complementary disinte-
gration of the larger social units is a very summary description of the 
development which has taken place and which continues to take place in 
Mïnangkabau. The changes in the domain of property relationships are but 
one aspect of this change. The developmen~ can be attributed to a series 
of factors, of which the property and inheritance law and the behaviour 
in property and inheritance affairs take part, too: the increase of the 
population and the growing scarcity of land occasioned by it; the esta-
blishment of a new system of power and authority by the Dutch, which in 
a modified manner was maintained by the National Indonesian government, 
thus weakening the authority system of adat, and putting the task of 
law interpretation and application officially into the hands of nagari-
external judges; the imposition of a new economic system on West Sumatra, 
which had a great impact on the nagari-internal economy; new residential 
arrangements, etc. Enumerating these factors is, of course, no more than 
a description of the change; it is no explanation in terms of operative 
causal connections. On the basis of my present knowledge of Minangkabau 
history I would not at tempt such a causal explanation of the develop-
ment except in the most general way. For there are only a few factors 
which we may assume to have had a one-way influence upon the others and 
for which we can show their logical and historical priority, like the 
influences (political, economic and others) which affected the nagari-
internal relationships from the outside without being conditioned by 
the nagari-internal situation. Like all other factors, the significance 
of these influences varied considerably in the course of history and, 
once incorporated in nagari life, they became also internal factors 
influencing and to some degree reinforcing each other. I therefore 
would speak rather of an interpretation of the change, not of its ex-
planation. What I can do is to assess the interdependence of the factors 
and the logical and functional link between them. 
The imposition of a new power and authority system by the Dutch colo-
ni al administration was an important factor contributing to the dis in te-
gration of the traditional socio-political units and the growing indi-
vidualization. The panghulu, the leaders of the political and property 
holding social units, whose position had just been attacked and partly 
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successfully demolished during the Padri-war, were slowly divested 
of most of their traditional political and juridical authority. To some 
extent they were incorporated into the new power structure, which made 
their function attractive as it provided them with a new source of power 
which they could use within the nagari. But only a limited number were 
thus privileged. The consequent distinction between recognized and un-
recognized panghulu led to a 1055 of prestige and authority on the part 
of the unrecognized panghulu. Those recognized by the colonial admini-
stration tended to abuse their power which adversely affected the tra-
ditional mechanism of buah gadang-cohesion. And in relation to the colo-
nial administrative system, the position of all panghulu was relative, 
they had become servants and tools of a higher power. 2 But the position 
of authority and prestige of the panghulu was not only reduced by the 
superordinate colonial power system. The new economic system and admini-
strative machinery offered alternative positions of authority and prestige 
to their fellow nagari men, positions which were accessible independent 
of social status based upon descent. The same holds true for the develop-
ing system of religious functionaries, former adat functionaries who 
since the Padri-war had emancipated themselves from the adat system of 
status acquisition and succession. The mere existence of these new 
positions of social and economic authority already put an end to the 
exclusiveness of the adat system of authority. Besides, the incumbents 
of the new authority statuses competed with the adat authorities for 
power and influence, and thereby decreased the actual power wielded by 
the lat ter. Minangkabau informants frequently stated that this loss of 
power and prestige of the panghulu, together with the high expenses 
connected with a panghulu installation, were the main reason why so many 
panghuluships were vacant in the present situation, and why there was 
consequently no real authori ty exercised over the buah gadang and kaum 
members. Whilst this is probably partly true, there is another reason 
for the many vacancies. In CKL, there were several panghuluships for 
which there were interested potential successors, who did have the means 
to finance the installation ceremony. They were not instalIed because 
no consensus could be reached as to who of the various claimants really 
"owned" the title and should succeed to it. This was mainly due to the 
difficulty of the claimants to trace back and prove their actual gene a-
logical relationship to the former panghulu. When the Dutch prohibited 
the creation of new panghulu titles in the 1880'5, they also inhibited 
the traditional mechanism of group formation. Instead of splitting the 
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group of "one sako and one harato pusako" in accordance with the adat 
principle of "what has become too large must be shortened, what has be-
come unclear must be clarifie~' (Chapter 2: 66), the buah gadang could 
not effectively split any longer,and this just happened during the period 
of the most massive population increase. Thus, "one property" holding 
groups became too large, and within them, subdivisions developed with a 
great degree of autonomy in property matters, although in adat they re-
mained subject to the final authority of the panghuZu. The more kaum de-
veloped in a buah gandang,and the more of ten these kaum split themselves, 
the more difficult it became to settIe the question of the succession to 
the panghuZuship. As the musyawarah-until-sapakat-principle of decision 
making still functions weIl in that no panghuZu is instalIed unless there 
is an agreement between all units of the buah gadang, many panghuZuships 
stayed vacant. And the more panghuZuships stayed vacant, the more inde-
pendent the kaum under their mamak kepaZa waris became. This led to the 
ambiguity which surrounds the legal status of 50 many contemporary buah 
gadang and kaum in CKL. It further greatly contributed to the feeling 
that being "of one property" in adat wi th the other kaum of one' 5 buah 
gadang has only little to do with actual property relationships. The 
political and socio-economie units are practically dissociated in con-
temporary CKL. 
Within the smaller social units, the kaum, which appeared as the 
property holding groups, the cohesion of property and authority was 
further dissolved through the increasing monetarization of property 
relationships to the "common" property. This was the result mainly of 
Dutch economie policy. Through the system of forced cultivation of coffee, 
money - held individually and mostly by men - became important. For lack 
of alternative possibilities it was invested within the nagari, mainly 
in land through pawnings, redemptions, and transfers of pawnings. This 
started the monetarization of property relationships to harato pusako, 
which provided the investors with a legitimation to use and to exploit 
harato pusako independent of the traditional mechanisms of allocation and 
distribution. 
The new Dutch economie policy introduced in the beginning of this 
century brought new changes (cf. Kahn 1975, 1976, Dobbin 1977). The 
system of forced cultivation was abandoned, a tax-system introduced, and 
West Sumatra was opened to the influx of foreign commodities. A need for 
cash was created along with increased opportunities to earn cash through 
wage labour, trade, and the cultivation of cash crops; activities in 
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which mainly men were engaged. Harato pancaharian increased in economic 
importance, and it made the men increasingly independent of their kaum's 
harato pusako. But the monetarization of relationships to harato pusako 
also gained in importance as land was increasingly used to procure money 
through pawnings and, on the other hand, as an object of investment of 
money through redemptions and transfers of pawnings. The traditional 
mechanisms of distribution and allocation of harato pusako lost in im-
portance as they were increasingly replaced by the acquisition of ex-
ploitation rights through the investment of money. They were increasingly 
limited in their operation to a smaller circle of kin within the kaum, 
namely to those persons for whom the formerly monetarized relationship 
to harato pusako became harato pusako turun temurun in the course of 
time. This gradual dissociation of the legitimation to receive use-rights 
from the status of kaum member also contributed to a further decrease of 
the authority that could be exercised in decision making processes ab out 
harato pusako in which all kaum members participated; it also affected 
the mamak's authority whose task it was to see to it that such decisions 
were taken. 
The growing disintegration of the authority and property relation-
ships within the kaum led to, and was reinforced by, the increasing 
spatial dissociation of the kaum members, apracess accompanied and 
speeded up by the population increase. In farmer times, when there were 
smal I groups, nearly all kaum members could live in one or two rumah 
gadang. Living together probably contributed significantly to the feeling 
of belonging together. The concentration of the individual kaum members 
on the smaller kaum segments and their conjugal families, facilitated 
by their separate holding of harato pusako, and the increasing number of 
such segments as a consequence of the population increase, led people 
to prefer living in smaller houses. The monetarization and individual-
ization of property relationships facilitated the building of smaller 
houses. The investment of money held separately in the building pre-
vented it from being invested in the interest of the kaum as a group. 
When smaller segments of the kaum started to live in smaller houses, the 
conjugal families gained in importance. In most daily affairs the hus-
bands were confronted with a smaller set of their wives' kin. Cornmon 
residence of husband and wife in a smaller house also led to an increas-
ing individuation of the wives within their kaum. Husbands lived in with 
their wives in small houses more permanently,and consequently less op-
portunities existed for them, as mamak, to stay in their mother's or 
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sisters' house(s). Sleeping in the open room of a small house is a much 
greater intrusion on the privacy of one's sisters than sleeping in the 
large front room of a rumah gadang. The more men lived together with 
their wives, and the more their mamak functions decreased in importanee, 
the more they directed their economie activities to the house and proper-
ty of their wives and children, applying most of their labour force and 
their harato pancaharian for the benefit of those with whom they lived. 
The new economie residence pattem and the increasing investment of men's 
harato pancaharian for the benefit of their conjugal family - generally 
in and on the harato pusako of their wives - led to an increasing indi-
vidualization of their wives' harato pusako and a greater influence and 
autonomy of the conjugal family vis-à-vis their wives' matrikin. 
This series of interrelated and mutually reinforcing aspects does not 
only affect the kaum-internal relationships and the conjugal families. 
It also is visible in the relationship between the bako and its anak 
pisang. Within the kaum, viewed as bako, social and property relation-
ships are increasingly individualized, with the urang sumando playing a 
greater role. The land is held by smaller jurai more independently and, 
owing to population increase, it has become scarce. There is not much 
common bako property left, which could be given to outmarrying kaum 
members as harato pambaoan, or to anak pisang as harato hibah. There is 
less willingness and less opportunity for the group to show its generosity. 
If such property is still given from time to time, it is rather given by 
jurai out of their separately held harato pusako, and then only to jurai 
members and their children. But if a male kaum/jurai member stays with 
his wife anyway, working on her fields and bringing all his harato pan-
caharian to the house of his wife and children, why should he be given 
pambaoan as weIl if his kaum has barely enough land to live on? The men 
counter this decrease of pambaoan and hibah by investing their harato 
pancaharian in their harato pusako through redemptions and transfers of 
pawnings for the benefit of their children, by stressing the latter's 
inheritance rights within the ganggam bauntuek complex, and simply by 
cheating their sisters and mothers. So the bako - anak pisang relation-
ship is gradually reduced to the individualized relationship between 
father and children. 
I have summarily described the process of individualization and the 
attachment of the Minangkabau to smaller social units, and discussed the 
factors which contributed to this development. The change of property 
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and inheritance law and the change in the Minangkabau behaviour in pro-
perty and inheritance affairs are one aspect of this process. I mentioned 
other factors which, through history, have influenced this process and, 
in turn, have been influenced by it. Thus if we wish to focus on the de-
velopment within the domain of property relationships we cannot treat the 
dialectical relationship between law and behaviour in isolation. It is 
behaviour, and not only within the domain of property relationships, 
which influences and eventually changes property and inheritance law; 
and it is not only property and inheritance law, but other law and other 
conceptions as weIl, which influence and eventually change the behaviour 
in property and inheritance affairs. All the factors mentioned must be 
kept in mind when the relationship between law and behaviour and its 
development through history are analyzed. Their analysis is of ten ap-
proached through the question of whether practice was "ahead" of law, 
and of whether and when the "gap" or the "lag" between behaviour and law 
was closed; or conversely, whether in certain historie periods law was 
ahead of practice. The conceptualization of law outlined in the first 
chapter, however, demands a different approach which in my view leads 
to a much better appreciation of the changes which have taken place. 
To begin with, we should no te that the change in property and inheri-
tance behaviour to a large extent has happened wholly in accordance with 
established general adat conceptions. The mechanisms of pawning and 
transfer of pawning are not new in adat, and the legal conceptions per-
taining to them have scarcely changed. But through the growing infusion 
of money int 0 the nagari and its investment in property relationships to 
hapato pusako, the frequency and importanee of these mechanisms have 
drastically changed the social and economie life in the nagari. This is 
an excellent example of what Renner, in his analysis of the development 
of the institutions of private law in Europe, called "change of function" 
(Funktionswandel): a considerable change in the "basis" or "infra-
structure", due to non-Iegal factors, without a consequent or necessary 
change in the law (Renner 1929: 5 ff.). 
Secondly, much change in practice could be achieved within the frame-
work of unchanged genera I conceptions through a differently directed 
exercise of autonomy in property and inheritance matters. We must remem-
ber that the autonomy of the property holding group, which became mani-
fest in its unanimous decisions, covered a wide range of potentially 
highly diverse results. The kaum could give property to its anak pisang; 
370 PROPERTI IN SOCIAL CONfINUITI 
the kaum members could give their consent to or take cognizance of the 
gift of property from a kaum member to his children. When in the course 
of history men tended to give their property to their children and the 
children could effectively keep this property af ter their father's death, 
this did not yet amount to a change of genera I law, nor was this neces-
sarily contrary to adat. It primarily meant th at the kaum recognized a 
greater autonomy in property affairs for their individual male kaum 
members. It is useful to recall the statistical data on pancaharian 
inheritance and hibah collected by Sa'danoer (1971). Sa'danoer reported 
an increasing amount of pancaharian inheritance and cases of hibah by the 
children, from which he concluded a change in inheritance Zaw. But his 
data on pancaharian transfers (given for 81.8% of the transfers) show 
that in nearly all cases such transfers by inheritance or hibah were 
based upon unanimous decisions or agreements by the recipients' matri-
lineal and/or patrilateral kinsmen. Only 0.3% of all cases were decided 
by a State Court, and only 3.9% by the adat council (1971: 12). So the 
direction of inheritance was changed as the Minangkabau tended to exer-
cise their autonomy, but this did not yet change the general adat con-
ceptions. The probable reasons for this change in practice have been 
discussed above. The de facto individualization of property relationships 
was recognized by the kaum members in concrete decision making processes, 
but the decisions reached were still "tergantung situasi dan condisi", 
depending on the situation and conditions of the concrete cases. The 
possibility of different decisions in future similar cases was thereby 
not excluded. 
New, however, was the rule that individuals could also dispose of 
their harato pancaharian for the benefit of their children against the 
wishes of their kaum members. We should note again, that this new general 
rule did not so much affect, or run counter to, the adat conceptions con-
cerning the direction of the diachronic flow of property, but primarily 
liberated the individual's autonomy from his kaum's former restrictions. 
It confirmed the de facto individualization in terms of general legal 
consequences. Though individual autonomy was thus strengthened at the 
expense of the kaum, the latter's restrictive powers were also trans-
ferred to "society" as a whoIe. This autonomy transfer from the social 
group to "society" is manifest in the new general legal conceptions, 
restricting the autonomy of both individuals and groups in the name of 
society and its law. The Colonial and State Courts played a prominent 
role in this process, for they transformed the, probably statistically 
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dominant, contents of concrete decisions made in the exercise of kaum 
autonorny into a general legal TUle ignoring kaum autonorny. The economic, 
moral, and political factors which influenced the decision making inter-
action of the kaum members in concrete cases to an increasing extent pro-
duced the same concrete result: the recognition of individual autonorny 
in concrete cases. These results were given general and prescriptive 
character by the courts. Two factors were decisive for this transformation: 
1. According to the theory of law to which the judges adhered, law was 
or should be either the recognition of normative principles reflected in 
statistically preponderant behaviour (in the sense of the theory of 
customary law) , or the recognition of normative principles embodied in 
the decisions of the courts and village judges in concrete cases (in the 
sense of Ter Haar's besZissingenZeer). In both alternatives this thinking 
involves the transformation of the concrete results into a general TUle: 
either directly as in Ter Haar's decision theory, or indirectly via the 
recognition of the statistical behavioural TUle as in the theory of cus-
tomary law. The essentially different doctrine of law and decision 
making in adat which stresses the uniqueness of each decision as being 
dependent upon the concrete situation, was thereby ignored (compare 
F.D. Holleman 1938). 
2. The adat process of reaching and legitimating decisions through the ad-
herence to procedural conceptions and the demand for unanimity cannot be 
reproduced in the State Courts. The courts cannot legitimate their de-
cisions in terms of an interaction process but must do so by reference 
to conceptions outside this process. According to the judges' theory of 
law and decision making, such "external" conceptions must necessarily be 
the genera I law. 
The most obvious change in the law of property relationships is the 
general prescription that a man's harato pancaharian .in intestate inheri-
tance falls to his children. Yet this change is not as drastic as it is 
of ten made to be. For one thing, the TUle only operates within the re-
lationship between father and children, whereas in all other cases of 
harato pancaharian inheritance the TUles of matrilineal inheritance 
still apply; for another, the patrifiliative relationship upon which the 
new intestate inheritance TUle was based, did not have to be "invented" 
for diachronic property transfers. In Minangkabau adat, a man's harato 
pancaharian couZd be diachronically transferred along the patrifiliative 
link, if he wished to do so and if his kaum/jurai members agreed. The 
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man's matrikin had, based upon corrnnon group mernbership, an "expectancy" 
to inherit their mamak's harato pancaharian. Their expectancy was manifest 
in their power to restrict his autonomy to dispose diachronically over 
his harato pancaharian, whether the transfer occurred during his lifetime 
or af ter his death. When this power was gradually abolished and his un-
restricted autonomy became recognized, also this expectancy vanished. 
If, as Willinck writes, in former times the children could never receive 
more harato pancaharian af ter their father's death than during his life-
time, now the reverse was true. What the kamanakan could not assert 
during their mamak's lifetime, they could not demand af ter his death 
either. Harato pancaharian intended for, used or kept in the house of 
the children, "remained" there and "feIl to" the children af ter their 
father's death. Moreover, a man always had and still has the option to 
"intend" harato pancaharian for his kamanakan, e.g. through pawning it 
in "the house of the kamanakan", in which case it still falls to them 
after his death. This "falling of harato pancaharian to the children" 
was th en called inheritance. 
Although data on the problem are nearly non-existent, I think that the 
"falling to the children" was only slowly identified with the technica I 
western legal conception of "intestate inheritance". Remernber that in 
former times the harato pancaharian received by the children were not 
incumbered by the pancaharian holder's debts. This seems to have changed, 
too, for children tend to be held responsible for their father's private 
debts in contemporary Minangkabau. But the uncertainty which still sur-
rounds the inheritance of debts in contemporary Minangkabau indicates 
that the filial inheritance of harato pancaharian is still somewhat dif-
ferent from th at of the kamanakan in former times, when the latter in-
heriting harato pancaharian were fully liable for the pancaharian holder's 
private debts. The recent case described earlier (Chapter 4: 184) in 
which a debt case was construed as a pawning case by the court, shows 
that there may weIl be different attitudes towards pancaharian activa 
or passiva. 
I would therefore say that the conceptualization of the chi I drens , 
inheritance right in their father's harato pancaharian presents a syste-
matic development of the old law recognizing the individual's autonomy 
over his harato pancaharian and of the use made of this autonomy under 
the prevailing socio-economic conditions, rather than a radical break 
of the adat conceptions regarding intestate inheritance. 
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RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH TIME 
373 
I shall now try to consider the system of property relationships in 
genera 1 as part of the social organization of the nagari, and give my 
interpretation of the changes which have occurred in the more recent pas1 
Some previous interpretations of social change in Minangkabau shall be 
briefly discussed first. 
For most authors commenting upon social change in Minangkabau, the 
change in the inheritance law concerning the harato pancaharian has been 
the centra I topic. The development of intestate pancaharian inheritance 
"from the kamanakan to the children" was regarded as indicative of a 
radical change in the Minangkabau family and social system in general. 
Already in 1909, Van Vollenhoven mentioned closer bonds between father 
and children (1918: 271), echoed by Joustra, who spoke of a growing in-
heritance law "in the father's line" (1923: 127). Later authors observed 
a change from matrilineality to patrilineality (Maretin 1961: 193). 
Although these statements do not, of course, embody the complete analyses 
which these authors have given, the label which they have put upon the 
change in Minangkabau is highly misleading, superficial, and not sup-
ported by ethnographic facts. 
For the sake of greater clarity, 1 present two diagrams (p. 374), 
showing the matrilineal, patrilineal, and bilateral connections between 
a deceased femalejmale and those pers ons who can become actual heirs to 
their property according to the contemporary inheritance system. Already 
a brief glance at the tables shows that statements about patrilineal or 
bilateral inheritance as a new system are completely unfounded. The table 
for the inheritance from a deceased female indicates that, for females, 
there has been no change at all, and references to bilateral or patri-
lineal inheritance are obviously nonsensical in this respect. They 
reveal not only a viricentric view of change, but do not even hold true 
for male deceaseds either. A "patriline" is only used in the descending 
direction for inheritance between a male ego and his children. The clas-
sical patrilineal heirs, BS, FE, FES, etc., are completely excluded in 
the Minangkabau system. Equally marked is the difference between actual 
inheritance and assumed patrilineal or bilateral inheritance on the -2 
generation level. The designated patrilineal heirs would be the SS and 
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Table of Lineal Inheritance Systems 
Deceased Female 
Deceased Male 
Potential heirs in an assumed patrilineal systern 
Potential heirs according to Minangkabau adat 
"New heirs" according to Minangkabau adat 
Potential heirs in an assumed bilateral systern 




become actual heirs in Minangkabau. The only thing one can say is that, 
within an otherwise unchanged matrilineal system of inheritance, the 
patrifiliative link in the descending direction is now also used for 
intestate inheritance. 
This misinterpretation of the development in the adat of inheritance 
can hardly be explained by the authors' superficial use of the concept 
of lineality. In my view, it rather reflects most authors' ideological 
bias. Many interpretations of the Minangkabau social system and such 
change as could be observed appear to be given by persons opposed to the 
adat system or who looked upon it as something "unnatural". Within 
Minangkabau, such interpretations were mostly given by experts with a 
strong Islamic background. Most foreigners adhered to conventional anthro-
pological or Marxist evolutionary ideas. All were convinced that af ter 
the unnatural state of matriarchal and heathen Minangkabau adat the 
patriarchal, Islamic, or capitalistic stage would follow. These biases 
become manifest, on the one hand, in a dramatization of the matrilineal 
principle as more or less the only one which structured "old" Minang-
kabau society; on the other hand in an equally strong dramatization of 
any change or deviance from this hypothesized matriliny. Any change from 
pure matriliny was interpreted as a change towards the desired and ex-
pected direction of an Islamic, bilateral modern, or capitalist society. 
This should be stressed, because much of the "description" given by some 
authors prove to be ideologically biased when the original sources, 
upon which these descriptions rest, are examined. Among the non-
Indonesian writers, Maretin offers the most obvious example, and his 
descriptions have already been commented upon in other parts of this 
study.3 In Minangkabau it was the persons with the closest attachment 
to Islam who put the greatest emphasis upon the change in the inheritance 
law. They held that in former times, the whole pancaharian was inherited 
by the kamanakan, whereas now it is inherited by the children in accordance 
with Islamic law. The opposite attitude, namely to play down any changes 
in the adat system, can be observed among the adat-"purists". So R.M. 
Dt. Rajo Panghulu, one of the most reknown contemporary adat experts who 
is regarded as an adherent of "pure" adat, writes that it was the law 
in Minangkabau that harato pancaharian should be inherited by the child-
ren (1971: 51).4 
The truth probably lies somewhere between these extremes. In terms of 
descent and ZineaZity the change in pancaharian inheritance is certainly 
not as drastic as it has been made out to beo Many of the apparent elements 
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of change are in fact integral parts of the traditional social system, 
as has also been stressed by a few writers. 50 the traditional system 
recognized bilateral kinship,(a point particularly stressed by Djojodi-
goeno 1968: 262 ff.), but these ties were not loaded with social functions. 
The patrifiliative link was always an integral part of the ~linangkabau 
social system, and it could be used for property transfers - similar to 
matrifiliative links being commonplace in patrilineal societies. Kom 
(1941) and Fischer (1964) in particular stressed the importance of the 
father-children/bako-anak pisang relationship as part of the social or-
ganization, and cautioned against the superficial interpretation in 
terms of "pure" matriliny and "exceptions". De Josselin de Jong I s inter-
pretation of the ~nangkabau social system as being based upon a system 
of double unilineal descent (1951), is exceptional insofar as it does 
not subscribe to the naive notion of a formerly exclusively matrilineal 
Minangkabau, and in that it does not treat the "deviations" from the 
matriliny as "changes". But instead of concentrating upon the bilateral 
kinship elements and the patrifiliative link, it postulates the existence 
of a patriline, for which the evidence adduced remains unconvincing. 5 
~bst of the changes which have occurred during the last 150 years 
could in fact be absorbed by the traditional social system. An analysis 
of how these changes were actually absorbed reveals the main factors 
which permitted matriliny to survive in ~nangkabau in spite of its fre-
quent obituaries. 
The ~1inangkabau social system is upheld through time by the principle 
of matrilineal descent, which embodies the ~nangkabau not ion of social 
continuity within the territoria I framework of the nagari. Social re-
lationships which are not in accordance with this principle are skil-
fully and consciously adapted. Those contributing to continuity are 
assimilated with matrilineal descent and expressed in des cent terminology: 
hence, the incorporation of group members not related by genealogical 
descent, as weIl as permanent inter-group relationships like the hindu 
system. The other relationships not in accordance with matrilineal 
descent, i.e. affinal and patrifiliative relationships, are recognized, 
but are only of a temporary nature. Though they are an integral part of 
the social organization of the living persons, they are not used to 
structure the system in continuity. Marriage establishes only temporary 
affinal bonds, which usually are very important for the persons con-
cemed, but unimportant for the continuity of the social organization. 
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This continuity is structured in terms of descent, and other permanent 
bonds between groups are created by common exogamy or "non-marriage". 
The filiative relationships between the bako and its anak pisang, though 
highly valued and functionally relevant, are also temporary, for they 
end with the death of the individual anak pisang. For the temporary 
existence of the individuals a larger set of relationships is therefore 
provided. They are not completely bound by descent principles; on the 
contrary, within the unchanging framework of continuity, the individuals 
are granted a certain amount of freedom. 
This parallel existence of permanence in terms of matrilineal 
pusako continuity and temporary non-matrilineal relationships, also ob-
tained in the field of property relationships. In continuity, all pro-
perty was, or was destined to become, harato pusako turun temurun. But 
temporarily, property could be transferred across the borders of the 
pusako holding groups. Harato pusako could be pawned, but the right to 
redeem could never be abrogated. The bako could allot property to its 
anak pisang, but af ter the anak pisang's death the property reverted 
to the bako. A person's harato pancaharian could be given to his children, 
crossing the line of his matrilineal property holding group, but once it 
had crossed the line, it again became and remained harato pusako in 
matrilineal continuity. 
The recent change in the inheritance law from the kamanakan to the 
children does not, as such, greatly affect the system, for the use of 
patrifiliative links for property transfers is by no means new. What has 
happened is that the functional value of the patrifiliative link has 
increased, but this only concerns the temporary relationship between a 
father and his children. Whether harato pancaharian becomes harato 
pusako in the man's jurai or in his children's jurai, is irrelevant for 
the system; what matters is that it becomes harato pusako, and as such 
follows the continuity outlined by matrilineal pusakó inheritance af ter 
its short patrifiliative interlude. 
The same holds true more or less for the changes which, for economic 
reasons, have occurred in the residential pattern and in the indivi-
dualization of the residential units. No matter for whom a man might 
work, or where he might spend most of his time, he was and is attached 
to a group in which matrilineal continuity is represented by women. 
As Tanner has stated, the new arrangement of the men's residence and 
economic activities in the nagari has led to a shift within the matri-
lineal sys tem , but has not affected the matrilineal system as such 
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(1971: 34). Whereas in former times men were more attached to their own 
matrilineal groups, in contemporary Minangkabau they are increasingly 
more closely attached to their wives' matrilineal groups. The new forms 
of individualized residence of conjugal families in small houses, which 
is generally thought to be detriment al to a matrilineal system, has sup-
ported rather than weakened matriliny in Minangkabau, for it has elimi-
nated the only alternative for uxorilocal residence. Residence is rooted 
in pusako property and adat, and since both still prevail in the whole 
nagari, there is practically no chance to establish neolocal residence 
in the nagari. I fully agree with Tanner who speaks of an even increasing 
matrifocality in the Minangkabau nagari (1971: 34). To some extent this 
even fulfils part of the modern man's wishes. He wants to live together 
with wife and children, he wants to work with and for them, and he wants 
to emancipate himself from the bonds of his kaum membership. But the 
more he does so, the more he lives and works with his wife on his wife's 
harato pusako, the more he also contributes to the maintenance of the 
pusako system, and the less he is a danger to it or to his sisters 
through whom the pusako is continued. The medium of economie emancipation, 
money, and its investment for the benefit of women (whether wives or 
sisters) is absorbed in the pusako system. Those men who really want to 
emancipate themselves by controlling property and money which is not at' 
once absorbed in the pusako system and who want to establish households 
whose residence is not determined by pusako and adat, leave the nagari 
to seek some freedom in the towns or in other areas of Indonesia. The 
Minangkabau tradition of voluntary temporary emigration (merantau) has 
gradually assumed a new quality. In former times, merantau would bridge 
only that period in a Minangkabau man's life in which he had not yet a 
stabIe position in his social system. In contemporary Minangkabau, 
merantau increasingly provides the outlet for those Minangkabau who do 
not wish to conform at all to the pusako system in the nagari (cf. 
Naim 1974). The conflict thus is not carried out within the nagari but 
is exported. As more men leave the nagari, so the importanee and domi-
nance of women increase within it, while the chances of Minangkabau men 
ever breaking the pusako system of property and residence in the nagari 
get even more slender. We have seen that in contemporary CKL even the 
staunchest opponents of the pusako system, the leading Islamie function-
aries who are economically largely independent of their wives' and their 
own harato pusako, have not yet had the chance of evading residence on 
their wives' harato pusako. 
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It is property which is the main carrier of the pusako ideology. That 
the maintenance of the pusako ideology is possible at all, largely de-
pends on the natural characteristic of that property. Basically, it is 
land and not consumabIe. It would be difficult to maintain such a system 
on the basis of consumer goods. But the natura I characteristics only 
facilitate the continuous existence of the pusako system; the decisive 
factor is the socio-Iegal definition of the pusako land as something 
essentially immobile ( i.e. inalienable) and inconsumable. The example 
of western societies shows th at land can easily be transformed into a 
highly mobile commodity which is socially "consumabIe"; in other socie-
ties, however, property objects which seem movable and consumabIe to us, 
like cattIe, may be transformed into virtually inconsumable and legally 
irnrnobile property which greatly contributes to the continuity of social 
groups.6 
In Minangkabau we can observe an important change in this respect. 
The monetarization and consequent individualization of property relation-
ships, the increasing evaluation of property relationships in terms of 
money, has been mentioned as the most important factor of change. I agree 
with Schrieke, Maretin, and Kahn that these changes in the economic 
system will be the most decisive factors which, in the end, may contribute 
to the destruction of the pusako system. This has not yet occurred, how-
ever. Until now, the system has been strong enough to absorb most of the 
impact which the monetarization of property relationships has had. So 
far, it has only become effective on the temporary level. The pusako 
status of the property objects to which the monetarized relationships 
pertain is maihtained through time, and the individualized relationships 
themselves become harato pusako through time. New groups come into 
existence which hold the formerly individualized property relationship 
as harato pusako turun temurun, and within which the traditional mechan-
isms of property allocation and distribution are used. In some respects 
the increased monetarization has even supported the pusako system by the 
increase of pawnings, redemptions and transfers of pawnings, and the 
pusako status of the property and the rules of matrilineal pusako 
inheritance are thus regularly restated. Temporary games with money and 
land can easily be played within a matrilineal system. 
The adat pusako system is, of course, not only a system of property 
relationships but also one of socio-political authority. Although the 
actual authority of the heads of the matrilineally structured groups 
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has decreased heavily, the little authority still left greatly supports 
the system. In the field of property relationships, the lineage head's 
authority has been weakened by the growing dissociation of the rights to 
use and to exploit property from the individual's status as a group 
member. Yet this loosening of authority has in part been counteracted by 
the concept ion of the "harato pusako tinggi -of the kaum as represented 
by the mamak kepaZa waris", which was and is systematically enforced in 
the Colonial and Indonesian State Courts. If authority over persons is 
considered in isolation, the authority of the mamak and panghuZu has 
decreased, too, by the superimposition of the colonialjnational system 
of local government. But these systems of authority, though skilfully 
manipulated by the Minangkabau, have remained a foreign element through 
their lack of social relevance.As regards authority relationships which 
are both social and political, there is no alternative (yet) for the 
adat system. In the domestic and property domain, authority still is too 
much bound to pusako. Men as fathers can exercise some authority within 
their domestic household, but they have no chance of building up a larger 
group of pers ons over whom they could exercise authority. In the political 
domain, all efforts to bind political representation and government to 
political party relationships have more or less failed, which probably 
is also due to the fact that the Central Government does not permit really 
free political party association. It is symptomatic that the DPRN (Dewan 
PerwakiZan Rakyat Negeri) , the elective village government councils, have 
recently been abolished by the Provincial Government for their ineffect-
iveness. Recourse is made again to a Kerapatan Adat, in which the Ninik 
Mamak, the adat lineage elders, play a dominant role. This new prestige 
given to the adat functionaries makes their position more attractive 
again. It may now be easier to fill the many vacant panghuZuships, and 
to bolster the declining authority of adat functionaries in general. 
With the analysis of the factors which maintain the system of the 
adat pusako I have also indicated those aspects in which change, or con-
tinuing change, may prove to be fateful for it. The analysis provides a 
good frame of reference in which the development trends outlined in 
Chapters 5 and 6 can be properly asséssed. 
In the last resort, it is the conception of the pusako continuity of 
property relationships which gives the Minangkabau social system its 
distinctive character. All actual property transfers are related to the 
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notion of pusakocontinuity and thereby assume a temporary quality. The 
notion of continuity "infuses" these temporary affairs with the past and 
future. The inalienability of residual property relationships through 
time, and the rule that all property must become hapato pusako through 
time, are the basic functional safeguards of the system. In contemporary 
Minangkabau, there is no evidence that the idea of matPi~inea~ continuity 
is to be replaced by any other concept ion of ~inea~ continuity. But there 
is sufficient evidence that the conception of continuity itself will 
disappear. It is probable that, if the notion of pusako continuity fades 
away, the hitherto temporary holding of property, and the temporary 
character of property transfers, will gradually assume a different quality. 
They will lose their temporary character in relation to predefined con-
tinuity. The presents in which they occur will become discrete periods 
of time which follow each other successively and the sum of which con-
stitutes "continuity". 
There are definite signs which indicate this development. The con-
ception of pusako-continuity forms part of the knowledge and conscious-
ness of the Minangkabau. As such, it is to a great extent embodied in 
language. In Chapter 6 I have shown how language, the conceptual system 
in which the Minangkabau think and speak about their property relation-
ships, changes. The diachronic dimension is gradually eliminated from 
the conceptional system, which finds its culmination in the trans forma-
tion of the hapato categories into the hak mi~ik category. The hak mi~ik 
status of property objects is not affected by time or property transfers, 
synchronic or diachronic. Nothing in the hak mi~ik conception transcends 
the holding and the inheritance of property. Looked at retrospectively, 
it is and was hak mi~ik regardless of the way it had been acquired. 
Prospectively, it will keep its legal status also when inherited. Hak 
mi~ik holding and hak mi~ik inheritance will be successively repeated in 
the same way through time, and continuity of property holding can only be 
inferred from such successions. 
The tendency to employ hak miZik for hapato is most marked when people 
refer to hapato pancahaPian. This leads to a concept ion in which hapato 
pancahaPian is equated with hak mi~ik, and in which the property relation-
ship no longer becomes a hapato pusako relationship but keeps its ab-
stract legal status through time. As could be illustrated by a court 
judgement (p. 345 ff.), there is a tendency to make this explicit and 
to abolish the pusakoization rule for hapato pancahaPian as a matter of 
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law and to ban it from conceptual objectifications. Thus, at least as 
regards harato pancaharian, the future will have no place in the thinking 
about property. This will not only have the effect that no new harato 
pusako will be created, it will also gradually diminish existing harato 
pusako through its pancaharianization. We could see that, through the 
monetarization and individualization of use-rights, pancaharianized re-
lationships to pusako property are increasingly divorced from the matri-
linea 1 system of inheri tance and pusako continui ty. There is also a 
tendency to extend the use of hak miZik to harato pusako if the latter 
is individualized through monetarization or even through intra-jurai 
inheritance (see p. 347 f.). The rights to use harato pusako are reified 
in the concept of hak miZik. As a consequence, the rights themselves -
and not the land to which they pertain - tend to be treated as things. 
Through this mechanism the legitimation of holding and using property is 
increasingly dissociated from the natural characteristics of the pro-
perty as weIl as from its original acquisition and previous transfers. 
In short, the past is being eliminated from property relationships. 
The weakening of adat socio-political authority likewise has important 
consequences for this development, for the continuity of pusako is also 
expressed in the socio-political control over property. Pusako property 
was held in common by a group defined as "one" within the wider socio-
political domain. The distributions and allocations of use-rights in 
such a group were temporary in relation to the permanent division of the 
residual "group-pusako" relationship, a division which involved property 
and political group alike. Such permanent divisions of the group-pusako 
relationship have lost in importance with the decline of pusako-based 
authority and the disturbance of the traditional mechanisms of group 
splitting and format ion of new groups (see p. 78). Seen against the de-
creasing relevance of permanent property divisions, the formerly temporary 
distributions and allocations appear to be less temporary, and the holding 
of distributed pusako property will increasingly be regarded as more in-
dividualistic and permanent. The old allocations and distributions turn 
out to become final divisions, and the provisional character of these 
property relationships tends to develop into a residual one. 
As the notion of pusako continuity fades away from the language and 
consciousness of the Mïnangkabau, the present in which they live gains 
in importance, and with i t, all acti vi ties which occur in that present. 
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Here, individuals hold individualized property relationships. Rights to 
land are highly mobile. Even if they are still considered to be of a 
temporary nature only, the effectiveness of transfers of ten transcends 
the lifetime of individual persons. Individualized property relation-
ships are inherited by the children, and if the individualized character 
of the relationships can be maintained through time, they will later be 
inherited by their children, too. If the Mïnan~kabau were to consider 
only this when conceptualizing their system of property relationships, 
they probably would not retain a system like adat pusako. But the 
notion of pusako continuity is still strong and as yet absorbs an ever 
expanding present. A new notion of continuity could only be derived 
from the present, and this would require a present similar to the past 
and the future. It would require that the mechanisms maintaining the 
continuity of property relationships in the present were similar to 
the ones used in the past and expected to be used in the future. Before 
a notion of continuity can be established which is different from the 
old one and more in line with the activities in contemporary Mïnangkabau, 
the association of property holding and inheritance with the past and 
the future must be completely abolished first. As we have seen, the 
Minangkabau are weIl on their way to doing so and to reducing the past 
and the future in favour of the present - at least as far as the system 
of property relationships is concerned. But we have also seen that many 
factors which on the one hand weaken the pusako system, reinforce it 
again on the other. If left to further evolution, it may still have a 
long existence in Minangkabau. Those who are opposed to it probably 
rightly believe that a revolution would be necessary to cut short its 
life (HAMKA 1946). 
C. CONCLUDING NOTE ON TIiE APPROACH EMPLOYED 
Finally, I briefly wish to revisit some of my basic assumptions and 
hypotheses in order to evaluate them in the light of the empirical data 
and analyses which I have presented. 
As a whoIe, my study illustrates an important lesson in anthropolo-
gical theory, which is neither new nor generally taken to heart. The 
presentation of the Minangkabau material shows that it would be naive 
to assume that systems of objectified conceptions, the adat pusako in 
particular, would be an adequate representation of what really happens 
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in property and inheritance affairs. Such assumptions would be par-
ticularly unwarranted, if the systems were to be forced into the 
straight jacket of a structural-functional model in which the internal 
contradictions were smoothed away and the "gaps of uncertainty", left 
open for the exercise of society's members' autonomy, were filled. The 
disregard with which British social anthropologists like Radcliffe-
Brown and Evans-Pritchard treated the actual behaviour of society's 
members was based upon the assumption that the structure which they 
described was, essentially, a representation of actual behaviour. 
Conduct not conforming to this patterned set of roles and relationships 
was dismissed as exceptional or deviant. 7 During the last two decades 
several anthropologists have demonstrated that this assumption cannot 
be upheld. They stressed that "the ideal order tends to be a constant 
which is reinterpreted to fit the changing circumstances of economic 
and political fact, ... but that the latter, the facts of empirical 
reality, are, in every variation, constrained by the ideas which people 
hold about what is supposed to be the case" (Leach 1954, 1961 b: 9). 
They focussed attention on the fact that people could, through such 
reinterpretations, substantially change the ideal order. Other authors 
have stressed the superficiality of the structural-functionalist as-
sumptions as regards the nature of rul es and structures, demonstrating 
that society's structures and general legal conceptions rarely, if ever, 
form a logically consistent system nor are prescriptive in character 
only. ~bre attent ion was consequently given to the study of social pro-
cesses in which people were shown to manipulate existing conceptions 
and to create their own innovations. A variety of conceptual frameworks 
was designed to analyse such processes, like case-method, situational 
analysis, processual analysis, network analysis, etc. 8 The comparison 
of the Minangkabau systems of objectified conceptions given in Chapter 
4, and the stories told in the 5th Chapter, reemphasize the need of 
such studies if social organization is to be described comprehensively. 
But my own study illustrates, too, that social organization cannot 
be treated as a system of overt human activities only, and th at the 
nature of a social system cannot simply be inferred from the human 
conduct observed in concrete cases. As Leach already stressed in his 
Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954) and as has been outlined 
systematically by Berger and Luckmann (1967), human behaviour is only 
understandable in terms of the body of objectified conceptions which 
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provides the means by which the ac tors explain and justify their 
actions. If we observe 100 cases where children inherit their parents' 
ha~ato pancaharian in Minangkabau, this does not make the inheritance 
system for ha~ato pancaharian bilateral. Such bilaterality would only 
exist in the anthropologist's head. The generalization of concrete 
behaviour and its projection into structures or general legal conceptions 
which lies at the root of action theories in sociology and of the case-
methods in legal anthropology, is no less misleading and distorting than 
was the former structuralist-functionalist assumption. For it creates 
structures or general legal conceptions where there are none, and induces 
the anthropologist to substitute the people's genera 1 system by his own 
interpretations of concrete cases. The greater emphasis which in recent 
studies has been laid upon the diachronic aspect of social processes is 
an important step towards improving their analysis. But the study of 
"diachronic micro-sociology" (Turner 1957: 328), too, only makes sense 
in relation to the system of objectified conceptions and the notions of 
time which are embodied therein. 
The anthropologist must take a step back, and look at both the actual 
behaviour of society's members and the system of objectified conceptions. 
He must try to assess how the system of conceptions influences human 
activity and how human activity influences the conceptional system 
through historical time. He is in the position which Gluckman, with 
reference to legal anthropology, has characterized with the words: "We 
are caught in a circle, in which law, it is true, can only be understood 
through cases - but cases can be understood only through law, and both 
have to be set in the matrix of social process" (1973 b: 622). 
All reality is subject to social definition, and all social definition 
of reality has its legal aspect. This holds true for all domains of 
social organization which have been defined with reference to universal 
problems, and it holds equally true for the three factors which consti-
tute the field in which all human societies exist: the psychobiological 
character of man, the temporal continuum, and the environment. The 
Minangkabau system of property relationships and the changes which have 
occurred therein illustrate this point in a manner which is not very 
exotic. Let me briefly clarify the point in comparison with the con-
clusions which Leach has drawn in a study dealing with a situation 
similar to Minangkabau. In Pul Eliya (1961 b) he stressed that the 
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ecological situation, and the use made of it for production, are factors 
which determine what people will do, and that the constraints of econo-
mies are prior to morality and law (1961 b: 9). I should rather say 
that these factors determine that people do something ab out them; they 
pose problems to be solved by social definition and activity. What 
people do, however, is not 50 determined. It is true, th at 'water 
evaporates and flows downhill" and that land cannot be extended in space 
(Leach 1961 b: 9), but the immovable character of land can be accommo-
dated by creating socio-Iegal mobility of property relationships to it. 
Besides, the constraints of economics are part of the social definition 
of reality, too. To some extent, they exist in the form of law and 
morality, although they may be "prior" to the law and morality in other 
domains of social organization. 
Though Leach's description and analysis rests upon assumptions which 
are basically similar to mine, I find irritating his insistence that 
the social structure he describes for Pul Eliya is, in principle, a 
statistical notion, and that Pul Eliya is a society in which locality 
and not descent forms the basis of corporate grouping (1961 b: 300 f.). 
For this would imply that locality, in contrast to kinship, would not 
be a subject for social definition and legal conceptions. That locality, 
in its abstract sense, is the basis of the continuity of human societies, 
is a commonplace which holds true as long as people live on earth. 
It is always socially defined locality, in terms of property relation-
ships and residence, which are basic to continuity. The character of 
these social definitions canno more be inferred from the mere fact that 
people live on the land - the Mïnangkabau residence rules here provide 
a good example to illustrate this point - than it can be inferred from 
the fact that a man begets children, that he will be treated as a 
father in his society. Though Leach later speaks of "the environmental 
context as a social construct" (1961 b: 306), he does not incorporate 
this notion into his analysis, but rather suggests an alternative between 
the legallyjmorally defined kinship system and the natural continuity 
of the environmental layout and mode of economic production. His ana-
lysis does not make i t sufficiently clear that the "alternative" here 
is between two aspects and domains of the objectified system of social 
reality and its legal dimension. 9 
What Leach actuaJly means,of course, is that locality, conceived in 
terms of property relationships to land, is of much greater importance 
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for the continuity of Pul Eliya society than is Pul Eliya kinship. But 
his conclusion, "that kinship systems have no 'reality' at all except in 
relation to land and property" and that "what anthropologists call kin-
ship structures is just a way of talking about property relations" 
(Leach 1961 b: 305), does not help to clarify the matter. It rather 
conceals the specific problems about which we would want to make gene-
ralizations. For one thing, it confuses descentjkinship as an ideology 
of identities (Moore 1969) with the legal consequences which can be 
attached to this ideology. As Moore has pointed out in her brilliant 
analysis of "Des cent and Legal Position" arnong the Lango (1969: 375 H.), 
and as the Minangkabau data also illustrate,such a distinction is crucial 
for the understanding of social systerns in which descentjkinship is a 
dominant element. Secondly, it is a misleading restatement of Maine's 
dictum that primitive law does not sharply distinguish between the law 
of persons and the law of things. In a most genera I and superficial way 
Leach's aphorism would seem to hold true for both Pul Eliya and Minang-
kabau; yet there are important differences which are concealed by it. 
In both societies there is more than one mechanism of incorporation into 
the socio-political group, as a result of which kinship terrns and group 
membership are extended to persons who are not related to the core-
mernbers of the group who are inter-related by cornrnon descent. In Minang-
kab au , the incorporation into the group by formal adoption is a pre-
condition for the acquisition of property rights. In Pul Eliya rather 
the contrary is the case, the critical test of membership in the 
"descent-group" being whether or not a person can assert a claim to any 
kind of property right (Leach 1961 b: 303). This presupposes that a 
person can acquire such property rights by means other than his prior 
group membership. These means are indeed provided in Pul Eliya through 
the mechanisrns of sale and outright gift, and this probably led to the 
dissociation of descent and property holding and to a relatively greater 
irnportance of property law as distinct from the legal consequences of 
descent. So in Pul Eliya "property is a way of talking about kinship", 
rather than vice versa. But note the difference with Minangkabau. Here, 
too, kinship and property are increasingly divorced. But whereas property 
can be acquired by means other than those provided by the legal conse-
quences attached to kinship, kinship cannot be acquired by establishing 
rights to property. 
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The relation between kinship and property is also crucial if the 
maintenance of kin groups and of property relationships through time is 
considered. I think that the approach proposed towards this problem in 
the first chapter is justified by its practical application to the 
Minangkabau system of property relationships. I do not want to repeat 
myself unnecessarily here, but will only indicate the difficulties into 
which we would have run if the alternative approach, as exemplified by 
Goody, had been followed. 
When speaking of inheritance in the widest sense, the definitional 
restriction of the category to property transfers af ter the death of a 
property holder has to be given up. This much was indicated by the 
ethnographic data referred to in Chapter 1 and in most social and legal 
anthropological writing. So inevitably, property transfers made during 
the lifetime of the property holder have to be associated with the 
"inheritance in its widest meaning" or, as I would have it, with "dia-
chronic transfers". Admittedly, this primarily concerns donations to 
persons who would, af ter the property holder's death, receive this pro-
perty as legally prescribed heirs anyway, the donations in the holder-
heir situation (Goody). Yet if we we re to follow Goody's suggestion and 
only treat donations from holder to prospective heirs as inheritance in 
its widest sense, where would we stand in Minangkabau and how could we 
analyze the change in Minangkabau inheritance law? 
Hibah transfers of harato pancaharian from afather to his children 
at the time when the kamanakan still inherited such property intestately, 
would not be subsumed under Goody's "inheritance" but under "alienation". 
Yet a) the transfer would only be effective af ter the father's death, 
b) the property would be held by the children during their whole life-
time, and c) we can safely assume that such transfers were made "propter 
mortem" by Minangkabau men. It is true that such transfers are an 
alienation of property from the corporate group, but they also are 
clearly diachronic or inheritance-like in character. Important as the 
distinction between in-group and out-group property transfers is, it 
should not be the decisive element in the definition of "inheritance" 
but be subordinate to the synchronic/diachronic distinction. Inheritance 
within the group, donations in the holder-heir situation, and donations 
and testamentary dispositions to non-intestate heirs (to non-group 
members) are, of course, different kinds of property transfers and should 
be distinguished, but they are all diachronic in character and should 
therefore be distinguished as sub-categories of the wider category of 
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diachronic.transfers. 
This approach is even more plausible if the change in Minangkabau 
pancaharian inheritance law is considered. The conternporary intestate 
inheritance of harato pancaharian by a man's children should be included 
in the anthropological category of inheritance, probably no one would 
contradict this. And, in terms of Goody's argument, the hibah to the 
children in conternporary Minangkabau would have to be included as a 
donation in the holder-heir situation. Yet, in Goody's conception, these 
transfers would be "alienations" from the corporate group? ! And how 
should we categorize a hibah transfer of pancaharian property to the 
kamanakan in conternporary Minangkabau: as "inheritance", because it is 
a transfer to members of the rnatrilineal descent group? Or as "alienation", 
since it is an alienation of property from the new legal heirs? Clearly, 
Goody's categories fail us here. Through the irnplicit identification of 
unilineal descent with inheritance (which is in contrast with Goody's 
explicitly stated intention, see 1962: 316), it cannot deal adequately 
with situations where the one changes differently from the other. As the 
Minangkabau exarnple illustrates, the change in intestate pancaharian in-
heritance law, though changing the functional relevance of the matrilineal 
descent principle and of the patrifiliative relationship, has not changed 
the latter as such: it has neither changed the cornposition of the Minang-
kabau matrilineal descent groups nor added new pers ons to a man's kin. 
Is it therefore not much more reasonable to de fine "inheritance" by 
reference to the character of a property transfer (diachronic, no counter-
prestation) than by focussing on the beneficiaries? 
It should be noted that the same objections would hold true if a less 
rigid approach than Goody's were followed and the "corporate group" were 
to be replaced by "kin" or "legal intestate heirs" in general. Again, i t 
cannot be denied that all legal systerns predefine a set of persons as 
intestate heirs, usually selecting a person's kin (by descent, filiation, 
rnarriage) as beneficiaries of his property, and th at donations or 
testamentary dispositions to non-kin are legally and emotionally treated 
differently from those made for the benefit of kin or leRal heirs. But 
there would again be the identification of inheritance with transfers to 
the legal heirs. In other words, such a conception of inheritance is 
irnplicitly based upon a predefined system of prescriptive inheritance 
law. It would only ernbrace the restriction of society's mernbers' autonorny 
in property affairs. It would ignore that even in the most traditional 
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societies society's members have some legally recognized autonomy to 
determine by whom their property is to be held af ter their death; or,if 
it is transferred during their lifetime, who may keep it af ter their 
death. Any change in prescriptive inheritance law would directly affect 
such a concept of inheritance. Consequently, the concept would not be 
suitable as an analytical framework for dealing with culturally and 
historically variabIe inheritance laws and practices. 
This brings me to what I believe to be the primary question in the 
study of social organization and its legal dimension. It is not how the 
social system, in its various domains, is structured, but how fap or 
to what degpee it is structured at all; or conversely, to what extent 
society's members, be they individuals or groups, are free to exercise 
their autonomy. My study of Minangkabau property relationships has, I 
hope, demonstrated that such an approach has a largeT heuristic and 
analytical value than an approach centering upon institutions as units 
of study and comparison. 
NOTES 
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
In this introduction I can only give a brief and partIy rather 
superficial account of these assumptions. BasicaIIy, I have tried 
to appIy the methodoiogical ideas of Leach (1954, 1961 a) and 
Goidschmidt (1966) and the conceptualization of social reality as 
outlined by Berger and Luckmann (1967) to the study of property, 
inheritance, and Iaw. A more detailed discussion of the ideas under-
Iying Berger and Luckmann's reformulation of the sociology of know-
Iedge and of alternative methodoiogical approaches wouid have been 
far beyond the scope of this study. 
2 Moore has pointed out that the problem can partIy be solved by using 
"neutrai" terms which do not or not only have alegal meaning in 
western societies, 1969: 342. The reader interested in the history 
of metaphorical polemics should know that the remark which had been 
made with respect to Gluckman's work - "Gluckman's work has been 
characterized as analogous to that of a linguist who attempts com-
parison by jamming Barotse grammar into Roman Dutch categories" 
(Nader 1965: 11), and which Gluckman (1969: 352 FN 5) traced to 
Vansina's statement: "Kuba law is thus different from any European 
legal system, and to try to define it in terms of European legal 
concepts is like trying to fit a Bantu grammar into a Latin model 
of grammatical categories (1965: 17)," - had also already been made 
by Van Vollenhoven in 1909, who stated " ... that it would be a 
strange sort of nonsense if one pressed the Sundanese language into 
a La tin grammar" (1909: 59). 
3 For law: Radin 1938: 1145, Frank 1970: VII, Llewellyn 1930: 432; 
for marriage: Leach 1961 a: 105. 
4 Goody (1962: 285 f.) gives an overview concerning the ways lawyers 
and anthropologists have arranged this bundie. For the discussion 
on marriage see Gough 1952, 1959, Leach 1961 a (19S5) and Gold-
schmidt 1966. 
5 Thus Goldschmidt, when delineating the social function which is to 
replace the institution of marriage, has to admi t: "Since we do not 
start with institutions but rather with functions, we must develop 
out of our theoretical presuppositions those functions which general-
ly revolve around what anthropologists intuitively call marriage" 
(1966: 93). 
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6 Semi-autonomous group here would closely correspond to what Van Vol-
lenhoven, and following him most Dutch scholars of adat law, have 
called "legal communities" (rechtsgemeenschappen) and what was later 
discussed as "corparate groups" in social anthropology, see Smith 
1975, Fortes 1970 a: 276 ff. 
7 For an overview of the terminology see Mitchell 1969 and Barnes 1969. 
On quasi-groups see Mayer 1966. 
8 Compare Bohannan 1967a:46 f. In contrast to Bohannan, however, proce-
dural (or adjectival) rules here do not only refer to institutions 
which settIe disputes, but to institutions in general. 
9 This is, to a large extent, also the Minangkabau theory of decision 
making, see F. v. Benda-Beckmann 1977. On the musyawarah (decision 
by common deliberation) principle in the Indonesian societies in 
general,compare Koesnoe 1969 and Van den Steenhoven 1973. 
10 Only a few writers define law as internalized conceptions, for in-
stance Elias, who speaks of "the body of rules which are recognized 
as obligatory by its (the corrnnunity's) members" (1956: 55). 
11 Compare note 3. 
12 Twining (1973: 561 ff.) gives an interesting account of Llewellyn's 
and Hoebel 's opinions on this problem. In the "Theory of Investigation", 
outlined in The Cheyenne Way, the question of whcther the trouble case 
approach should be framed in terms of theory or methodology was left 
open (Twining 1973: 570). Llewellyn considered a definition of law 
based upon the trouble case approach as toa selective, Hoebel tended 
to base the definition of law on the proposed methodological approach. 
In The Law of Primitive Man (1954), Hoebel then systematically de-
veloped his original ideas. 
13 See also Fortes "Toward the Jural Dimension" (1970 a: 60 H.). How-
ever, Fortes does not always distinguish clearly between the jural 
dimension and the politico-jural domain. Whereas on the analytical 
level of domains, the politico-jural and the kinship domains may be 
conceived as complementary, on the level of the dimension, the jural 
dimension should refer to all domains. In his analysis, Fortes some-
times uses dimension with the connotations of domain, e.g. on pp. 
69, 72 f., 80. For a more severe critique of these ambiguities, see 
LöHler 1971. 
14 Barkun, who also conceives of law as "if-then statements made up of 
concepts that are woven into TUles" (1968: 85), also emphasizes the 
distinction between value and fact components (1968: 90). Fact com-
ponents can further be distinguished into "perceptual categories" 
and "modal behaviour". Cancian speaks of "reality assumptions" 
(1975: 3, 108, 142). 
15 In the words of Needham "prescriptive marriage connotes that the 
category or type of persons to be married is precisely determined 
and this marriage obligatory" (1962: 9). 
16 In a similar way, this was expressed by Lounsbury: "lt is not the 
incidence of marriages according to a given TUle that is decisive, 
but the consequences of such marriage. We would think that the 
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distinction should rest rather on an aspect of the legal structure 
of a society" (1962: 1308). 
I would not dare to stress the obvious 50 much if distinguished 
anthropologists did not find it 50 difficult to keep these two 
spheres of conceptions apart. Thus Maybury-Lewis, in an article 
purporting to clarify the issue of the prescriptive marriage systems, 
confuses the whole matter again when he writes: "It is characteristic 
of prescriptive marriage systems that they prescribe marriage for a 
given ego within a relationship category. All marriages which take 
place in such societies are therefore (?) treated as being marriages 
within the prescribed categories" (1971: 218). With the distinction 
elaborated above, the choice-element as discussed by Needham 
(1962: 9), Maybury-Lewis (1971: 220), and Schneider (1965: 65 f.) 
can be satisfactorily dealt with. It only falls into the first sphere, 
i.e. the behaviour which is cvaluated for legal relevance, and not 
within the sphere dealing with the consequences which are attached 
to the evaluation. 
17 Gluckman, who has demonstrated the analytical and heuristic advan-
tages of such an approach in his still unparalleled treatment of 
Barotse law, states: "For the time being I am concerned with law's 
existence in two senses: as a co~pus iuris, a body of rules, and as 
adjudication, a process in which cases are tried and judgements or 
legal rulings are given on them" (1973 a: 227). 
For a similar approach to law as "a complex of rules pertaining to 
a field of action" see Moore 1969: 391 f.; compare also Tanner 1970: 
379 ff., who, however, limits law to the ideas pertaining to con-
flict. In my elaboration of "concrete law" I rather follow the 
ideas developed by the Dutch scholars of adat law, Van Vollenhoven, 
Logemann, Ter Haar, F.D. Holleman, and J.F. Holleman. For more de-
tailed references see below pp. 34 f. 
18 I have employed the "transformation"-metaphor in a paper read at a 
conference of legal sociologists held in Bielefeld, Germany, in 
1973, see F. v. Benda-Beckmann 1976. 
19 See also Cochrane 1972 for a critique of the "unidecisional" ap-
proaches of Pospisil and Hoebel. 
20 It is surprising, therefore, that Hoebel treats Ter Haar as an ad-
herent of the so-called "ideological approach" (1954: 33); particu-
larly, if one considers that Hoebel co-edited and translated Ter 
Haar's Adat Law in Indonesia (1948). 
21 Already Gluckman stated clearly, that these two manifestations of 
law may not only diverge, but that they cannot coincide because 
they are quite different kinds of social phenomena (1973 a: 325). 
22 For a similar critique of Pospisil's attribute of intention of 
universa I application see Fried 1967: 91 and Cochrane 1972: 50 ff. 
Cochrane rightly notes that a decision is law only in one concrete 
case and not afterwards, and critically relates this to the imputed 
function of social control by law. It should be noted that the simi-
lar assumptions which were embodied in Ter Haar's beslissingenlee~ 
(1937) had been incorporated consciously. The anthropological 
description of a society's legal system was not Ter Haar's primary 
aim. He was mainly concerned with the creation of a doctrine of adat 
law application suitable for the Dutch colonial courts in Indonesia, 
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cf. F.D. Holleman 1938, Logemann 1939. 
23 For most discussions of the concepts of property and ownership, 
Hooker's comments are fully appropriate: "The anthropological data 
adduced in a description of a social system are organized around and 
in terms of various usages of the ideas of 'obligation' or of related 
terms such as 'rights', 'duties', and so on. The elements of these 
ideas are partially determined by whatever knowledge of his own 
legal system the social scientist has and partially by formulations 
made by himself and others in ethnographic studies and in the theo-
retical analyses which these studies have occasioned. This character-
istic, if no other, is a persisting feature of legal ethnography and 
explains the constant difficulties in the application of concepts of 
western jurisprudence" (1975: 23). 
Allegedly analytical concepts are usually a de-westernized form 
of a western legal concept denoting an institution, and thus are 
based upon a very different approach than is taken in this study. Most 
analytical concepts suffer from the inherent disadvantages of such 
an approach. What Goody, for instance, describes as his analytical 
concept of property relationship, is little else than a mixture of 
doctrinal western legal thinking and functional anthropological 
theory: His property relationship is an equilibrium model of society 
in miniature, an equilibrium between rights and concomitant and 
correlative duties which is upheld by sanctions (1962: 288). Not 
surprisingly, he takes his cue from Hohfeld's fundamental legal 
conceptions, which divide all legal relations into four fundamental 
reciprocal relations denoted by eight concepts (Hohfeld 1923, 
cf. Hoebel 1954: 48 ff., Goody 1962: 289, Hooker 1975: 28). And this 
is exactly what they are: fundamentally legal. That any right have 
a correlative duty is a demand put up by someone engaged in doctrinal 
legal thinking. There may be societies in which property relation-
ships are socially constructed in this way, but there mayalso be 
systems where this is not the case. To include such a demand into 
one's analytical apparatus means answering the question before one 
has asked it. No wonder then, that such an approach can only be of 
"peripheral importance" and "without rnuch result on the empirical 
level", as Goody himself admi ts (1962: 289). So why fill pages wi th 
it? 
24 That this distinction is arbitrary and should not be projected into 
non-western legal systems, had already in 1909 convincingly been 
put by Van Vollenhoven (1909: 49 ff.). 
25 If one derives one's analytical notion of property from western 
law, one can, of course, use property as property relationship 
(see e.g. Goody 1962: 284 f.) or as property object (see e.g. 
Derrett 1965: 9 f.) with equal justification. However, the multiple 
meaning of the concept in Anglo-American law should be avoided in 
anthropological usage. 
26 Gluckman has criticized Goodenough's neologisms for not expressing 
the distinction between what he calls "estates of administration" 
and "estates of production" (1972: 94 f.). He is right in so far 
as his distinction and the one made by Goodenough are quite dif-
ferent. Gluckman's distinction expresses the two levels upon which 
property relationships are expressed, and this distinction is not 
inherent in the one made by Goodenough. In fact,Goodenough does 
not give attention to this aspect in his analysis of property re-
lationships on Truk. Gluckman, on the other hand, fails to realize 
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that the conceptions of residual and provisional rights can be applied 
on both levels of socio-political authority and of use and exploit-
ation. The hierarchy of the estates of administration, which Gluck-
man describes for the Barotse system, can also be weIl expressed in 
terms of residual and provisional rights of socio-political authority 
over property objects. 
27 "For a social system to maintain itself its two vital resources - the 
human and the social capital - must be maintained at an adequate 
level by continuous use and replacement" (Fortes 1966: 1). 
28 The term "capaci ty" is used here in the sense elaborated upon by 
Allott, Epstein, and Gluckman 1969: 46. 
29 Cf. Goody 1962: 321 ff. with further references. The transcendence 
of social relationships beyond physical death is not only known 
from the field of property relationships, but also from the field 
of marital relationships, e.g. in the form of the levirate. In 
"actual life" , the wife's husband is dead and it is the husband's 
brother who is married to the widow and who may beget further 
children; in social definition, however, the widow is still married 
to the deceased and any children begotten by the levir are "the 
deceased' schildren". 
30 Most works on the temporal aspect of social relationships owe a 
"certain generic relationship" (Leach 1966: 120) to Fortes' essay 
"Time and Social Structure" (1970b). As Fortes has put i t recently, 
"the most promising advance in recent research on the social struc-
ture of homogenous societies has been the endeavour to isolate and 
conceptualize the time-factor" (1966: 1). The time-factor is con-
sidered in most systematic approaches to property and inheritance 
but in a different way than is done in my study (compare Maine 1905, 
Goody 1962, Gluckman 1972, Gray 1964, Derrett 1965). 
31 Leach (1961 a: 124 ff.) has demonstrated how differently societies 
conceive of the notion of "continuity". The Kachin distinguish 
"vertical" and "lateral" continuity, which are expressed by different 
social relationships (Leach 1957 a: 54). 
32 This, of course, has important implications for the discussion of 
the typology of reciprocities. An extensive consideration of the 
relevant opinions would go beyond the scope of my study, and only 
a few remarks willbe made here: 
The anthropologists who have concerned themselves with "the 
gift" and the classification of reciproci ty have usually not taken 
the temporal dimension of property transfers into account. When 
Mauss wrote his famous essay he was quite aware of the fact that 
the term don, gift, might be a misnomer (1968: 167) and he only 
employed it in want of a better one. Those gifts which were dia-
chronic property transfers were not discussed at all in his essay. 
In his understanding, the notion of the gift was firmly connected 
with reciprocal property exchanges. These exchanges were not always 
socially or legally defined as "exchange" but could also be effected 
by a series of property transfers which were formally defined as 
involving no counter-prestation. Hence the term gift. 
The conception of reciprocity also provided the frame of reference 
within which Malinowski's no ti on of the "pure" or "free" gift (1922: 
176) was discussed and criticized (Mauss 1954: 71, Panoff 1970: 62, 
cf. Malinowski 1926: 41 FN 1, Leach 1957 b: 134). This style of 
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thought has persis ted, and "deviants" such as Sahlins, who builds upon 
Malinowski's notion of the pure gift in his classification of reci-
procities (1965: 141 ff.) are treated with considerable indignance 
by the self-appointed administrators of the Maussian heritafe (see 
Panof f ,who critici zes Sahlins wi th the argument tha t "already Mauss 
has established that there are no pure gifts" (1970: 62). 
The whole discussion is framed against an implicit synchronic 
concept ion of reciprocity. Authors like Sahlins (1965) and Firth 
(1957), who value Malinowski's distinction, ment ion the time-factor 
but fail to explicate that the distinction between gifts or forms 
of reciprocity should be determined by reference to the temporal 
dimension in which the property transfers are located. Thus Sahlins 
says about what he calls "generalized reciprocity": 
"Generalized reciprocity refers to transactions that are putatively 
altruistic, transactions in the line of assistance given and, if 
possible and necessary, assistance returned. The ideal type is 
Malinowski' s 'pure gift'. Here ... the expectation of an immediate 
return is at best implicit. The material side of the transaction is 
repressed by the social: Reckoning of debts outstanding cannot be 
left overt and is typically left out of account. This is not to 
say that handing over things in such form even to the 'loved ones' 
generates no counter-obligation. But the counter is not stipulated 
by time, quantity, or quality: The expectation of reciprocity is 
indefinite" (1965: 147). 
Firth, another author who found some value in Malinowski's ori-
ginal distinction, writes: 
"But his original distinction has some validity. His conception of 
'pure' or 'free' gift should have been rephrased, but it differenti-
ates a category of Trobriand transfers of goods and services of a 
special kind. They are not characterized by expectation of immediate 
return, there is no specific equivalent to which they correspond, 
and they are empirically characterized as things which the owner 
wants to give" (1957: 221 L). 
These are important points, but Sahlins and firth fail to speci-
fy why there cannot be an expectation of immediate return and why 
the counter is not stipulated by time. In my view, the answer is to 
be found in the diachronie character of the transfers: There cannot 
be an expectation of return, as the giving person, to whom something 
might be returned, will, roughly speaking, not exist anymore and 
will not have the capacity to receive a counter-prestation. These 
gifts are "through time" and therefore non-reciprocal. The notion 
of reciprocity, on the other hand, includes that the counter-pres-
tation is gi ven "in time", even if i t is temporally deferred. 
33 In many western legal systems, like in Dutch law, the "legitimate 
heirs" can invalidate donations made by the testator during his 
lifetime af ter the testator's death, art. 967 B.W. See Chapter 4: 
208. 
34 A pertinent illustration is given by Goodenough (1951,1974) in his 
description and analysis of property relationships on Truk. On Truk, 
it was customary that "provisional titles" were given from the 
father's corporation to the childrens' corporation, which was the 
father's corporation's presumptive heir. This transfer has to be 
considered as a synchronic one. Goodenough, too, does not treat it 
as a case of inheritance (diachronie transfer), of which he only 
speaks when the father's corporation has become extinct and the 
residual title is fused with the provisional title. 
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35 For such an attitude in the older German legal anthropology see 
Thurnwald 1934: 80 ff. 
36 A weIl known ethnographic example which will illustrate the analytical 
advantages of the provisional/residual and the synchronie/diachronie 
differentiation is the "gratis gift" from father to son among the 
Trobriand Islanders, concerning which we have an excellent reana-
lysis by Fortes. Fortes concluded his assessment of Malinowski's 
analysis with the words: "What I want to seize on is that his pic-
ture (i.e. Malinowski's analysis, v.B.B.) represents a father's 
gift as outright alienation contrary to the laws of inheritance" 
(1957: 183). And he then propos es an alternative interpretation: 
" ... we should regard the gift as being in reality a sharing with 
his sons, by the father, of his possessions and rights on the same 
principle as a child is permitted and indeed entitled to share any 
food offered to his father. 
This sharing, or lending, is for the time being only, and holds only 
during the father's lifetime. It arises quite naturally out of the 
father's duty to rear his children to adulthood; and is not a 
'circumvention' of the laws of inheritance. On the contrary, it is 
an aspect of the rightful employment by a father, in his capacity 
of legal holder for his lifetimc, of any properties and privileges 
that ac crue to him as a member of his lineage and his uncle's heir. 
While he is the holder he is entitlcd to use the inheritance as he 
pleases, provided that his heir is not deprived when he in turn 
comes to inherit. 
When he dies the rights of the lineage, in the person of his 
heir, are immediately reasserted. The whole estate, including the 
portions of which the sons have had temporary benefit, reverts to 
the lineage by right of inheritance" (1957: 183 L). 
Clearly, what Fortes suggests here is a distinction similar to 
the one which I have made between synchronie and diachronie trans-
fers. The Trobriand gift is no inheritance and neither is it a 
circumvention of inheritance. In my words, it does not fall into 
the category of diachronie transfers. The father only derives an-
other provisional relationship for the benefit of his sons. 
Though this endures a certain time, it is not diachronie, but syn-
chronie because of its provisional and temporary nature. 
We must not get confused here by the impression of the father-
son relationship which usually carries a diachronie connotation. 
Whether the provisional right is given to the son (the son's cor-
poration on Truk) or to the father (the fathep's corporation) makes 
no difference in the temporary character of the transaction, as 
little as a sale from an old man to a young man is diachronie in 
character because it is between persons of different generations. 
It is therefore qui te misleading to characterize "inheritance in 
its widest sense" as "intergenerational transmission", as e.g. 
Goody does (1962: 311 f.). If Goody states that "although trans-
fers mayalso occur laterally, in the end they must take place 
between the generations" (1962: 273), and later restricts the dis-
cussion of his ethnographic data to "the ways in which property 
passes between rather than within generations" (1962: 313), this 
is not suitable for an analytical concept. For it is either a meta-
phor for the fact that any transfer "in the end" must occur through 
time and through the generations of persons who live in the temporal 
continuum, and achieves no distinction between specific kinds of 
transfers of property relationships; or it refers to an ethnocentric 
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definition of the rules of diachronie transfers. But diachronie 
transfers need not occur between the generations; in fact, in some 
societies inter-generational transfers are avoided as much as pos-
sible. For the transfer of rights over women, Goody himself reports 
this from the LoDagaa (1962: 314). 
NOTES Ta CHAPTER TWO 
For further information about Minangkabau political history the reader 
may be referred to the following sourees: Couperus 1855, Dobbin 
1975, 1977, Francis 1839, De Haan 1897, Van Hasselt 1882, De Josse-
lin de Jong 1951, Joustra 1923, Kemal 1964, Kielstra 1887 a, 1887 b, 
1888, 1889, Kroesen 1873, Leyds 1926, Van der Linden 1855, Mansoer 
et al. 1970, De Rooij 1890, Stibbe 1869, TNI 1839, TNI 1855, Taufik 
Abdullah 1971, Verkerk Pistorius 1868, Westenenk 1913, 1916, 1918 a, 
1918 b, Willinck 1909. 
On the tambo, see Dt. Batuah Sango and Haji Dt. Tuah 1966, Dt. 
Majoindo 1956, Dt. Maruhum Batuah and Bagindo Tanameh 1954, 
Dt. Nagari Basa 1966, Netscher 1850, Dt. Sangguno Dirajo 1920, 
Dt. Sidi Bandaro 1965, Stapel 1935, TNI 1859. 
Dobbin's impressive reconstruction of Minangkabau economie and 
political history (1977), unfortunately only came to my notice af ter 
my manuscript had been finished. 
2 1 refer here only to the "traditional system of sodal stratifica-
tion", see De Josselin de Jong 1975: 10 H. The national system and 
the aristocratie principles of stratification, which developed in 
the coastal areas under Achenese and later under Dutch domination 
will not be discussed here. 
3 Some adat experts differentiated between batali dapah and satali 
dapah, "having blood relationships" and "sharing one blood relation-
ship" , roughly: between group external and group internal matri-
lineal des cent relationships (R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu, interview 
1974) . 
4 Freedom could be of two kinds: either one was "free as a bird" 
(lepas unggei) or "free as a chicken" (lepas ayam). In the latter 
case, the freed slaves had to stay with their former masters and 
to continue to render some services to them, see Ver kerk Pistorius 
]868: 435 f. 
5 Cf. Verkerk Pistorius 1868, Umar Junus 1964, Kielstra 1892, AB 11: 
82 ff.; Verkerk Pistorius reports that in the reg ion of Lubuk Basung 
(in Agam) , a whole district, lapas, was founded by descendants of 
former slaves with the help of the Dutch governor (1868: 443). 
6 Divergent terminological use of the group terms by the parties and 
the judges in the State Courts leadsto frequent misunderstandings. 
The problem will be dealt with in detail in the thesis of K. v. 
Benda-Beckmann. In nagapi 111 Balai, for instanee, the groups called 
buah gadang in CKL were called kaum, and its subgroups (kaum in 
CKL) buah papuik; the buah papuik in CKL are a group of buah gadang. 
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7 It should be noted that De Josselin de Jong has given a very dif-
ferent interpretation of the kok lima kali turun-rule. In his opinion, 
the adat rule has to be regarded as a "five generation rule" which 
indicates that group splits occur in each fifth generation. This is 
then linked to Lévi-Strauss' discussion of the "rythme d'extinction 
exogamique", the periodical extinction of exogamy, and to the double-
unilineal des cent system which he (De Josselin de Jong) assumes to be 
one of the basic structures of Minangkabau social organization 
(1951: 86 f.). That this interpretation is not tenable will be shown 
in a different publication treating in detail the adat social orga-
nization of Minangkabau. 
8 In the literature, the various forms of panghulu installation general-
ly are treated under one heading. For the reason given above, how-
ever, one must clearly distinghuish between those installations which 
are held for the successor of an already existing panghuluship and 
those installations in which new panghuluships are created and which 
affect the buah gadang structure. 
9 For an extensive overview of the forms of panghulu installations and 
the labels given to them see "PanghoeloeverheHing" (1888-1889) in 
AB 11: 91-114. In nearly all writings on Minangkabau adat by Minang-
kabau authors an overview of the basic forms is given, see e.g. 
R.M.Dt.Rajo Panghulu 1971: 72, I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1974: 36 ff. 
10 The question of which was the primary meaning in Minangkabau cannot 
be answered with certainty. The linguistic evidence suggests that 
it is the residential meaning, as the word kampung, kampong, has 
a territorial meaning in most Malayan languages. One could there-
fore hypothesize th at the genealogical meaning in Minangkabau was 
derived from the territorial one. However, as far as one can trace 
back the use of kampuang in Minangkabau, nonco-resident individuals 
or groups have been designated as being "of one kampuang". 
11 For the view that the suku were originally clans, see Stibbe and 
Kroesen in Résumé 1872; for the contrary view, that suku were ad-
ministrative associations of clans at the very beginning of Minang-
kabau nagari organization see De Rooij 1890 and Leyds 1926. 
In my view, both kinds of groups must have existed in the early 
stages of Minangkabau political organization. For the recognition 
of the two different kindsof groups in early CKL, see the account 
of the nagari foundation given below. The same distinction is re-
ported in the account of the foundation of nagari Tanjung Sungayang, 
which is considered one of the oldest nagari in Minangkabau. Dt. 
Sangguno Dirajo describes how the leaders of the genealogical groups 
"make" suku adat (1920: 82 H.). 
12 The distinction apparently obtains in all Minangkabau nagari, al-
though the two sortsof groups are of ten labelled with the same term 
suku. In the nagari with Koto-Piliang adat, all genealogical clan 
groups are grouped together in four administrative units. In the 
district 50 Koto, these administrative units are called suku, where-
as the component genealogical groups are called kampuang. The suku 
are named through reference to the number of their component kam-
puang. Thus there is the suku nan 5 or suku nan 9, the suku of the 
5 or 9 (kampuang). There is, among several nagari in different parts 
of Minangkabau, a certain uniformity with respect to the number of 
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the component clan-units within the administrative units, which 
suggests some greater political uniformity and centralisation in 
pre-Dutch times. In some nagari, the administrative units are called 
"big suku", and the clan-units "small suku", see Kemal 1964: 101 H. 
In other nagari, both groups are called by the matriclan n~es, 
see De Waal 1889. 
13 These data were collected from the tax-register of CKL. 
14 The description of the hindu composition is based uDon the tambo-
cxcerpts and the information given by several adat experts during 
interviews. These data were not always in accordance, but there 
was a general consensus about the degree of complexity which I have 
described below. The "rea I" composition probably was much more com-
plicated. 
15 Cupak is a measure made of bamboo. It is also used for "measure, 
s tandard, rule" in adat. Here, the cupak usa l i and the cupak buatan 
(the newly made measure) are contrasted, see also below Chapter 3: 
115) . 
16 The proper Koto-Piliang system knew four adat dignitaries,the urang 
ampek jinih: Panghulu, dubalang (police officer and military leader), 
malim (religious functionary) and manti (judicial functionary), see 
Joustra 1923: 100, R.M.Dt.Rajo Panghulu 1971: 76 f. 
17 That buek antedates adat was the opinion of CKL adat experts. This 
statement may not only refer to the development of buek and adat in 
the concrete history of the nagari, where adat (in this restricted 
meaning) is only "made" with the foundation of the nagari. It may 
also refer to an historical sequence in general. According to R.M. 
Dt. Rajo Panghulu, buek was the term for regulations, and for the 
area in which the regulations were in force, before the term adat 
was used at all in Minangkabau, and perhaps before the nagari-
system in general (1971: 86). The term buek still appears in several 
adat sayings which are frequently quoted in the works of Minangkabau 
adat experts (compare R.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 86). 
18 Kom reports that in the census of 1930, in which a.o. the "family 
heads" were counted, a large number of "female mamak" were given, 
who in some nagari amounted to 30% and more of the total number of 
family heads (1941: 304). In Oud Agam, the district in which CKL is 
located, only 2% female mamak were counted. Kom discusses these 
findings in the light of the general statement "that a woman cannot 
be mamak kepala waris". According to his interpretation, the census 
data indicate that women can become "acting" mamak kepala waris, 
at least in property matters, and also assume the function of out-
ward representation. He cites a decision of the Kerapatan Adat 
Nagari Simanau, in which the oldest female of a kaum was recognized 
as "kapdo warih" for the control of the kaum property (1941: 321 f. 
N.B.: Not mamak kapalo warih). He further mentions that in nagari 
Pianggu, there even was a female panghulu suku adat (1941: 323). 
19 The only (and rare) exceptions which we found during our research 
at the State Courts ~oncerned cases in which women as representatives 
of their jurai or kaum took legal action against a mamak kepa-Za 
waris who, according to their allegation, unjustly claimed to be 
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their mamak kepala waris. 
20 In the literature, both western and Indonesian, the border between 
these two sets of rul es has only seldom been drawn, resulting in 
rather indiscriminate descriptions of "panghulu installations" and 
in same quite contradictory statements, depending on which set of 
rules the writer or his informant had concentrated upon. 
21 According to information given in interviews, the MB - ZS succession 
rule seems to be (or to have been) a prescriptive rule in Koto-
Piliang adat. 
22 Nearly all Minangkabau publications on adat contain elaborate de-
scriptionsof the tasks of the panghulu and of the personal qualifi-
cations which a panghuZu should have. Tasks and qualifications of 
the panghulu are the subject of a multitude of adat sayings. A good 
example is offered by R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 69 ff. and I.H. 
Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1974. 
23 According to adat experts in CKL, 15 steps had to be followed ac-
cording to the "real and old adat" of CKL, but no one could (or 
wished to?) enumerate more than 9. At the last panghulu installation 
held in CKL, only the four "most important" ceremonies had been 
held: meetings with the 5 hindu of Candung, 7 hindu of Kota Lawas, 
"the nagaY'i" (meaning all 12 hindu-Ieaders, the 12 juaY'O adat and 
the 14 anak mudo); finally the ceremony in which the "7 suku" 
(meaning the 12 panghulu acting as hindu-Ieaders) invested the new 
panghulu with his title. 
With respect to the number and character of the ceremonies therc 
is a considerable variation between nagari. In CKL, the ceremonies 
were said to be closed to the "public"; in nagari Padang Tarab, 
where we attended two panghulu installations, the buah gadang's 
women were given an official part in one of the most important cere~ 
monies, and women and children attended all ceremonies as spectators. 
24 See above Notes 8 and 20. There are also differences between adat 
Koto-Piliang and adat Bodi-Caniago. In Koto-Piliang adat, the hiduik 
bakarilahan-variant is not allowed (I.H.Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1974: 38). 
The Mati batungkek budi-variant is somewhat different in adat Koto-
Piliang: Before the corpse of the deceased panghulu is buried, the 
successor must be chosen and officially be declared panghulu. The 
official installation ceremony then follows later (see I.H. Dt. Rajo 
Panghulu 1974: 38). 
25 As has happened in case 1 of 1970 PN Batu Sangkar; compare also 
Chapter 3: 123. The problem will be dealt with in more detail by 
K.v. Benda-Beckmann. 
26 For a philosophical elaboration of the Minangkabau theory of decision 
making see Nasroen 1957. The musyawaY'ah principle is a trait of most 
Indonesian adat systems (see Koesnoe 1969, Van den Steenhoven 1973) 
and has also been incorporated into the state ideology, see Damian 
and Hornick 1972: 498. 
27 This will also be apparent in some of the stories told in Chapter 5 
and the cases to be discussed by K. v. Benda-Beckmann. For further 
examples see Tanner 1969: 40 ff. and 44 ff. 
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28 See also Tanner 1971: 265 f. The judges in the State Courts told 
us that they were frequently asked for advice by older women who 
feIt cheated by their mamak and did not know what to do about it. 
29 Against the unwarranted overemphasis on matrilineal kinship and the 
neglect of the bilateral kinship elements and the important patrifi-
liative link between ego and his father's lineage, see Korn 1941, 
Fischer 1964, Djojodigoeno 1968. 
30 On the term waris as category of personal kin see Firth 1974. On the 
term warih as used in Minangkabau thinking about inheritance see 
below Chapter 4: 196 ff. 
31 For a systematic description and analysis of the kinship terms col-
lected in one nagari, see Thomas 1977. With respect to the actual 
terrns used, there is quite a variety between and among the Minang-
kabau nagari, although in general the same pattern seems to be 
followed. For an earlier discussion of Minangkabau kinship and an 
extensive overview of the terminology given by other writers see 
De Josselin de Jong 1951. Cf. Umar Junus 1964, Fischer 1964, Djo-
jodigoeno 1968. 
32 The more differentiated statistics are as follows (source: Marriage 
Registry of CKL, N = 186) : 
Age of Male Female 
Marriage Partners Sex Sex 
- 16 0 1 
17 - 19 15 68 
20 - 22 65 69 
23 - 25 44 14 
26 - 29 19 13 
30 - 34 14 8 
35 - 39 11 5 
40 - 49 13 7 
50 - 59 4 1 
60 - 1 0 
Unfortunately, the nurnber of second or further marriages could not 
be determined. 
33 One of the last cases concerned a woman from nagari Koto Gadang in 
Agam, who had married someone not from Koto Gadang in Tebing Tinggi 
(Nor th Sumatra). She was punished by the nagari council with the 
permanent expulsion from the nagari (buang tingkarang). For the 
full text of-the decision see AB 20: 143-146; excerpts are given in 
Chairul Anwar 1967: 130 ff. and in Koesnoe 1977: 49 ff. 
34 In CKL, the endogamy rule was abolished by the Karapatan Adat Nagari 
in 1950 for men and in 1954 for women. Thomas reports, that in Gurun 
the rule was abolished for women between 1952 and 1955, but that 
"men have not been proscribed from marrying out within memory" 
(1977: 104). 
35 I could not determine whether the marriages between members of suku 
Sikurnbang were in accordance with or in violation of the Sikurnbang 
exogamy rules. 
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36 See De Josselin de Jong 1975: 9, Maretin 1961: 195. 
37 Compare Van Eerde 1901 and Besseling 1904. The following quotation 
from Besseling (1904: 349) in my view can be regarded as supportive 
for my arguments about the former option-character of the CCM-rule 
and the bias in favour of the patrilateral CCM: 
"Many a ~1alayan, who is already married, is constantly bothered by 
his induek bako (in the sense of: head of the father's matrilineage, 
v.B.B.) to choose another wife from his (the father's) kamanakan. 
To resist this demand without good reasons would be against the 
good and appropriate marmers (kurang babaso)". 
38 Minangkabau has the highest divorce ra te in all Indonesia, see Naim 
1974: 426-428. 
39 This was definitely the case in CKL, and Thomas reports the same 
from Gurun. In contrast, De Josselin de Jong maintained that urang 
swnando was conceived as "bride receiversjhusband givers"-group in 
Minangkabau (1975: 18 f.). His references to Korn (1941: 324, 328), 
however, by which he justifies his opinion, cannot support it ade-
quately. Korn spe aks of the "urang swnando group" which consists of 
"the husbands of the female household members~ (1941: 324). Although 
he later vaguely mentions an extension to all matrilineal relatives 
of individual urang swnando, no single incidence is reported where 
the several urang swnando' kawn would act as a group. On the con-
trary, when Korn proceeds to describe the activities of the urang 
swnando group it is evident that this "group" consists of the in-
dividual urang swnando (1941: 328). 
40 Compare De Josselin de Jong 1951: 46 ff., Umar Junus 1964. For a 
recent comprehensive overview of the literature see Thomas 1977: 
228-233. 
41 The main ideas outlined in this section have already been published 
in an article by K. and F. v. Benda-Beckmarm (1978). 
42 The Minangkabau have a saying "bak dirwnah bako" - "like in the 
house of the bako", which they use with the same connotation as we 
do when speaking of "living like God in France": meaning that the 
anak pisang have a wonderful life in the house of their bako and 
are spoilt by the members of the bako. 
43 This has some important implicatioffifor the discussion of marriage 
systems in Minangkabau. From the above statement w~ould expect a 
preference for a tendency toward buek endogamy, the husbands wishing 
to retain their political rights in the buek in which they are to 
spend most of their married life. From the relatively small number 
of marriages, for which I could determine the spouses' buek resi-
dence (N=159), 42% were within the same umpuek and 67% within the 
same buek. 82% of the marriages were either within Candung or Kota 
Lawas. 
In the study of marriage systems in Minangkabau, more attention 
therefore should be given to smaller-than-nagari territorial units, 
the buek and koto. It must also be remembered that not each perma-
nent settIement was a nagari, yet marriage arrangements must-have 
existed before the nagari foundation. 
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Not being a Sanskritist I am not in a position to judge how far 
the linguistic evidence supports this interpretation. It strikes me 
as plausible. In any case it is much more in accordance with the 
meaning the word adat undoubtedly has had in the Indonesian languages. 
It would further help to explain some other peculiarities connected 
with the word adat in Indonesia. As Van Vollenhoven noted, in the 
Moluccas the "adat kebiasaan" - the adat which is custom - is con-
trasted with other forms of adat(1918: 7). In his interpretation, 
this is just a clarification of the word. Yet if we take the Sanskrit 
etymology, it would be quite understandable if "adat which is cus-
tom" would be distinguished from other forms of adat. 
A much better understanding could also be achieved of a frequent-
ly quoted Minangkabau adat saying, in which the adat is divided into 
eight kinds (see R.M. Ot. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 89, I.H. Dt. Rajo 
Panghulu 1973: 109, Nasroen 1957: 63, Westenenk 1918 a: 80). 
Dibalah-balah patigo 
Sipauik pambalah potan 
Luhak dibaginyo tigo 
Adat dibaginyo salapan 
Nan ampek tabang kalangik 
Nan ampek tingga didunie 
Nan ampek tabang ka langik 
Aso bulan, duo mantapi 
Tigo timue, ampek salatan 
Nan ampek tingga didunie 
Rumah gadang lumbueng bapepeng 
Sawah gadang banda buatan 
The rotan is cut into three with a knife 
The country is divided into three luhak 
The Adat is divided into eight 
Four fly to heaven 
Four remain on earth 
The four which fly to heaven are: 
One: the moon, Two: the sun 
Three: the East, Four: the South 
The four which remain on earth, are: 
The family house, the carved rice-granaries 
The great rice-fields and the irrigation works 
This saying can hardly be understood if adat is taken to mean 
"custom" as had been done by many scholars • The surprised Westenenk 
stated: "From this fantastic expression we seem to have to conclude 
that anything which is seen, done, and experienced by man is put 
into adat"(1918 a: 80). True, but the saying is "fantastic" only 
if one thinks of adat as custom. Taken in its Sanskrit meaning, the 
division of adat into a heavenly and earthly sphere would make much 
more sense. There is, of course, the possibility that the Arabic 
word adat, adah is also derived from the Sanskrit word adat. In this 
context I should like to stress that most scholars of Islam do not 
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translate the Arabic adat as "custorri', but as "customary law" which 
was in force before the introduction of the Islamic religion, see 
Juynboll 1903: 2, 8. 
2 On the Malayan pepbilangan see Hooker 1972. 
3 The most elaborate distinctions are given by Dt. Sidi Bandaro 1965. 
4 The development of these classifications is not very clear. In many 
Swnatran societies, lists of laws (undang2) were only drawn up by 
the indigenous experts af ter the confrontation with the Europeans, 
see Moyer 1975. But the same may, at least in Minangkabau, have al-
ready happened af ter the coming of Islam, cf. Taufik Abdullah 1966: 
9 f. 
5 With the exception of adat nan sabana adat (which is always used for 
natural and/or divine law) and adat istiadat (which is the only of 
the concepts used to mean adat in contrast with Islam), the Minang-
kabau adat categories are used interchangeably by Minangkabau adat 
experts. The reference to "generaI" or "frequent" use on p.116 is 
hased upon a survey of 27 literary sources. 
It should be noted, that Koesnoe claims that the three analytical 
categories of adat which he has developed in several articles can 
be identified with the Minangkabau adat categories (1971: 8 ff., 
1975: 277 ff., 1977: 66 ff.). In Koesnoe's interpretation, the cate-
gories adat istiadat, adat nan taadat, and adat nan diadatkan re-
present three different degrees of generality: custom in general, 
specific custom, and custom accepted by decision (1971: B 5). In my 
view, however, the rategories distinguish adat according to its 
sources. They indicate, how and through whom adat was made or given. 
6 Cf. Koesnoe 1969, Van den Steenhoven 1973, F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1977. See also the descriptions of actual decision making in Minang-
kahau in Tanner 1969, 1970, 1971. 
7 On Van Vollenhoven's ideas about the concept of law cf. Van Dijk 
1948: 13 ff. and Sonius 1976: 25 ff. 
8 The two outstanding exceptions are the definitions offered by Djo-
jodiguno and Koesnoe. Djojodiguno (1969) stresses the social process 
character of law. For Koesnoe, law is a dimension of adat which can 
become manifest in the form of rules and decisions, independent of 
the functional attribute of sanction (1971: 10). His approach is 
quite similar to the one which I have outlined in ~ first chapter. 
liowever, Koesnoe chooses to define the dimension of law by reference 
to "what is just and proper in the field of social relations" 
(1971: 10), whereas I have done so by reference to the way society's 
consti tuents, autonomy is restricted and recognized. 
9 This problem will be dealt with in detail in the thesis of K. von 
Benda-Beckmann. 
10 See Jaspan 1964/65: 252. In a critique of Jaspan 1964/65, Stirling 
comments, that the concept hukum adat would date back to the intro-
duction of Islamic law (1965/66: 52). It should be noted, however, 
that Islamic law is generally referred to with the terms syapak or 
fiqh. 
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11 Compare the judgement in the well-known Allahabad case Aziz Bano v. 
Md. Ibrahim (1925), Fyzee 1955: 35, where the same distinction is 
drawn. 
12 Koran literally means "what is recited in the right way" (Juynboll 
1903: 10). It is the body of God's own words as they have been 
revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. The Koran is divided into 114 
chapters (surah) which are subdivided into verses ((ijah, pl. CiJCit). 
The had7th are traditions of the Prophet's behaviour which have 
been·witnessed by eye-witnesses~ The sunnai~ the practice of the 
Prophet as deduced from the ~adith. The qiyas is the principle of 
analogical deduction. It allows the Imam, the founder and head of 
a legal school, to exercise his faculty of reasoning and to deduce 
legal principles which are in accordance with the word of God and 
the actions and words of the Prophet. 
The ijma' is the consensus of the learned in matters which are held 
not to be clearly regulated by one of the other sources. See Juyn-
boll 1903: 11,17 L, 44,54 H., Fyzee 1955: 10,17 f. 
13 The first period is counted from the year 1 (the Hidjrah, Mohammed's 
migration from Mekkah to Medinah, in the year 622 A.D.) until the 
year 10. This is the period in which the Koran was revealed to the 
Prophet, and it is also the time of many hadTth. 
The second period is counted from 10 to 40 A.H. This is the time 
of the first three caliphs (successors) of the Prophet. Into this 
period fall most of the sunna, and the collecting and editing of 
the Koran was carried out under the third caliph 'Uthman. The Koran 
has since then been transmitted in unchanged form. 
The third period is counted from 40 until the third century. In 
this period, most of the traditions were collected. In this time, 
the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence were founded: 
1. The HanafI-school, founded by Imam Abu Hanlfa (80/699-150/767), 
who laid great stress upon the princlPlê of analogical deduction. 
2. The Maliki-school, founded by Imam Malik ibn Anas (90/713-179/ 
795) who stressed the principle of the consensus of the learned. 
3. The Shafi'I-school, founded by Imam Shafi'I, a pupil of Imam 
Malik. Shafi'I (150/767 - 204/820) is generally acknowledged as 
one of the greatest jurists which Islam has produced. 
4. The Hanbali-school, founded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal(164/780 -
241/855), a pupil of Shafi'I. He is regarded möre as a traditiona-
list than a lawyer, but is recognized as Imam. 
The fourth period is counted from the 4th century onwards. In 
this period the fiqh has been systematized and laid down in many 
standard works of Islamic jurisprudence. Cf. Juynboll 1903: 16, 
26, 38, Fyzee 1955: 22 f. 
14 For an overview of Dutch law and its development see De Smidt 1972. 
15 By the Provisioneel Reglement op het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 
4. 11 . 1823. 
16 On the dual court system and its development see Couperus 1882, 
Mieremet 1919, Carpentier Alting 1926, Kleintjes vol. 2 1929, de 
la Porte 1933, Ter Haar 1948: 1 ff. 
17 In 1927, the Rechtsreglement voor de Buitengewesten, R.B.G., esta-
blished the distriktsraad in the villages and the landraden in the 
province's main places, without bringing any important changes 
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to the judicial system. 
18 The credit for the official recognition is mainly due to the poli-
tically active members of the adat law school of Leiden university. 
19 Ordonnantie of 9.3.1935, S. 1935: 102, which amended the R.B.G. by 
inserting a new art., 3a R.B.G. The full text of the ordinance is 
published in T 142: 109 ff. 
20 On Java and Madura, Islamic religious councils with limited juris-
dictional powers had been recognized since 1808. The regulation 
issued by Daendels in 1808 was incorporated into art. 78 Regerings-
reglement (R.R.) of 1854, and later into art. 134 Indische Staats-
regeling (l.S.), the constitutions of the Colony, see Lev 1972 a: 
8 ff., Hooker 1975: 269). 
21 The Algemene Bepalingen van Wetgeving, S. 1847: 23, had established 
the two categories. The tripartite division was introduced by the 
R.R., see Ter Haar 1948: 1 ff., Gautama and Hornick 1972: 1 ff., 
Hooker 1975: 250 ff. 
22 Art. 163 l.S. had first been promulgated as an amendment to art. 
109 R.R. 
23 The law declared applicable to the native group included: 
The regulations of the Dutch Commercial Code concerning shipping, 
S. 1876: 119, later replaced by the provisions in the new Commer-
cial Code, S. 1933: 49, which came into force in 1938; 
The provisions of the Dutch Civil Code concerning labour contracts, 
art. 1601 - 1603, S. 1876: 256; 
The provisions of the Dutch Civil Code concerning gambling and the 
placing of bets, art. 1788 - 1791, S. 1907: 306. 
24 See Tobi 1927. Art. 109 (5) R.R., and later art. 163 (5) l.S. author-
ized the Governor General to issue a declaration that a given ap-
plicant was henceforth a member of the European group. Natives 
also had opportunities to submit to European law without a change 
of group membership by total, partial, ad-hoc, and presumptive sub-
mission, art. 131 (4) l.S. and Royal Decree, S. 1917: 12. Partial 
submission was excluded for the fields of family law and inheritance. 
The fields of inheritance, wilIs, and land law were excluded for 
ad-hoc submission to European law, see Ter Haar 1948: 35 ff., Gau-
tama and Hornick 1972: 16. On the conflicts of law pertaining to 
the interracial and interreligious relationships see Kollewijn 1930, 
1955, Schiller 1942, Lemaire 1934, 1952. 
25 The transitional provisions of the 1945-constitution specified that 
all laws and regulations in force at the time of Independence should 
continue to be in force until and unless they were replaced by sta-
tute. The legal situation is somewhat ambiguous, as an Executive 
Order issued in 1945 (P.P. 1945: 2) interprets the constitution 
to mean that pre-Independence regulations continue to be in force 
only to the extent to which they are not contrary to the consti-
tution. On the basis of this order it has been argued that the arts. 
131 and 163 l.S. are no longer valid. Most legal scholars, however, 
hold that they are still in force, see Gautama and Hornick 1972: 
6, 180 ff., Damian and Hornick 1972: 522. 
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26 For an explicit reference to these provisions see case 278 of 1961 
in the PN Padang, published in "Berita Pengadilan Tinggi" no. 1 
(1968): 24. Cf. Hooker 1975: 276. For a case, in which arts. 131 
and l.S. are declared to be invalid see"Yurisprudensi Indonesia" 
1969 I: 33. 
27 Arts. 24 and 25 of the 1945-constitution declared that the juris-
diction should be exercised by a Supreme Court and other courts. 
The three types of courts were officially introduced by law no. 
13 of 1965. In 1970, the judicial system was revised through the 
Basic Law of the Judicial Administration (Undang2 ten tang Ketentuan2 
Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman, law no. 14 of 1970). On the development 
of the judicial system sec Lemaire 1952, Logemann 1955, Damian and 
Hornick 1972, Hooker 1975. 
28 For an overview of the development of thc colonial and national 
local government systems see Kemal 1964, Sjofjan Thalib 1974. The 
texts of the various decrees and regulations are published in Si-
hombing and Sjamsulbahri 1975. In 1915, the lapas-system had been 
abolished, and in 1914/1918 a new ordinance on nagaPi government had 
been introduced. In 1938, these regulations were repealed by the 
Inlandsche Gemeente OY'donnantie vooy' de Buitengewesten, (I.G.O.B. , 
S. 1938: 490). Art. 1 I.O.G.B. stated that the nagaPi was alegal 
person which was represented by the Kepapatan Adat, the organization 
of which should be in accordance with adat. 
Post-Independence sawa multitude of regulations which mostly 
were preliminary in character. Maklumat 20 of 1947 established an 
Office of Daily Affairs (Dewan HaPian NagaY'i) and a Counci I of 
NagaY'i Representatives (Dewan PeY'Wakilan NagaY'i). In these pro-
visions it was declared that all population groups within thc nagaY'i 
should be represented in the Kepapatan Adat and thc other nagaPi 
institutions. In 1963, a new preliminary re~llation was issued by 
the Gavernor of West Sumatra (SK/desa/GSB/1963), in which the adat 
group, the pangh~lu and lineage elders, was recognized besides nine 
other groups. The nagaY'i government consisted of a mayor, the 
KeY'apatan NagaPi, and a NagaY'i Deliberation Committee (Badan 
Musyawapatan NagaY'i). Each of the main population groups had its 
own sub-council, the adat group thc KeY'apatan Adat NagaPi, and the 
religious group the KeY'apatan Agama. 
29 See arts. 30 - 33 SK 015/GSB/1968 and art. 1 (4) SK 149/GSB/1970. 
30 But not all members of the KAN are members of the fu~ as weIl. In 
CKL, there is much rivalry between thc two institutions. On the 
relationship between recognized and unrecognized adat councils 
in Minangkabau in general see Amilijoes Sa'danoer 1973 and Sjofjan 
Thalib 1974. 
31 On the situation on Java and Madura see Lev 1972 a: 75 ff. 
32 This problem will be dealt with in the thesis of K. v. Bcnda-
Beckmann. 
33 These findings are similar to the data given by Tanner(1969: 50 ff .• 
1971: 163, 181 ff.) for the same court's case-laad in the period 
1964 - 1966. 
34 The LKAAM was founded in 1966 at the instigation of the Provincial 
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Governrnent. It is the successor to previous adat organizations, the 
SAAM and MTKAAM, which were much freer of governrnent influence. 
The SAAM was founded during the Dutch colonial rule as an adat-
pressure group against colonial rule and the Islamic pressure groups. 
For an excellent account of the formation of these pressure groups 
see Taufik Abdullah 1971, 1972. 
In the provincial L~I, each naga ri has one representative, gener-
ally the head of the KeY'apatan Adat Nagari. The LKAAM is a "functional 
group" in the sense of GOLKAR (Golongan KaY'ya) , the assemblage of 
functional groups which acts as the strongest political party in 
post-Sukarno Indonesia; GOLKAR is pro-governrnent. The top positions 
of the LKAAM are filled by panghulu who hold higher administrative 
posts. Most of the nagaY'i's representatives also hold administrative 
appointments on nagari or kecamatan level. Yet it also functions 
as a pressure group for the panghulu who are trying to regain some 
of the power which they lost af ter Independence, and who are not at 
all shy in uttering their grievances against the governrnent's policy 
at the genera I meetings (MusyawaY'ah BesaY', M[JBES). Concerning the 
1974 meeting, which we were allowed to attend, see Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann 1975; on the previous meeting of 1969 see Naim 1973. 
The success of the L~1 is limited. Information is given, and 
the adat-functionaries realize that the governrnent pays at least 
some respect to their authority. But most Minangkabau perceive thc 
LKAAM as a government organization, something that "comes from 
above", and the regulations proposed through the LKAAM channel usual-
Iy are quite unpopular in the nagaY'i. One of the main topics dis-
cuss~~ at the last meetings was the necessity to have the village 
land (tanah ulayat) registered and to have genealogies (Y'anji) drawn 
up for each kaum, with the aim of reducing land disputes. In spite 
of the solemn agreement of all MUBES-participants, nothing has yet 
come out of these plans. In CKL, not a single panghulu had made a 
Y'anji (including thc LKAAM representative) and no land has been rc-
gistered as kaum land. 
35 Islamie schools are quite popular as they do not demand school fees. 
In CKL, there was a Sekolah TaY'biah Islam, a secondary Islamie school, 
which was famous throughout Indonesia, and which was attended by 
pupils from all over Indonesia. It had been founded by Syeh Suleiman 
ar Rassuli, a weIl known Minangkabau Islamie leader. In 1974, it was 
directed by two of his sons, one of whom was a lecturer for Islamie 
law in the Islamie University in nearby Bukit Tinggi. The school 
leaving certificate of the secondary Islamie schools entitles the 
pupils to study at the Islamie university. On the role of Islamie 
schools in Minangkabau and Indonesian polities see~aufik Abdul1ah 
1971. 
36 The classic account of a teacher - pupil relationship is given by 
Dt. Sanggoeno Dirajo in Mustiko Adat Alam Minangkabau (1920). 
37 In the framework of the new loc al governrnent regulations of 1968 
and 1974, the ceY'dik pandai constitute the third group to be re-
presented in the KeY'apatan Negeri besides the adat and religious 
groups, cf. Sjofjan Thalib 1974: 28. In CKL, however, th ere was no 
consensus about who the ceY'dik pandai actually were. Both adat and 
Islamic functionaries tried to claim their followers as ceY'dik 
pandai. The adat group held that "actually' the juaY'o adat were 
the ceY'dik pandai. 
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38 The secrecy with which some knowledge is kept and the differentiat-
ion of knowledge heavily influence the anthropologist's atternpts to 
elicit information in these matters. Even when experts want to make 
an exception for the foreign guest, care must be taken that the in-
format ion does not reach the "wrong" ears. If, e.g., persons from 
another suku are present, the expert will usually not discuss their 
suku problerns or the status of their buah gadang in the nagari. As 
it is difficult to speak with a panghulu alone - it would be beneath 
his rank to appear or receive without at least a small following of 
pupils or senior lineage members - it is of ten very difficult to 
establish a situation in which the information can be given at all, 
even if he is willing to give it. 
39 In the State Courts, by contrast, it is considered as hearsay evi-
dence. The conflicts between the adat and the Dutch conceptions of 
evidence will be dealt with by K. v. Benda-Beckrnann. 
40 For instance in nagari Bayur, personal cornrnunication from Fred 
Errington, and nagari Gurun, personal cornrnunication from Lynn 
Thomas. In CKL, this was not of ten the case. 
41 A more detailed analysis will be given by K. v. Benda-Beckrnann. 
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Minangkabau adat thus contradicts the assurnption which has already 
been mentioned in Chapter 1: That the fact that primitive law does 
not distinguish the system of property relationships from social 
relationships in general would irnply that property relationships 
are expressed as what they "really" are, narnely relationships 
between pers ons with respect to things, Bloch 1975: 204. 
2 Westenenk, in particular, called attention to similar usages of the 
word rajo in other contexts, where rajo is used to denote "the 
master", as e.g. in the adat saying in which the wife is referred 
to as "the queen in the house and kitchen", " ... adopun padusi nan 
rajo pado tampeknyo tatakalo batanak dan manggulai ... " (1918 a: 20). 
3 See Résurné 1872: 11 ff., Kroesen 1874: 15, Westenenk 1918 a: 15, 
Van Vollenhoven 1918: 263, 1919, Logemann and Ter Haar 1927. For a 
surnrnary of the references to the beschikkingsrecht see Pandecten I: 
nos. 92-145, 728-749, 1016-1073, 1381-1394, 1712-1718, 1779-1790. 
4 Van Vollenhoven's use of the term beschikkingsrecht or hak ulayat 
fully corresponds with rny notion of socio-political control over 
property as outlined in Chapter 1. In his treatise De Indonesiër 
en zijn grond (1919) (The Indonesian and his Land), he spoke of it 
as "the adat restrictions of the native right of possession, the 
inlandsch bezitrecht", as the rights on the level of use and ex-
ploitation were labelled by the Dutch (1919: 7 ff.). 
5 The confusion probably arose as the native term ulayat, signifying 
only part of the area to which the beschikkingsrecht pertained, was 
ernployed to denote the beschikkingsrecht in general as an analytical 
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concept. My interpretation is fully supported by Ter Haar's analysis 
in "Het beschikkingsrecht in het adatrecht" (Logemann and Ter Haar 
1927: 12 f.). He draws attention to the fact that neither in Minang-
kabau adat sayings nor in the writings of the Minangkabau adat ex-
pert Dt. Sangguno Dirajo, was the concept of hak ulayat used. Only 
the ulayat panghulu was mentioned, which according to Ter Haar 
should best be translated as "the territory over which the guardian-
ship of the panghulu, which is based upon the beschikkingsrecht, 
extends" (1927: 12, cf. Dt. Sangguno Dirajo 1924: 71 ff.). Willinck 
claims that the conception of the hak ulayat as vested in the 
panghulu or in the nagari as a corporation was an invention of the 
late 19th century under the influence of Islam (1909: 637 ff.). In 
Willinck's interpretation, the land outside the cultivated area be-
longed to the nagari community in general. 
6 According to most scholars, see Willinck 1909: 573, Loeb 1935: 108. 
Kern,however, claims that the etymology of the word is unknown, 
and that pusako is not derived from Sanskrit (AB 22: 445). 
7 Patah tumbueh and hilang baganti is of ten used as a succession rule 
for panghulu offices. In the area of Solok, patah tumbueh is a label 
for what has been described as hidup berkarilahan and hilang baganti 
is used for mati batungkek budi (see Chapter 2: 87 f. and AB 11: 
93 H.). 
8 R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu distinguishes pusako kebesaran and pusako 
harato (1971: 131). Dt. Sidi Bandaro makes a distinction between 
the pusako which are harato and the pusako which are sako-things 
(1965: 76 ff.). Under the immaterial pusako also fall special kinds 
of knowledge like the tambo of Minangkabau or of the nagari. The 
pusako kebesaran can be the heritage of a buah gadang but also of 
larger groups. The offices of the Minangkabau empire, the Basa nan 
Ampek Balai, are also treated as pusako kebesaran of the lareh 
Koto-Piliang, see R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 115 ff. 
I have only found one instance of a quadrupartition of pusako, 
where pusako darah (the heritage of the blood), pusako bangsa (the 
heritage of the nation), pusako gala (the heritage of titles),and 
pusako harta (the heritage of property) are distinguished, see Dt. 
Majoindo 1956: 89. 
9 The fourth category is sometimes replaced with harato pusako 
tambilang budi, "the property which has been acquired by good 
social relationships", usually the pusako given to strangers or the 
descendants of slaves. For a similar classification\of milik, see 
AB 41: 379. 
10 But see R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu (1971: 131 f.), who attributes a 
different meaning to the tinggi - rendah distinction. For him, the 
harato pusako tinggi is the ulayat, and the harato pusako rendah 
the "pusako", which would comprise both the high and low pusako 
property of the common usage. 
The appendices tinggi and rendah are also used in a different 
way, much to the confusion of foreigners, see Tanner 1971: 262. So 
one of ten speaks of pusako tinggi and pusako rendah, meaning the 
pusako kebesaranand the pusako harato respectively. We of ten no-
ticed that persons switched from the one way of classifying pusako 
to the other within one interview. But note that in the latter 
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classification, one spe aks of pusako, not of harato pusako. 
11 In modern Indonesian usage one can als 0 speak of immaterial harta. 
12 For a different interpretation of these concepts see the decisions 
of the PT Bukit Tinggi and the Mahkamah Agung in the rice-mill case, 
which are discussed in Chapter 6:338 ff. 
13 Van Vollenhoven (1918: 262) and following him, Joustra (1923: 113) 
wrote that harta pancaharian become "family property" af ter the 
death of the pancaharian holder as harta manah or harta sako, and 
only in the second generation of heirs become harta pusako (cf. Raad 
Padang in AB 6: 168). Willinck held that the harta pancaharian become 
harato pusako with the death of the pancaharian holder, but spoke of 
harta sako in the case where harato pancaharian had been given to the 
pancaharian holder's children by way of hibah (1909: 772,750). But 
I have nowhere else heard or read of such conceptual usage. When 
harta manah or harta sako are employed at all to denote the legal 
status of property ohjects, they are used to indicate the oldest 
lineage propcrty which may never be divided (Kemal 1964: 66 for 
harta sako, Locb 1935: 108 for harta manah) or for pusako the origin 
of which is not clearly remembered anymore (Van den Toorn 1881: 514). 
In most publications on Minangkahau adat and according to the con-
temporary conceptual usage in the nagar>i and the State Courts, 
harato pancaharian becomes harato pusako rendah with the death of 
the pancaharian holder. 
14 In the Dutch literature, most statements on pancahaPian inheritances 
are rather undifferentiatcd and speak of "inheritance by the kaum", 
"hy the kamanakan", or "by the heirs (waris)"; for an overview see 
Pandecten V: nos. 689 - 871. The most differentiated statements are 
given by Willinck (1909: 776 H.), Sarolea (1920: 120 ff.) and in 
AB 6: 119 ff.,the latter reproduced in De Josselin de Jong 1951: 57 
f. Note, that the fault in the rules given in AB 6: 120, which De 
Josselin de Jong calls an "ohvious inconsistency" (1951: 58), had 
already been rectified in AB 18: 253. 
15 The division of the suarang property in the case of the death of one 
spouse has nothing to do with inheritance or other forms of dia-
chronic transfers. For one half of the property was the, albcit un-
divided, property of the surviving spouse already during the life-
time of both spouses, see Van Vollenhoven 1918: 262 f., Willinck 
1909: 553 ff. For an overview of the Dutch writcrs' statements on 
the division of suarang property see Pandecten VIII: nos. 2610 -
2633. 
16 Note, that the distinction has been emphasized by Willinck (1909: 
547 f., 782 f.) and Sarolea (1920: 120 ff.). 
17 We have to understand in this context the statements contained in 
several judgements of Dutch colonial courts, that the pusako pro-
perty may only be "divided" if there is an irreconcilable _ quarrel 
between the kaum members, see LR Padang (1927) in T 112: 132 and 
(1927) in T 126: 130, and LR Fort de Kock (1933) in T 140: 202. 
18 In CKL, the split occurs on the kaum level at which two new kaum with 
common harato pusako and independent property control are established. 
NOTES TO D-lAPTER FOUR 413 
On the buah gadang level, the component kawn reITlain "of one pusako 
property in adat" unless the buah gadang itself should he divided. 
19 Compare the system of thc rotation of the panghub title, the gadang 
balega, Chapter 2: 86. 
20 Besides the sako and the gala pusako, other titles can he used. There 
are honorific titles which express honorific addresses to older men, 
$uch as Angku and Inyiek, which are conferred upon thc individuals 
by the communi ty i n a ceremony. 
In addition, also "nick-ti tIes" ((Jalo pan(J(Jilan) are used, which 
mostly contain an ironical undcrtone hut can also c;..:press particular 
respect. Thus an elderly man in our neighbourhooJ was calleJ Datuck 
Harimau. He was not entitled to wear the Datuek (as he was no 
adat functionary) and Harimau (Tiger) was not a ~r!jlu useJ in CKL. 
But people likeJ to cal! him this way as he had been a fierce anJ 
hrave resistance fighter. 
I was often addressed hy :m7.a invented on the spot, as people feIt 
unwilling to address me by name. This is hccallse J was married and 
occupied a posi ti on which was at least important enollgh that i t 
could provide me with the money to come to Minangkabau - so I shoulJ 
have a gala. In the later part of our stay, a J(lla was conferred upon 
me in a mock ad'zt ceremony, which was afterwarJs used by several men 
to address me, rartly jokingly, partly in earnest. The panUuUarl 
or gaZa kiacan (allusionary htles) are not conferreJ in a forma I 
ceremony. On the system of gala WO years ago see MansvelJ 187ö. 
21 In CKL, ti tl es ljkc f'.langkuto, Palimo, Sinaro, etc. were consjdered 
the pusako of particular suku. The titles which were general pw;ako 
of all suku were Sutan, an "adat"-gaZa usual1y given to young men 
who do not ho!J an adrzt office, and titles inJicating particular 
ahili ties in the re ligious world, 1 ike Pakih (j'iql:h, the one learncJ 
in law) , Malin(m) (yan:7 herrilmu, the learned). ~Ialim could also 
denote thc religious office of the suku. 
Most of the gala have some fUllctional/officc connotations, like 
mantari (minister), pa U"lO (m i li tary conunander J, bm1CiclhaY'o (t rcasllrer) • 
Tt may well he, that in former times, these titles were only givcn 
to the holders of such offices. But since information on ~linang­
kabau titlcs is availahle, these titles had in any case lost their 
functional connotations. If a man wears the titlc of I'alimo F'lItih 
(the whitc military connnander), nobody expects him to hl' a rnilit;l1)· 
conunander in the saJTIe sense as nohOOy wi 11 suspect that a Mr. King 
in England is a king or a descendant of a king. In other parts of 
Indoncsia, the Minangkahau titles have caused quite a surprise 
(?ee AB 27: 258 fL) as titles such as Raja or Maharaja IJiraja had 
stil] connotations of rank and nohility. 
In historical perspective, thc titles which arc considercJ 
pusako of a suku may weIl point to a greater importance of the SUKU 
in former times. If the title of Ot. Sati e.g. was the property of 
suku Sikumhang in CKL ano of sukêA TanjllIlg in another nagm'i, this 
could, and sometimes was, attributed to the fact that in former 
times suku Sikumhang and suku Tanjung were "olle". 
22 This makes the record.ing of a genealogy extremely diffjcult for thc 
anthropologist, as the same persoQs are of ten refcrred to by thcir 
different titles. 
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23 This custom was probably developed in the Padri-era. In other nagari, 
as in nagari Gurun, such a practice was unknown, and the young men 
received their title only from their kaum or from their father's 
kaum (Thomas 1977: 88). 
24 So Thomas, in his preliminary study of genealogies from naga~i Gurun, 
could not detect any specific pattern of father-children or mamak-
kamanakan gala-inheritance (1977: 87). 
25 This is not quite in accordance with the data given by Naim 1973: 20. 
At the ~~ES - 1969 of the LKAAM, 92% of the respondent panghulu had 
answered that they had received their title from their "mamak 
kandung", which Naim translates as "direct MB". Although i t may seem 
somewhat inappropriate to contradict a Minangkabau who himself is a 
western trained sociologist, I suggest that these numbers should be 
re ad wi th caution. Though "kandung" usually denotes the closest 
blood relatives, and mamak kandung usually would denote the MB, I 
am quite convinced that in this context mamak kandung comprised a 
wider range of mamak, an impression which was drawn from interviews 
with several adat experts. In a common (with Naim) interview with 
Dt. Mangkuto Sati, a panghulu and recognized adat expert and former 
chairman of the PN Bukit Tinggi, Dt. Mangkuto Sati stated, that a 
Minangkabau panghulu would in principle insist that he had received 
his title and office from his mamak kanduang, even if this mamak 
should be a mamak in a different kaum of the buah gadang. A negative 
reply to the answer might imply that the present ho1der was not fully 
entitled to the gala. 
In CKL, panghulu referred to their predecessor as their mamak, 
also if this mamak was a MMMMZDDDS. More in line with my statement 
are the data given by Thomas on the basis of a sample check of 
genealogies. In nagari Gurun, closer descendants were of ten passed 
over in favour of more distant descendants, such as classificatory ka-
manakan, grandchildren, or even great-grandchildren (1977: 89). Note 
that Gurun follows adat Koto-Piliang. 
26 Compare case 1 of 1936 of the LR Fort van der Capellen in "Berita 
Pengadilan Tinggi" no. 1, 1968: 33 H. In this case the gala of 
Chatib Adat had been given to an anak pisang af ter mufakat and 
sakato had been reached in the father's group and a ceremony had 
been held. 
27 Note that Gluckman has asserted that in all legal systems a funda-
mental distinction is made between movable and immovable property 
(1972: 113 ff.). As the Minangkabau example and others indicate, the 
distinction between self-acquired and inherited property is much more 
fundamental in many systems of property relationships (cf. Fortes 
1950, 1963 for the Ashanti, Goody 1962 for the LoDagaa; see also the 
societies described in Derrett (ed.) 1965. In contemporary Minang-
kabau State Courts at least, the holder 's autonomy over pancaharian 
land in no way is distinguished from his autonomy over pancaharian 
movables (see cases 39 of 1969 and 16 of 1972 PN Bukit Tinggi , 7 of 
1970 and 36 of 1972 PN Batu Sangkar). 
28 In the pawning register of CKL, which was kept by the Tuangku La~eh 
of Candung between 1873 and 1897, a sale of rice-Iand is recorded. 
This transfer seems to have been approved by "the whole community", 
judging from the impressive number of witnesses' signatures: 27 
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persons in all, among them 8 panghulu. 
29 In the literature it is not always clearly stated which group must 
be extinct. The terTILS kawTI, familie, sabuahpaY'uik are mentioned 
interchangeably (see the references in the Pandecten V: nos. 1629 -
1646 and the judgements in T 140: 205 and 215). We must keep in mind 
that the teTTILS denote different groups in different nagaY'i. The basic 
principle is th at as long as there arc still persons "of one pro-
perty", the pusako must be inherited. If all uY'ang sahaY'ato sapusako 
are extinct, the property could he alienated with the cognizance of 
the related buah gadang. 
30 On the adat of pawning see in particular Guy t's thesis Gr>ondveY'pan-
ding in Minangkabau (1936). 
31" istilah untuk memindahkan hak atas tanah buat sementaY'a waktu" 
(Dt. Maruhwll Batuah and Bagindo Tanameh 1954: 54). 
32 The Westkust-y>appopt of 1927 mentions 9 cases in which pawning was 
regarded as permissible. Guyt, however, reduced these to various 
manifestations of the tour classical cases (1936: 61). 
33 The general principle seems to have heen, that all kaum members had 
to agree to the transaction, also those who did not live in the 
nagaY'i. A mamak returning from the pantau could therefore claim the 
invalidation of the transaction on the hasis that his consent had 
not been asked. If he was away, his consent should have been asked 
by mail (see Willinck 1909: 614, 616, 700, De Rooij AB 20: 128, 
AB 27: 276, De Waal van Anckeveen AB 1: 114, Dt. Sanggoeno Dirajo 
1920: 104). But there are also modi[ied statements which exclude 
the younger kaum members (sec Guyt 1936: 65). 
Guyt has develoned the thesis, that the mamak kepala waY'is could 
pawn the hapato pusako in the four classical cases in his own right, 
and that he was bound by the sakato-requirement only in other cases 
(1936: 70 ff.). This oninion, in the literature only found with 
Wienecke (AB 11: 120),· is mainly based upon two judgements (LR 
Fort de Kock (1933) in T 140: 218 and LR Payakwnbuh (1933) in T 140: 
226 ff.), which, however, had been given by no other than Guyt him-
self: (This is not mentioned in his thesis). It can safely be stated 
that this was not the adat rule. Even in the more liberal contemoorary 
situation, the mamak cannot pawn without the consent of the ahli 
waY'ih, a rule which is regularly restated in the nagaY'i and State 
Courts. 
34 This procedural element usually is not mentioned in the Dutch 
literature on pagang gadai, though it is of considerable importance 
for the diachronic transfer of the pawnee's rights, see below 
p. 171. 
35 Guyt reports that this system had been introduced in Batipuh and X 
Koto in 1888 (1936: 45, cf. AB 33: 289). Gadai-deeds dating back as 
far as 1870 are reprinted in AB 41: 406 ff. 
36 " ... minta tambah uang gadaian pada yang memagang semula" (Dt. 
Maruhum Batuah and Bagindo Tanameh 1954: SS). 
37 Van Vollenhoven mentions that in jual gadai cases, the redemption 
sum amounted to twice the original nawning sum, to which an additional 
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token gift (toegifte) was added (1918: 266). 
38 In Guy t's characterization of the property relationships in terms of 
rights, the pawner keeps the hak, whereas the pawnee received the 
milik on the property object (1936: 15 f.). Different is the Raad van 
Justitie Padang according to which the pawner keeps the hak milik 
whereas the pawnee only gets a use right, hak pakai (T 140: 262). 
39 See Raad van Justitie Padang in T 133: 183 and the expert opinions 
given in AB 6: 223 - 233, which are q~ite in accordance with the 
rules given in interviews in CKL. 
40 On Lombok, for instance, the term gadai is nowadays usually used to 
denote pawnings, but the older people still use the (presumably) 
older term sande (Koesnoe 1975: 154). 
41 The explanations given by adat experts in 1911 differed: One expert 
considered sando apagang gadai transaction in which the right of 
redemption was restricted. For another expert it depended on the 
value of the pawning sum, whether a transaction was sando or pagang 
gadai: below 20 real, it was gadai, in excess of 20 real,it was 
sando. Of the sando agung it was said that the property in question 
could only be redeemed by the direct ascendants and descendants of 
the pawner (see AB 6: 235 ff.). 
42 The term kudo, horse, seems to indicate a special relationship between 
bako and anak pisang. At panghulu installations in CKL, it was the 
task of the bako to give the adat kudo, "the adat of the horse". 
According to villagers, a horse was given in farmer times. In con-
temporary CKL, a symbolic money payment has replaced the horse. 
43 "Hibbah ialah berlaku kapada anak kanduang dengan jalan menjadikan 
anak tersebut manjadi kamanakan, tetap tinggal dan hidup berketurunan 
didalam suku dan koroang kampuang pusaka yang dihibahkan oleh si 
bapak". 
44 "Hibah ten opzichte van harato pusako of ten aanzien van het ganggam 
bauntuek zijn dan van zelf ab ovo nietig". 
45 Willinck has analyzed the character of the Minangkabau hibah in 
terms of western conceptions of donation. He concludes that hibah 
cannot be called a donation (schenking), as the donation always has 
the consequence that the donor loses the property to the donee. In 
western law (and in Islamic law, toa) the donation is a contract 
which requires the acceptance of the property by the donee, whereas 
in adat such acceptance is not necessary. The hibah can neither be 
compared to the donatio mortis causa of the Roman law (which is 
not allowed in most contemporary western legal systems) as different 
consequences are attached to the hibah: The property given by hibah 
could never be used to fulfil the claims of the deceased's creditars, 
even if the hibah was made with the aim to evade the creditars' 
claims. In Roman law, the property donated mortis causa could be 
held liable for certain claims of the donor's creditors (1909: 750 f.). 
46 For an overview see Pandecten V: nos. 1489 - 1532. 
47 This adat rule was in contrast to the regulations introduced by the 
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R.B.G. (Rechtsreglement voor de Buitengewesten 1875), art. 208 and 
216. According to these provisions, the harato pusako of a debtor's 
kaum could be held liable for debts if there was not sufficient 
harato pancaharian to satisfy them, see Der Kinderen 1875: 197, 199. 
In practice, however, adat prevailed. Dutch lawyers interoreted the 
provisions as "formal" law only, which could be apnlied only, if 
according to material law pusako could have been used to fulfil the 
creditor's claim. As the material law in this case was adat law, 
according to which this was not possible, the provision of the 
R.B.G. could not be apnlied in ~11nangkabau, ct". Guyt 1936: 57. The 
Dutch colonial courts followed this interoretation and did not en-
force the prOVlSlons, see LR Padang (1929) in T 133: 238, LR Solok 
(1932) in T 138: 480. 
48 But even if the kaum members of the debtor agree to the glvlng of 
harato pusako as security, the bank may run into serious trouhle if 
it tri es to sell the property in puhlic. In a CKL case, a bank had 
already twice tried to do 50, but without any result, and the pro-
perty was worked by the debtor's kamanakan in spite of the seizure. 
49 Conversely, the payment of another person's debts such as hospital 
bills etc. is of ten adduced as evidence as to who the heir of the de-
ceased is. This generally happens in cases where the legal status 
of the property, harato pancaharian or harato pusako, is disputed. 
These problems of evidence will be described by K. v. Benda-Beckmann. 
50 This differentiation is also made by Van Vollenhoven in another con-
text but he does not relate it to his concept ion of rechtsgemeen-
schap (1918: 252). 
51 In a later publication, Goody exnresses himself more cautiously: "In 
using the word 'corporate' to describe a group I do not even imply 
that its members hold equal rights in common pronerty" (1973: 26). 
In Death, Property and the Ancestors he did 50 explicitly. 
52 One of the few authors who make the distinction is Lloyd in his 
study of Yoruba nroperty law, in particular 1959: 29 ff. and 1965: 
170 ff. He distinguishes the "coroorate holding of the title" and 
the "entailment of self-acquired interests in property", which af ter 
the death of their creator cannot pass hy bequest or inheritance 
outside the group descended from the creator, or, on the extinction 
of this group, outside his own kin group (1959: 32). 
Derrett also warned of the "deceptive appearance of a merger of all 
assets into a common indistinguishable mass" (1965: 25). Moore has 
illustrated the importance of the distinction with respect to cattIe 
holding groups (1969: 390). 
53 Evers' statement could be excused if it had been based upon a 
rather undifferentiated description of ~1inangkabau property relation-
ships. But ironically enough, Evers just quotes Willinck, the author, 
who had "detected" this "new" form of property holding already in 
the beginning of this century. However, Evers rather misquotes Wil-
linck, when he writes: 
"Willinck (1909: 57) claims that harta pusaka or tanah ulayat can be 
owned either by a sub-clan (jurai) or an extended family (paruik). 
I did not come across any property that was effectively owned by a 
jurai in Padang" (1975: 88 FN 1). 
He did. For "the recent form of communal ownership" which he found 
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in Padang is nothing else than what Willinck had described as pusako 
held by a jUY'ai. How Evers came to impute that Willinck meant a 
"sub-clan" when writing about a jUY'ai, is incomprehensible to me, 
for Willinck is quite explicit in stating that he means a sub-branch 
of the paY'uik, when he speaks about the jUY'ai on p. 574 f. and p. 
782 f. Evers' p. 57 must be a typing error. 
54 This was very evident in a dispute about pusako- and buek rights 
which was brought to the KaY'apatan Adat NagaY'i of CKL in 1975. This 
case will be descrihed in the thesis of K. v. Benda-Beckmann. 
55 Firth (1974) discusses the use of the concept waY'is among the 
Kelantan Malays as a category of personal kin. Unfortunately, he 
does not consider inheritance among the "operational categories" 
(1974: 48 ff.), although "in general it is only consanguine links 
which entitle people to he included among someone's waY'is" (1974: 
38) and the system of inheritance is essentially between consanguinal 
kin relations based unon common des cent (1974: 34). His failure to 
consider inheritance may weIl be motivated by a subconscious ad-
diction to the temporal attitude towards iruleritance in western 
societies. 
56 On the consequences of the Y'iba-prohibition on the pagang gadai 
transactions see above p. 174. 
57 But like all kinds of property relationships, the eigendom, too, has 
never been unrestricted, and it therefore would be misleading to 
speak of it, as is sometimes done, as of an "absolute" or "complete" 
right. This is fully recognized hy Dutch lawyers (see Pitlo 1965: 
120, 1966: 296). 
58 Even this is subject to an exception, [or the Dutch legal culture 
has produced a "temporary eigendom" in the case where eigendom is 
transferred as security for a debt under the condition that it must 
be retransferred aft er the pay~ent of the debt (Pitlo 1965: 123 f.). 
59 In making the basic distinction along these lines, I [ollow the 
exposition of Pitlo (1965: 148 ff., 1966: 309 ff.). There is, how-
ever, no unanimity among Dutch legal experts as to the hasic cri-
teria according to which the vY'ije and gebonden mede-eigendom should 
be distinguished. The prevalent opinion makes the distinction ac-
cording to the possibility of division of the property. But this 
results in inconsistencies, as e.g. inherited property, though di-
visible, is always considered to he gebonden mede-eigendom (see 
Pitlo 1965: 149 H.). 
60 Except for the rules concerning inheritance, art. 1112 ff. B.W., 
there are no more rules in the B.W. that regulate the form and con-
sequences of mede-eigendom. If mede-eigendom is mentioned elsewhere 
in the Civil Code, one is referred to the inheritance provisions. 
The rules described in the text have been elaborated by the legal 
experts and the courts. Cf. Pitlo 1966: 310 ff. 
61 It is estimated that only about 10% of all married couples make such 
contractual agreements (Pitlo 1966: 272, Klaassen, Eggens and 
Luijten 1973: 130.). 
62 See Pitlo 1966: 271 ff., Klaassen, Eggens, and Luijten 1973: 88. 
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The law of marital property has undergone several changes in the 
recent past. Until 1957, the married woman was not entitled to dis-
pose of marital property without her husband's consent. In 1957 this 
was changed. The new form of marital property was only created in 
1969 (S. 1969: 257). 
63 See arts. 880 and 1002 B.W. The continuation of the holder's capa-
ci ty occurs through law. This principle is called saisine. "Le mort 
saisit Ze vif". In Germanic law, saisine only governed the inheri-
tance of property relationships by blood relatives, the legal heirs. 
Roman law considered legal heirs and heirs by testament on an equal 
basis. This principle has been adopted into most continental European 
legal systems. 
Inheritance is restricted to property relationships. Personal 
relationships and public status-relationships are discontinued with 
the death of their holder (cf. Pitlo 1966: 423 ff.). 
64 In addition, there is a class of persons who may not inherit at all 
as testamentary heirs, like guardians, priests, doctors, or notaries 
who stood in a professional relationship with the deceased, arts. 
951, 953, 954 B.W. This principle is also extended to donations 
inter vivos , art. 1718 B.W. Until 1969, second wives and recognized 
natural children could only inherit a limited portion of the heri-
tage by testament, arts. 949, 955 B.W. 
65 The legitimate portion is generally taken to be a right to a frac-
tion of the property objects and not of i ts value (Pi tlo 1966: 448). 
In art. 972 B.W. it is explicitly stated with respect to immovable 
property tha t i t mus t be gi ven back in natura if i t is required to 
fill up the legitimate portion. 
66 In German law, for instance, such retroactive invalidation of gifts 
can only be claimed with respect to donations made during the last 
ten years of the property holder's lifetime, art. 2325 BGB. 
67 " ... dat, bij eigendoms-overgang van het geheel of van een gedeel-
te van eenig onroerend goed, toebehoorende aan een lid der oor-
spronkelijke bevolking van Sumatra's Westkust, en waarvan een wet-
tig eigendomsbewijs opgemaakt is, de bewijzen, welke tengevolge 
van erfenis, boedelscheiding als anderzins mogten vereischt worden, 
door de eerste plaatselijke autoriteit zullen worden verleend, na 
vooraf te hebben ingewonnen het advies van de bevoegde regenten, 
soekoe- en familiehoofden". 
68 The Domain-Declaration (Domeinverklaring) was contained in the 
Agrarian Decree (Agrarisch Besluit) of 1870 (S. 1870: 118. Cf. 
Gautama and Hornick 1972: 80). 
69 Art. 1 is reprinted in Logemann and Ter Haar 1927: 106: 
"Alle woeste gronden in de gouvernementslanden op Sumatra behooren, 
voor zoover daarop door leden der inheemsche bevolking geen aan het 
ontginningsregt ontleende regten worden uitgeoefend, tot het Staats-
domein. OVer die tot het Staatsdomein behoo~nde gronden berust, 
behoudens het ontginningsregt der bevolking, de beschikking uit-
sluitend bij het Gouvernement." 
70 The provisions of the Domain-Declaration created a state of con-
siderable legal uncertainty. The concept eigendom was not further 
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defined and permitted several interpretations. Van Vollenhoven noted 
that four different interpretations were held by the colonial admi-
nistration. These ranged from the opinion that all land except 
civil code eigendom [elI under the domain of the State to the view 
that all rights according to adat had to be subsumed under eigendom 
(1919: 53 f.). The position taken on Java was that all land which 
was held according to adat law feIl under the domain, except for the 
land which had been converted into agrarisch eigendom (cf. Gautama 
and Hornick 1972: 80 f.). In the areas outside Java and Madura the 
situation was even less clear, as separate Domain-Declarations had 
been issued, and it was uncertain to what degree the 1870-decla-
ration applied to these areas at all (see Van Vollenhoven 1919: 54). 
71 Sec also the opinion of the D'irecteur van Justitie in his letter of 
8.12.1903 to the Governor o[ the West Coast (AB 11: 74 ff.). 
72 The mort gages on European land [ollowed the Dutch 13w about the 
hypotheek as laid down in Book 2 B.W. In 1908, the system of forced 
cultivation had been abolished, and the system o[ taxation been 
introduced. The creation of mortgages on Indonesian land thus was 
no coincidence. 
73 On the Basic Agrarian Law see Gautama and Harsono 1972, Harsono 
1973 with the texts of all laws and further regulations, Gautama 
and llornick 1972, Tan 1977. 
74 TI1e conversion-provisions were contained in the Peraturan Menteri 
Agraria no. 2 of 1960. 
75 Section 7 of law 56 of 1960 had been devised to meet the situation 
on Java. On Java, rich people of ten pawned property from poor people. 
The poor were generally not able to repay the uang tebusan, and the 
pawning therefore of ten amounted to a de facto permanent alienation: 
The pawner, once [orced to pawn his property in need of cash, pawned 
hi s property to the rich who had i t worked by wage labour. Once the 
cash had been spent, the original holders were usually not in the 
position to redeem their land. 
Section 7 represents an attempt to put a stop to these practices. 
In Minangkabau, however, the si tuation is generally different. 
Pawned land is usually taken by people who do not have enough pro-
perty of their own for subsistence farming. The pawners are usually 
persons (or kaum) who have sufficient harato pusako and who can af-
ford to give away some of it without losing their own subsistence 
basis. If section 7 had been applied in Minangkabau, this would have 
meant th at the poor were even deprived of the money which they had 
invested in the rich man's property. 
In 1964, Land Reform Courts(Pengadilan Landreform) had been esta-
blished by law no. 21 of 1964 to deal with conflicts arising out of 
the implementation of the Basic Agrarian Law. They did not function 
weIl and were officially abolished again in 1970 (law no. 11 of 
1970) . 
76 The new marriage law severely inhibits polygamy. The consent of the 
first wife is necessary if the husband wants to marry a second wife. 
This consent must be in writing and be given before the court. The 
husband must also prove that he is economically able to support more 
than one wife. 
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NOTES TO GlAPTER F lVE 
I do not share the view that the "typicality" of extended cases is 
irrelevant (Mitchell 1964: XIII). The functional value of a part i-
cular fonn of problem-solving human behaviour cannot be detennined 
by its relation to the structural regularities. It only becomes 
clear through the comparison of the frequency of its incidence with 
the other forms of behaviour aimed at solving the same problem. 
2 I have changed the names and titles of the CKL-villagers who appear 
as actors in the following stories. 
3 Contrary to Tanner's statement (1971: 286), cases over Bako are 
sometimes taken to the State Courts in Minangkabau. In the years 
1969-1974, 5 cases involving the right to the Bako were brought 
before the PN Batu Sangkar. But such cases are rarely finally 
decided in court. Since 1960, the question of whether the State 
Courts may entertain a suit over Bako at all cannot be answered 
clearly. The PT Medan, in the appeal decision quoted in this story, 
denied the jurisdiction of State Courts in Bako matters. However, 
not all contemporary State Courts keep to this decision (or do not 
know about it). In case 1 of 1970 of the PN Batu Sangkar, for in-
stance, the jurisdiction of the court in Bako matters was acknow-
ledged. 
The three judgements from which I have extracted the events are 
1. the judgement of the Rapat of the Tungku LaraB of IX Kota of 
5.5.1910, 2. case 28 of 1951 of the PN Solok, and 3. case 213 of 
1960 of the PT Medan. Some additional infonnation was given by the 
younger brother of the present Dt. B. 
4 The document, comprising 84 pages with entries from 1873 - 1897, 
was written in Malayan letters. Af ter the PN's judgement, the docu-
ment was kept in the court records. The chainnan of the PN allowed 
us to make photocopies of the documents, and we had all entries 
transcribed into Indonesian. For a partial analysis of the entries 
see p. 288 f. 
5 A very similar decision was given in case 34 of 1973 which concerned 
the property of the plaintiff's father's brother, who also had been 
a trader in Medan. 
6 This influence of Islamic law is also apparent in the decisions of 
the 1952-conference on Minangkabau inheritance law. It was declared 
that testators should be obliged to give 1/3 of their "pure" 
harato pancaharian by testament to their kamanakan (see Chapter 6: 
325) . 
7 One of the greatest deficiencies of the report, as already Evers 
has noted (1975: 99), is the fact that the sex of the testators 
has not been given. The sex ratio among the recipients is 52.2% 
for females and 47.8% for males (1971: 16). Given a speculative 
ratio of 50:50 % among the testators, the significance of the data 
as indicators of social change and change in the inheritance law 
would have to be altered. With respect to the overall result, it 
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would mean that the 202 cases of inheritance by the kamanakan and 
the 149 cases of hibah to the kamanakan would be drawn from only 
50% of all cases, as only men have kamanakan. The significance of 
these data should therefore be doubted. If one wants to interpret 
the data in terms of lineality, as Sa'danoer does, half of the 
cases of inheritance and hibah to the children would be quite in 
accordance with matrilineality, as stemming from female testatorsl 
donors. 
Another deficiency of the report is that it has not been mentioned 
(asked) in which network of interpersonal relationships the testators 
lived. For if a person had had no children, it would be quite in 
accordance with adat that the pancaharian would pass to the kamana-
kan. 
In addition it is not mentioned whether the property received 
by the respondents was the total or only a part of the testators' 
pancaharian, and whether he or she was the only recipient of the 
property. 
8 In the case of land we would like to know, of course, whether it 
was a residual or a provisional relationship which was transferred, 
taking into account that Minangkabau villagers usually refer to the 
land which they have pawned as to "my pancaharian". 
9 See note 7. 
10 Only if this is known,one can understand some highly contradictory 
reports on Minangkabau landholding. In 1928, Schrieke reported that 
in the area of Solok "all the family land has been done away wi th 
and has been transformedinto self-earned land as a consequence of 
pledging" (1955: 110). 25 years later, Prins repudiated this state-
ment, drawing attention to recent research which had shown that 
most property in this area still was harato pusako (AB 41: 392 ff.). 
Prins correctly commented that the use-rights could be regarded as 
falling among the harato pancaharian but that this did not affect 
the pusako status of the land to which the use-rights pertained 
(1954: 52). 
11 1 have mapped this area without the help of geode tic instruments 
on the basis of an older Dutch military map which gives the exact 
location of the roads and paths. The borders between the rice-
fields are given correctly, but the exact measures and sizes of the 
fields are approximations only. The many hours spent on the fields 
offered ample opportunities to talk with the farming villagers, and 
I have collected much information on their property relationships 
during these casual conversations. Additional information was given 
by an informant living in this area and by some panghuZu with whom 
I made a systematic check of the kinds of property relationships 
pertaining to the land which I had mapped. Unfortunately, the in-
format ion which I could collect during our stay in CKL was not suf-
ficient for a systematic reconstruction of the property history of 
the whole area. 
12 Compare Bohannan on "The Impact of Money on an Mrican Subsistence 
Economy" (1967 b), in particular pp.123 H., 133. There is astrong 
parallel between the impact of "all-purpose money" on the relation-
ships to women among the Tiv and the relationships to harato pusako 
among the Minangkabau, which cannot, however, be explored systematic-
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ally in this study. 
13 Thomas (pers. communication) reported several cases of this kind to 
me. 
14 For similar arguments wi th respect to Minangkabau see Fischer 1964: 
103. For matrilineal societies in general compare Fortes 1957: 183. 
15 De Josselin de Jong cites this argument as evidence against the 
patrilateral CCM in early Minangkabau social organization (1951: 
62), a necessary corollary to his hypothesis of prescriptive matri-
lateral C~1. But I would think that in early Minangkabau the wishes 
of the young spouses would be much less taken into account than in 
contemporary Minangkabau. 
16 Firth therefore should rather apply another of his remarks on Soviet 
anthropologists to Maretin's analysis, namely "that nowhere is the 
distortion of observations by evolutionary hypotheses so marked as 
in the works of Soviet ethnographers in the sphere of kinship, where 
the hunt for 'survivals' has concentrated attention ... on unusual, 
sporadic deviations of custom" (1965: 362 FN 2). 
17 I must report one exception from the Religious Court in Bukit 
Tinggi. In an uncontested case, !wo sisters demanded that the court 
confirm their status of heirs in accordance with hukum fa~aidh 
(case 82 of 1974). 
18 These oplnlons were voiced during an interview session with several 
panghulu in nagapi 111 Balai. See also R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 
58. 
19 These data are based upon our research of the court records of the 
PN Bukit Tinggi and Payakumbuh from 1968-1974, and of PN Batu 
Sangkar from 1969-1974. The percentage of disputes concerning 
pusako property probably is even higher. I have only considered 
those disputes where pusako is explicitly mentioned in the records. 
A more systematic differentiation of the courts' case load will 
be given by K. von Benda-Beckmann. 
20 Several instances of such cases will be described by K. von Benda-
Beckmann. 
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Like in the proceedings of the LR Padang, T 140: 273 ff. 
2 See Lev 1962 on the development of adat inheritance law in the 
Mahkamah Agung. 
3 The!wo judgements and the documents relating to them are recorded 
in the Dutch National Archives in Schaarsbergen, File no. 4/23/ 
1862 no. 9. 
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4 Letter of 24.8.1861: " ... dat de gY'onden niet vallen ondeY' de ma-
leische instellingen of het maleisch eY'fY'egt, maaY' dat de eigening 
daaY'van indeY'daad volgens het EUY'opeesch Y'egt heeft plaats gevonden 
en de hoofden, ten aanzien wieY' oveY'staan die eigening heeft plaats 
gevonden, daaY'mede hebben ingestemd . 
... neemt men dit als waaY'heid aan, ... , dan heeft ook een lid deY' 
oOY'spY'onkelijke bevolking van SumatY'a's Westkust volkomen het Y'egt 
om naaY' veY'kiezing oveY' dien gY'ond te beschikken en gaan zijne 
Y'egten onveY'andeY'd op de volgende bezitteY's, wie die ook zijn, oveY', 
teY'Wijl alleen bij afsteY'ven ab intestato de maleische eY'fopvolging 
dient in acht genomen te wOY'den." 
5 The DiY'ecteuY' van Middelen en Domeinen (in his letter of 1.9.1860) 
and the PY'ocuY'euY' GeneY'al (in his letter of 20.11.1861) bath held 
that an annulment of the judgements was out of the question, as 
such measure would be contrary to the principles of the admini-
stration (" ... het bevel tot schoY'ting van het vonnis ... is te 
zeeY' in stY'ijd met de bestaande Y'egeY'ingsbeginselen dan dat de 
Y'egeY'ing dat beve l zoude kunnen goedkeuY'en"). The PY'ocuY'euY' GeneY'al 
further advocated that the regulation should not be changed: "It 
seems advisable in my opinion not to regulate toa much in these 
matters where conflicts with the customs of the population can sa 
easilyarise" (letter of 20.11.1861). The regulation was, however, 
changed by the Gavernor General in a decree of 15.2.1862. In the 
reasans given for the amendment it was stated that it was neither 
the aim of art. 2 of the aId regulation nor of the Government's 
policy to subject all transactions over pusako-eigendom to the 
consent of the administrative authorities, but that this rule should 
only apply to intestate inheritance. 
6 Letter of 20.11.1861: 11 ••• het kan wel niet twijfelachtig z&Jn, 
dat, daaY' paY'tijen in den eigendom wOY'den bevestigd dooY' een 
EUY'opeesch ambtenaaY' naaY' de EUY'opeesche wetten, en dit eigendoms-
Y'egt eene zuiveY' EUY'opeesche instelling is, de gevolgen aan het-
zelve veY'bonden naaY' de EUY'opeesche wetgeving moeten beooY'deeld 
wOY'den ... 
De LandY'aad te padang heeft tY'ouwens mindeY' gedwaald in de toe-
passing van de Y'egten aan den eigendom van den gY'ond ontleend, als 
wel in de toepassing van het Maleische veY'steY'fY'egt, waaY'van die 
Y'egtbank eene zoo uitgebY'eide weY'king heeft toegekend, dat elke 
andeY'e eigendomsoveY'gang op gY'ond van het veY'steY'fY'egt zoude nietig 
zijn." 
7 Thomas reports the same from nagaY'i Gurun (personal communication). 
8 On the relation between adat and Islam in Minangkabau cf. Taufik 
Abdullah 1966, 1971, 1972; Prins 1953, 1954; HAMKA 1946; Lev 1972 
a, 1972 b for an excellent account of the role of Islamic law and 
Islamic courts in Indonesia in general; Dobbin 1977. 
9 The Ithna Ashari school is a Shi'ite Islamic school. The Shi'ites 
are the followers of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-Iaw, who regard Ali 
as the only legitimate successar of Mohammed, whereas the Sunnites 
recognize the caliphs, see Fyzee 1955: 28 ff. On the legal rules 
of this school see Fyzee 1955: 379 ff. 
Already Verkerk Pistorius reported that the descendants of farmer 
slaves were called "kemanakan áengan sabab" (1868: 437). The con-
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temporary classification of heirs is made in I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 
1974: 39 ff. In CKL, it was given by one adat expert. Note that 
I.H. Dt. Rajo Panghulu had held adat lectures at the Islamic second-
ary school of CKL some years ago. 
10 See the description of the sidang system in CKL earlier in this study. 
In Lubuk Sikaping, the nagari government was formed by the Besar 
nan IX, the "9 Great Ones", who consisted of the Datuek nan V and 
the Tuangku nan IV, see AB 39: 213. Cf. Dobbin 1975, 1977. 
11 This resulted, however, in the institutional emancipation of Islam. 
The Islamic functionaries have since then stood outside the adat 
system. The role of the religious suku functionaries decreased and 
the importance of the Islamic functionaries acting as Mosque per-
sonnel and religious teachers outside the adat system has steadily 
increased. 
12 See HAMKA 1946: 15 f., Taufik Abdullah 1972: 203. Achmad Chatib had 
made the pilgrimage as a boy of 15. He later became one of the most 
mfluential Islamic teachers in Cairo. He refused to return to Mi-
nangkabau unless its pagan institutions had been abolished. 
13 For an excellent account of the local poli tics between the adat-
and Islamic pressure groups in the first half of this century see 
Taufik Abdullah 1971, 1972. 
14 On the 1952-conference see Prins 1953, Tanner 1969: 65. The com-
mittee's proposals were published on 20.1.1952, see Prins 1953: 323. 
The 1968-conference is weIl documented. All papers given at and 
the conclusions taken by the conference are given in full in Naim 
(ed.) 1968. 
15 As Prins already noted there we re several ambiguities in the pro-
posals made in 1952: The position of female property holders was 
not considered at all and no mention was made of harato suarang. 
It also was not stated what "the property derived from the pusako 
in accordance with syarak" might mean (see Prins 1953: 323 f.). 
16 For a good overview of the Dutch literature see Pandecten V: nos. 
1489 - 1532. 
17 See Pandecten V: nos. 1489-1532. On the difference between "know-
Iedge" and "consent" see Chapter 4: 191 ff. 
18 For a similar decision referring to the coastal town of Pariaman, 
see LR Lubuk Begalung (1905) in AB 6: 259. 
19 For the period following the war and Indonesia's independence no 
published judgements have been found. 
20 "Overwegende, dat echter de Raad zich vereenigende met de uitkomsten 
van het deskundigen onderzoek en de motieven en conclusien van dat 
rapport overnemend en tot de zijne makend van oordeel is, dat 
eischers de eenige rechthebbenden op de nalatenschap van dr. Muchtal 
dus op meerbedoelde geldsom (zouden) zijn (de pancaharian), ware 
het niet ... dat deze bij beschikking ... deze geheele nalatenschap 
op wettige wijze aan zijn kinderen ... had vermaakt" (T 131: 85). 
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The Supreme Court in its appeal judgement left this question 
open because it did not consider it relevant to the dispute: " ... 
daargelaten of deze wijziging zich reeds zoverre heeft voltrokken, 
dat aan de kinderen een erfrecht bij versterf ten aanzien van het 
geheel of een gedeelte van de harta pancaharian van hun vader toe-
komt ... " (T 1 31: 91). 
21 "Mijn conclusie is deze: Naar het adatrecht der Minangkabausche 
maatschappij zijn de gelden ... door hem persoonlijk gewonnen goed 
(hart a pentjarianJ, vallen als zodanig in zijn nalatenschap en 
zouden daarmee vererven op den heer M. (the mamak kelala waris of 
dr. Muchtar's kaum, v.B.B.) ware het niet dat dr. Muchtar ... op 
wettige wijze aan zijn kinderen had vermaakt" (T 131: 96). Carpen-
tier Alting stated: "Van een uit eigen hoofde aan de kinderen toe-
komend erfrecht is echter geen sprake" - "That the children have a 
right of inheritance is out of the question" (T 131: 102). 
22 Case 11 of 1964 PN Padang Panjang: 
+A • B Q C ? 
Ó Dl D26 Ó P1 P2Ó ÓP3 P4Ó 
A had died in 1960. In 1959 he had given his narta pancaharian worth 
1.5 Mill. rupiah by way of hibah to his 4 children and his 2 kama-
nakan. Af ter his death, the children of his predeceased wife B had 
taken all the property and refused to share it with the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs claimed 4/6 of the property, whereas the defendants 
stated that all the property had been common property of A and B, 
and th at A therefore had had no right to dispose of it by hibah. 
The court gave the following ruling: As far as the harta pan-
caharian are concerned the respective rights of husband and wife 
are to ! each. As B was predeceased, her ! feIl to her children, 
the defendants. The hibah was valid only in as far as the husband 
could dispose of his ~ of the pancaharian. All the parties there-
fore were entitled to 1/12 of that property (to 1/6 of the father's 
suarang part). Thus the court accepts as self-evident the principle 
that only the children of the marriage in which the property was 
acquired are entitled to the inheritance. 
23 "Menimbang, bahwa dari kenyataan yang hidup dalam masyaY'akat Minang-
kabau sekarang bahwa orang2 yang berpolygamie pada masing2 isteri 
sudah terbentuk unit2 kekayaan pada masing2 Y'umah tangga maka sudah 
selanyaknya anak2 yang lahir dalam peY'kawinan polygamie itu tidak 
berhak terhadap unit2 kekayaan lain diperoleh dalam perkawinan." 
24 " ... bahwa tidak jaranglah teY'jadi di Minangkabau suata haY'ta yang 
bersal dari harta pancaharian yang te rang dan nyata menuY'Ut per-
kembangannya sudah menjadi hak milik pribadi dari seoY'ang anggota 
kaum, dapat dihibahkan atau diberikannya kepada anak2nya sendiri, 
yang akan tetapi dalam hal demikian pengetahuan dan penyaksian 
kemanakan2 yang patut didalam kaum yang akan menghibahkan atau pem-
beri dan demikian pula sebaliknya daY'i pihak sipenerima diperlukan 
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juga adanya untuk mencegah ganggu gugatan dikemudian haY'i." 
25 "QZeh kaY'ena sebagai haY'ta pancahaY'ian daY'i pada SiY'ing, mak a menu-
Y'ut hukum adat Minangkabau teZah mengaZami peY'kembangan sekaY'ang 
ini, dengan meninggaZnya SiY'ing haY'ta itu dituY'Unkan kepada anaknya 
sah dit. sa tu kata Dt. S sebagai satu2nya ahZi waY'is; 
... bahwa peY'kembangan hukum adat dimaksud adaZah paY'aZeZ dengan 
peY'kembangan yang teY'jadi daZam susunan (stY'uktuY') kemasyaY'akatan 
oY'ang Minangkabau yang teZah beY'jaZan sejak masa sebeZum kemeY'de-
kaan dan masih beY'jaZan teY'us sampai sekaY'ang ini, yaitu semakin 
kokoknya ikatan keZuaY'ga yang unsuY'2nya teY'diY'i daY'i suami, isteY'i 
dan anak2nya, disamping semakin Zemahnya ikatan kaum yang membawa 
akibat puZa pada pemisahan yang semakin tajam antaY'a haY'ta pan ca-
haY'ian sebagai kekayaan daZam keZuaY'ga, dan haY'ta pusaka sebagai 
miZik atau kekayaan kaum; 
..• (PT) beY'pendapat, bahwa haY'ta pancahaY'ian seseoY'ang hanyaZah 
mungkin dituY'unkan menjadi haY'ta pusaka daZam kaum, manakaZa haZ 
itu secaY'a khusus memang sudah menjadi kehendak daY'i yang beY'sang-
kutan sendiY'i, yaitu manakaZa dapat dibuktikan secaY'a nyata bahwa 
oZeh sipemiZiknya haY'ta teY'sebut sudah dipeY'untukkan sebagai pusaka 
daZam kaum, bukan untuk diwaY'iskan kepada anak2 sebagaimana haY'us-
nya." 
26 "KaZuak paku kacang baZimbiang - Pucueknyo Zenggang-Zenggankan -
Dibao ka SaY'uaso - Anak dipangku k.amanakan dibimbiang - UY'ang 
kampuang patenggankan - Jago nagaY'i jan binaso" (see Nasroen 1957: 
176). The saying is, by the way, quoted by Dt. Rajo Panghulu in the 
same publication without the additions (1973: 195). It is sympto-
matic that I.H. Dt. Rajo panghulu, though undoubtedly recognized 
as one of the leading contemporary adat experts, is generally 
counted among the proponents of an Islamic adat. The additions in-
corporated into the adat saying serve to legitimate the inheritance 
of haY'ato pancahaY'ian by the children "in accordance with Islamic 
law and adat". The same new version was given during one interview 
with adat experts in nagaY'i Simabur. It is my assumption that the 
interviewee had got hold of the new vers ion from the book or from 
the author himself: Both persons were leading mernbers of the LKAAM. 
27 So already Wilken in 1883: "De haY'ta pancahaY'ian is, geZijk van 
zeZf spY'eekt, 1:ndividueeZ eigendom" (1926: 54). 
28 See Smits and Van Bosse as quoted by Willinck 1909: 770 f.; AB 1: 
87; AB 10: 15, 160. Even Van Vollenhoven (1918: 262 f.) ,and follow-
ing him, Joustra (1923: 114) subscribed to this view. 
29 According to contemporary Dutch law, the division can be deferred 
maximally for 5 years. In German law, the maximal period is 30 
years. 
30 It should be noted, that the haY'ato pusako complex was also defined 
in this differential way in the proposals of the 1968-conference 
on Mînangkabau inheritance law: Neither the mamak nor the kamana-
kan are the "owners" , pemiZik, of the haY'ato pusako (Naim (ed.) 
1968: 243). 
31 According to a manuscript on "Pusako Tinggi", wri tten by R.M. Dt. 
Rajo panghulu for the author in 1974. 
428 PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTlNUITY 
NOTES TO rnAPTER SEVEN 
Camp are Rattray (1929:20) and Fortes (1950: 272) on the Ashanti, 
Malinowski (1927: 80 f.) on the Trobriand Islanders, Goody (1962: 
429 ff.) on the LoDagaa. 
2 Cf. Taufik Abdullah 1971: 6 f. For the view, that the imposition of 
Dutch colonial rule did on the whole not have a deleterious effect 
on the position of the panghulu, see Kahn 1976: 85 ff. 
3 See rny comments on the "increase of patrilineal inheritance" (p. 
327) and on the "increase of patrilateral cross-cousin marriages 
as signifying the change from matrilineality to patrilineality" 
(p. 300). 
4 We had a similar experience during an interview session with several 
panghulu in nagari III Balai. All panghulu insisted that there had 
been na change at all in the adat of inheritance. This was quite a 
surprise in the light of what we had read and heard about Minang-
kabau inheritance law elsewhere. My explanation for this attitude 
is, that the inheritance of harato pancaharian is to be legitimated 
by adat at all casts. If the Islamic leaders proclaim a change of 
inheritance law "from the kamanakan to the children" due to the in-
fluence of Islamic law, the best way to counter this argument is by 
denying that there hasbeen any change at all. 
5 It should be noted, that de Josselin de Jong in a later publication 
treats the childrens' inheritance of their father's harato panca-
harian as a manifestation of patrifiliation (1964: 189) and not 
anymore as a patrilineal mode of inheritance (1951: 85). 
6 See Tuden 1969 on the importance of the chibuwe-cattle among the 
Ila; cf. Gulliver 1955 and Krige 1964. 
7 The locus classicus is Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 192. For crltlques of 
this assumption Van Velsen 1964: XXIII ff., 1967: 129 ff.; Boisse-
va in 1974: 9 ff. 
8 The concept "extended case-method" goes back to Gluckman 1961. The 
concept of "situational analysis" was developed by Van Velsen 1964 
and 1967. The use of the concept "network" goes back to Barnes 
(1954) and Bott (1957). For an overview of the development of net-
work analysis see Mitchell 1969. Turner (1957: 91 ff.) developed 
the notion of the "social drama" and speaks of "processual ana-
lysis" (1968: XXVI) or "diachronic micro-sociology" (1957: 328). 
9 I may be wrong in rny interpretation, but Leach's way of expressing 
himself is at least ambiguaus. Bloch seems to share this view, al-
though it is related to his own assumptions, when he writes: 
"While Leach talks of property as through it equalled the mode of 
production, I see it here as already part of the superstructure. 
For me, property in these systems is already 'talking about' pro-
duction and indeed misrepresenting it. The link between property 
and kinship is beween wo aspects of the supeY'structure" (1975: 211, 







- nan diadatkan 
- pusako 
- nan sabana adat 
- nan taadat (yang teradat) 
adatrecht (D.) 
adiek (adik) 











'ariya (151. law) 
'asabat (151. law) 
'ayn (Islo law) 
bagi (membagi) 
bagi bauntuek (bagi beruntuk) 
GLOSSARY 
accrual 
tradition, custom, law, morality, poli-
tical system, legal system 
adat which is in accordance with Islam 
general, ceremonial adat 
the heathen or pagan adat, adat inconsis-
tent with Islam 
the adat of the nephews and nieces, 
the matrilineal system 
adat which has been made adat (through 
council decision) 
the adat of matrilineal heritage, the 
matrilineal system 
adat which is truly adat, natural law, 
divine law 
adat which has developed into adat 
adat law 
younger sibling 
the heirs, the group members 
world, nature 





the nephews and nieces, members of a 
matrilineal kin group 
functionary of the hindu adat 
child(ren) of the male members of one's 
matrilineal kin group 
Islamic functionary, adviser to the pang-
hulu, honorific title, respectful form 
of address for older men 
donation of pro fits 
agnates 
the substance of property objects 
divide, split 
distribution of the use-rights to the 
harato pusako 




























caradiek (cerdikJ pandai 
Chatib 













a child's father's matrilineal descent 
group 
matrilineally related kinship group in a 
different nagari 
father, address for older mal es 
the Great Ones of the Four Council Halls; 




related in terms of adat 
related through gold 
related through good social relationships 
related through blood 
balanced exchange, sibling exchange in 
marriage 
sale 
common right of control and disposition 
decision theory 
sleeping-room in the family house 
wife 
mother, address for older women 
blood relatives 
one of the two Zareh and adat systerns 
with an egalitarian and democratic tra-
dition 
matrilineal des cent group under a pang-
huZu (in CKL) 
group of related buah gadang (in CKL); 
matrilineal des cent group 




District Head, Head of a Kabupaten 
sub-District Head, head of a Kecamatan 
the "intellectuals" 
religious adat functionary, title of re-
ligious adat functionary 
the "streak of lines", the property con-
stitution 
rneasure made of bamboo, standard 
the new standard 
the original standard 
system of forced cultivation 
close, near 
sibling(s) 
the received property of a female 
the nucleus of the Minangkabau world, 
forrned by the three Zuhak Tanah Datar, 
Agam, and 50 Koto 
(a title) is put aside 
(persons) are accepted as heirs 
district court 
adat functionary, military and police 






farc! (151. law) 
fatwa (151. law) 










Gesamthandseigentum (G. law) 











- pusako rendah 










'ij"äh (151. law) 
ijmä' (151. law) 
'iZm w;üZ (151. law) 
imam (151. law) 





family, matrilineal kinship group 
inheritance (law) 
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inheritance portion; prescribed religious 
injunctions 
explanation(s) of law given by religious 
experts 
intelligence, Islamic jurisprudence 
pawn, pledge 
the greatness rotates, system of title-




title which is part of the pusako 
the title(s) of higher adat functionaries 
the handful for use, use-right to the 
harato pusako 
to replace the mat, reference to sororate 
and levirate 
common ownership 
traditions of the Prophet 
right 
arbitrator, village judge 
ownership 
forbidden 
property objects (material) 
common property 
property a wife brings into marriage 
self-acquired property 
property a husband brings into marriage 
inherited property 
"Iow" inherited property 
"high" inherited property 
common marital property 
donation, gift 
Mohammed's migration from Mekkah to 
Medina in 622 A.D. 
association of matrilineal descent groups 
based upon political arrangements 
law 
adat law 




the consensus of the learned 
the science of the four sources of law 
head of a school of Islamic law; title 
of religious functionary 







jä'iz (151. law) 
jaminan 
jorong 
jua bali (jual beli) 
juaro adat 
jurai 




- dibCliJ)a dada 
- dib(]);)a lutuik 









keturunan garis ibu 
kiasan 






lareh (nan duo) 
legaat (D.) 
legitimaris (sen) (D.) 
locieh 
lukak (nan tigo) 
Mahkamah Agung 
makrflh (Islo law) 
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mother 
the bako of the bako 
sibling in-law 
wife 
indifferent, na value judgement expressed 




adat champion, functionary of the hindu 
adat 
matrilineal des cent group 
acceptance (of an offer) 
district 
older sibling 
sister's child(ren); members of a matri-
lineal des cent group 
sister's children below the breast, 
adopted group members 
sister's children below the chin, blood 
relatives 
sister's children below the knee, descen-
dants of slaves 
sister's children below the stomach, des-
cendants of strangers 
settIement cluster (in CKL), matrilineage, 
matriclan 
matrilineal des cent group, subunit of a 
buah gadang (in CKL) 
world, rule, decision 
"round" decision, meeting in which a 





descent in the mother's line 
allusion 
to transfer the pawning 
settIement center, fortification 
one of the two lareh, the one wi th the 
more autocratic tradition 
dry field, garden 
male 
the original official nagari territory 




5 1 ave 5 
(the three) districts, the nucleus of the 
Mïnangkabau world 
Supreme Court 
not advised, one should abstain from 
maZakok 
mäZ (151. law) 








manàub (151. law) 









































to associate with a descent group 
ownership, property 
owner 
religious adat functionary 
shame, ashamed 
mother's brother, group head 
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the mamak who is the head of the heirs, 
kaum head 
the kaum head 
the head of a family house, mamak kaum 
adat saying 
advised, positively looked upon 
to take profi t 
to accept as group members 





to redeem (pawnings) 
to take cognizance 
to cut the hair loek 
to deepen (the pawning) 





common deliberation process aiming at a 
unanimous decision 
village state, village 
marriage 
grandparent, honorific title, polite form 
of address for old men 




expert, clever, knowing 
adat functionary, head of a buah gadang 
(in CKL) 
adat functionary, aide to the panghuZu 
division (of property) 
donation of property 
wife, female 
rice pot, the people who eat together 
womb, matrilineal descent group 
ceremonial rhetoric 





State Appeal Court 









pulang ka anak mamak 








qiyas (151. law) 
l'abb (151. law) 





l'ibä (151. law) 


















selama hidup anak 





sunna (151. law) 
surat 
- gadai 




ceremonial adat recital 
adat saying 
debts outs tanding 
to return to the child of one's mamak, 
marry one' 5 MBD 
to return to the bako, marry one's FZCh 
extinct (of a matrilineal descent group) 
heritage 
the pusako allotted to a female lineage 
member for her conjugal household 
inherited property 
immaterial heritage 
the pusako allotted to a male lineage 
member for his conjugal household 
extinct (of a matrilineal descent group) 










family long house 
rupiah (Ind. currency) 
gold rupiah 
of one, wi th common 
one fathom, from fingertip to fingertip 
being offended together 
with the consent 
one finger ('5 length) 
unanimous decision 
the titles of adat functionaries 
being ashamed together 
pawning 
sharing one graveyard 
the breadth of one hand 
with the knawledge 
irrigated rice-field 




matriclan, administrative unit composed 
of several (related or unrelated) matri-
lineal des cent groups 
measure for harvested rice, ca. 31 kg. 
























thaZak (151. law) 
thaZak takZik 
Tuangku 


























letter giving power of authority 




the mine of adat, chairman of the KAN 
spade, dug up with a spade 
(property) acquired with gold 
(property) acquired with the iron hoe 
(property) given by donation 
(property) dug up from the tree stumps, 
the land cultivated by the ancestors 
legend, folk history 
land 
colonial land 
land won in war 
no-man's land between adjacent nagari 
uncultivated nagari territory 
sign, object given as evidence or acknow-
ledgement of one's intentions or one's 
guilt 




the suspended divorce 
lord, title of religious functionaries 
head of a Zaras (district) 
large rice-fields, a cluster of rice-
fields 
head of the group living in a rumah gadang, 
kawn head 
old, elder 
continually descending (in the matriline) 
money 
the pawning sum 
the redemption sum 
elder brother 
uncultivated nagari area 




strangers, descendants of strangers 
husband(s) of one's female lineage mem-
bers 
the original people, the first settlers 
debts 
usufruct 
property in the dead hand 
guardian 
adat guardian, the mamak 
guardian in Islamic law, the father 
village mayor 
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warih (waris) heir(s), group members 
warith (Isl. law) heirs 
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